Tariffs and trade barriers
190 of 521 companies added a paragraph in Risk Factors that uses one of these words:
tariff, tariffs, trade war, import duties, customs duties, export controls.
The paragraph is in the latest 10-K and nothing like it was in the one before.
It counts text; it does not say how serious a risk is. Words in capitals only (such as AI) must be in capitals.
By sector
Sector is the SEC's industry description of the company. Each count opens that sector's quotes below.
| Sector | Companies | Compared |
|---|---|---|
| Arrangement of Transportation of Freight & Cargo | 2 | 2 |
| Cutlery, Handtools & General Hardware | 2 | 2 |
| Instruments For Meas & Testing of Electricity & Elec Signals | 2 | 2 |
| Optical Instruments & Lenses | 2 | 2 |
| Aircraft | 1 | 1 |
| Aircraft & Parts | 1 | 1 |
| Apparel & Other Finishd Prods of Fabrics & Similar Matl | 1 | 1 |
| Canned, Fruits, Veg, Preserves, Jams & Jellies | 1 | 1 |
| Communications Equipment, NEC | 1 | 1 |
| Communications Services, NEC | 1 | 1 |
| Electromedical & Electrotherapeutic Apparatus | 1 | 1 |
| Engines & Turbines | 1 | 1 |
| Farm Machinery & Equipment | 1 | 1 |
| Gas & Other Services Combined | 1 | 1 |
| General Industrial Machinery & Equipment, NEC | 1 | 1 |
| Grain Mill Products | 1 | 1 |
| Guided Missiles & Space Vehicles & Parts | 1 | 1 |
| Heavy Construction Other Than Bldg Const - Contractors | 1 | 1 |
| Leather & Leather Products | 1 | 1 |
| Meat Packing Plants | 1 | 1 |
| Metal Mining | 1 | 1 |
| Misc Industrial & Commercial Machinery & Equipment | 1 | 1 |
| Miscellaneous Food Preparations & Kindred Products | 1 | 1 |
| Oil & Gas Field Machinery & Equipment | 1 | 1 |
| Ophthalmic Goods | 1 | 1 |
| Ordnance & Accessories, (No Vehicles/Guided Missiles) | 1 | 1 |
| Paper Mills | 1 | 1 |
| Poultry Slaughtering and Processing | 1 | 1 |
| Radiotelephone Communications | 1 | 1 |
| Retail-Eating & Drinking Places | 1 | 1 |
| Retail-Home Furniture, Furnishings & Equipment Stores | 1 | 1 |
| Retail-Radio, Tv & Consumer Electronics Stores | 1 | 1 |
| Services-Detective, Guard & Armored Car Services | 1 | 1 |
| Services-Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management | 1 | 1 |
| Services-Misc Health & Allied Services, NEC | 1 | 1 |
| Special Industry Machinery, NEC | 1 | 1 |
| Telephone & Telegraph Apparatus | 1 | 1 |
| Television Broadcasting Stations | 1 | 1 |
| Wholesale-Motor Vehicle Supplies & New Parts | 1 | 1 |
| Biological Products, (No Diagnostic Substances) | 4 | 5 |
| Laboratory Analytical Instruments | 4 | 5 |
| Semiconductors & Related Devices | 11 | 15 |
| Computer & office Equipment | 2 | 3 |
| Computer Communications Equipment | 2 | 3 |
| Electronic Computers | 2 | 3 |
| Measuring & Controlling Devices, NEC | 2 | 3 |
| Natural Gas Transmission | 2 | 3 |
| Plastic Materials, Synth Resins & Nonvulcan Elastomers | 2 | 3 |
| Services-Consumer Credit Reporting, Collection Agencies | 2 | 3 |
| Wholesale-Drugs, Proprietaries & Druggists' Sundries | 2 | 3 |
| Pharmaceutical Preparations | 7 | 11 |
| Industrial Instruments For Measurement, Display, and Control | 3 | 5 |
| Orthopedic, Prosthetic & Surgical Appliances & Supplies | 3 | 5 |
| Finance Services | 15 | 28 |
| Services-Business Services, NEC | 8 | 16 |
| Motor Vehicles & Passenger Car Bodies | 2 | 4 |
| Retail-Eating Places | 2 | 4 |
| Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical Sys | 2 | 4 |
| Security & Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges & Services | 2 | 4 |
| Agricultural Chemicals | 1 | 2 |
| Aircraft Engines & Engine Parts | 1 | 2 |
| Fats & Oils | 1 | 2 |
| Industrial Organic Chemicals | 1 | 2 |
| Men's & Boys' Furnishgs, Work Clothg, & Allied Garments | 1 | 2 |
| Paperboard Containers & Boxes | 1 | 2 |
| Printed Circuit Boards | 1 | 2 |
| Rubber & Plastics Footwear | 1 | 2 |
| Services-General Medical & Surgical Hospitals, NEC | 1 | 2 |
| Services-Medical Laboratories | 1 | 2 |
| Services-To Dwellings & Other Buildings | 1 | 2 |
| Telephone Communications (No Radiotelephone) | 1 | 2 |
| Trucking (No Local) | 1 | 2 |
| Beverages | 2 | 5 |
| Computer Storage Devices | 2 | 5 |
| Retail-Variety Stores | 2 | 5 |
| Services-Computer Programming, Data Processing, Etc. | 2 | 5 |
| Investment Advice | 3 | 8 |
| National Commercial Banks | 4 | 11 |
| Electric Services | 5 | 15 |
| Electric & Other Services Combined | 4 | 12 |
| Air-Cond & Warm Air Heatg Equip & Comm & Indl Refrig Equip | 1 | 3 |
| Electrical Work | 1 | 3 |
| General Industrial Machinery & Equipment | 1 | 3 |
| Life Insurance | 1 | 3 |
| Perfumes, Cosmetics & Other Toilet Preparations | 1 | 3 |
| Services-Commercial Physical & Biological Research | 1 | 3 |
| Services-Computer Integrated Systems Design | 1 | 3 |
| Surgical & Medical Instruments & Apparatus | 3 | 10 |
| Real Estate Investment Trusts | 8 | 27 |
| Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas | 2 | 7 |
| Fire, Marine & Casualty Insurance | 3 | 12 |
| Electronic & Other Electrical Equipment (No Computer Equip) | 1 | 4 |
| Services-Prepackaged Software | 4 | 19 |
| Petroleum Refining | 1 | 6 |
| State Commercial Banks | 1 | 6 |
| Security Brokers, Dealers & Flotation Companies | 1 | 7 |
454 paragraphs · Semiconductors & Related Devices show all sectors
In 2025, the U.S. government announced a series of tariffs, including tariffs targeting a broad range of imports and targeted tariffs on goods from specific countries and industries. In response, many countries imposed reciprocal tariffs and other trade restrictions on the United States. Although many of these tariffs, countermeasures and other trade restrictions have since been eased or paused, their initial announcements triggered considerable volatility in global markets and heightened economic uncertainty, and the global trade situation, particularly between the United States and China, continues to be highly dynamic. Further, throughout 2025 the U.S. government has initiated numerous investigations into products and industries under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. For example, in April 2025, the Department of Commerce launched an investigation into the national security impacts of imported semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. While the results of this investigation remain unknown, it is expected to result in additional tariffs and trade restrictions that may adversely impact our business. Similar investigations on other industries or products, including automotive, copper, steel, aluminum, critical minerals and aircraft, may also adversely impact the semiconductor industry and our business. These changes have, and similar changes in the future may continue to, increase the cost or reduce the availability of raw materials and supplies we need to operate, cause customers to advance, delay, reduce, or cancel orders, shift buying patterns, impact demand in our end markets, complicate demand forecasting for us and our customers, increase supply chain complexity and contribute to volatility, a broader economic slowdown or recession. Any of these impacts or changes could materially and adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 25, 2025 ↗
Our business, financial condition and results of operations may be adversely affected by uncertainty and changes in trade policies, including tariffs, and trade disputes between the United States and other countries. The United States has announced changes to its trade policy, including increased tariffs on imports. These actions have caused substantial uncertainty and have resulted in retaliatory measures, including new tariffs on U.S. goods imposed by China and other countries. Some of these actions have been followed by announcements of limited exemptions and temporary pauses and trade frameworks with certain countries.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 12, 2025 ↗
A significant number of our customers and suppliers are located outside of the United States. Increases in tariffs increase our costs and can negatively impact our margins and reduce the competitiveness of our products due to the increase in the cost of importing materials, parts and components used in manufacturing our products. Tariffs can also increase supply chain complexity and may make it more difficult to purchase necessary equipment and supplies to manufacture our products. Increases in tariffs, including reciprocal and sector-based tariffs, also increase the cost to our customers of importing our products, which could harm customer demand for our products. Uncertainty or volatility with respect to tariffs and trade disputes may also make it difficult for us and our customers and suppliers to make and execute business and capital equipment investment plans; lead to global or regional inflation and economic recession and reduce demand for semiconductor chips and electronic devices; cause our customers to delay or cancel orders or negatively impact our competitive position; impede our ability to purchase materials, including critical materials and minerals, and disrupt supply chain and logistics. For example, in 2025 the Chinese government implemented export controls on the export of rare earth minerals that are used in certain of our products and may implement additional controls in the future. We may take actions to mitigate the impact of increases in tariffs and changes in trade policies, but there can be no assurance that we will be successful, and any such actions could result in additional costs, manufacturing delays or other difficulties, as well as additional risks, and may not be effective. Any or all of these factors may have a material and adverse impact on our business, financial condition and results of operations.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 12, 2025 ↗
Additional export restrictions imposed in the future may not only impact our ability to serve China but could also impact our ability to serve other markets. If any new export controls impact more of our products, we may be unable to sell our inventory of such products and we may further incur inventory and related charges since there is no assurance that the U.S. government will grant licenses at all or in a timely manner. Even if we are granted licenses, the licenses may be temporary or could impose onerous conditions for us or our customers. If we are not granted licenses, we may be unable to develop a competitive product for the China market that is not subject to licensing requirements. Limits on sales of our offerings in the China market due to export controls could impact our competitive position compared to domestic Chinese competitors and other companies or competitors not subject to the same restrictions. As such, we could lose market position and our business, operating results, and financial condition would be adversely impacted.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 4, 2026 ↗
The implementation or increase of any tariffs, trade protection measures or restrictions, or retaliatory actions from foreign governments could result in lost sales and adversely impact our reputation and business. The U.S. government has instituted or proposed changes in trade policies that include higher tariffs on imports into the U.S. and other government regulations affecting trade between the United States and other countries where we conduct our business. Such changes to U.S. trade policy have the potential to adversely impact the U.S. economy or sectors thereof and could significantly impact our business, in particular the import of products used in our business that are manufactured outside the U.S. Any retaliatory actions by affected countries and foreign governments could result in tariffs, trade protection measures or other restrictions imposed on our current and future products. Our customers’ costs of doing business may increase or their sales may be negatively affected. As such, customer demand for our products may decline, which could adversely impact our ability to generate revenue and result in inventory impairment changes. For instance, tariffs on hardware required for data centers could raise costs for our customers, potentially causing them to delay or cancel AI infrastructure investments. Further, to the extent that the United States, China or other countries seek to promote products that are produced domestically or reduce their dependence on products from another country, they may implement regulations or policies that may negatively affect our business.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 4, 2026 ↗
We have equity interests in two joint ventures (collectively, the THATIC JV) with Higon Information Technology Co., Ltd. (THATIC), a third-party Chinese entity. In June 2019, BIS added certain Chinese entities to the Entity List, including THATIC and the THATIC JV. Since that time, the United States administration has called for changes to domestic and foreign policy, including policies with respect to China and Russia. Specifically, United States-China trade relations remain uncertain as the United States continues to add more Chinese companies to the Entity List and introduce new regulations on advanced computing, semiconductor manufacturing, and AI, while China has imposed retaliatory tariffs. Moreover, as the U.S. government continues adding companies to the Entity List, our supply chain may be negatively impacted as we may be required to suspend purchasing from such suppliers or selling to such customers or otherwise unable to fulfill our contractual obligations to them. For example, in September 2025, BIS issued a new rule designating any entity that is at least 50% owned by one or more entities on the Entity List will be subject to Entity List restrictions and this rule similarly applies to entities at least 50% owned by listed “military end users” and certain sanctioned parties. In October 2025, the U.S. government announced that it planned to suspend enforcement of this new rule for one year. However, the restrictions can be reimposed at any time. These restrictive governmental actions and any similar measures that may be imposed on U.S. companies by other governments, especially in light of ongoing trade tensions with U.S. trading partners, will likely limit or prevent us from doing business with certain of our customers or suppliers and harm our ability to compete effectively or otherwise negatively affect our ability to sell our products. If we were ever found to have violated these laws or similar applicable non-U.S. laws, even if the violation occurred without our knowledge, we may be subject to penalties, which could adversely affect our reputation, business, operating results and financial condition.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 4, 2026 ↗
While U.S. tariffs and counter-tariffs, including semiconductor-related tariffs, have not had a material impact on our financial condition or results of operations, tariffs and other macroeconomic factors could materially increase costs and disrupt our supply chain. We continuously manage product availability and costs in our supply chain to mitigate the direct and indirect impact of tariffs and other macroeconomic impacts. The ultimate impact remains uncertain and will depend on
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 18, 2025 ↗
•any tariffs that reduce the profitability of contracts, whereby the cost of tariffs exceeds the amount able to be, or willing to be, absorbed by either us or the customer under the provisions of the contract and may lead to us or the customer cancelling such contract, potentially resulting in the reduction of future revenue, the loss of the contractual right to a termination payment from the customer, and potentially the required return of a previously received customer down payment;
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 24, 2026 ↗
•any reciprocal or other tariffs may place burdens on our customers’ supply chains exclusive of module import costs, including through increased costs of trackers, inverters, transformers, and other imported equipment, which are often heavily dependent on Chinese supply chains. These and other costs could result in an inability for certain projects to generate profitable returns, and may lead to the delay or abandonment of such projects, thereby reducing or removing demand for currently contracted PV module sales; and
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 24, 2026 ↗
•any reduction in our ability to profitably import modules from our international manufacturing locations as a result of tariffs or other trade laws could lead to us significantly reducing capacity utilization at certain international manufacturing facilities. Such underutilization may lead to potential impairment of certain international equipment and facilities and may also increase our selling costs and reduce our competitiveness in the market, thereby reducing demand for our modules.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 24, 2026 ↗
•United States — IEEPA Tariffs. In 2025, the U.S. President imposed a series of tariffs on nearly all U.S. trading partners pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (“IEEPA”). As it pertains to the countries where we manufacture solar modules, IEEPA tariffs applied to Vietnam (20%), India (25%), and Malaysia (19%). In August 2025, the U.S. President had imposed an additional 25% tariff
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 24, 2026 ↗
on India over its purchases of Russian oil, resulting in an overall rate of 50%. On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the IEEPA tariffs unlawful. President Trump responded immediately by revoking the IEEPA tariff actions and imposing new global tariffs pursuant to Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (“Section 122”), which provides for tariffs up to 15% for a period of no more than 150 days. The additional, higher tariffs on imports from these countries has increased the costs of our solar modules manufactured in these countries with respect to our U.S. market. Further, such circumstances have and may continue to impact our ability to sell certain modules into the United States and therefore have and may continue to also impact the operational status of certain of our international manufacturing facilities. As a result, our operating results have and may continue to be adversely impacted by these tariffs.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 24, 2026 ↗
•United States — Potential Tariffs on Processed Critical Minerals and Derivative Products, Polysilicon, Robotics and Industrial Machinery. On April 22, 2025, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation to determine the effects on the national security of imports of processed critical minerals, as well as their derivative products, under Section 232; on July 1, 2025, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce initiated a Section 232 investigation to determine whether imports of polysilicon and its derivatives impair U.S. national security; and on September 2, 2025, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation to determine the effects on the national security of imports of robotics and industrial machinery under Section 232. The scope of these investigations is potentially broad and may cover materials and equipment used in solar module manufacturing. These investigations may result in the imposition of tariffs or import restrictions, or may remove barriers on the imports of competitor products and materials, all of which could negatively impact demand and/or price levels for our solar modules and limit our growth, lead to a reduction in our net sales, or increase our costs, thereby adversely impacting our operating results.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 24, 2026 ↗
•impact of restrictions, export controls, or other limitations on critical materials sourced from concentrated suppliers reducing sales;
Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2026 ↗
Any of these factors could increase our manufacturing costs, impair our sourcing flexibility, delay our production schedules, and adversely affect our operating results. Additionally, our sales may be adversely impacted if tariffs or government trade actions restrict access to needed supplies.
Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2026 ↗
Tariffs, trade restrictions, and evolving global trade policies pose risks to our supply chain, cost structure, and customer demand. Beginning in 2018 and continuing through 2026, the U.S. imposed additional tariffs on various imports, and several countries have imposed retaliatory tariffs on goods originating from the U.S. Although semiconductors currently remain exempt from certain U.S. tariffs under the ongoing Section 232 investigation, many inputs used in semiconductor manufacturing - including chemicals, metals, and equipment - remain subject to country specific tariffs or may become subject to new duties. The tariff landscape remains uncertain and may change with limited notice.
Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2026 ↗
Tariffs and trade restrictions also affect our customers. If customers face reduced availability of labor, materials, or components, whether due to trade restrictions, supplier disruptions, escalating shipping constraints, or public health issues, they may reduce or suspend production of their own products, leading to decreased demand for our products. For example, in 2025, government actions involving Nexperia (including export control measures and interventions affecting its operations and cross-border shipments) resulted in restricted availability of certain mature-node semiconductors (such as discrete devices and standard logic) that are widely used by automotive and consumer electronics manufacturers. As a result, some of our customers may experience shortages of these components which may reduce their production volumes and, in turn, reduce demand for our products. Any such customer side disruptions may negatively affect our revenue and operating results.
Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2026 ↗
On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that certain tariffs collected pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) were unconstitutional. On April 20, 2026, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) began processing refunds through its Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries (CAPE) portal. Although Microchip was the importer of record for products that were subject to tariffs imposed under IEEPA and should be entitled to a refund, the timing and the amount of any such recovery is not yet clear. As such, this could have a favorable impact on our financial position, operations, or cash flows, but we cannot predict the timing, likelihood, or amount of any refunds or other recoveries we may realize.
Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2026 ↗
We may lose sales if critical materials from concentrated sources become restricted or subject to export controls.
Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2026 ↗
China is a predominant producer of many rare earth materials essential to the global electronics industry. In 2025, China imposed and later expanded export restrictions and licensing requirements on certain rare earth elements and related magnets. Although some restrictions were subsequently suspended for certain U.S. end‑users, future restrictions or renewed implementation could constrain global supply. If China further restricts exports or pressures other countries to do so, our suppliers may face shortages, longer lead times, or increased costs. Limited access to these materials could impair our ability to manufacture certain products, increase our production costs, or reduce our competitiveness relative to manufacturers with alternative supply sources. These constraints may also affect downstream customers; for example, export controls on rare earth magnets have previously led certain automotive manufacturers to temporarily suspend operations.
Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2026 ↗
Export controls, sanctions, and trade restrictions are increasingly complex and subject to discretionary interpretation by regulatory authorities, with requirements that may change through guidance, enforcement, or licensing decisions. Even where we believe authorizations apply, differing or changing regulatory interpretations could disrupt shipments, delay revenue recognition, require product or customer changes, and adversely affect our operating results.
Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2026 ↗
On August 1, 2025, the U.S. administration implemented additional changes to its tariff policy, including the suspension of the de minimis exemption, expiration of the 10% baseline tariff, implementation of revised reciprocal tariffs tailored to each trading partner, and the imposition of tariffs on particular goods (e.g., copper). Although semiconductors remain exempt from most of the recent tariff actions, an increase in tariffs on semiconductors is expected to be imposed once the Section 232 investigation into the impact on U.S. national security by imports of semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment and their derivative products is concluded. Semiconductors may also be subject to tariffs resulting from ongoing trade negotiations. Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that IEEPA-based tariffs are unconstitutional, we cannot predict the timing, likelihood, or amount of any refunds or other recoveries.
Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2026 ↗
In addition to the above risks related to economic conditions, the U.S. has implemented a series of tariffs targeting various nations and industries. These announcements have triggered global reactions, affecting markets, slowing global economic growth, and heightening concerns about broader financial instability. Tariffs and escalations of trade tensions between the U.S. and its trading partners, especially China, and the decoupling of global economies could result in a global economic slowdown and long-term changes to global trade. See also, “Adverse changes in the political, regulatory and economic policies of governments in connection with trade with China and Chinese customers have reduced the demand for our products and damaged our business” and “Changes to U.S. or foreign tax, trade policy, government incentives, tariff and import/export regulations may have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.”
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 11, 2026 ↗
In 2025, U.S. government interactions with U.S. semiconductor companies implied that as a condition to obtaining and maintaining export licenses for certain products and technologies destined for China, they remit to the U.S. government a fee equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the gross revenue derived from such China-related sales. In January 2026, BIS issued a new licensing policy related to chips from certain semiconductor companies, including a twenty-five percent (25%) tariff and other requirements. Historically, restrictions on sales to China were implemented by the U.S. government as national security measures that did not include revenue-sharing arrangements and export licensing was not tied to revenue sharing with the U.S. government. While these U.S. government actions did not impact Marvell, if such revenue sharing were to be imposed on our China-derived revenue, it could erode our gross margins, reduce our pricing flexibility, and potentially prompt us to curtail or discontinue sales in China.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 11, 2026 ↗
On April 14, 2025, the BIS announced the initiation of investigations into the effects on U.S. national security of imports of semiconductors under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The scope of the investigation includes semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and their derivative products including semiconductor substrates and bare wafers, legacy chips, leading-edge chips, microelectronics, and other components. While the results of this investigation are currently unknown, the investigation may result in additional tariffs and trade restrictions, which may adversely impact our business.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 11, 2026 ↗
In February 2026, the USG granted a license that would allow us to ship small amounts of H200 products to specific China-based customers. To date, we have not generated any revenue under the H200 licensing program, and do not yet know whether any imports will be allowed into China. The license requires that the H200s go through an inspection process in the United States prior to any shipment to the customer. As a result, any H200 shipped under the new licensing program will be subject to a 25% tariff upon importation into the United States.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗
In the event that we are able to sell licensed products into the China market, we may not be able to pass along all or any of the tariff to our customers, and may be subject to litigation, increased costs, and a harmed competitive position.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗
The export controls applicable to China are complex and address a variety of parameters, including the total processing performance of a chip, the “performance density” of a chip, the interconnect bandwidth of a chip, and the memory bandwidth of a chip. Under the current rules and geopolitical landscape, we are unable to create and deliver a competitive product for China’s data center market that receives approval from both the USG and the Chinese government. As of the end of fiscal year 2026, we were effectively foreclosed from competing in China's data center computing/compute market, and our effective foreclosure from the China market helped our competitors build larger developer and customer ecosystems to challenge us worldwide. Unless we are able to return with a product that meets the approval of both the USG and the Chinese government, our lost opportunity and the benefit to our competitors will have a material and adverse impact on our business, operating results, and financial condition.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗
In addition to controls targeting D:1, D:4 and D:5 countries, the USG has also imposed worldwide export controls impacting our products, and may impose additional controls in the future.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗
The USG already imposed export controls restricting certain gaming GPUs, and if the USG expands such controls to restrict additional gaming products, it may disrupt a significant portion of our supply and distribution chain and
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗
negatively impact sales of such products to markets outside China, including the U.S. and Europe. In addition, as the performance of the gaming GPUs increases over time, export controls may have a greater impact on our ability to compete in markets subject to those controls. Export controls may disrupt our supply and distribution chain for a substantial portion of our products, which are warehoused in and distributed from Hong Kong.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗
Export controls restricting our ability to sell data center GPUs may also negatively impact demand for our networking products used in servers containing our GPUs. The USG may also impose export controls on our networking products, such as high-speed network interconnects, to limit the ability of downstream parties to create large clusters for frontier model training.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗
Export controls have and are likely in the future to have a disproportionate impact on NVIDIA and may disadvantage us against certain of our competitors that sell chips that are outside the scope of such control. Export controls have already and may in the future encourage customers outside China and other impacted regions to “design-out” certain U.S. semiconductors from their products to reduce the compliance burden and risk, and to ensure that they are able to serve markets worldwide. Export controls have already encouraged and may in the future encourage overseas governments to request that our customers purchase from our competitors rather than NVIDIA or other U.S. firms, harming our business, market position, and financial results.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗
As a result, export controls have in the past and may in the future negatively impact demand for our products and services not only in China, but also in other markets, such as Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Export controls increase the risk of investing in U.S. advanced semiconductor products, because by the time a new product is ready for market, it may be subject to new unilateral export controls restricting its sale, resulting in excess inventory and purchase obligations as we recently experienced with the H20. At the same time, such controls may increase investment in foreign competitors, which would be less likely to be restricted by U.S. controls.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗
The increasingly complex export controls impose complex and burdensome compliance obligations on our partners, suppliers, and customers. While we seek to strictly comply with all applicable export control regulators, reports of diversion of controlled products, even when unsubstantiated and untrue, may negatively impact our business, relationships with partners and customers, and our reputation. Incorrect allegations that our compliance efforts satisfy the letter but not the “spirit” of the applicable regulations, as well as incorrect allegations that legitimate and appropriate business is using supposed “loopholes” in the export controls may negatively impact our business, relationships with partners and customers, and our reputation.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗
Recently announced and future tariffs and other trade restrictions could materially and adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2026 ↗
In 2025, the U.S. government announced a series of tariffs, including tariffs targeting a broad range of imports and targeted tariffs on goods from specific countries and industries. In response, many countries imposed reciprocal tariffs and other trade restrictions on the United States. Although many of these tariffs, countermeasures and other trade restrictions have since been eased or paused, their initial announcements triggered considerable volatility in global markets and heightened economic uncertainty, and the global trade situation, particularly between the United States and China, continues to be highly dynamic. Further, throughout 2025 the U.S. government has initiated numerous investigations into products and industries under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. For example, in April 2025, the Department of Commerce launched an investigation into the national security impacts of imported semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. While the results of this investigation remain unknown, it is expected to result in additional tariffs and trade restrictions that may adversely impact our business. Similar investigations on other industries or products, including automotive, copper, steel, aluminum, critical minerals and aircraft, may also adversely impact the semiconductor industry and our business. These changes have, and similar changes in the future may continue to, increase the cost or reduce the availability of raw materials and supplies we need to operate, cause customers to advance, delay, reduce, or cancel orders, shift buying patterns, impact demand in our end markets, complicate demand forecasting for us and our customers, increase supply chain complexity and contribute to volatility, a broader economic slowdown or recession. Any of these impacts or changes could materially and adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2026 ↗
on a timely basis or at all. Additional tariffs, export controls or other trade restrictions between the two countries could materially adversely affect our results of operations.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 9, 2026 ↗
•the imposition of or changes to tariffs, including the tariffs announced by the United States in 2025 with respect to numerous global trading partners and sectors, and any retaliatory tariffs or measures by any such trading partners, including countermeasures by China, have impacted and could further negatively impact trade between, or increase the cost of operating in, or increase the cost of or negatively impact the demand for, our products or our customers’ products in the countries in which we or our customers do business,
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 7, 2025 ↗