What companies that hold crypto say they bought and hold, quoted from their 8-Ks and checked against their 10-Qs;
who holds the crypto ETFs, from every 13F; what changed in the ETFs' prospectuses; a daily copy of pages projects and
stablecoin issuers change without notice; and what the largest DAOs voted for. No prices: every number here comes from a document, linked.
Closed Snapshot votes of the largest DAOs, newest first, with the choice that won and the proposal's own summary, quoted.
"Money" marks proposals about the treasury, grants, fees, emissions, unlocks or buybacks.
This Constitutional AIP proposes to resume Stylus contract activations on Arbitrum One following the Security Council’s pause of new activations: Security Council Emergency Action – 2/10/2026. This proposal authorizes a new Stylus Activation Contract and delegates to the Arbitrum Foundation the right to authorize the activation of Stylus contracts that have passed a limited security audit performed by an Arbitrum Security Program auditor (explained in further detail below) and that focuses on whether the code threatens the stability (and security) of the Arbitrum network. The ArbitrumDAO can change or revoke this delegation via a constitutional vote at any time.
We propose that the DAO approve the Governor Nexus update, the next version of the ENS governor. It is built on OpenZeppelin v5.6.1 and fixes the risks found in the Governance Security Assessment. If this vote passes, the code goes through an external audit paid by MetaGov, and we then bring the migration proposal to an executable proposal.
Result: Yes, let's do it with 100.0% of the votes cast
The DAO multisig still has approximately 9.3061 AAVE available to claim from its former stkAAVE position. These rewards appear to have remained unclaimed when the position was unstaked during the Treasury Council migration.
Result: Yes, let's do it with 100.0% of the votes cast
The Balancer DAO holds 10,000,000 BEETS on Sonic, worth roughly $39k, under half a percent of the treasury. BIP-928 consolidates smaller and less liquid positions like this one before round one. We propose burning these BEETS instead of distributing or selling them. There is no contractual basis for this request; we are asking in good faith.
Result: Yes, let's do it with 100.0% of the votes cast
The following specifications are for Ethereum, since that is the only chain that requires governance approval for these actions. On all other chains, the core team will perform the analogous actions from their multisig.
The Meta-Governance Working Group is ENS DAO's sole Working Group for Term 7 (1 July 2026–30 June 2027), following the dissolution of the Ecosystem and Public Goods Working Groups (EP 6.44). It oversees DAO governance and core operations: reviewing proposals and governance upgrades and funding DAO-approved security audits; administering the SPP3 cohort, the marketplace award, and the two SPP2 streams that end in May 2027; representing ENS DAO across the wider ecosystem and giving builders time with delegates; running public calls, keeping records, and maintaining the Working Group Rules; and supporting the remaining endowment handover to the ENS Foundation.
- Entropy proposes transferring 1,700 ETH accrued from Sequencer, Timeboost, and PGA revenue from the DAO’s treasury to the Arbitrum Developer Guild & the TM Portfolio
This AIP proposes a L1 voting system that allows ArbitrumDAO proposals to be created, voted on, queued, and executed from Ethereum L1. Voting power is derived from ARB delegations proven against confirmed Arbitrum assertions. Approved actions would be routed through a new L1 timelock to the existing upgrade executors.
This proposal updates the parentGasFloorPerToken and perBatchGasCharge parameters on Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova in response to Ethereum’s Glamsterdam upgrade.
Arbitrum has partnered with Paxos by joining the Global Dollar Network (GDN), giving builders an ecosystem-aligned dollar with committed liquidity, incentives, and integration support behind it from day one. This proposal asks the DAO to back a coordinated effort across the Arbitrum Aligned Entities (AAEs) to grow USDG adoption, so that incentives, grants, and partnerships compound in one direction: toward builders first, and back to the DAO over the long term. The DAO becomes the steward of USDG's growth on Arbitrum and the recipient of the economic value that growth creates.
Result: Yes, let's do it with 100.0% of the votes cast
After BIP-925, the inactive Timeless VeBalGrant still has approximately 10,286.807445 USDC in unclaimed FeeDistributor rewards. These were not recovered by BIP-925 because withdrawBalances() only handles BAL and WETH.
This proposal requests ~7,400,000 SAFE tokens from the SafeDAO treasury to fund Safenet Aegis - the phase following Safenet Beta - over a limited 12-month period beginning Tuesday, October 13th 2026. Specifically:
Result: Yes, let's do it with 100.0% of the votes cast
This BIP proposes that Balancer DAO and CoW DAO revert the tokenswap performed under BIP-770, with COW DAO Managed Treasury purchasing the remaining COW owned by Balancer DAO at a 15day TWAP.
Result: Yes, with tetuBAL at 50% with 70.7% of the votes cast
- I propose an orderly winddown of Balancer: no new business development, a phased sunset of the protocol with a defined exit window, and the DAO closed to the extent legally and practically possible. - The treasury goes to BAL holders in kind and pro rata, after setting aside what the winddown still needs to spend, in two rounds and a final sweep. Round one opens at the end of May 2027: holders burn their BAL and receive their share of the treasury. Round two is an airdrop to the addresses that redeemed in round one, in proportion to what they redeemed, within two months of the close: the unspent budget, what arrived since, and the share not redeemed. A final sweep six months later distribu…
Result: No, this is not the way with 69.9% of the votes cast
A wind-down of Balancer has been proposed. Whether it passes or not, we would like to make sure that the spirit of Balancer survives either way. We propose a reincarnation of the protocol that is ready for the next wave of assets coming onchain. Balancer has developed and fine-tuned unique technology that is perfectly positioned for this, and should find a continuation no matter what.
I am putting forward a comprehensive proposal for community discussion and subsequent Snapshot voting. The goal is to aggressively optimize the DAO’s operational expenditures and realign our token support mechanisms with current market realities.
This proposal is part of the protocol fee rollout, following proposals 93, 94, 95, 96, 99, and 100. It uses the expedited governance process approved in UNIfication, where fee parameter update proposals can bypass the RFC stage and go directly to a five-day Snapshot followed by an onchain vote.
DUNI owns the three Gauntlet-curated Morpho Vaults V2 behind Uniswap Earn: uniUSDC, uniUSDT and uniETH, all on Ethereum mainnet. Gauntlet has upgraded its signing infrastructure and needs to swap out some wallets configured in the Sentinel role on vault deployment. setIsSentinel , the function used to adjust addresses granted the Sentinel role, is owner-gated and the Owner is Uniswap governance’s mainnet Timelock.
This proposal requests Lido DAO to authorize a contingent, capped market-making mandate for LDO on centralized exchanges (CEXs), to reduce the risk of LDO trading-pair degradation or delisting due to insufficient liquidity.
This vote seeks Lido DAO approval for the appointment of Leeward Supervisors Limited ("Leeward") as Supervisor of Lido Alliance BORG Foundation ("Lido Alliance BORG").
This proposal establishes the 1inch DAO Security Council as the formally ratified signer set of the DAO Treasury multisig and ratifies the replacement of 7 of the 12 current signers with the slate listed below, voted on as a single slate.
Result: FOR - Ban APX Finance with 100.0% of the votes cast
The following case from the Watchdog Program has been deemed to constitute high-severity misuse. Accordingly, the Watchdog Committee is proposing to ban this project from the ArbitrumDAO:
Result: FOR - Ban Limitless with 100.0% of the votes cast
The following case from the Watchdog Program has been deemed to constitute high-severity misuse. Accordingly, the Watchdog Committee is proposing to ban this project from the ArbitrumDAO:
Result: FOR - Ban Good Entry with 100.0% of the votes cast
The following case from the Watchdog Program has been deemed to constitute high-severity misuse. Accordingly, the Watchdog Committee is proposing to ban this project from the ArbitrumDAO:
Result: Yes, let's do it with 100.0% of the votes cast
On all chains, revoke leftover permissions on the V2 vault for relayers that are deprecated or no longer used. Only the latest 20231031-batch-relayer-v6/BalancerRelayer is left intact.
Result: Yes, let's do it with 100.0% of the votes cast
I, @Xeonus ( 0xaa5af0dd9c52c773d36cdbc509a0b2a1ded4c196 ), am proposing my resignation from the Balancer Treasury Council (TC), effective as of the date this vote passes, and am nominating @zekraken ( 0xBCC63E9c0a486D10Cdb8617242507733fEF1d792 ) as my successor to fill the resulting seat.
This is the successor proposal to GIP-128 and requests a grant of $15m in stablecoins, at half of last year’s ask, for a 12-month period starting September 1, 2026, disbursed quarterly to Gnosis Ltd’s Safe.
This proposal is a non-binding signaling vote to gauge community appetite for inviting Gnosis Guild to revisit the formally steward GnosisDAO governance under the structural principles originally outlined in GIP-99 (with modular governance infrastructure, staged funding milestones, explicit KPIs, and an independent firewall between governance operations and treasury allocation).
The Arbitrum Foundation proposes to continue and evolve the Arbitrum Audit Program (AAP) - launched on 1 August 2025 with a one-year mandate - into a broader Arbitrum Security Program (ASP), running for a further 12 months on a rolling-application basis.
Result: Yes, let's do it with 100.0% of the votes cast
As a result of BIP-252, there is still a grant open in this custom build VeBalGrant contract: https://etherscan.io/address/0x89f67f3054bFD662971854190Dbc18dcaBb416f6. The unlock time has since then passed ( 2025-02-13T00:00:00Z ). Balancer DAO contributed 50k BAL, Timeless contributed ~42 WETH.
Result: Yes, let's do it with 100.0% of the votes cast
Recover unclaimed $BAL and $LDO incentives still sitting in Balancer’s pre-veBAL MerkleRedeem liquidity-mining contracts (~364k BAL and ~350k LDO respectively), and transfer recovered tokens to the BizDev Safe for redeployment as user incentives at BizDev’s discretion.
Result: Yes, let's do it with 100.0% of the votes cast
Following the execution of [[BIP-892]](https://forum.balancer.fi/t/bip-892-distribution-of-rescued-funds-from-balancer-v2-november-3rd-2025-attacks/6883) , which established the initial 180-day (6-month) claim window and distribution framework for funds recovered from the November 3rd, 2025 Balancer v2 exploits, this proposal asks Balancer DAO governance to decide on the path forward for the next phase of claims and remaining recovered assets.
GIP: 153 title: Should Gnosis Chain transition into the Ethereum Economic Zone? author: Friederike Ernst with co-authors Philippe Schommers and Ben Carvill status: phase-3 type: strategic direction created: 2026-07-22 1. Abstract This asks GnosisDAO to align on transitioning Gnosis Chain from a standalone Layer 1 into a ZK-proven Ethereum Economic Zone (EEZ) rollup instance that settles natively on Ethereum. This is not a new chain and there is nothing to migrate to: it is Gnosis Chain, now based on Ethereum, inheriting Ethereum’s security and liquidity directly.
Result: Yes, let's do it with 100.0% of the votes cast
After Balancer decided to sunset the veBAL system, Aura made the decision to thus fully wind down their protocol (AIP-78). The Aura locker was shut down, and therefore their (ve)BAL (meta) governance as well. Aura confirmed they will no longer participate in Balancer’s governance. As a result, it is proposed to formally exclude the Aura protocol from voting, and with that reduce the quorum accordingly.
This proposal outlines a structural overhaul of GnosisDAO governance to eliminate the systemic liabilities associated with centralized concentration of voting power (de facto GbR partnership liability) under the fully enforced Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulatory environment.
Gnosis’s consumer app (Gnosis App), so far, has been run within the Gnosis Ltd annual funding mandate ($3.1 M – see GIP 128). Over the last few months, it has also been supported by the Circles team ($1.5M) & the Marketing team ($2M) as their primary focus in developing the product and bringing it to market. Gnosis App has built on work done in the past (including that of Metri & the Gnosis Wallet). It uses other Gnosis products under the hood (Gnosis Pay, CoWSwap, Safe). It hasn’t yet found breakout success/PMF. We spent the last 3 months rebuilding it centered on Circles (instead of a pure-play neobank approach, few reasons outlined here and here).
Allocates up to 500,000 USDC to a three-month maker incentive program on Aqua, stacked on the 10M 1INCH base campaigns funded by the 1inch Foundation on the same markets — paid for processed volume through Merkl, safeguarded, checkpointed, and returned if unspent.
Result: Yes, let's do it with 100.0% of the votes cast
Recover unclaimed $BAL and $LDO incentives still sitting in Balancer’s pre-veBAL MerkleRedeem liquidity-mining contracts (~364k BAL and ~350k LDO respectively), and transfer recovered tokens to the BizDev Safe for redeployment as user incentives at BizDev’s discretion.
Result: Yes, let's do it with 100.0% of the votes cast
Following the execution of [[BIP-892]](https://forum.balancer.fi/t/bip-892-distribution-of-rescued-funds-from-balancer-v2-november-3rd-2025-attacks/6883) , which established the initial 180-day (6-month) claim window and distribution framework for funds recovered from the November 3rd, 2025 Balancer v2 exploits, this proposal asks Balancer DAO governance to decide on the path forward for the next phase of claims and remaining recovered assets.
This proposal outlines 1inch’s adoption of the SEAL (Security Alliance) Whitehat Safe Harbor Agreement (“Safe Harbor Agreement”). By adopting the Safe Harbor Agreement, 1inch improves the security of its on-chain assets by allowing whitehats to intervene during active exploits to save protocol funds.
GFX Labs/Oku Trade proposes deploying Uniswap V4 on four EVM-compatible networks: Sei, Etherlink, Pharos, and 0G . These deployments expand V4's footprint, generate protocol fees across new chains, and give hook developers new environments to build on. With Morpho deployed on these networks, the addition of V4 provides a playground for unique financial applications to be developed. V3 is deployed on all chains and acts as the main liquidity hub for the networks.
In September 2025, the ArbitrumDAO showed varying degrees of support for five Security Council Election process improvements via a temperature check. This updated temperature check aims to ratify the DAO’s support for the inclusion of four and omission of one of the originally proposed improvements, ahead of an on-chain vote.
This proposal introduces 0x02 CSM, a new permissionless staking module that gives Node Operators a way to run validators with 0x02 withdrawal credentials, supporting an effective balance of up to 2,048 ETH. It complements the existing module, referred to as 0x01 CSM from here on, which continues serving smaller operators unchanged.
This proposal introduces the Penalty Framework for the Curated Module v2 (CMv2) as the baseline process for assessing and applying penalties to Node Operators. The Framework establishes how the Curated Module Committee (CMC), with analysis and support from the NOM team (Node Operator Mechanisms workstream of DAO contributors), reviews incidents involving Node Operator conduct, misconfiguration, underperformance, or other protocol-impacting events.
- SPP3 concluded with five selections. The provider selected for the marketplace and revenue vertical declined its award, leaving that vertical unfilled and $1,560,284 of the authorized budget uncommitted. - Rather than renegotiate privately outside the published process, the committee requests to run an open, scoped RFP for a live, revenue-generating ENS marketplace, funded from the budget the DAO already authorized for SPP3. - The cohort proposal is standalone and it ratifies the four remaining providers. - One award of up to $500,000 from the remainder, milestone-gated: roughly half streamed through go-live, half released against traction gates verifiable on-chain. The balance returns to …
This proposal requests $1,201,000 from the DAO Treasury for 1inch Network security audits covering Aqua/SwapVM versions 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0, plus the discounted OpenZeppelin annual retainer, while formally confirming the DAO's irrevocable operational rights under the Aqua Source License 1.1.
This proposal is part of the protocol fee rollout, following proposals 93 , 94 , 95 , and 96 . It uses the expedited governance process approved in UNIfication, where fee parameter update proposals can bypass the RFC stage and go directly to a five-day Snapshot followed by an onchain vote.
The election phase for the Oversight and Transparency Committee (OAT) will begin today, Thursday 9th of July, and will conclude a week later on Thursday, 16th of July. For the vote, a shutterized, weighted voting system will be utilized.
This proposal continues the protocol fee rollout approved in UNIfication, following proposals 93, 94, 95, and 96. It uses the expedited governance process where fee parameter update proposals go directly to a five-day Snapshot followed by an onchain vote.
Result: Nick Johnson (nick.eth) with 13.3% of the votes cast
The two-year mandate of the current Security Council expires soon. The framework was established under EP 5.7, the members were confirmed under EP 5.10, and the contract was deployed under EP 5.13.
This Constitutional AIP proposes to establish the Fast Feed , a paid, authenticated data streaming product for Arbitrum One. The Fast Feed allows subscribers to get updates on transactions, their relative ordering, and related transaction metadata earlier than they would otherwise via the regular feed. The Fast Feed makes that stream accessible to Arbitrum's ecosystem as a specialized, subscription-based data product.
Secure crosschain messaging is an integral part of Uniswap's governance model. Governance votes like protocol fee adjustments are executed by UNI holders on Ethereum Mainnet and must subsequently be relayed to destination chains.
This proposal seeks approval to automate the Timeboost proceeds split on Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova, and distribute accrued rewards to the Arbitrum Developer Guild (ADG) via a constitutional vote, as per the already-passed and executed proposal to adopt Timeboost. Currently, all Timeboost bid proceeds are sent to the Arbitrum DAO treasury; the portion of Timeboost proceeds allocated to the ADG (3%) must also be sent via an onchain action. This process can be automated by introducing a fee splitter that forwards funds proportionally to the DAO Treasury and to the ADG address that is controlled by the Arbitrum Foundation (AF).
This proposal is an update to the ENS Endowment Investment Policy Statement. It revises the framework governing the management of the ENS Endowment Fund by KPK on behalf of ENS DAO, updating the investment objectives, risk parameters, constraints, and governance mechanisms within which the Endowment Manager operates.