Screener / SEC EDGAR /CIK 0002000638 /10-K filed Feb 27, 2026, compared with Mar 5, 2025 /Numbers from the XBRL of the 10-Ks
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The 10-K against last year's

137 changes: 29 added, 5 removed, 97 reworded, 6 quiet changes

10-K Feb 27, 2026 vs Mar 5, 2025

10-K 0001437749-26-006054 (Feb 27, 2026) vs 10-K 0001437749-25-006261 (Mar 5, 2025) Not compared: Legal Proceedings.

Every paragraph, and how much of it changed

One bar per paragraph, in the order of the 10-K. Height and colour show the share of its words not in the closest paragraph a year earlier; the tallest bars are new paragraphs.

Risk Factors

396 paragraphs · 29 new · 130 reworded · 5 gone · 10-K Feb 27, 2026 against Mar 5, 2025
New paragraph Reworded (5% of its words or more) Same or nearly
Paragraph 109 · 49% changed Every version of it
monetary policies of governments, legislation or regulation, tariffs, trade restrictions, currency devaluations and revaluations and regulatory measures or enforcement actions, if any, that restrict the use of ether as a form of payment or the purchase of ether on the digital asset markets; revaluations;
Paragraph 88 · 48% changed Every version of it
Validation on the Ethereum network requires ether to be transferred into smart contracts on the underlying blockchain networks that are not under the Trust’s or anyone else’s control. If the Ethereum network source code or protocol fail to behave as expected, suffer cybersecurity attacks or hacks, experience security issues, or encounter other problems, such assets may be irretrievably lost. The Ethereum network imposes three types of sanctions for validator misbehavior or inactivity, which would result in a portion of their staked ether being destroyed or “burned”: penalties, slashing and inactivity leaks. A validator may face penalties if it fails to take certain actions, such as providing a timely attestation to a block proposed by another validator. Under this scenario, a validator’s staked ether could be burned in an amount equal to the reward to which it would have been entitled for performing the actions. A more severe sanction (i.e., “slashing”) is sanction, known as “slashing,” may be imposed if a validator commits engages in malicious acts related behavior, such as proposing or attesting to the proposal or attestation of blocks with containing invalid transactions. Slashing can result in the validator having immediate forfeiture, withdrawal, or burning of a portion of its the validator’s staked ether immediately confiscated, withdrawn or burned by the network, resulting in losses to them. After this initial slashing, the validator is queued for forceful removal from the Ethereum network’s validator “pool,” and more of the validator’s stake is burned over a period of approximately 36 days with the exact amount of ether burned and time period determined by the network regardless of whether the validator makes any further slashable errors, at which point the validator is automatically removed from the validator pool. Staked ether may also be burned through a process known as an “inactivity leak,” which is triggered if the Ethereum network has gone too long without finalizing a new block. For a new block to be successfully added to the blockchain, validators that account for at least two thirds of all staked ether must agree on the validity of a proposed block. This means that if validators representing more than one third of the total staked ether are offline, no new blocks can be finalized. To prevent this, an inactivity leak causes the ether staked by the inactive validators to gradually “bleed away” until these inactive validators represent less than one-third of the total stake, thereby allowing the remaining active validators to finalize proposed blocks. This provides a further incentive for validators to remain online and continue performing validation activities. Within the post-Merge Ethereum network, as part of the “activating” and “exiting” processes of staking, staked ether will be inaccessible for a variable period of time determined by a range of factors, including network congestion, resulting in potential inaccessibility during those periods. “Activation” is the funding of a validator to be included in the active set, thereby allowing the validator to participate in the Ethereum network’s proof-of-stake consensus protocol. “Exit” is the request to exit from the active set and no longer participate in the Ethereum network’s proof-of-stake consensus protocol. As part of these “activating” and “exiting” processes of staking on the Ethereum network, any staked ether will be inaccessible for a period of time. The duration of activating and exiting periods are dependent on a range of factors, including network conditions. However, depending on demand, un-staking can take between hours, days or weeks to complete. Furthermore, the Ethereum network requires the payment of base fees and the practice of paying tips is common, and such fees can become significant as the amount and complexity of the transaction grows, depending on the degree of network congestion and the price of ether. Any cybersecurity attacks, security issues, hacks, penalties, slashing events, or other problems could damage validators’ willingness to participate in validation, discourage existing and future validators from serving as such, and adversely impact the Ethereum network’s adoption or the price of ether. Any disruption of validation on the Ethereum network could interfere with network operations and cause the Ethereum network to be less attractive to users and application developers than competing blockchain networks, which could cause the price of ether to decrease. The limited liquidity during the “activation” or “exiting” processes could dissuade potential validators from participating, which could interfere with network operations or security and cause the Ethereum network to be less attractive to users and application developers than competing blockchain networks, which could cause the price of ether to decrease. validator.
Paragraph 148 · 46% changed Every version of it
Given the foundational role that stablecoins play in global digital asset markets, their fundamental liquidity can have a dramatic impact on the broader digital asset market, including the market for ether. Because a large A significant portion of the digital asset market still depends continues to depend on stablecoins such as Tether and USDC, there is a risk that USDC. As such, any disruption in the operation or perceived stability of these stablecoins such as a disorderly de-pegging event or a run-on Tether or USDC loss of market confidence resulting in a run on reserves could lead to dramatic substantial market volatility in across digital assets more broadly. Volatility in stablecoins, operational issues with stablecoins (for example, technical issues that prevent settlement), concerns about the sufficiency of any reserves that support stablecoins or potential manipulative activity when unbacked stablecoins are used to pay for other digital assets (including ether), or regulatory concerns about stablecoin issuers or intermediaries, such as exchanges, that support stablecoins, or the removal or migration of prominent stablecoins away from the Ethereum network, could impact individuals’ willingness to trade on trading venues that rely on stablecoins, reduce liquidity in the ether market, and affect the value of ether, and in turn impact an investment in the Shares.
Paragraph 89 · 44% changed Every version of it
Validation on the Ethereum network requires ether to be transferred into smart contracts on the underlying blockchain networks not under the Trust’s or anyone else’s control. If the Ethereum network source code or protocol fail to behave as expected, suffer cybersecurity attacks or hacks, experience security issues, or encounter other problems, such assets may be irretrievably lost. The Ethereum network imposes three types of sanctions for validator misbehavior or inactivity, which would result in a portion of their staked ether being destroyed or “burned”: penalties, slashing and inactivity leaks. A validator may face penalties if it fails to take certain actions, such as providing a timely attestation to a block proposed by another validator. Under this scenario, a validator’s staked ether could be burned in an amount equal to the reward to which it would have been entitled for performing the actions. A more severe sanction (i.e., “slashing”) is imposed if a validator commits malicious acts related to the proposal or attestation of blocks with invalid transactions. Slashing can result in the validator having a portion of its staked ether immediately confiscated, withdrawn or burned by the network, resulting in losses to them. After this initial slashing, the validator is queued for forceful removal from the Ethereum network’s validator “pool,” and more of the validator’s stake is burned over a period of approximately 36 days days, with the exact amount of ether burned and time period determined by the network regardless of whether the validator makes any further slashable errors, at which point the validator is automatically removed from the validator pool. Staked ether may also be burned through a process known as an “inactivity leak,” which is triggered if the Ethereum network has gone too long without finalizing a new block. For a new block to be successfully added to the blockchain, validators that account for at least two thirds of all staked ether must agree on the validity of a proposed block. This means that if validators representing more than one third of the total staked ether are offline, no new blocks can be finalized. To prevent this, an inactivity leak causes the ether staked by the inactive validators to gradually “bleed away” until these inactive validators represent less than one-third of the total stake, thereby allowing the remaining active validators to finalize proposed blocks. This provides a further incentive for validators to remain online and continue performing continuously perform validation activities. Within the post-Merge Ethereum network, as part of the “activating” and “exiting” processes of staking, staked ether will be inaccessible for a variable period of time determined by a range of factors, including network congestion, resulting in potential inaccessibility during those periods. “Activation” is the funding of a validator to be included in the active set, thereby allowing the validator to participate in the Ethereum network’s proof-of-stake consensus protocol. “Exit” is the request to exit from the active set and no longer participate in the Ethereum network’s proof-of-stake consensus protocol. As part of these “activating” and “exiting” processes of staking on the Ethereum network, any staked ether will be inaccessible for a period of time. The duration of activating and exiting periods are dependent on a range of factors, including network conditions. However, depending on demand, un-staking can take between hours, days or weeks to complete. Furthermore, the Ethereum network requires the payment of base fees and the practice of paying tips is common, and such fees can become significant as the amount and complexity of the transaction grows, depending on the degree of network congestion and the price of ether. Any cybersecurity attacks, security issues, hacks, penalties, slashing events, or other problems could damage validators’ willingness to participate in validation, discourage existing and future validators from serving as such, and adversely impact the Ethereum network’s adoption or the price of ether. Any disruption of validation on the Ethereum network could interfere with network operations and cause the Ethereum network to be less attractive to users and application developers than competing blockchain networks, which could cause the price of ether to decrease. The limited liquidity during the “activation” or “exiting” processes could dissuade potential validators from participating, which could interfere with network operations or security and cause the Ethereum network to be less attractive to users and application developers than competing blockchain networks, which could cause the price of ether to decrease.
Paragraph 242 · 39% changed Every version of it
On March 22, 2023, the Prime Execution Agent and its parent, Coinbase Global, Inc. (such parent, “Coinbase Global” and together with Coinbase Inc., the “Relevant Coinbase Entities”) received a “Wells Notice” from the SEC staff stating that the SEC staff made a “preliminary determination” to recommend that the SEC file an enforcement action against the Relevant Coinbase Entities alleging violations of the federal securities laws, including the Exchange Act and the Securities Act. According to Coinbase Global’s public reporting company disclosure, based on discussions with the SEC staff, the Relevant Coinbase Entities believe these potential enforcement actions would relate to aspects of the Relevant Coinbase Entities’ Coinbase Prime service, spot market, staking service Coinbase Earn, and Coinbase Wallet, and the potential civil action may seek injunctive relief, disgorgement, and civil penalties. On June 6, 2023, the SEC filed a complaint against the Relevant Coinbase Entities in federal district court in the Southern District of New York, alleging, inter alia: (i) that Coinbase Inc. has violated the Exchange Act by failing to register with the SEC as a national securities exchange, broker-dealer, and clearing agency, in connection with activities involving certain identified digital assets that the SEC’s complaint alleges are securities, (ii) that Coinbase Inc. has violated the Securities Act by failing to register with the SEC the offer and sale of its staking program, and (iii) that Coinbase Global is jointly and severally liable as a control person under the Exchange Act for Coinbase Inc.’s violations of the Exchange Act to the same extent as Coinbase Inc. The SEC’s complaint against the Relevant Coinbase Entities does did not allege that ether is a security, nor does did it allege that Coinbase Inc’s activities involving ether caused the alleged registration violations, and the Ether Custodian was not named as a defendant. The SEC’s complaint seeks sought a permanent injunction against the Relevant Coinbase Entities to prevent them from violations of the Exchange Act or Securities Act, disgorgement, civil monetary penalties, and such other relief as the court deems appropriate or necessary. Coinbase Inc., as Prime Execution Agent, could be required, as a result of a judicial determination, or could choose, to restrict or curtail the services it offers, or its financial condition and ability to provide services to the Trust could be affected. If the Prime Execution Agent were to be required or choose, as a result of a regulatory action (including, for example, the litigation initiated by the SEC), to restrict or curtail the services it offers, it could negatively affect the Trust’s ability to operate or process creations or redemptions of Baskets, which could force the Trust to liquidate or adversely affect the price of the Shares. While the Ether Custodian is not named in the complaint, if Coinbase Global, as the parent of the Ether Custodian, is required, as a result of a judicial determination, or could choose, to restrict or curtail the services its subsidiaries provide to the Trust, or its financial condition is negatively affected, it could negatively affect the Trust’s ability to operate. Alternatively, the Trustee could decide to replace Coinbase Custody as the Ether Custodian with custody of the Trust’s ether, pursuant to the Custodian Agreement. Similarly, Coinbase Custody or Coinbase Inc. could terminate services under the Custodian Agreement or the Amended and Restated Coinbase Prime Broker Agreement (the “Prime Execution Agent Agreement”) respectively upon providing the applicable notice to the Trust for any reason, or immediately for Cause (a “Termination for Cause” is defined in the Custodian Agreement as (i) the Trust materially breaching any provision of the Custodian Agreement; (ii) the Trust becomes bankrupt or insolvent; or (iii) the Trust fails to pay and settle in full its obligations to Coinbase Custody’s affiliate, the Trade Credit Lender (as defined below), which may, from time to time, provide financing to the Trust in the form of Trade Credits). Transferring maintenance responsibilities of the Trust’s account at the Ether Custodian to another custodian will likely be complex and could subject the Trust’s ether to the risk of loss during the transfer, which could have a negative impact on the performance of the Shares or result in loss of the Trust’s assets. As Prime Execution Agent, Coinbase Inc. does not guarantee uninterrupted access to the Trading Platform or the services it provides to the Trust as Prime Execution Agent. Under certain circumstances, Coinbase Inc. is permitted to halt or suspend trading on its trading platform, or impose limits on the amount or size of, or reject, the Trust’s orders, including in the event of, among others, (a) delays, suspension of operations, failure in performance, or interruption of service that are directly due to a cause or condition beyond the reasonable control of Coinbase Inc, (b) the Trust has engaged in unlawful or abusive activities or fraud, (c) the acceptance of the Trust’s order would cause the amount of Trade Credits extended to exceed the maximum amount of Trade Credit (as defined below) that the Trust’s agreement with the Trade Credit Lender permits to be outstanding at any one time, or (d) a security or technology issue occurred and is continuing that results in Coinbase Inc. being unable to provide trading services or accept the Trust’s order, in each case, subject to certain protections for the Trust. Also, if Coinbase Custody or Coinbase Inc. become insolvent, suffer business failure, cease business operations, default on or fail to perform their obligations under their contractual agreements with the Trust, or abruptly discontinue the services they provide to the Trust for any reason, the Trust’s operations including its creation and redemption processes would be adversely affected.
Paragraph 250 · 39% changed Every version of it
The Trust is not a banking institution or otherwise a member of the FDIC or Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) and, therefore, deposits held with or assets held by the Trust are not subject to the protections enjoyed by depositors with FDIC or SIPC member institutions. In addition, neither the Trust nor Coinbase Global has informed the Sponsor insure the Trust’s ether. Coinbase Global that it maintains a commercial crime insurance policy of up to $320 million, policy, which is intended to cover the loss of client assets held by Coinbase Global and all of its subsidiaries, including the Ether Custodian and the Prime Execution Agent (collectively, Coinbase Global and its subsidiaries are referred to as the “Coinbase Insureds”), including from employee collusion or fraud, physical loss including theft, damage of key material, security breach or hack, and fraudulent transfer. The insurance maintained by the Coinbase Global is shared among all of Coinbase’s customers, is not specific to the Trust or to customers holding ether with the Ether Custodian or Prime Execution Agent and may not be available or sufficient to protect the Trust from all possible losses or sources of losses. Coinbase Global’s insurance may not cover the type of losses experienced by the Trust. Alternatively, the Trust may be forced to share such insurance proceeds with other clients or customers of the Coinbase Insureds, which could reduce the amount of such proceeds that are available to the Trust. In addition, the digital asset insurance market is limited, and the level of insurance maintained by Coinbase Global may be substantially lower than the assets of the Trust. While the Ether Custodian maintains certain capital reserve requirements depending on the assets under custody, and such capital reserves may provide additional means to cover client asset losses, the Trust cannot be assured that the Ether Custodian will maintain capital reserves sufficient to cover actual or potential losses with respect to the Trust’s digital assets. Furthermore, under the Custodian Agreement, the Ether Custodian’s liability None of Coinbase Inc., Coinbase Custody, or Coinbase Global is limited as follows, among others: (i) other than with respect to claims and losses arising from spot trading of ether, an FDIC or fraud or willful misconduct, the Mutually Capped Liabilities (defined below), the Ether Custodian’s aggregate liability under the Custodian Agreement shall not exceed the greater of (A) the greater of (x) $5 million and (y) the aggregate fees paid by the Trust to the Ether Custodian in the 12 months prior to the event giving rise to the Ether Custodian’s liability, and (B) the value of the affected ether or cash giving rise to the Ether Custodian’s liability; (ii) the Ether Custodian’s aggregate liability in respect of each cold storage address shall not exceed $100 million; (iii) in respect of the Ether Custodian’s obligations to indemnify the Trust and its affiliates against third-party claims and losses to the extent arising out of or relating to, among others, the Ether Custodian’s gross negligence, violation of its confidentiality, data protection and/or information security obligations, or violation of any law, rule or regulation with respect to the provision of its services (the “Mutually Capped Liabilities”), the Ether Custodian’s liability shall not exceed the greater of (A) $5 million and (B) the aggregate fees paid by the Trust to the Ether Custodian in the 12 months prior to the event giving rise to the Ether Custodian’s liability; and (iv) in respect of any incidental, indirect, special, punitive, consequential or similar losses, the Ether Custodian is not liable, even if the Ether Custodian has been advised of or knew or should have known of the possibility thereof. In general, the Ether Custodian is not liable under the Custodian Agreement unless in the event of its negligence, fraud, material violation of applicable law or willful misconduct. The Ether Custodian is not liable for delays, suspension of operations, failure in performance, or interruption of service to the extent it is directly due to a cause or condition beyond the reasonable control of the Ether Custodian. In the event of potential losses incurred by the Trust as a result of the Ether Custodian losing control of the Trust’s ether or failing to properly execute instructions on behalf of the Trust, the Ether Custodian’s liability with respect to the Trust will be subject to certain limitations which may allow it to avoid liability for potential losses or may be insufficient to cover the value of such potential losses, even if the Ether Custodian directly caused such losses. Furthermore, the insurance maintained by the Ether Custodian may be insufficient to cover its liabilities to the Trust. SIPC member institution.
Paragraph 215 · 38% changed Every version of it
Intellectual property rights claims may Any of these factors could adversely affect the performance of the Trust and the value of the Shares.
Paragraph 90 · 38% changed Every version of it
Validation on the Ethereum network requires ether to be transferred into smart contracts on the underlying blockchain networks not under the Trust’s or anyone else’s control. If the Ethereum network source code or protocol fail to behave as expected, suffer cybersecurity attacks or hacks, experience security issues, or encounter other problems, such assets may be irretrievably lost. The Ethereum network imposes three types of sanctions for validator misbehavior or inactivity, which would result in a portion of their staked ether being destroyed or “burned”: penalties, slashing and inactivity leaks. A validator may face penalties if it fails to take certain actions, such as providing a timely attestation to a block proposed by another validator. Under this scenario, a validator’s staked ether could be burned in an amount equal to the reward to which it would have been entitled for performing the actions. A more severe sanction (i.e., “slashing”) is imposed if a validator commits malicious acts related to the proposal or attestation of blocks with invalid transactions. Slashing can result in the validator having a portion of its staked ether immediately confiscated, withdrawn or burned by the network, resulting in losses to them. After this initial slashing, the validator is queued for forceful removal from the Ethereum network’s validator “pool,” and more of the validator’s stake is burned over a period of approximately 36 days with the exact amount of ether burned and time period determined by the network regardless of whether the validator makes any further slashable errors, at which point the validator is automatically removed from the validator pool. Staked ether may also be burned through a process known as an “inactivity leak,” which is triggered if the Ethereum network has gone too long without finalizing a new block. For a new block to be successfully added to the blockchain, validators that account for at least two thirds of all staked ether must agree on the validity of a proposed block. This means that if validators representing more than one third of the total staked ether are offline, no new blocks can be finalized. To prevent this, an inactivity leak causes the ether staked by the inactive validators to gradually “bleed away” until these inactive validators represent less than one-third of the total stake, thereby allowing the remaining active validators to finalize proposed blocks. This provides a further incentive for validators to remain online and continue performing validation activities. Within the post-Merge Ethereum network, as part of the “activating” and “exiting” processes of staking, staked ether will be inaccessible for a variable period of time determined by a range of factors, including network congestion, resulting in potential inaccessibility during those periods. “Activation” is the funding of a validator to be included in the active set, thereby allowing the validator to participate in the Ethereum network’s proof-of-stake consensus protocol. “Exit” is the request to exit from the active set and no longer participate in the Ethereum network’s proof-of-stake consensus protocol. As part of these “activating” and “exiting” processes of staking on the Ethereum network, any staked ether will be inaccessible for a period of time. The duration of activating and exiting periods are dependent on a range of factors, including network conditions. However, depending on In periods of low demand, un-staking can may be completed within hours or several days, while in periods of elevated exit activity the process may take between hours, days multiple weeks or weeks longer to complete. Furthermore, the The Ethereum network requires the payment of base fees and the practice of paying tips is common, and such fees can become significant as the amount and complexity of the transaction grows, depending on the degree of network congestion and the price of ether. Any cybersecurity attacks, security issues, hacks, penalties, slashing events, or other problems could damage validators’ willingness to participate in validation, discourage existing and future validators from serving as such, and adversely impact the Ethereum network’s adoption or the price of ether. Any disruption of validation on the Ethereum network could interfere with network operations and cause the Ethereum network to be less attractive to users and application developers than competing blockchain networks, which could cause the price of ether to decrease. The limited liquidity during the “activation” or “exiting” processes could dissuade potential validators from participating, which could interfere with network operations or security and cause the Ethereum network to be less attractive to users and application developers than competing blockchain networks, which could cause the price of ether to decrease.

MD&A

19 paragraphs · 0 new · 10 reworded · 0 gone · 10-K Feb 27, 2026 against Mar 5, 2025
New paragraph Reworded (5% of its words or more) Same or nearly
Paragraph 13 · 24% changed
The Financial Statement NAV of $30.86 $36.46 on December 6, 2024 August 22, 2025 was the highest during the period, year, compared with a low of $16.85 $11.09 on September 6, 2024. April 8, 2025.
Paragraph 11 · 22% changed
The Trust’s net asset value increased from $3,571,262,167 at December 31, 2024 to $10,300,756,520 at December 31, 2025, a 188.43% increase. The increase in the Trust’s net asset value resulted primarily from an increase in the number of outstanding Shares, which rose from 400,000 Shares at May 21, 2024 to 141,480,000 Shares at December 31, 2024, 2024 to 458,720,000 at December 31, 2025, a consequence of 147,280,000 546,320,000 Shares (3,682 (13,658 Baskets) being created and 6,200,000 Shares(155 229,080,000 Shares (5,727 Baskets) being redeemed during the period. year. The increase in the Trust’s net asset value also benefited from an increase was partially offset by a decrease in the price of ether, which grew 1.03% fell 10.86% from the Trust’s first ether purchase of $3,299.54 on June 24, 2024 to $3,333.60 at December 31, 2024. 2024 to $2,971.55 at December 31, 2025.
Paragraph 12 · 18% changed
The 0.96% increase 11.01% decrease in the NAV for purposes of the Trust’s periodic financial statements (“Financial Statement NAV”) from $25.00 at May 21, 2024 (Date of Seeding) to $25.24 at December 31, 2024 to $22.46 at December 31, 2025 is directly related to the 1.03% increase 10.86% decrease in the price of ether. The Financial Statement NAV increased decreased slightly less more than the price of ether on a percentage basis due to the net Sponsor’s fees, Fee, which were $888,986 was $18,411,090 for the period, year, or 0.08% 0.23% of the Trust’s average weighted assets of $1,087,092,372 $8,063,917,630 during the period. year.
Paragraph 14 · 17% changed
Net increase decrease in net assets resulting from operations for the period year ended December 31, 2024 2025 was $34,418,803, $2,315,493,008, resulting from an unrealized gain loss on investment in ether of $27,767,502 $2,262,771,767, a net investment loss of $18,411,090, and a net realized loss of $22,070 from ether sold to pay expenses and a net realized gain of $7,562,357 $195,777,445 from ether sold for the redemption of Shares. Shares, partially offset by a net realized gain of $135,453 from ether sold to pay expenses, and a net realized gain of $161,331,841 from ether paid for the in-kind redemption of shares. Other than the net Sponsor’s fees Fee of $888,986, $18,411,090, the Trust had no expenses during the period. year.
Paragraph 16 · 9% changed
The 0.96% increase in the Financial Statement NAV for purposes of the Trust’s periodic financial statements (“Financial Statement NAV”) from $25.00 at May 21, 2024 (Date of Seeding) to $25.24 at December 31, 2024 is directly related to the 1.03% increase in the price of ether. The Financial Statement NAV increased slightly less than the price of ether on a percentage basis due to the net Sponsor’s fees, Fee, which were was $888,986 for the period, or 0.08% of the Trust’s average weighted assets of $1,087,092,372 during the period.

A paragraph is matched with the one last year that shares the most of its words; under half in common makes it new. The paragraphs shown are the 8 reworded the most in each section.

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Marked against last year's 10-K: cut words struck through, new words highlighted.

Risk Factors702 words changed in this paragraph; it is 56% similar to last year's version.
During the course of the block validation processes, validators exercise the discretion to select which transactions to include within a block and in what order to include these transactions. Beyond the standard block reward and transaction fees, validators on many blockchains, including the Ethereum blockchain, have the ability to extract what is known as Maximal Extractable Value (“MEV”) by strategically choosing, reordering, or excluding certain transactions during block production in return for increased transaction fees or other forms of profit for such validators. In blockchain networks that facilitate DeFi protocols in particular, such as the Ethereum network, users may attempt to gain an advantage over other users by offering additional fees to validators for effecting the a certain order or inclusions of certain transactions within a block. Certain software solutions, such as MEV Boost by Flashbots, have been developed which facilitate validators and other parties in the ecosystem in capturing MEV. MEV Boost is one way to capture MEV on the Ethereum network, but it is not the only way, although it is widely understood that most validation on the Ethereum network involves MEV Boost. MEV Boost is designed to separate block building from block proposal (“proposer-builder separation”), with the intent to decentralize validation activity and reduce the likelihood of transaction censorship by validators. In MEV Boost, there are four groups of market participants: “searchers”, who identify MEV opportunities by scanning the publicly visible so-called memory pool (“mempool”) of pending but unexecuted transactions awaiting validation; “builders”, who take transactions awaiting validation and build them into potential blocks in a manner that captures the MEV opportunities identified by searchers, but do not propose the block to the Ethereum network; “relays”, who send limited information about the block (such as the amount of transaction fees payable to the validator), but not the complete list of transactions, to the validator who will propose them to the Ethereum network; and “proposers”, the validators who have been selected by the Ethereum network to propose a particular block, who are generally intended to accept blocks in the form proposed by block builders and relayed by relays without changing their contents (leading to the intended proposer-builder separation that MEV-Boost was designed to facilitate). The presence of MEV on many blockchains, including the Ethereum blockchain, may incentivize associated practices such as sandwich attacks or front running that can have negative repercussions on DeFi users. A “sandwich attack” on many blockchains that enable DeFi transactions, including the Ethereum blockchain, is executed by placing two transactions around a large, detected transaction to capitalize on the expected price impact. For instance, a market participant (such as a searcher on MEV Boost) might identify a sizable transaction within the publicly visible so-called memory pool (“mempool”) of pending but unexecuted transactions awaiting validation mempool that will significantly alter an asset’s price on a decentralized exchange. The participant could then for example orchestrate a transaction bundle: one transaction to acquire the asset prior to the detected transaction, followed by the large transaction itself, and a final transaction to sell the asset after the market price has increased due to the large transaction’s execution. Such transaction bundles can be submitted to validators through mechanisms like MEV-Boost, MEV-Boost (in the case of the Ethereum network, with other networks having other mechanisms), with validators receiving a share of the profits as an incentive to include the specific transaction bundle in the block. In the context of MEV, MEV on the Ethereum network, “front running” is said to occur when a user spots a transaction in the mempool, and then pays a high transaction fee to a validator to have their transaction executed on a priority basis in a manner designed to profit from the pending but unexecuted transaction that is still in the mempool. MEV may also compromise the predictability of transaction execution, execution on many blockchains, including the Ethereum blockchain, which may deter usage of the network as a whole. Although based on widely available information given that transactions in the mempool are publicly visible, any there have also been instances of validators allegedly leveraging the MEV-Boost software to allegedly trick the software into prematurely releasing the full contents of proposed blocks, such as by a block proposer providing a false signature to the relay. For example, in April 2023, certain Ethereum validators (acting as proposers) allegedly exploited the MEV Boost software that allegedly allowed them to view the full contents of proposed blocks submitted by relays before this information was made public (for example, by allegedly signing transactions with relays using false signatures), allegedly enabling them to insert their own front-running transactions (acting as builders) in front of the front-running transactions originally identified by searchers, propose modified blocks containing those front-running transactions, and allegedly capture approximately $25 million in profits by manipulating block order to the detriment of the original sandwichers (i.e., the searchers who identified MEV opportunities for block builders to incorporate into potential blocks and relays to relay to potential proposers). On May 15, 2024, Anton Peraire-Bueno and James Peraire-Bueno were indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for this exploitation of MEV-Boost and specifically charged with wire fraud, wire fraud conspiracy, and money laundering. They assert defenses on a variety of grounds, including, among others, that the searchers in MEV Boost conducted the original sandwich attacks, which victimize ordinary traders by driving up costs and exploiting their trades in the publicly visible mempool in the first place. As of the date of this report, the case has not been decided yet. The case, which the indictment itself acknowledges is the “first of its kind”, raises novel issues for the digital assets industry given that validators attempting to capture MEV is a widespread practice on many blockchain networks, including the Ethereum network, and is widely viewed as a test case by legal commentators, illustrating that applicable law and regulation around MEV remains unsettled. Any potential perception of MEV a sun fair manipulation as unfair manipulation, despite its prevalence on many blockchain networks, including the Ethereum network, may also lead to adverse publicity, legal and regulatory uncertainty, or discourage users and other stakeholders from engaging with DeFi protocols or the Ethereum network in general. general, which could cause ether to lose value. In addition, it is possible governmental authorities, regulators or legislators could enact rules which restrict practices associated with MEV, which could diminish the popularity of the Ethereum network among users and validators. Any validators and could - if it hampers or impedes existing validation processes - potentially even lead to a reduction in network security or cause ether to lose value. MEV is a novel issue, and while it is impossible to predict with certainty how it could affect the price of ether over time, any of these or other outcomes related to MEV may adversely affect the value of ether and the value of the Shares.

Source: Item 1A, 10-K 0001437749-26-006054 vs Item 1A, 10-K 0001437749-25-006261

MD&A53 words changed in this paragraph; it is 73% similar to last year's version.
The Trust’s net asset value increased from $3,571,262,167 at December 31, 2024 to $10,300,756,520 at December 31, 2025, a 188.43% increase. The increase in the Trust’s net asset value resulted primarily from an increase in the number of outstanding Shares, which rose from 400,000 Shares at May 21, 2024 to 141,480,000 Shares at December 31, 2024, 2024 to 458,720,000 at December 31, 2025, a consequence of 147,280,000 546,320,000 Shares (3,682 (13,658 Baskets) being created and 6,200,000 Shares(155 229,080,000 Shares (5,727 Baskets) being redeemed during the period. year. The increase in the Trust’s net asset value also benefited from an increase was partially offset by a decrease in the price of ether, which grew 1.03% fell 10.86% from the Trust’s first ether purchase of $3,299.54 on June 24, 2024 to $3,333.60 at December 31, 2024. 2024 to $2,971.55 at December 31, 2025.

Source: Item 7, 10-K 0001437749-26-006054 vs Item 7, 10-K 0001437749-25-006261

Accounting Policies40 words changed in this paragraph; it is 56% similar to last year's version.
Coinbase Custody Trust Company, LLC (the “Ether Custodian”) is responsible for safekeeping the ether owned by the Trust. Anchorage Digital Bank N.A. is the “Additional Ether Custodian” for the Trust. At the current time, the Sponsor has no plans to move any of the Trust’s ether to the Additional Ether Custodian. The Ether Custodian is and the Additional Ether Custodian are appointed by the Trustee.

Source: 10-K text, Note 2 – Significant Accounting Policies, 10-K 0001437749-26-006054 vs 10-K text, Note 2 – Significant Accounting Policies, 10-K 0001437749-25-006261

Sentences and paragraphs added, removed or reworded

Every change, by type

Sentences and paragraphs of ETHA's Risk Factors and MD&A, 10-K Feb 27, 2026 against 10-K Mar 5, 2025. Each links to the text at sec.gov.

Quiet changes are sentences kept from last year with one to four words changed, at least one of them a hedge, a modal or a qualifier (may, could, will, not, significant, material…). A year or date rolling forward is not counted.

The full word list

adverse, adversely, all, although, anticipate, anticipates, any, approximately, believe, believes, can, cannot, certain, could, expect, expects, generally, however, if, intend, intends, largely, likely, many, material, materially, may, might, most, must, never, no, not, possible, primarily, probable, should, significant, significantly, some, substantial, substantially, unlikely, will, would

AddedRisk Factors
On March 6, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order for the “Establishment of the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and United States Digital Asset Stockpile” (the “Order”). The Order requires the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury to establish two offices to administer and maintain a “Strategic Bitcoin Reserve” (the “Bitcoin Reserve”) and a U.S. Digital Asset Stockpile (the “Digital Asset Stockpile”), respectively. The Bitcoin Reserve will be capitalized with bitcoin forfeited as part of U.S. criminal or civil proceedings or in satisfaction of penalties imposed by executive agencies. The Order directs the Secretaries of the U.S. Treasury Department and the U.S. Department of Commerce to develop budget-neutral strategies for acquiring additional bitcoin for the Bitcoin Reserve. As established by the Order, the Bitcoin Reserve will not contain ether, and there can be no assurance, and there is no present indication, that it would be changed to include ether in the future. The Digital Asset Stockpile will be capitalized initially with digital assets other than bitcoin forfeited as part of criminal or civil asset forfeiture proceedings, which could include ether; however, there will be no new acquisitions of ether as part of the Digital Asset Stockpile. The anticipation of a U.S. government-funded strategic cryptocurrency reserve may have motivated large-scale purchases of ether in the expectation of the U.S. government potentially acquiring ether to fund such an expected reserve, and the market price of ether may have decreased as a result of the ultimate content of the Order, which did not ultimately provide for acquisition of ether as part of the Bitcoin Reserve, though ether could be held as part of the Digital Asset Stockpile. While legislation has been introduced in the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, which would direct the acquisition of one million bitcoin by the federal government over a five-year period, no such similar federal legislation has been introduced that would provide for acquiring ether. Even if such legislation providing for the acquisition of ether were to be introduced at the federal level, it could fail to pass. Bills have also been introduced in several state legislatures to authorize the acquisition of bitcoin by state governments or their instrumentalities, some of which have failed to pass; however, the Sponsor is not aware as of the date of this report that similar legislation at the state level has been introduced in respect of ether, in the same quantity as legislation in respect of bitcoin. If now or in the future, the U.S. federal government or any state government or any instrumentality thereof does not announce ether acquisition plans or does announce such plans, but these plans fall short of market expectations, the price of ether may decline, which may impact Share value. Even if government acquisitions of ether were to occur or if legislation requiring acquisitions of ether is enacted, the price of ether may decline if there are implementation challenges, unexpected difficulties, or policy or legal reversals, any of which may negatively impact Share value. Further, executive orders such as the Order are subject to change and can be reversed or overturned. The enduring existence and size of the Digital Asset Stockpile is subject to complex challenges and uncertainty that makes it difficult to evaluate its effect on the value of ether and the Shares, now or in the future. There can be no assurance that any particular legislation will ever be introduced or passed at either the federal or state level providing for the acquisition of ether by governmental instrumentalities.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
AddedRisk Factors
The Ethereum core developers have agreed on December 2025 as the date of the upcoming Fusaka hard fork, which is designed to expand data capacity, reinforce defenses against denial-of-service attacks, and introduce new tools for developers and users, among others. The main feature of the Fusaka upgrade is a new way of handling the data in the blobs introduced by the Dencun upgrade, which is expected to create improvements for Layer 2s to store data on the main Ethereum network. As with any change to software code, planned forks such as Fusaka could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, security risks, problematic incentive structures, or otherwise fail to work as intended or achieve the expected benefits that proponents hope for in the short term or the long term, which could also have an adverse effect on adoption of the Ethereum network and the value of ether, and therefore the Shares.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
AddedRisk Factors
The complexity and interconnectedness of digital asset networks, applications, and economic systems enables new forms of malicious attacks that leverage a feature or vulnerability of one system to attack another. Such an attack may take the form of a temporary manipulation of the price of certain digital assets that trigger second order behaviors, such as automatic collateral liquidations on decentralized applications or digital asset trading platforms. Such an attack could adversely affect investments. A malicious actor can exploit the structure of one or a series of smart contracts or applications in ways that do not technically constitute exploitation of a “bug” or flaw in the smart contract or application. For example, such an exploit has occurred repeatedly in the Ethereum DeFi ecosystem, whereby a decentralized trading platform or lending application is designed to reference an external pricing source of a particular digital asset to determine when to liquidate collateral. By manipulating the price of the particular digital asset on a third-party platform (such as a digital asset trading platform), the pricing source used by the decentralized trading platform or application is consequently manipulated, which then leads to uneconomic collateral liquidations on the decentralized trading platform or application. Such liquidations may be processed automatically and could have a material adverse effect on our investments and trading strategies.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
AddedRisk Factors
Some digital assets have a limit (“hard cap”) on the supply of outstanding digital assets. There is no hard cap on the supply of ether, which will continue to be issued as a reward to validators for new blocks. The prices of many digital assets like ether are heavily influenced by supply and demand. If the supply of ether is inflationary, then in the absence of deflationary forces, ether could lose value, assuming the same amount of demand.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
AddedRisk Factors
Additional risks such as operational failures (e.g., technical issues that prevent settlement), concerns regarding the adequacy or transparency of reserve assets backing stablecoins, the use of unbacked or undercollateralized stablecoins in potentially manipulative trading practices and regulatory scrutiny of stablecoin issuers or intermediaries, including exchanges that facilitate stablecoin transactions, may also adversely affect market confidence and liquidity. Further, these risks are underscored by recent legislative developments. On July 18, 2025, the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act of 2025 (“GENIUS Act”) was enacted, establishing a federal regulatory framework for payment stablecoins. The GENIUS Act will become effective on July 18, 2028. The GENIUS Act prohibits the issuance or use of payment stablecoins unless the issuer obtains a qualifying license and complies with a range of regulatory requirements, including reserve backing with liquid assets, redemption rights, governance standards, and operational transparency. The GENIUS Act also restricts the payment of interest on stablecoins and imposes oversight on both bank and nonbank issuers. The enactment of the GENIUS Act, or the removal or migration of prominent stablecoins from the Ethereum network, could reduce the willingness of market participants to engage in digital asset transactions that rely on stablecoins, diminish liquidity in the ether market, and adversely affect the price of ether. Any such developments could, in turn, materially and adversely impact the value of the Shares.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
AddedRisk Factors
In recent times, a number of companies engaged in businesses outside the digital asset industry have begun to hold their corporate treasuries in digital assets instead of in fiat currency (“digital asset treasury companies”). In some cases, these companies have raised funds through financing or securities offerings and applied the proceeds to purchase digital assets, including ether.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
AddedRisk Factors
Digital asset treasury companies are a relatively new phenomenon and it is difficult to predict their long-term sustainability, and therefore their impact to digital asset markets, and to the Trust. Digital asset treasury companies may increase procyclical dynamics in the market because they may purchase digital assets, such as ether, when prices are rising and they may in certain circumstances be forced to sell such assets when prices are decreasing, potentially causing downward pressure on ether prices in a falling market (causing prices to fall faster than they otherwise would). Digital asset treasury companies could cause greater volatility in digital asset markets, including markets for ether. Negative events or sentiment surrounding digital asset treasury companies could affect the market for ether. The increase of consolidated positions in ether held by digital asset treasury companies could affect the operation of the Ethereum blockchain. One digital asset treasury company, BitMine Immersion Technology Inc. (“BitMine Immersion”), held approximately 2.8% of ether’s supply as of November 3, 2025. If BitMine Immersion or another similarly situated digital asset treasury company begins to operate validators, it could gain influence in how the Ethereum blockchain operates. The foregoing or similar events involving digital asset treasury companies could adversely affect holders of Shares in the Trust.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
Show the other 37
AddedRisk Factors
If transaction confirmation fees become too high, the marketplace may be reluctant to use ether. This may result in decreased usage and limit expansion of the Ethereum network in the retail, commercial and payments space, adversely impacting investment in the Trust. Conversely, if the reward for validators or the value of the transaction fees is insufficient to motivate validators, they may cease to validate transactions.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
AddedRisk Factors
Ultimately, if the awards of new ether costs of validating transactions grow disproportionately, validators may operate at a loss, transition to other networks, or cease operations altogether. Each of these outcomes could, in turn, slow transaction validation and usage, which could have a negative impact on the Ethereum network and could adversely affect the value of the ether held by the Trust. As a result of Ethereum’s fee burning mechanism, the incentives for validators to validate transactions with higher gas fees may be reduced, since fee burning changes the gas fee split between users, validators, and token holders.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
AddedRisk Factors
An acute cessation of validator operations would reduce the collective processing power on the Ethereum network, which would adversely affect the transaction verification process by temporarily decreasing the speed at which blocks are added to the blockchain and make the blockchain more vulnerable to a malicious actor obtaining control in excess of 50% of the processing power on the blockchain. Reductions in processing power could result in material, though temporary, delays in transaction confirmation time. Any reduction in confidence in the transaction verification process may adversely impact the value of Shares of the Trust or the ability of the Sponsor to operate.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RemovedRisk Factors
Alternatively, some developers may be funded by entities whose interests are at odds with other participants in the Ethereum network. In addition, a bad actor could also attempt to interfere with the operation of the Ethereum network by attempting to exercise a malign influence over a core developer. To the extent that material issues arise with the Ethereum network protocol and the core developers and open-source contributors are unable to address the issues adequately or in a timely manner, the Ethereum network and an investment in the Trust may be adversely affected.
Read it in 10-K Mar 5, 2025 at sec.gov
RemovedRisk Factors
The Trust is currently only able to accept cash purchase orders and redemption orders, which means that an Authorized Participant will deliver only cash to create Shares and will receive only cash when redeeming Shares and the Trust will choose, in its sole discretion, to enter into a transaction with an Ether Trading Counterparty or the Prime Execution Agent to buy or sell ether in exchange for cash. However, and in common with other spot ether exchange‑traded products, the Trust is not at this time able to create and redeem Shares via in-kind transactions with Authorized Participants in exchange for ether.
Read it in 10-K Mar 5, 2025 at sec.gov
RemovedRisk Factors
To the knowledge of the Sponsor, exchange-traded products for all spot-market commodities other than digital assets, such as gold and silver, employ in kind creations and redemptions with the underlying asset. The Sponsor believes that it is generally more efficient, and therefore less costly, for spot commodity exchange-traded products to utilize in-kind orders rather than cash orders, because there are fewer steps in the process and therefore there is less operational risk involved when an authorized participant can manage the buying and selling of the underlying asset itself, rather than depend on an unaffiliated party such as the issuer or sponsor of the exchange-traded product. As such, a spot commodity exchange-traded product that only employs cash creations and redemptions and does not permit in-kind creations and redemptions is a relatively novel product, and could be impacted by any resulting operational inefficiencies.
Read it in 10-K Mar 5, 2025 at sec.gov
RemovedRisk Factors
Even if In-Kind Regulatory Approval were obtained, there can be no assurance that in-kind creations or redemptions of the Shares will be available in the future, or that broker-dealers would be willing to serve as Authorized Participants with respect to the in-kind creation and redemption of Shares. Any of these factors could adversely affect the performance of the Trust and the value of the Shares.
Read it in 10-K Mar 5, 2025 at sec.gov
RemovedRisk Factors
President Biden’s March 9, 2022 Executive Order, asserting that technological advances and the rapid growth of the digital asset markets “necessitate an evaluation and alignment of the United States Government approach to digital assets,” signals an ongoing focus on digital asset policy and regulation in the United States. A number of reports issued pursuant to the Executive Order have focused on various risks related to the digital asset ecosystem and have recommended additional legislation and regulatory oversight. There have also been several bills introduced in Congress that propose to establish additional regulation and oversight of the digital asset markets.
Read it in 10-K Mar 5, 2025 at sec.gov
RewordedRisk Factors
(i) other than with respect to claims and losses arising from spot trading of ether, or fraud or willful misconduct, or the PB Mutually Capped Liabilities (defined below), the Prime Execution Agent’s Ether Custodian’s aggregate liability under the Custodian Agreement shall not exceed the greater of (A) the greater of (x) $5 million and (y) the aggregate fees paid by the Trust to the Prime Execution Agent Ether Custodian in the 12 months prior to the event giving rise to the Prime Execution Agent’s Ether Custodian’s liability, and (B) the value of the cash or affected ether or cash giving rise to the Prime Execution Agent’s Ether Custodian’s liability; (ii) the Ether Custodian’s aggregate liability in respect of each cold storage address shall not exceed $100 million; (iii) in respect of the Prime Execution Agent’s Ether Custodian’s obligations to indemnify the Trust and its affiliates against third-party claims and losses to the extent arising out of or relating to, among others, the Prime Execution Agent’s Ether Custodian’s gross negligence, violation of its confidentiality, data protection and/or information security obligations, or violation of any law, rule or regulation with respect to the provision of its services, or the full amount of the Trust’s assets lost due to the insolvency of or security event at a Connected Trading Venue (as defined below) services (the “PB Mutually “Mutually Capped Liabilities”), the Prime Execution Agent’s Ether Custodian’s liability shall not exceed the greater of (A) $5 million and (B) the aggregate fees paid by the Trust to the Prime Execution Agent Ether Custodian in the 12 months prior to the event giving rise to the Prime Execution Agent’s Ether Custodian’s liability; and (iii) (iv) in respect of any incidental, indirect, special, punitive, consequential or similar losses, the Prime Execution Agent Ether Custodian is not liable, even if the Prime Execution Agent Ether Custodian has been advised of or knew or should have known of the possibility thereof.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedRisk Factors
Similarly, Coinbase Custody or Coinbase Inc. could terminate services under the Custodian Agreement or the Amended and Restated Coinbase Prime Broker Agreement (the “Prime Execution Agent Agreement”) respectively upon providing the applicable notice to the Trust for any reason, or immediately for Cause (a “Termination for Cause” is defined in the Custodian Agreement as (i) the Trust materially breaching any provision of the Custodian Agreement; (ii) the Trust becomes bankrupt or insolvent; insolvent; or (iii) the Trust fails to pay and settle in full its obligations to Coinbase Custody’s affiliate, the Trade Credit Lender (as defined below), which may, from time to time, provide financing to the Trust in the form of Trade Credits). Credits.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedRisk Factors
There On May 15, 2025, the Division of Trading and Markets of the SEC and the Office of General Counsel of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) stated that broker-dealers are permitted to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions in connection with spot crypto exchange-traded products; however, there has yet to be definitive regulatory guidance on whether and the specific details of how registered broker-dealers can comply with these SEC rules with regard to transacting in or holding spot ether.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedRisk Factors
Transferring In the event that the Trust transfers maintenance responsibilities of the Trust’s account at the Ether Custodian to another custodian will likely be complex and could subject (or transfers the Trust’s ether from the Ether Custodian or the Prime Execution Agent to the Additional Ether Custodian or vice versa), the Trust’s ether would be subject to a risk of loss during the transfer, which which, if such risk eventuates, could have a negative impact on the performance of the Shares or result in loss of the Trust’s assets.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedRisk Factors
The Rules like those previously proposed rule changes by the SEC, that would amend the definition of a “qualified custodian” under Rule 206(4)-2(d)(6) and expand the current custody rule in 406(4)-2 to cover all digital assets, including ether, and related advisory activities. activities, would likely impose additional regulatory requirements with respect to the custody and storage of digital assets, including ether.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedRisk Factors
In addition, it is possible governmental authorities, regulators or legislators could enact rules which restrict practices associated with MEV, which could diminish the popularity of the Ethereum network among users and validators. validators and could - if it hampers or impedes existing validation processes - potentially even lead to a reduction in network security or cause ether to lose value.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedRisk Factors
Furthermore, Authorized Participants, as broker-dealers, and the Prime Execution Agent and Ether Custodian, Agent, as an entity licensed to conduct virtual currency digital asset business activity by the New York Department of Financial Services Services, the Ether Custodian, as and a limited purpose trust company subject to New York Banking Law, respectively, and the Additional Ether Custodian, as a national trust bank chartered by the OCC, are “financial institutions” subject to the U.S.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedRisk Factors
For instance, a market participant might “searchers”, who identify a sizable transaction within MEV opportunities by scanning the publicly visible so-called memory pool (“mempool”) of pending but unexecuted transactions awaiting validation that will significantly alter an asset’s price on a decentralized exchange. validation;
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedRisk Factors
The Ether Custodian has represented that it is a fiduciary under § 100 of the New York Banking Law and a qualified custodian for purposes of Rule 206(4)-2(d)(6) under the Advisers Act and is licensed to custody the Trust’s ether in trust on the Trust’s behalf. Law.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedRisk Factors
A more severe sanction (i.e., “slashing”) is sanction, known as “slashing,” may be imposed if a validator commits engages in malicious acts related behavior, such as proposing or attesting to the proposal or attestation of blocks with containing invalid transactions.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedRisk Factors
Any MEV is a novel issue, and while it is impossible to predict with certainty how it could affect the price of ether over time, any of these or other outcomes related to MEV may adversely affect the value of ether and the value of the Shares.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedRisk Factors
Moreover, in the event of an insolvency or bankruptcy of the Prime Execution Agent (in the case of the Trading Balance) or the Ether Custodian (in the case of the Vault Balance) in the future, Balance), given that the contractual protections and legal rights of customers with respect to digital assets held on their behalf by third parties are relatively untested in a bankruptcy insolvency of an entity such as the Ether Custodian or Prime Execution Agent these types of entities in the digital asset industry, there is a risk that customers’ assets – including the Trust’s assets – may be considered the property of the bankruptcy estate of the Prime Execution Agent (in the case of the Trading Balance) Balance), or the Ether Custodian (in the case of the Vault Balance), and customers – including the Trust – may be at risk of being treated as general unsecured creditors of such entities and subject to the risk of total loss or markdowns on value of such assets.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
Quiet changesRisk Factors
“Zero knowledge rollups” are generally designed to run the computation needed to validate the transactions off-chain, on the Layer 2 protocol, and submit a proof of validity of a batch of transactions (not all of the entire transactions themselves) that is recorded on the Layer 1 Ethereum network.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
Quiet changesRisk Factors
In blockchain networks that facilitate DeFi protocols in particular, such as the Ethereum network, users may attempt to gain an advantage over other users by offering additional fees to validators for effecting the a certain order or inclusions of certain transactions within a block.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
Quiet changesRisk Factors
These proposed modifications to the Ethereum network’s source code, if adopted, can could lead to forks (referred to as “planned forksˮ because they take place through a formal process).
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
Quiet changesRisk Factors
Further more,many Furthermore, many ether trading venues lack certain safeguards put in place by exchanges for more traditional assets to enhance the stability of trading on the exchanges and prevent “flash crashes,” such as limit-down circuit breakers.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
Quiet changesRisk Factors
If the Authorized Participants or Ether Trading Counterparties have inadequate policies, procedures and controls for complying with applicable anti-money laundering and applicable sanctions laws or the Trust’s procedures or diligence prove to be ineffective, violations of such laws could result, which could result in regulatory liability for the Trust, the Sponsor, the Trustee or their affiliates under such laws, including governmental fines, penalties, and other punishments, as well as potential liability to or cessation of services by the Prime Execution Agent and its affiliates, including the Ether Custodian, under the Prime Execution Agent Agreement and Custodian Agreement, or the Trust’s other service providers and counterparties.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedMD&A
Net increase decrease in net assets resulting from operations for the period year ended December 31, 2024 2025 was $34,418,803, $2,315,493,008, resulting from an unrealized gain loss on investment in ether of $27,767,502 $2,262,771,767, a net investment loss of $18,411,090, and a net realized loss of $22,070 from ether sold to pay expenses and a net realized gain of $7,562,357 $195,777,445 from ether sold for the redemption of Shares. Shares, partially offset by a net realized gain of $135,453 from ether sold to pay expenses, and a net realized gain of $161,331,841 from ether paid for the in-kind redemption of shares.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedMD&A
The increase in the Trust’s net asset value also benefited from an increase was partially offset by a decrease in the price of ether, which grew 1.03% fell 10.86% from the Trust’s first ether purchase of $3,299.54 on June 24, 2024 to $3,333.60 at December 31, 2024. 2024 to $2,971.55 at December 31, 2025.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedMD&A
The increase in the Trust’s net asset value resulted primarily from an increase in the number of outstanding Shares, which rose from 400,000 Shares at May 21, 2024 to 141,480,000 Shares at December 31, 2024, 2024 to 458,720,000 at December 31, 2025, a consequence of 147,280,000 546,320,000 Shares (3,682 (13,658 Baskets) being created and 6,200,000 Shares(155 229,080,000 Shares (5,727 Baskets) being redeemed during the period. year.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedMD&A
The 0.96% increase 11.01% decrease in the NAV for purposes of the Trust’s periodic financial statements (“Financial Statement NAV”) from $25.00 at May 21, 2024 (Date of Seeding) to $25.24 at December 31, 2024 to $22.46 at December 31, 2025 is directly related to the 1.03% increase 10.86% decrease in the price of ether.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedMD&A
The Financial Statement NAV of $30.86 $36.46 on December 6, 2024 August 22, 2025 was the highest during the period, year, compared with a low of $16.85 $11.09 on September 6, 2024. April 8, 2025.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedMD&A
The Financial Statement NAV increased decreased slightly less more than the price of ether on a percentage basis due to the net Sponsor’s fees, Fee, which were $888,986 was $18,411,090 for the period, year, or 0.08% 0.23% of the Trust’s average weighted assets of $1,087,092,372 $8,063,917,630 during the period. year.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedMD&A
The 0.96% increase in the Financial Statement NAV for purposes of the Trust’s periodic financial statements (“Financial Statement NAV”) from $25.00 at May 21, 2024 (Date of Seeding) to $25.24 at December 31, 2024 is directly related to the 1.03% increase in the price of ether.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov
RewordedMD&A
The Trust does not have any officers, directors, or employees, and is administered by the Second Third Amended and Restated Trust Agreement dated as of July 3, 2024, 8, 2025, among the Sponsor, the Trustee and the Delaware Trustee.
Read it in 10-K Feb 27, 2026 at sec.gov

Sources

The two latest 10-Ks on EDGAR, section by section. Each change links to the text at sec.gov.

Also

New risk factors: paragraphs with nothing like them last year, quoted in full.

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