Added10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
The price of ETH has historically been subject to dramatic price fluctuations and is highly volatile.
SBETSharplink
Sharplink undertook a significant strategic shift in June 2025 in our business operations by becoming one of the world’s largest publicly traded companies to adopt Ether (“ETH”), the native token of the Ethereum blockchain, as its primary treasury asset. 10-K, Item 1
- Headquarters
- Miami, FL
- CEO
- Joseph Chalom
- Next results
- around Mar 8, 2027
141 paragraphs in Risk Factors of the 10-K filed Mar 9, 2026 with nothing like them in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025. Quoted exactly. Paragraphs that were only edited are under 10-K change.
Compared with the Risk Factors in the latest 10-K of the other 31 Crypto companies: a paragraph with at least half its words the same at another company is called similar, and the companies are listed under it. A paragraph most of them have is marked boilerplate. No line means no other company has one like it. This counts text; it does not say how serious a risk is.
You should carefully consider the risks described below before making an investment decision. The risks and uncertainties described in this section may not be the only ones we face. Additional risks and uncertainties that are not currently known to us, or that we currently deem immaterial, may also impair our business operations or financial condition. If any of the risks described below or any such additional risks actually occur, our business, financial condition, results of operations and the market price of our securities could be materially adversely affected. In particular, because we have adopted a digital asset treasury strategy centered on acquiring and holding Ether (“ETH”), and a substantial portion of our assets are concentrated in ETH and related digital intangible asset holdings, our financial results and the market price of our securities are subject to significant volatility and may be adversely impacted by events affecting the price, perception, regulation, or technological underpinnings of ETH.
Similar paragraph at 9 of 31 other Crypto companies: ASST, FWDI, GEMI, GME, HUT, LITS, MSTR, WULF and 1 moreAbsent federal regulations, there is a possibility that ETH and LsETH may be classified as a “security.” Any classification of ETH and LsETH as a “security” would subject us to additional regulation and could materially impact the operation of our business.
Neither the SEC nor any other U.S. federal or state regulator has publicly stated whether they agree that ETH is a “security.” Despite the Executive Order titled “Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology” which includes as an objective, “protecting and promoting the ability of individual citizens and private sector entities alike to access and … to maintain self-custody of digital assets,” ETH has not yet been classified with respect to U.S. federal securities laws. Therefore, while (for the reasons discussed below) we believe that ETH is not a “security” within the meaning of the U.S. federal securities laws, and registration of the Company under The Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the “Investment Company Act”) is therefore not required under the applicable securities laws, we acknowledge that a regulatory body or federal court may determine otherwise. Our belief, even if reasonable under the circumstances, would not preclude legal or regulatory action based on such a finding that ETH is a “security” which would require us to register as an investment company under the Investment Company Act.
We have also adapted our process for analyzing the U.S. federal securities law status of ETH and other cryptocurrencies over time, as guidance and case law have evolved. As part of our U.S. federal securities law analytical process, we take into account a number of factors, including the various definitions of “security” under U.S. federal securities laws and federal court decisions interpreting the elements of these definitions, such as the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in the Howey and Reves cases, as well as court rulings, reports, orders, press releases, public statements, and speeches by the SEC Commissioners and SEC Staff providing guidance on when a digital asset or a transaction to which a digital asset may relate may be a security for purposes of U.S. federal securities laws. Our position that ETH is not a “security” is premised, among other reasons, on our conclusion that ETH does not meet the elements of the Howey test. Among the reasons for our conclusion that ETH is not a security is that holders of ETH do not have a reasonable expectation of profits from our efforts in respect of their holding of ETH. Also, ETH ownership does not convey the right to receive any interest, rewards, or other returns.
We acknowledge, however, that the SEC, a federal court or another relevant entity could take a different view. The regulatory treatment of ETH is such that it has drawn significant attention from legislative and regulatory bodies. Application of securities laws to the specific facts and circumstances of digital assets is complex and subject to change. Our conclusion, even if reasonable under the circumstances, would not preclude legal or regulatory action based on a finding that ETH, or any other digital asset we might hold is a “security.” As such, we are at risk of enforcement proceedings against us, which could result in potential injunctions, cease-and-desist orders, fines, and penalties if Ether was determined to be a security by a regulatory body or a court. Such developments could subject us to fines, penalties, and other damages, and adversely affect our business, results of operations, financial condition and prospects.
If we were deemed to be an investment company under the Investment Company Act, applicable restrictions likely would make it impractical for us to continue segments of our business as currently contemplated.
Under Sections 3(a)(1)(A) and (C) of the Investment Company Act, a company generally will be deemed to be an “investment company” if (i) it is, or holds itself out as being, engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities or (ii) it engages, or proposes to engage, in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities and it owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40% of the value of its total assets (exclusive of U.S. government securities, shares of registered money market funds under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act, and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis. Rule 3a-1 under the Investment Company Act generally provides that notwithstanding the Section 3(a)(1)(C) test described in clause (ii) above, an entity will not be deemed to be an “investment company” for purposes of the Investment Company Act if no more than 45% of the value of its assets (exclusive of U.S. government securities, shares of registered money market funds under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act, and cash items) consists of, and no more than 45% of its net income after taxes (for the past four fiscal quarters combined) is derived from, securities other than U.S. government securities, shares of registered money market funds under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act, securities issued by employees’ securities companies, securities issued by qualifying majority owned subsidiaries of such entity, and securities issued by qualifying companies that are controlled primarily by such entity. We do not believe that we are an “investment company” as such term is defined in either Section 3(a)(1)(A) or Section 3(a)(1)(C) of the Investment Company Act.
Similar paragraph at 11 of 31 other Crypto companies: BTBT, CRCL, DFDV, DJT, GEMI, HSDT, HYPD, LITS and 3 moreRecently, we have begun focusing on pursuing opportunities to expand our portfolio into digital assets. With respect to the 40% asset threshold under Section 3(a)(1)(A), following the May 2025 PIPE Offering, proceeds from the offering were used to acquire ETH, resulting in ETH comprising 98% of the Company’s total assets. Since we believe ETH is not an investment security, we do not hold ourselves out as being engaged primarily, or propose to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities within the meaning of Section 3(a)(1)(A) of the Investment Company Act.
With respect to Section 3(a)(1)(C), we believe we satisfy the elements of Rule 3a-1 and therefore are deemed not to be an investment company under, and we intend to conduct our operations such that we will not be deemed an investment company under, Section 3(a)(1)(C). We believe that we are not an investment company pursuant to Rule 3a-1 under the Investment Company Act because, on a consolidated basis with respect to wholly-owned subsidiaries but otherwise on an unconsolidated basis, no more than 45% of the value of the Company’s total assets (exclusive of U.S. government securities, shares of registered money market funds under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act, and cash items) consists of, and no more than 45% of the Company’s net income after taxes (for the last four fiscal quarters combined) is derived from, securities other than U.S. government securities, shares of registered money market funds under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act, securities issued by employees’ securities companies, securities issued by qualifying majority owned subsidiaries of the Company, and securities issued by qualifying companies that are controlled primarily by the Company.
ETH and other digital assets, as well as new business models and transactions enabled by blockchain technologies, present novel interpretive questions under the Investment Company Act. There is a risk that assets or arrangements that we have concluded are not securities could be deemed to be securities by the SEC or another authority for purposes of the Investment Company Act, which would increase the percentage of securities held by us for Investment Company Act purposes. The SEC has requested information from a number of participants in the digital assets’ ecosystem, regarding the potential application of the Investment Company Act to their businesses. For example, in an action unrelated to the Company, in February 2022, the SEC issued a cease-and-desist order under the Investment Company Act to BlockFi Lending LLC, in which the SEC alleged that BlockFi was operating as an unregistered investment company because it issued securities and also held more than 40% of its total assets, excluding cash, in investment securities, including the loans of digital assets made by BlockFi to institutional borrowers.
If we were deemed to be an investment company, Rule 3a-2 under the Investment Company Act is a safe harbor that provides a one-year grace period for transient investment companies that have a bona fide intent to be engaged primarily, as soon as is reasonably possible (in any event by the termination of such one-year period), in a business other than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, with such intent evidenced by the company’s business activities and an appropriate resolution of its board of directors. The grace period is available not more than once every three years and runs from the earlier of (i) the date on which the issuer owns securities and/or cash having a value exceeding 50% of the issuer’s total assets on either a consolidated or unconsolidated basis or (ii) the date on which the issuer owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40% of the value of such issuer’s total assets (exclusive of U.S. government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis.
Similar paragraph at 11 of 31 other Crypto companies: CRCL, DFDV, DJT, GEMI, HSDT, HYPD, LITS, SUIG and 3 moreAccordingly, the grace period may not be available at the time that we seek to rely on Rule 3a-2; however, Rule 3a-2 is a safe harbor and we may rely on any exemption or exclusion from investment company status available to us under the Investment Company Act at any given time. Furthermore, reliance on Rule 3a-2, Section 3(a)(1)(C), or Rule 3a-1 could require us to take action to dispose of securities, limit our ability to make certain investments or enter into joint ventures, or otherwise limit or change our service offerings and operations. If we were to be deemed an investment company in the future, restrictions imposed by the Investment Company Act — including limitations on our ability to issue different classes of stock and equity compensation to directors, officers and employees and restrictions on management, operations, and transactions with affiliated persons — likely would make it impractical for us to continue our business as contemplated, and could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, financial condition, and prospects.
We are not subject to legal and regulatory obligations that apply to investment companies such as mutual funds and exchange-traded funds, or to obligations applicable to investment advisers.
Similar paragraph at 12 of 31 other Crypto companies: ASST, DFDV, DJT, FWDI, HSDT, HYPD, LITS, MSTR and 4 moreMutual funds, ETFs and their directors and management are subject to extensive regulation as “investment companies” and “investment advisers” under U.S. federal and state law; this regulation is intended for the benefit and protection of investors. We are not subject to, and do not otherwise voluntarily comply with, these laws and regulations. This means, among other things, that the execution of or changes to our ETH Treasury Management strategy, the manner in which our ETH is custodied, our ability to engage in transactions with affiliated parties and our operating and investment activities generally are not subject to the extensive legal and regulatory requirements and prohibitions that apply to investment companies and investment advisers. Our board of directors has broad discretion over the investment, leverage and cash management policies it authorizes, whether in respect of our ETH holdings or other digital asset activities we may pursue, and has the power to change our current policies, including our strategy of acquiring and holding ETH and other digital assets.
Similar paragraph at 13 of 31 other Crypto companies: ASST, BKKT, DFDV, DJT, FWDI, HSDT, HYPD, LITS and 5 moreLegislative or regulatory change regarding the regulation of “commodities” by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and the potential regulation of digital assets as “digital commodities” could subject us to additional regulatory burdens and oversight by the CFTC and could adversely affect the market price of ETH and the market price of our listed securities.
The CFTC has stated it believes, and judicial decisions involving CFTC enforcement actions have confirmed, that at least some digital assets fall within the definition of a “commodity” under the U.S. Commodities Exchange Act of 1936 (the “CEA”) and the rules promulgated by the CFTC thereunder (“CFTC Rules”). While the CFTC has enforcement authority to police against fraud and manipulation in spot commodity markets (including the spot market for digital assets that are commodities), the CFTC only has regulatory and supervisory jurisdiction with respect to “commodity interest” transactions, such as futures, options, and swaps on a commodity (including a digital asset commodity) and certain leveraged, margined, or financed transactions in commodities involving retail customers. Accordingly, we are not currently regulated or supervised by the CFTC and are not subject to the legal and regulatory obligations that are applicable to CFTC-registered entities under the CEA and CFTC Rules.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: XXIThe regulation of digital assets in the U.S. is subject to change because of the enactment and adoption of new laws and regulations. For example, the proposed CLARITY Act recently passed by the U.S. House of Representatives and other draft digital asset market structure and regulation bills have proposed granting the CFTC additional regulatory and supervisory powers with respect to spot digital assets as “digital commodities.” While it is not possible to predict if and in what form such proposals will be adopted, if any, changes to or expansion of the jurisdiction of the CFTC with respect to activities in spot digital assets could result in the imposition of additional regulatory obligations and burdens, which could include registration, disclosure, reporting, and business conduct requirements. For example, it is possible that if the CLARITY Act were to become law as currently proposed, our ETH Treasury Management strategy could cause us to be deemed a “commodity pool” under the CEA such that our operators and advisors may need to register with the CFTC as commodity pool operators and comply with other CFTC regulations as well as the rules of the National Futures Association. Such additional regulatory burdens and oversight could materially increase the cost of our business, could adversely affect the market price of ETH, and in turn could adversely affect the market price of our listed securities.
The launch of central bank digital currencies (“CBDCs”) may adversely impact our business.
The introduction of a government-issued digital currency could eliminate or reduce the need or demand for private-sector issued crypto currencies, or significantly limit their utility. National governments around the world could introduce CBDCs, which could in turn limit the size of the market opportunity for cryptocurrencies, including ETH.
Changes in regulatory interpretations could require us to register as a money services business or money transmitter, leading to increased compliance costs or operational shutdowns.
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, a division of the U.S. Treasury Department (“FinCEN”) regulates providers of certain services with respect to “convertible virtual currency,” including ETH. Businesses engaged in the transfer of convertible virtual currencies are subject to registration and licensure requirements at the U.S. federal level and also under U.S. state laws. While FinCEN has issued guidance that cryptocurrency mining, without engagement in other activities, does not require registration and licensure with FinCEN, FinCEN has not made similar pronouncements with respect to the operation of Ethereum validators. In addition, our engaging in decentralized finance activities could expose us to further risk in this regard.
If regulatory changes or interpretations require us to register as a money services business with FinCEN under the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act, or as a money transmitter under state laws, we may be subject to extensive regulatory requirements—including those that would mandate us to implement anti-money laundering programs meeting certain requirements, make certain reports to FinCEN or state regulators, and maintain certain records, resulting in significant compliance costs and operational burdens.
We may incur extraordinary expenses to meet these requirements or, alternatively, may determine that continued operations are not viable. Further, we may not be capable of complying with certain federal or state regulatory obligations applicable to “money services businesses” and “money transmitters,” such as monitoring transactions and blocking transactions, because of the nature of the Ethereum blockchain. If we are deemed to be subject to and not in compliance with such additional regulatory and registration requirements, we may act to dissolve and liquidate. If we decide to cease certain operations in response to new regulatory obligations, such actions could occur at a time that is unfavorable to investors.
Our digital asset treasury strategy exposes us to various risks, including risks associated with ETH.
Similar paragraph at 9 of 31 other Crypto companies: DFDV, DJT, HSDT, HYPD, MSTR, NAKA, SUIG, UPXI and 1 moreOur ETH treasury management strategy exposes us to various risks, including risks associated with ETH, which include the following:
Similar paragraph at 9 of 31 other Crypto companies: DFDV, DJT, HSDT, HYPD, MSTR, NAKA, SUIG, UPXI and 1 moreETH is a highly volatile asset. ETH is a highly volatile asset that has traded below $1,472 per ETH and above $4,821 per ETH on the Coinbase exchange in the calendar year 2025. Our ETH holdings significantly impact our financial results and the market price of our listed securities. Our ETH holdings could significantly affect our financial results and if we continue to increase our overall holdings of ETH in the future, they will have an even greater impact on our financial results and the market price of our listed securities. Our assets are concentrated in ETH. The vast majority of our assets are concentrated in our ETH holdings or other receipt ETH related tokens (i.e., LsETH, WeETH, etc.) from staking. The concentration of our assets in ETH limits our ability to mitigate risk that could otherwise be achieved by holding a more diversified portfolio of treasury assets. If there is a significant decrease in the price of ETH, we may experience a more pronounced impact on our financial condition than if we invested our cash in a more diverse portfolio of treasury assets. We primarily purchase ETH using proceeds from equity financings. Our ability to continue future purchases of ETH within our ETH Treasury Management strategy depends in significant part on our ability to continue raising capital to purchase ETH. If we are unable to obtain equity, equity-linked or debt financing on favorable terms or at all, we may not be able to successfully execute on our ETH Treasury Management strategy. Our ETH Treasury Management Strategy has not been tested over an extended period of time or under different market conditions. We are continually examining the risks and rewards of our strategy to acquire and hold ETH and to stake such ETH to generate staking rewards. This strategy has not been tested over an extended period of time or under different market conditions. For example, although we believe ETH has the potential to serve as a hedge against inflation in the long term, the short-term price of ETH declined in recent periods during which the inflation rate increased. If ETH prices were to decrease or our ETH Treasury Management strategy otherwise proves unsuccessful, our financial condition, results of operations, and the market price of our listed securities would be materially adversely impacted. Our ETH staking activities could result in “slashing risks” and loss of staked ETH. ETH staking exposes us to slashing risks, defined as a punitive mechanism built into the Ethereum network, designed to penalize validators and their delegators for misbehavior or failing to follow network rules, which could result in the loss of our staked ETH. Our ETH Treasury Management Strategy may result in partial or total loss of deployed principle. Our strategies may employ on-chain and off-chain trading, credit and investing both via on-team deployments as well as via external allocations. These may be ETH denominated, USD denominated, or other similar exposure types. As a result, we have a risk of loss of partial or the entirety of the deployed principal, typical of these aforementioned activities. We are subject to provider and counterparty risks, including risks relating to our custodians. Although we have implemented various measures that are designed to mitigate our counterparty risks, including by storing substantially all of the ETH and other ETH-related digital assets we own in custody accounts at U.S.-based, institutional-grade custodians and negotiating contractual arrangements intended to establish that our property interest in custodied ETH and other ETH-related digital assets are not subject to claims of our custodians’ creditors, applicable insolvency law is not fully developed with respect to the holding of digital assets in custodial accounts. If our custodially-held ETH and other ETH-related digital assets were nevertheless considered to be the property of our custodians’ estates in the event that any such custodians were to enter bankruptcy, receivership or similar insolvency proceedings, we could be treated as a general unsecured creditor of such custodians, inhibiting our ability to exercise ownership rights with respect to such ETH, or delaying or hindering our access to our ETH holdings or other ETH-related digital asset holdings, and this may ultimately result in the loss of the value related to some or all of such ETH and other ETH-related digital assets which could have a material adverse effect on our financial condition as well as the market price of our listed securities. The broader digital assets industry is subject to counterparty risks, which could adversely impact the adoption rate, price, and use of ETH. A series of recent high-profile bankruptcies, closures, liquidations, regulatory enforcement actions and other events relating to companies operating in the digital asset industry have highlighted the counterparty risks applicable to owning and transacting in digital assets. Although these bankruptcies, closures, liquidations and other events have not resulted in any loss or misappropriation of our ETH or other ETH-related digital assets, nor have such events adversely impacted our access to our ETH or other ETH-related digital assets, they have, in the short-term, likely negatively impacted the adoption rate and use of ETH. Additional bankruptcies, closures, liquidations, regulatory enforcement actions or other events involving participants in the digital assets industry in the future may further negatively impact the adoption rate, price, and use of ETH, limit the availability to us of financing collateralized by ETH, or create or expose additional counterparty risks. Changes in the accounting treatment of our ETH holdings or ETH-related digital assets holdings could have significant accounting impacts, including increasing the volatility of our results. We have adopted ASU 2023-08 as of January 1, 2025, which requires us to measure our ETH holdings at fair value in our statement of financial position, and to recognize unrealized gains and losses from changes in the fair value of our ETH in net income each reporting period beginning January 1, 2025. ASU 2023-08 also requires us to provide certain interim and annual disclosures with respect to our ETH holdings. Due to the volatility in the price of ETH, we expect the measurement at fair value to have a material impact on our financial results in future periods, increase the volatility of our financial results, and affect the carrying value of our ETH on our balance sheet. ASU 2023-08 could also have adverse tax consequences. In addition, on September 30, 2025, the Treasury and the IRS issued interim guidance (the “Interim Guidance”) which, in relevant part, clarifies that a corporation may disregard unrealized gains and losses on its digital asset holdings when computing adjusted financial statement income for purposes of determining whether it is subject to the 15% corporate minimum alternative tax under the Inflation Reduction Act. The Treasury and IRS intend to issue revised proposed regulations similar to this Interim Guidance. These impacts could in turn have a material adverse effect on our financial results and the market price of our listed securities. Additionally, our LsETH digital assets holdings as of December 31, 2025 are accounted for at cost-less-impairment. Significant declines in the price of LsETH have, and may in the future, result in material impairment within our financial results.
We have engaged in decentralized finance transactions and deploy ETH using liquid staking protocols, which present additional risk as opposed to simply holding our digital assets.
We have deployed ETH using one or more decentralized finance protocols. All trading and investment activity involves risk, which is heightened in the case of decentralized finance due to the irrevocable nature of blockchain transactions and the possibility of errors in smart contracts. Decentralized finance protocols also attract hackers and persons looking to exploit flaws in or the ability to misuse smart contracts. We also may incur losses in connection with our decentralized finance activity due to human error or our inability to predict future price movements. Any losses we sustain in connection with decentralized finance activities could cause an adverse impact on our financial condition, results of operations, and the market price of our Common Stock.
Decentralized finance protocols also pose heightened regulatory concerns even beyond those that face digital asset networks and digital assets generally. The U.S. financial system is extensively regulated at both the federal and state level with a particular focus on intermediaries such as banks, broker-dealers, futures commission merchants, investment funds, investment advisers, financial asset exchanges, trading platforms, clearinghouses and custodians. U.S. laws and regulations impose specific obligations on financial services intermediaries both for the protection of their customers and for the protection of the U.S. financial system as a whole. These include, among others, capital requirements, activities restrictions, reporting and disclosure requirements and obligations to monitor the activities of their customers and to ensure that the intermediaries’ activities and the activities of their customers are conducted in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. Non-U.S. laws and regulatory requirements may impose similar obligations. By seeking to eliminate or substantially limit the role of traditional financial services intermediaries in lending, brokering, advisory, trading, clearing, custody and other financial services activities, DeFi protocols pose numerous challenges to the longstanding oversight framework developed under U.S. law and used by U.S. and other regulators. Legislative bodies and regulators may be required to adapt their regulatory models to accommodate decentralized financial activities, or take novel steps to supervise, limit or even prohibit decentralized financial activities. It is not possible to predict how or when these challenges will be resolved or what the impact on specific decentralized finance protocols will be, and it is likely that the decentralized finance industry will face a prolonged period of regulatory uncertainty. It is possible that some decentralized finance protocols will be subjected to costly and burdensome compliance regimes or even prohibited outright.
We have also deployed ETH using other ETH-related staking protocols. These staking protocols, which include liquid staking protocols, are even newer than many decentralized finance protocols and are a novel and evolving technology. The staff of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance has provided a statement that the SEC does not generally believe liquid staking services are securities offerings. However, these statements are not binding rule or regulations, and any deviations from the fact patterns described in the staff statement could result in the liquid staking protocols we use being deemed securities offerings. If it is determined that the liquid staking protocols we use, or the receipt tokens we receive, are securities offerings, the providers of liquid staking protocols may be required to pay fines or be subject to other third-party claims, and the ETH we have deposited with them may be available to their creditors to fulfill those claims. See “Our shift towards an ETH-focused treasury strategy requires substantial changes in our day-to-day operations and exposes us to significant operational risks” and “We face risks relating to the custody of our ETH, including the loss or destruction of private keys required to access our ETH and cyberattacks or other data loss relating to our ETH.” There is also ongoing uncertainty as to the regulatory treatment of liquid staking other ETH-related staking services from other regulators and agencies.
Both decentralized finance protocols and liquid staking protocols typically rely on the use of smart contracts. Smart contracts are computer programs that run on a digital asset network or related protocol that execute automatically when certain conditions are met. Because smart contract functions typically cannot be stopped or reversed, vulnerabilities in or unforeseen consequences of their programming can have damaging effects for the underlying digital asset network or protocol and the value of digital assets that use or interact with such smart contracts. For example, in June 2016, a vulnerability in the smart contracts underlying a protocol that was deployed on the Ethereum network, The DAO, a distributed autonomous organization for venture capital funding, allowed an attack by a hacker to syphon approximately $60 million worth of ETH from The DAO into a separate account. In the aftermath of the theft, certain developers of and core contributors to the Ethereum network pursued a “hard fork” of the Ethereum network in order to erase any record of the theft. Despite these efforts, the price of ETH dropped approximately 35% in the aftermath of the attack and subsequent hard fork. In addition, in July 2017, a vulnerability in a smart contract for a multi-signature wallet software developed by Parity led to a $30 million theft of ETH, and in November 2017, a new vulnerability in Parity’s wallet software led to roughly $160 million worth of ETH being indefinitely frozen in an account.
Other smart contracts, such as bridges between separate digital asset networks have also been manipulated, exploited or used in ways that were not intended or envisioned by their creators. Initial problems and continued problems with the development, design and deployment of smart contracts may have an adverse effect on the value of protocols, including liquid staking and decentralized finance protocols, built on smart contract platforms or other digital assets that rely on smart contract technology, including any liquid staking tokens such as LsETH. If any of the smart contracts with which we interact, whether decentralized finance, liquid staking, or otherwise, suffer from such manipulation or exploit, or otherwise do not function as intended or as we anticipate, our ETH and any LsETH or similar tokens we hold may be exposed.
The emergence or growth of other digital assets, including those with significant private or public sector backing, could have a negative impact on the price of ETH and adversely affect our business.
As a result of our ETH treasury management strategy, our assets are concentrated in our ETH and other ETH-related digital assets holdings. Accordingly, the emergence or growth of digital assets other than ETH may have a material adverse effect on our financial condition. There are numerous alternative digital assets and many entities, including consortiums and financial institutions, are researching and investing resources into private or permissioned blockchain platforms or digital assets. Additionally, the Ethereum network has completed multiple major upgrades since then and may undertake additional upgrades in the future. If the mechanisms for validating transactions in other alternative digital assets are perceived as superior to the Ethereum network, those digital assets could gain market share relative to ETH.
Additionally, central banks in some countries have started to introduce digital forms of legal tender. For example, China’s CBDC project was made available to consumers in January 2022, and governments including the United Kingdom, the European Union, and Israel have been discussing the potential creation of new CBDCs. Whether or not they incorporate blockchain or similar technology, CBDCs, as legal tender in the issuing jurisdiction, could also compete with, or replace, ETH and other digital assets as a medium of exchange or store of value. As a result, the emergence or growth of these or other digital assets could cause the market price of ETH to decrease, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, prospects, financial condition, and operating results.
Read in the 10-K ↗
ETH is a highly volatile asset, and fluctuations in the price of ETH are likely to influence our financial results and the market price of our listed securities. Our financial results and the market price of our listed securities would be adversely affected, and our business and financial condition would be negatively impacted, if the price of ETH decreased substantially (as it has in the past), including as a result of:
decreased user and investor confidence in ETH, including due to the various factors described herein; investment and trading activities, such as (i) trading activities of highly active retail and institutional users, speculators, and investors; (ii) actual or expected significant dispositions of ETH by large holders, including the expected liquidation of digital assets associated with entities that have filed for bankruptcy protection and the transfer and sale of ETH associated with significant hacks, seizures, or forfeitures; and (iii) actual or perceived manipulation of the spot or derivative markets for ETH or spot ETH exchange-traded products (“ETPs”); negative publicity, media or social media coverage, or sentiment due to events in or relating to, or perception of, ETH or the broader digital assets industry, for example, (i) public perception that ETH can be used as a vehicle to circumvent sanctions, including sanctions imposed on Russia or certain regions related to the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, or to fund criminal or terrorist activities, such as the purported use of digital assets by Hamas to fund its terrorist attack against Israel in October 2023; (ii) expected or pending civil, criminal, regulatory enforcement or other high profile actions against major participants in the ETH ecosystem; (iii) additional filings for bankruptcy protection or bankruptcy proceedings of major digital asset industry participants, such as the bankruptcy proceeding of FTX Trading and its affiliates; (iv) the actual or perceived environmental impact of ETH and related activities, including environmental concerns raised by private individuals, governmental and non-governmental organizations, and other actors related to the energy resources consumed in ETH related processes, and (v) changes in government regulations ; changes in consumer preferences and the perceived value or prospects of ETH; competition from other digital assets that exhibit better speed, security, scalability, or energy efficiency, that feature other more favored characteristics, that are backed by governments, including the U.S. government, or reserves of fiat currencies, or that represent ownership or security interests in physical assets; a decrease in the price of other digital assets, including stablecoins, or the crash or unavailability of stablecoins that are used as a medium of exchange for ETH purchase and sale transactions to the extent the decrease in the price of such other digital assets or the unavailability of such stablecoins may cause a decrease in the price of ETH or adversely affect investor confidence in digital assets generally; developments relating to the ETH protocol that may impact (i) its security, speed, scalability, usability, or value, (b) failures to upgrade the protocol to adapt to security, technological, legal or other challenges, and (iii) changes to the ETH protocol that introduce software bugs, security risks or other elements that adversely affect ETH; disruptions, failures, unavailability, or interruptions in service of trading venues for ETH; the filing for bankruptcy protection by, liquidation of, or market concerns about the financial viability of digital asset custodians, trading venues, lending platforms, investment funds, or other digital asset industry participants; regulatory, legislative, enforcement and judicial actions that adversely affect the price, ownership, transferability, trading volumes, legality or public perception of ETH, or that adversely affect the operations of or otherwise prevent digital asset custodians, trading venues, lending platforms or other digital assets industry participants from operating in a manner that allows them to continue to deliver services to the digital assets industry; reductions in staking rewards of ETH, or increases in the costs associated with ETH staking, including increases in electricity costs and hardware and software used in staking, or new or enhanced regulation or taxation of ETH staking, which could further increase the costs associated with ETH staking, any of which may cause a decline in support for the Ethereum protocol; transaction congestion and fees associated with processing transactions of ETH or lengthened periods to exit ETH staking or other delays to unstaking or withdrawing ETH from staking protocols; ETH staking exposes us to slashing risks, defined as a punitive mechanism built into the Ethereum network, designed to penalize validators and their delegators for misbehavior or failing to follow network rules, which could result in the loss of our staked ETH; macroeconomic changes, such as changes in the level of interest rates and inflation, fiscal and monetary policies of governments, trade restrictions, and fiat currency devaluations; and developments in mathematics or technology, including in digital computing, algebraic geometry and quantum computing, that could result in the cryptography used by the ETH blockchain becoming insecure or ineffective.
The Ethereum network operates using open-source protocols, meaning that any user can become a node by downloading the Ethereum Client and participating in the Ethereum network, and no permission of a central authority or body is needed to do so. In addition, anyone can propose a modification to the Ethereum network’s source code and then propose that the Ethereum network community support the modification. These proposed modifications to the Ethereum network’s source code, if adopted, can lead to forks. See risk factor “A “fork” in the Ethereum protocol could adversely affect the value of the Company’s shares”.
We may be subject to regulatory developments related to digital assets and digital asset markets, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Boilerplate Similar paragraph at 18 of 31 other Crypto companies: ABTC, BKKT, BMNR, BTBT, CORZ, CRCL, DFDV, EXOD and 10 moreAs digital assets are relatively novel and the application of state and federal securities laws and other laws and regulations to digital assets are unclear in certain respects, it is possible that regulators in the United States or foreign countries may interpret or apply existing laws and regulations in a manner that adversely affects the price of digital assets. The U.S. federal government, states, regulatory agencies, and foreign countries may also enact new laws and regulations, or pursue regulatory, legislative, enforcement or judicial actions, that could materially impact the price of digital assets or the ability of individuals or institutions such as us to own or transfer digital assets.
Similar paragraph at 13 of 31 other Crypto companies: ASST, DFDV, DJT, FWDI, HSDT, HYPD, LITS, MSTR and 5 moreOn January 23, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order titled “Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology” (the “Executive Order”) aimed at supporting “the responsible growth and use of digital assets, blockchain technology and related technologies across all sectors of the economy.” The Executive Order also established an interagency working group that is tasked with “proposing a Federal regulatory framework governing the issuance and operation of digital assets” in the United States. Pursuant to this Executive Order, the working group released a report in July 2025 outlining the administration’s recommendations to Congress and various agencies reflecting the administration’s “pro-innovation mindset toward digital assets and blockchain technologies.” In particular, the report recommends that Congress enact legislation regarding self-custody of digital assets, clarifying the applicability of Bank Secrecy Act obligations with respect to digital asset service providers, granting the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC”) authority to regulate spot markets in non-security digital assets, prohibiting the adoption of a central bank digital currency (“CBDC”), and clarifying tax laws as relevant to digital assets. In addition, the report recommends that agencies reevaluate existing guidance on digital asset activities, use existing authorities to enable the trading of digital assets at the federal level, embrace DeFi, launch or relaunch digital asset innovation efforts, and promote U.S. private sector leadership in the responsible development of cross-border payments and financial markets technologies, among others.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: GEMIThere have also been several bills introduced in Congress that propose to establish additional regulation and oversight of the digital asset markets. The Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025 (the “CLARITY Act”) was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on July 17, 2025, and, as of the date of this report, remains pending before the Senate. In addition, also in July 2025, the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act of 2025 (the “GENIUS Act”) became the first federal law specifically regulating the issuance, custody and other stablecoin-related matters in the United States. If enacted, the CLARITY Act would establish a federal framework for the regulation of certain digital asset markets and digital asset trading platforms in the United States.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: CLSKIt is difficult to predict whether, or when, as a result of these developments, Congress will grant additional authorities to the SEC or other regulators, what the nature of such additional authorities might be, how additional legislation and/or regulatory oversight might impact the ability of digital asset markets to function, the willingness of financial and other institutions to continue to provide services to the digital assets industry, or how any new regulations or changes to existing regulations might impact the value of digital assets generally and ETH held by the Company specifically. The consequences of increased federal regulation of digital assets and digital asset activities could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, financial condition, and prospects, as well as the market price of ETH, which in turn could adversely affect the market price of our listed securities.
Similar paragraph at 9 of 31 other Crypto companies: ABTC, CLSK, FWDI, GLXY, HUT, HYPD, NAKA, SUIG and 1 moreThe availability of spot ETPs for ETH and other digital assets may adversely affect the market price of our listed securities.
Although ETH and other digital assets have experienced a surge of investor attention since ETH was invented in 2015, until recently, investors in the United States had limited means to gain direct exposure to ETH through traditional investment channels, and instead generally were only able to hold ETH through “hosted” wallets provided by digital asset service providers or through “unhosted” wallets that expose the investor to risks associated with loss or hacking of their private keys. Given the relative novelty of digital assets, general lack of familiarity with the processes needed to hold ETH directly, as well as the potential reluctance of financial planners and advisers to recommend direct ETH holdings to their retail customers because of the manner in which such holdings are custodied, some investors have sought exposure to ETH through investment vehicles that hold ETH and issue shares representing fractional undivided interests in their underlying ETH holdings. These vehicles, which were previously offered only to “accredited investors” on a private placement basis, have in the past traded at substantial premiums to net asset value, possibly due to the relative scarcity of traditional investment vehicles providing investment exposure to ETH.
Although we are an operating company, and we believe we offer a different value proposition than an ETH investment vehicle, such as a spot ETH ETP, investors may nevertheless view our Common Stock as an alternative to an investment in an ETP and choose to purchase shares of a spot ETP instead of our Common Stock. They may do so for a variety of reasons, including if they believe that ETPs offer a “pure play” exposure to ETH that is generally not subject to federal income tax at the entity level as we are, or the other risk factors applicable to an operating business, such as ours.
As a result of the foregoing factors, availability of spot ETPs for ETH and other digital assets could have a material adverse effect on the market price of our listed securities.
Our historical financial statements do not reflect the potential variability in earnings that we may experience in the future relating to our ETH and LsETH holdings.
Our historical financial statements do not reflect the potential variability in earnings that we may experience in the future from holding or selling significant amounts of ETH and LsETH.
The price of ETH has historically been highly volatile and subject to dramatic price fluctuations. Because we intend to purchase additional ETH in future periods and increase our overall holdings of ETH, we expect that the proportion of our total assets represented by our ETH holdings will increase in the future. As a result, and in particular due to our adoption of ASU 2023-08 and use of the fair value method for accounting for digital ETH assets, volatility in our earnings may be significantly more than what we experienced in prior periods.
The LsETH token is relatively new and the market for LsETH may be subject to manipulation, limited transparency, inconsistent pricing sources and episodic illiquidity. The price information available in the market may not reflect executable prices or sufficient market depth and there can be no assurance that we would be able to sell our LsETH at the quoted market price, or at all. Because changes in the fair value of digital assets may impact earnings, limitations in market liquidity or pricing reliability for LsETH could increase volatility in our reported results. In addition, the market infrastructure supporting LsETH remains nascent, and future developments in protocol mechanics, exchange support or regulatory oversight may materially impact pricing, liquidity and valuation methodologies. Accordingly, the market value amounts reported for LsETH may not reflect the amount that could ultimately be realized upon redemption or sale, and actual realizable values could materially differ.
Our shift towards an ETH-focused treasury strategy requires substantial changes in our day-to-day operations and exposes us to significant operational risks.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: FWDIOur shift towards an ETH-focused treasury strategy, including staking, restaking, liquid staking and other decentralized finance activities, exposes us to significant operational risks.
Staking ETH involves holding a certain amount of ETH in a smart contract and running a piece of software known as a validator. Validators are randomly selected to propose a new block of transactions to be added to the Ethereum blockchain. When an Ethereum participant attempts a transaction, that participant is required to pay a minimum “gas” fee. A participant can opt to pay an additional fee to ensure that its transaction is added to the blockchain more quickly. These fees are denominated in ETH. The validator chosen to propose a block will (when that block is successfully confirmed by the other validator nodes) receive the gas fees for all transactions in the block (known as “execution layer rewards”). In addition, the Ethereum blockchain automatically issues ETH as rewards to validators who successfully propose a block, known as “consensus layer rewards.” The Ethereum network also automatically imposes penalties on validators that experience downtime or that propose incorrect blocks. These penalties are known as “slashing” and will reduce the number of ETH that are “staked” to the validator node.
Although we currently do not operate any validators, we may choose to operate our own validator services, or we may seek to continue to “delegate” our ETH to third party validation service providers. When we choose to use a third-party validation service, we share our staking rewards with that third-party validator, but that third-party validator may have more sophisticated technology which would enable those rewards to be greater. In either case of operating our own validators or utilizing third-party validators, staking increases the risk of loss of ETH, including through slashing penalties and through increasing vulnerabilities to hacking in the staking smart contracts. Validators also need to maintain uptime to maximize their rewards. Further, the ETH ecosystem rapidly evolves, with frequent upgrades and protocol changes that may require significant adjustments to our operational setup. The upgrades and protocol changes may require that we incur unanticipated costs, and it could cause temporary service disruptions. Technical failures or operational errors could impact our ability to obtain ETH rewards or gas fees, which could result in our failure to meet our financial projections.
Staked ETH is also subject to lock-up periods during which it cannot be withdrawn or sold. This lack of liquidity could limit our ability to respond to market changes or our financial needs. We could engage in other DeFi activities with liquid staking tokens. While we anticipate that the price of other ETH-related digital assets, such as liquid staking tokens, will correlate to ETH itself, there is a possibility that prices will diverge. This could especially happen if the validators deployed with a smart contract are subject to slashing penalties, in which case we may be able to withdraw fewer ETH than we originally deposited.
Any of these operational risks could materially and adversely affect our ability to execute our ETH treasury management strategy and may prevent us from realizing positive returns and could severely hurt our financial condition.
Our ETH holdings are less liquid than our existing cash and cash equivalents and may not be able to serve as a source of liquidity for us to the same extent as cash and cash equivalents.
Similar paragraph at 12 of 31 other Crypto companies: ASST, DFDV, DJT, FWDI, HSDT, HYPD, MSTR, NAKA and 4 moreHistorically, the ETH market has been characterized by significant volatility in price, limited liquidity and trading volumes compared to sovereign currencies markets, relative anonymity, a developing regulatory landscape, potential susceptibility to market abuse and manipulation, compliance and internal control failures at exchanges, and various other risks inherent in its entirely electronic, virtual form and decentralized network. During times of market instability, we may not be able to sell our ETH at favorable prices or at all. For example, a number of ETH trading venues temporarily halted deposits and withdrawals in 2022, although the Coinbase exchange (our principal market for ETH) has, to date, not done so. As a result, our ETH holdings may not be able to serve as a source of liquidity for us to the same extent as cash and cash equivalents. Further, ETH we hold with our custodians do not enjoy the same protections as are available to cash or securities deposited with or transacted by institutions subject to regulation by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Securities Investor Protection Corporation. Additionally, we may be unable to enter into term loans or other capital raising transactions collateralized by our unencumbered ETH or otherwise generate funds using our ETH holdings, including during times of market instability or when the price of ETH has declined significantly. If we are unable to sell our ETH, enter into additional capital raising transactions, including capital raising transactions using ETH as collateral, or otherwise generate funds using our ETH holdings, or if we are forced to sell our ETH at a significant loss, in order to meet our working capital requirements, our business and financial condition could be negatively impacted.
Similar paragraph at 13 of 31 other Crypto companies: ASST, BKKT, DFDV, DJT, FWDI, HSDT, HYPD, LITS and 5 moreWe plan to purchase additional digital assets using primarily proceeds from equity and debt financings, but we may be unable to obtain such financings on favorable terms.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: HSDTOur ability to achieve the objectives of our digital asset acquisition strategy depends in significant part on our ability to obtain equity and debt financing. The terms of debt or equity securities that we issue may require us to make periodic payments to the holders of those securities. If we are unable to obtain equity or debt financing on favorable terms or at all, we may not be able to successfully execute on our digital asset acquisition strategy.
Our ability to obtain equity or debt financing may in turn depend on, among other factors, the value of our digital asset holdings, investor sentiment and the public perception of ETH and other digital assets, our strategy and our value proposition. Accordingly, a significant decline in the market value of our digital asset holdings, our inability to monetize our ETH through staking, decentralized finance or other yield-generating activities, or a negative shift in these other factors may create liquidity and credit risks, as such a decline or such shifts may adversely impact our ability to secure sufficient equity or debt financing.
ETH constitutes the vast bulk of assets on our balance sheet. If we are unable to secure equity or debt financing in a timely manner, on favorable terms, or at all, we may be required to sell ETH to satisfy our financial obligations, and we may be required to make such sales at prices below our cost basis or that are otherwise unfavorable. Any such sale of ETH may have a material adverse effect on our operating results and financial condition and could impair our ability to secure additional equity or debt financing in the future. Our inability to secure additional equity or debt financing in a timely manner, on favorable terms or at all, or to sell our ETH in amounts and at prices sufficient to satisfy our financial obligations, including any debt service and cash dividend obligations, could cause us to default under such obligations. Any default on our future indebtedness or any newly issued preferred stock could have a material adverse effect on our financial condition. Such actions could cause significant variation in our operating results.
There are also volatility risks related to stablecoins, which are designed to have a relatively stable price relative to an underlying physical asset, most commonly a fiat currency, such as U.S. dollars, or an exchange-traded commodity. The stability of a stablecoin results from the underlying assets backing the stablecoin that are held by the stablecoin’s issuer in reserve accounts, among other factors such as the ability of a holder to redeem the stablecoin from its issuer at par. The issuers of certain stablecoins currently retain broad discretion to determine the composition and amounts of assets held in the issuers’ accounts backing those stablecoins, and to substitute assets other than the fiat currency that is initially deposited. The composition of backing assets varies considerably across popular stablecoins, with some stablecoins backed entirely by off-chain assets including cash or short-term, highly liquid assets, and others backed by assets significantly less liquid than cash or cash equivalents. For example, Circle, which issues USDC, reports that it holds cash and short-term cash equivalents to back its USDC stablecoins. We regularly transact in and hold stablecoins. As of December 31, 2025, USDC is the only stablecoin that we held. A lack of applicable law and regulation has afforded discretion to certain stablecoin issuers to determine the composition and amounts of assets backing those stablecoins. There is a risk that an issuer may be unable to liquidate enough backing assets if it were to face mass redemptions of its stablecoin, which could cause the price of the stablecoin to deviate from the price of the underlying fiat currency or other asset with which the stablecoin is designed to align in price. In extreme cases, such as a request to immediately redeem all or substantially all of a particular stablecoin in circulation, even stablecoins backed by reserves comprised primarily of cash and cash equivalents may be subject to instability or an inability of the stablecoin issuer to meet all redemption requests, as the market for short-dated U.S. government obligations might not be sufficiently price stable. Market participants have increasingly shown concern about the actual underlying liquidity and reserves for dollar stablecoins such as USDC. For example, according to reports, Circle had more than $3 billion of its USDC reserve funds on deposit at Silicon Valley Bank (“SVB”) which became temporarily inaccessible when SVB was placed into FDIC receivership in March 2023. Although these funds were ultimately made available, concerns related to Circle’s access to these funds caused USDC to temporarily fall below its $1.00 peg, and the total market capitalization of USDC decreased following this temporary depegging. If a stablecoin issuer were to fail to honor its redemption obligations, this could undermine public confidence in stablecoins and in digital assets more broadly, which could have a widespread impact on the crypto economy, causing the prices of other stablecoins and digital assets to become more volatile.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: GLXYVolatility in stablecoins, operational issues with stablecoins (for example, technical issues that prevent settlement), concerns about the sufficiency of any reserves that support stablecoins, or regulatory concerns about stablecoin issuers or intermediaries, such as crypto asset spot markets, that support stablecoins, could have a significant impact on the global digital asset market and may adversely affect our business.
Because stablecoins purport to be backed by underlying reserve assets, a fundamental issue in the event of the bankruptcy or insolvency of the issuer of a given stablecoin is which party possesses beneficial ownership of the underlying reserve assets: the holder of the stablecoin, or the issuer. If a particular stablecoin were structured in a manner that entitles its holder only to a contractual right to payment from the issuer (even if such payments are to be derived from the underlying assets), then the assets underlying the stablecoins may be considered to be the property of the issuer’s bankruptcy estate, such that all of the issuer’s creditors would be entitled to their pro rata share of such assets, with the stablecoin holder being treated as an unsecured creditor of the issuer. In such an event, if the issuer were to have insufficient funds or assets to satisfy the claims of its creditors, then the holder of a stablecoin would likely receive only a partial recovery, and not the full purported value of its stablecoin holdings. Conversely, if a particular stablecoin were structured in a manner that entitles its holder to absolute beneficial ownership of the underlying reserve assets, whereby the issuer holds bare legal title to the underlying assets but has no beneficial interest or property rights in such assets, then the holders would likely have a stronger claim on the underlying assets in the event of a bankruptcy or insolvency of the issuer. However, due to the novelty of stablecoins, courts have not yet considered the treatment of underlying reserve assets in the context of a bankruptcy or insolvency of a stablecoin issuer, and there can be no certainty as to a court’s determination in such circumstances.
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If we are unable to recruit or retain skilled personnel, or if we lose the services of our Chairman of the Board of Directors and/or our Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Financial Officer, our business, operating results, and financial condition could be materially adversely affected.
Similar paragraph at 10 of 31 other Crypto companies: ASST, BMNR, BTBT, FIGR, FWDI, GEMI, GLXY, MSTR and 2 moreOur future success depends on our continuing ability to attract and retain highly skilled personnel. Competition for employees is intense. We may not be able to retain our current key employees or attract, train, and retain other highly skilled personnel in the future. Competition for qualified employees in the technology industry has historically been high. Our future success also depends in large part on the continued service of Joseph Lubin, our Chairman of the Board of Directors, Joseph Chalom as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Robert DeLucia, Chief Financial Officer of the Company. If we lose the services of Messrs. Lubin, Chalom or DeLucia, or if we are unable to attract, train and retain the highly skilled personnel we need, our business, operating results and financial condition could be materially adversely impacted.
Our Common Stock has traded below the value of the digital assets we hold and may trade at a discount to the value of the digital assets in the future.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: MSTROur Common Stock, par value $0.0001 per share has, and may in the future, trade at a discount to the value of our holdings of ETH and ETH-related digital assets, to the extent investors view our Common Stock as providing exposure to ETH and ETH-related digital assets. This may occur due to the rise in other traditional investment vehicles providing exposure to digital assets, including ETH, as well as the increase in the number of investors who may wish to purchase digital assets, including ETH, directly, among other reasons. For example, the SEC has recently provided guidance that will allow broker-dealers to custody digital assets on behalf of investors. The SEC has also rescinded Staff Accounting Bulletin 121 which, by forcing public companies to include on their balance sheets digital assets custodied on behalf of third parties, effectively prevented publicly traded banks from providing digital asset custodial services. Any movement of investor funds to such other sources, or a change in the market’s perception of digital asset treasury vehicles or in investor sentiment generally, could result in a decrease in price of our Common Stock and may impair our ability to engage in future financings.
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The market price of our Common Stock may be highly volatile and could fluctuate significantly in response to a number of factors, many of which are beyond our control. These factors include, among others, changes in the market price of digital assets held by the Company, developments in digital asset markets, regulatory actions or announcements relating to digital assets, changes in investor sentiment toward digital asset-related companies, variations in our financial results, announcements regarding strategic transactions and general market and economic conditions. As a result, investors may experience substantial losses, and the market price of our Common Stock may not reflect the Company’s underlying asset value or operating performance at any given time.
We may issue additional shares of Common Stock or other equity-linked securities in the future to raise capital, pursue strategic transactions or for other corporate purposes. Any such issuances could result in dilution to existing stockholders, reduce the relative ownership interest of existing investors, and adversely affect the market price of our Common Stock. The timing, size and terms of any future equity issuances will depend on market conditions and other factors, and there can be no assurance that such issuances will be favorable to existing stockholders.
Our capital stock structure and potential future financings may increase stock price volatility.
The Company has utilized, and is expected to continue to utilize, equity financings to fund its operations and digital asset treasury strategy. Equity financings, including public offerings, private placements or other capital-raising transactions, may increase trading volume and price volatility in our Common Stock. In addition, the perception that such financings may occur could place downward pressure on the market price of our Common Stock.
Concentrated ownership or the issuance of shares to strategic investors could influence matters requiring stockholder approval.
If a small number of stockholders or strategic investors acquire a significant ownership position in the Company, those stockholders may have the ability to exert substantial influence over matters requiring stockholder approval, including the election of directors, approval of mergers or other significant transactions and other corporate actions. Such concentration of ownership could discourage potential investors or limit the ability of other stockholders to influence corporate governance matters.
The absence of dividends may limit the return on an investment in our Common Stock.
We have not paid cash dividends on our Common Stock and do not currently intend to pay dividends in the foreseeable future. The Company intends to retain any available funds to support its operations, digital asset treasury activities and strategic initiatives. As a result, investors seeking cash dividends may find our Common Stock less attractive, and any return on investment will depend primarily on appreciation in the market price of our Common Stock.
Provisions in our organizational documents and under applicable law could discourage or delay a change of control.
Certain provisions of our certificate of incorporation, bylaws and applicable state law may have the effect of discouraging, delaying or preventing a change in control of the Company that stockholders may consider favorable. These provisions may limit the ability of stockholders to replace management, approve certain transactions or influence corporate governance matters, and could reduce the likelihood that stockholders would receive a premium for their shares in connection with a change of control.
If securities analysts or investors do not continue to view the Company as an attractive investment, the trading price of our Common Stock could decline.
Similar paragraph at 10 of 31 other Crypto companies: ASST, BKKT, BTBT, CLSK, CORZ, GLXY, HYPD, NAKA and 2 moreThe trading market for our Common Stock depends in part on the interest of securities analysts, institutional investors and retail investors. If analysts cease coverage of the Company, issue unfavorable reports or if investors perceive the Company’s strategy or execution to be less attractive, the market price and trading volume of our Common Stock could decline.
Although our Common Stock is publicly traded, an active trading market may not be sustained. Limited trading volume may contribute to increased price volatility and may make it difficult for stockholders to sell their shares at or near desired prices or at times of their choosing.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: HSDTIf we or our third-party service providers experience a security breach or cyberattack and unauthorized parties obtain access to our ETH, or if our private keys are lost or destroyed, or other similar circumstances or events occur, we may lose some or all of our ETH and our financial condition and results of operations could be materially adversely affected.
Similar paragraph at 11 of 31 other Crypto companies: ASST, DFDV, DJT, FWDI, HSDT, LITS, MSTR, SUIG and 3 moreAll of the ETH and ETH-related digital assets we own is held in custody accounts at institutional-grade digital asset custodians. Security breaches and cyberattacks are of particular concern with respect to our ETH and ETH-related digital assets. ETH and other blockchain-based cryptocurrencies and the entities that provide services to participants in the ETH ecosystem have been, and may in the future be, subject to security breaches, cyberattacks, or other malicious activities. A successful security breach or cyberattack could result in:
Similar paragraph at 11 of 31 other Crypto companies: ASST, DFDV, DJT, FWDI, HSDT, LITS, MSTR, SUIG and 3 morea partial or total loss of our ETH and ETH-related digital assets in a manner that may not be covered by insurance or the liability provisions of the custody agreements with the custodians who hold our ETH and ETH-related digital assets; harm to our reputation and brand; improper disclosure of data and violations of applicable data privacy and other laws; or significant regulatory scrutiny, investigations, fines, penalties, and other legal, regulatory, contractual and financial exposure.
Similar paragraph at 11 of 31 other Crypto companies: ASST, DFDV, DJT, FWDI, HSDT, LITS, MSTR, SUIG and 3 moreFurther, any actual or perceived data security breach or cybersecurity attack directed at other companies with digital assets or companies that operate digital asset networks, regardless of whether we are directly impacted, could lead to a general loss of confidence in the broader blockchain ecosystem or in the use of the Ethereum network to conduct financial transactions, which could negatively impact us.
Similar paragraph at 14 of 31 other Crypto companies: ASST, BTBT, CRCL, DFDV, DJT, FWDI, GEMI, HSDT and 6 moreAttacks upon systems across a variety of industries, including industries related to ETH, are increasing in frequency, persistence, and sophistication, and, in many cases, are being conducted by sophisticated, well-funded and organized groups and individuals, including state actors. The techniques used to obtain unauthorized, improper or illegal access to systems and information (including personal data and digital assets), disable or degrade services, or sabotage systems are constantly evolving, may be difficult to detect quickly, and often are not recognized or detected until after they have been launched against a target. These attacks may occur on our systems or those of our third-party service providers or partners. We may experience breaches of our security measures due to human error, malfeasance, insider threats, system errors or vulnerabilities or other irregularities. Threats can come from a variety of sources, including criminal hackers, hacktivists, state-sponsored intrusions, industrial espionage, and insiders. In addition, certain types of attacks could harm us even if our systems are left undisturbed. For example, certain threats are designed to remain dormant or undetectable, sometimes for extended periods of time, or until launched against a target and we may not be able to implement adequate preventative measures. The risk of cyberattacks could also be increased by cyberwarfare in connection with the ongoing Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas conflicts, or other future conflicts, including potential proliferation of malware into systems unrelated to such conflicts. Any future breach of our operations or those of others in the ETH industry, including third-party services on which we rely, could materially and adversely affect our business.
Similar paragraph at 13 of 31 other Crypto companies: ASST, BTBT, CRCL, DFDV, DJT, FWDI, GEMI, LITS and 5 moreOur ETH treasury management strategy exposes us to risk of non-performance by providers and counterparties.
Our ETH treasury management strategy exposes us to the risk of non-performance by providers and counterparties, whether contractual or otherwise. Risk of non-performance includes inability or refusal of a provider or counterparty to perform because of a deterioration in the counterparty’s financial condition and liquidity or for any other reason. For example, our execution partners, custodians, or other counterparties might fail to perform in accordance with the terms of our agreements with them, which could result in a loss of ETH and/or LsETH, a loss of the opportunity to generate funds, or other losses.
Our primary provider risk with respect to our ETH and ETH-related digital assets are custodian performance obligations under the various custody arrangements we have entered into. In particular, we are reliant on our custodial relationships and agreements with Anchorage Digital Bank N.A. and its affiliates, as well as Coinbase Inc. and its affiliates. Any failures of our custodians to perform could have an impact on our business, prospects, financial condition and operating results. In addition, in the event of a termination of one or more of our custody agreements, the Company would be required to contract with an alternative custodian at terms and conditions that may not be as favorable as our current custody agreements.
A series of recent high-profile bankruptcies, closures, liquidations, regulatory enforcement actions and other events relating to companies operating in the digital asset industry have highlighted the perceived and actual counterparty and provider risk applicable to digital asset ownership and trading. Although these bankruptcies, closures and liquidations have not resulted in any loss or misappropriation of our ETH and ETH-related digital assets, nor have such events adversely impacted our access to our ETH and ETH-related digital assets, legal precedent created in these bankruptcy and other proceedings may increase the risk of future rulings adverse to our interests in the event one or more of our custodians becomes a debtor in a bankruptcy case or is the subject of other liquidation, insolvency or similar proceedings.
While all of our custodians are subject to regulatory regimes intended to protect customers in the event of a custodial bankruptcy, receivership or similar insolvency proceeding, no assurance can be provided that our custodially-held ETH and ETH-related digital assets will not become part of the custodian’s insolvency estate if one or more of our custodians enters bankruptcy, receivership or similar insolvency proceedings. Additionally, if we pursue any strategies to create income streams or otherwise generate funds using our ETH and ETH-related digital assets holdings, we may become subject to additional counterparty risks. Any significant non-performance by providers and counterparties, including in particular the custodians with which we custody substantially all of our ETH and ETH-related digital assets, could have a material adverse effect on our business, prospects, financial condition and operating results.
Similar paragraph at 9 of 31 other Crypto companies: ASST, DJT, FWDI, HSDT, MSTR, NAKA, SUIG, TRON and 1 moreOur custodians’ digital asset insurance may not be sufficient to make us whole in the event of any loss of ETH.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: EXODAs of the date of this filing, the insurance that covers losses of our ETH holdings may cover none or only a small fraction of the value of the entirety of our ETH holdings, and there can be no guarantee that such insurance will be maintained as part of the custodial services we have or that such coverage will cover losses with respect to our ETH. The insurance policies maintained by our custodians are shared among all of such custodian’s customers and are not specific to us and may not be available or sufficient to protect us as a result. Moreover, our use of custodians exposes us to the risk that the ETH our custodians hold on our behalf could be subject to insolvency proceedings and we could be treated as a general unsecured creditor of the custodian, inhibiting our ability to exercise ownership rights with respect to such ETH. Any loss associated with such insolvency proceedings is unlikely to be covered by any insurance coverage we maintain related to our ETH. The legal framework governing digital asset ownership and rights in custodial or insolvency contexts remains uncertain and continues to evolve, which could result in unexpected losses, protracted recovery processes or adverse treatment in insolvency proceedings.
Cybersecurity incidents and other issues related to our information systems, technology and data may affect us materially and adversely.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: GLXYCybersecurity incidents and cyberattacks have been occurring globally at a more frequent and severe level and will likely continue to increase in frequency in the future. The digital asset industry is a particular target for cybersecurity incidents, which may occur through intentional or unintentional acts by individuals or groups having authorized or unauthorized access to our systems or our clients’ or counterparties’ information, which may include confidential information. These individuals or groups include employees, vendors and customers, as well as hackers. The information and technology systems used by us and our service providers, and other third parties, are vulnerable to damage or interruption from, among other things: hacking, ransomware, malware and other computer viruses; denial of service attacks; network failures; computer and telecommunication failures; phishing attacks; infiltration by unauthorized persons; security breaches; usage errors by their respective professionals; power outages; terrorism; and catastrophic events such as fires, tornadoes, floods, hurricanes and earthquakes. It is difficult or impossible to defend against every risk being posed by changing technologies, as well as criminals’ intent to commit cybercrime, and these efforts may not be successful in anticipating, preventing, detecting or stopping attacks, or reacting in a timely manner. The increasing sophistication and resources of cybercriminals and other non-state threat actors and increased actions by nation-state actors make it difficult to keep up with new threats and could result in a breach of security. Such threats may see their frequency increased, and effectiveness enhanced, by the use of artificial intelligence. Further, cybersecurity risks may be heightened as a result of ongoing global conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict or the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict. Additionally, we cannot guarantee that our insurance coverage would be sufficient to cover any such losses.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: GLXYTo the extent the operation of our systems relies on our third-party service providers, through either a connection to, or an integration with, third parties’ systems, the risk of cybersecurity attacks and loss, corruption, or unauthorized access to or publication of our information or the confidential information and personal data of customers and employees may increase. Third-party risks may include insufficient security measures, data location uncertainty, and the possibility of data storage in inappropriate jurisdictions where laws, security measures or other controls may be inadequate or in which there are uncertainties regarding governmental intervention and use of such data, and our ability to monitor our third-party service providers’ data security practices are limited. Although we generally have agreements relating to cybersecurity and data privacy in place with our third-party service providers, they are limited in nature and we cannot guarantee that such agreements will prevent the accidental or unauthorized access to or disclosure, loss, destruction, disablement or encryption of, use or misuse of or modification of data (including personal data) or enable us to obtain adequate or any reimbursement from our third-party service providers in the event we should suffer any such incidents. Due to applicable laws and regulations or contractual obligations, we may be held responsible for any information security failure or cybersecurity attack attributed to our vendors as they relate to the information we share with them. A vulnerability in or related to a third-party service provider’s software or systems, a failure of our third-party service providers’ safeguards, policies or procedures, or a breach of a third-party service provider’s software or systems could result in the compromise of the confidentiality, integrity or availability of our systems or the data housed in our third-party solutions.
The security of the information and technology systems used by us and our service providers may continue to be subjected to cybersecurity threats that could result in material failures or disruptions in our business. If these systems are compromised, become inoperable for extended periods of time or cease to function properly, we or a service provider may have to make a significant investment to fix or replace them. The failure of these systems or of disaster recovery plans for any reason could cause significant interruptions in operations and result in a failure to maintain the security, confidentiality or privacy of sensitive data, including personal information relating to stockholders (and the beneficial owners of stockholders). Such a failure could harm our reputation, subject us to legal claims and otherwise materially and adversely affect our investment and trading strategies and our value.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: GLXYWe face risks relating to the custody of our ETH and ETH-related digital assets, including the loss or destruction of private keys required to access our ETH and ETH-related digital assets and cyberattacks or other data loss relating to our ETH.
Similar paragraph at 11 of 31 other Crypto companies: BMNR, BTBT, CLSK, CRCL, DJT, GEMI, HSDT, HYPD and 3 moreWe hold our ETH and ETH-related digital assets with regulated custodians that have duties to safeguard our private keys. Our custodial services contracts do not restrict our ability to reallocate our ETH and ETH-related digital assets among our custodians, and our ETH holdings may be concentrated with a single custodian from time to time. In light of the significant amount of ETH and ETH-related digital assets we hold, we will seek to engage additional custodians to achieve a greater degree of diversification in the custody of our ETH and ETH-related digital assets as the extent of potential risk of loss is dependent, in part, on the degree of diversification. If there is a decrease in the availability of digital asset custodians that we believe can safely custody our ETH and ETH-related digital assets, for example, due to regulatory developments or enforcement actions that cause custodians to discontinue or limit their services in the United States, we may need to enter into agreements that are less favorable than our current agreements or take other measures to custody our ETH and ETH-related digital assets, and our ability to seek a greater degree of diversification in the use of custodial services would be materially adversely affected.
ETH and ETH-related digital assets are controllable only by the possessor of both the unique public key and private key(s) relating to the local or online digital wallet in which the ETH and ETH-related digital assets are held. While the ETH blockchain ledger requires a public key relating to a digital wallet to be published when used in a transaction, private keys must be safeguarded and kept private in order to prevent a third party from accessing the ETH and ETH-related digital assets held in such wallet. To the extent the private key(s) for a digital wallet are lost, destroyed, or otherwise compromised and no backup of the private key(s) is accessible, neither we nor our custodians will be able to access the ETH and ETH-related digital assets held in the related digital wallet. Furthermore, we cannot provide assurance that our digital wallets, nor the digital wallets of our custodians held on our behalf, will not be compromised as a result of a cyberattack. ETH, as well as other digital assets and blockchain technologies, have been, and may in the future be, subject to security breaches, cyberattacks, or other malicious activities.
Similar paragraph at 15 of 31 other Crypto companies: ABTC, ASST, BKKT, BMNR, BTBT, CRCL, DJT, GEMI and 7 moreETH is created and transmitted through the operations of the peer-to-peer Ethereum network, a decentralized network of computers running software following the Ethereum protocol. If the Ethereum network is disrupted or encounters any unanticipated difficulties, the value of Ethereum could be negatively impacted.
If the Ethereum network is disrupted or encounters any unanticipated difficulties, then the processing of transactions on the Ethereum network may be disrupted, which in turn may prevent us from depositing or withdrawing ETH and ETH-related digital assets from our accounts with our custodian or otherwise effecting ETH and ETH-related digital assets transactions. Such disruptions could include, for example: the price volatility of ETH; the insolvency, business failure, interruption, default, failure to perform, security breach, or other problems of participants, custodians, or others; the closing of ETH trading platforms due to fraud, failures, security breaches, or otherwise; or network outages or congestion, power outages, or other problems or disruptions affecting the Ethereum network.
In addition, although we do not currently run o, digital asset validating operations can consume significant amounts of electricity, which may have a negative environmental impact and give rise to public opinion against allowing, or government regulations restricting, the use of electricity for validating operations. Additionally, validators may be forced to cease operations during an electricity shortage or power outage.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: HYPDA “fork” in the Ethereum protocol could adversely affect the value of the Company’s shares.
Forks in the Ethereum protocol may lead to disruptions, security risks or declines in ETH value and therefore the value of the Company’s Common Stock. A “fork” occurs when a change to the Ethereum network’s source code creates two incompatible versions of the blockchain, resulting in separate networks. Forks may be planned (e.g., upgrades to the Ethereum protocol like the Merge or Dencun) or unplanned (e.g., due to software bugs or validator disagreement). Planned forks are designed to improve performance or introduce new features, but they may introduce bugs, security vulnerabilities or unexpected economic consequences. Unplanned forks can arise from client software inconsistencies or protocol failures, causing network instability or fragmentation. In either case, forks may result in operational outages, user confusion, replay attacks and reduced validator participation, all of which could undermine confidence in the Ethereum network and adversely affect the price of ETH. Our ETH and ETH-related digital assets holdings, staking activities and related treasury strategy could be materially negatively impacted in the event of such a fork.
Blockchain technology may expose us to sanctioned or blocked persons or may result in unintentional or inadvertent violations of economic sanctions and anti-money laundering laws and regulations.
We are subject to the rules enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“OFAC”), including prohibitions on conducting direct or indirect business with persons named on, or owned by persons named on, OFAC’s various sanctions lists, including the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list (“SDN List”). We are also prohibited from direct or indirect dealings with persons located, organized, or resident in jurisdictions subject to comprehensive U.S. economic sanctions (as of today, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic, and the Crimea region of Ukraine), and may be prohibited from dealing with persons in other jurisdictions subject to targeted U.S. sanctions such as Venezuela, Russia, and Belarus.
U.S. sanctions compliance obligations apply to all U.S. persons and cover transactions in digital assets. U.S. sanctions authorities and law enforcement have, in recent years, directed significant attention to sanctions compliance among the digital assets industry. For example, OFAC has issued updated advisories regarding the use of virtual currencies, added a number of digital asset exchanges and service providers to the SDN List, and engaged in several enforcement actions, including a series of enforcement actions that have either shut down or significantly curtailed the operations of several smaller digital asset exchanges associated with Russian and/or North Korean nationals.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: XXIBecause of the pseudonymous nature of blockchain transactions and decentralized applications, we may inadvertently and without knowledge, directly or indirectly engage in transactions with or for the benefit of prohibited persons under U.S. sanctions regulations, especially when engaging in DeFi activities where it may be impossible for us to determine the identity of our counterparties. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a “strict liability” basis, meaning we may be held responsible for transacting with prohibited parties even if we have no knowledge that a particular counterparty is a prohibited person under U.S. sanctions regulations. In addition, we may be subject to non-U.S. economic sanctions laws and regulations to the extent we conduct activity within the jurisdiction of other sanctions regimes, including those of the European Union and United Kingdom.
OFAC and other governmental authorities have significant discretion in the interpretation and enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions laws and regulations. Moreover, economic sanctions laws and regulations continue to evolve, often with little or no notice, which could raise operational or compliance challenges. If it is determined that we have transacted with prohibited persons under U.S. sanctions regulations, even inadvertently, this could result in substantial reputational harm, fines or penalties, and costs associated with governmental inquiries and investigations. Despite our compliance efforts and activities we cannot assure compliance by our employees or representatives for which we may be held responsible, and any or all of the foregoing could have a material adverse effect on our business, prospects, operations or financial condition.
In addition, there has been increasing focus on the extent to which digital assets can be used to launder the proceeds of illegal activities or fund criminal or terrorist activities. This misuse, or the perception of such misuse, could lead to greater regulatory oversight of ETH and ETH platforms, and there is the possibility that law enforcement agencies could close or blacklist ETH platforms or other ETH-related infrastructure with little or no notice and prevent users from accessing or retrieving ETH held via such platforms or infrastructure.
We have recently implemented policies and procedures reasonably designed to promote compliance with applicable anti-money laundering laws and regulations and take care to only acquire our ETH through entities subject to anti-money laundering regulation and related compliance rules in the United States, if we are found to have purchased any of our ETH from bad actors that have used ETH to launder money or otherwise engage in illicit financial activity, we may be subject to regulatory proceedings and further transactions or dealings in ETH may be restricted or prohibited.
Changes in the governance of a digital asset network or protocol may not receive sufficient support from users and validators, which may negatively affect that digital asset network’s or protocol’s ability to grow and respond to challenges.
The governance of some digital asset networks and protocols, such as the Ethereum Network, is generally by voluntary consensus and open competition. For such networks and protocols, there may be a lack of consensus or clarity on that network’s or protocol’s governance, which may stymie such network’s or protocol’s utility, adaptability and ability to grow and face challenges. The foregoing notwithstanding, the underlying software for some digital asset networks and protocols, such as the Ethereum Network, is informally or formally managed or developed by a group of core developers that propose amendments to the relevant network’s or protocol’s source code. Core developers’ roles may evolve over time, generally based on self-determined participation. If a significant majority of users and validators were to adopt amendments to a decentralized network based on the proposals of such core developers, such network would be subject to new source code that may adversely affect the value of the relevant digital asset. As a result of the foregoing, it may be difficult to find solutions or marshal sufficient effort to overcome any future problems, especially long-term problems, on digital asset networks.
If the digital asset award or transaction fees for recording transactions on the Ethereum Network are not sufficiently high to incentivize validators, or if certain jurisdictions continue to limit or otherwise regulate validating activities, validators may cease expanding validating power or demand high transaction fees, which could negatively impact the value of Ether and the value of our Common Stock.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: UPXIIn 2021, the Ethereum Network implemented the EIP-1559 upgrade. EIP-1559 changed the methodology used to calculate transaction fees paid to Ether validators (then called “miners”) in such a manner that reduced the total net issuance of Ether fees paid to miners. If the digital asset awards for validating blocks or the transaction fees for recording transactions on the Ethereum Network are not sufficiently high to incentivize validators, validators may cease validating blocks and confirmations of transactions on the Ethereum Network could be slowed. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of our Common Stock:
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: UPXI● If the profit margins of digital asset validating operations are not sufficiently high, digital asset validators are more likely to immediately sell digital assets earned by validating, resulting in an increase in liquid supply of that digital asset, which would generally tend to reduce that digital asset’s market price.
● A reduction in digital assets staked by validators on the Ethereum Network could increase the likelihood of a malicious actor or botnet obtaining control. See “If a malicious actor or botnet obtains control of more than 33% of the validating power on the Ethereum Network, or otherwise obtains control over the Ethereum Network through its influence over core developers or otherwise, such actor or botnet could manipulate the Ethereum Network to adversely affect the value of our Common Stock.”
● Validators have historically accepted relatively low transaction confirmation fees on most digital asset networks. If validators demand higher transaction fees for recording transactions on the Ethereum Network or a software upgrade automatically charges fees for all transactions on the Ethereum Network, the cost of using ETH and ETH-related digital assets may increase and the demand for ETH and ETH-related digital assets may correspondingly decrease. Alternatively, validators could collude in an anti-competitive manner to reject low transaction fees on the Ethereum Network and force users to pay higher fees, thus reducing the attractiveness of the Ethereum Network. Higher transaction confirmation fees resulting through collusion or otherwise may adversely affect the attractiveness of the Ethereum Network, the value of ETH and ETH-related digital assets and the value of our Common Stock.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: UPXI● To the extent that any validators cease to record transactions that do not include the payment of a transaction fee in validated blocks or do not record a transaction because the transaction fee is too low, such transactions will not be recorded on the Ethereum blockchain until a block is validated by a validator who does not require the payment of transaction fees or is willing to accept a lower fee. Any widespread delays in the recording of transactions could result in a loss of confidence in the Ethereum Network.
● During the course of ordering transactions and validating blocks, validators may be able to prioritize certain transactions in return for increased transaction fees, an incentive system known as “Maximal Extractable Value” or MEV. For example, in blockchain networks that facilitate DeFi protocols in particular, such as the Ethereum Network, users may attempt to gain an advantage over other users by increasing offered transaction fees. Certain software solutions have been developed which facilitate validators in capturing MEV produced by these increased fees. The MEV incentive system may lead to an increase in transaction fees on the Ethereum Network, which may diminish its use. Users or other stakeholders on the Ethereum Network could also view the existence of MEV as unfair manipulation of decentralized digital asset networks, and refrain from using DeFi protocols or the Ethereum Network generally. In addition, it’s possible regulators or legislators could enact rules which restrict the use of MEV, which could diminish the popularity of the Ethereum Network among users and validators. Any of these or other outcomes related to MEV may adversely affect the value of Ether and the value of our Common Stock.
Digital asset networks face significant scaling challenges and efforts to increase the volume and speed of transactions may not be successful.
Many digital asset networks face significant scaling challenges due to the fact that public, permissionless blockchains generally face a tradeoff between security and scalability. One means through which digital asset networks that utilize public, permissionless blockchains achieve security is decentralization, meaning that no intermediary is responsible for securing and maintaining these systems. For example, a greater degree of decentralization of a public, permissionless blockchain generally means a given digital asset network is less susceptible to manipulation or capture. In practice, this typically means that every single node on a given digital asset network is responsible for securing the system by processing every transaction and maintaining a copy of the entire state of the network. As a result, a digital asset network that utilizes a public, permissionless blockchain may be limited in the number of transactions it can process by the computing capabilities of each single fully participating node. As of 2025, the Ethereum Network’s base layer typically processed transactions at rates in the tens of thousands per second, with actual throughput varying based on gas usage and network demand. Broader ecosystem throughput, including Layer-2 rollups, reached daily averages of more than 300 transactions per second in late 2025. Network capacity has increased materially since 2021 through successive protocol upgrades, including the Merge (September 2022), Dencun (March 2024), Pectra (May 2025), and Fusaka (December 2025), which expanded data availability and improved scalability for Layer-2 networks.
Many developers are actively researching and testing scalability solutions for public blockchains that do not necessarily result in lower levels of security or decentralization, such as off-chain payment channels and Layer 2 networks. Off-chain payment channels would allow parties to transact without requiring the full processing power of a blockchain. Layer 2 networks can increase the scalability of a blockchain by allowing users to transact on a second blockchain deployed on top of a “Layer 1” network. However, such off-chain channels and Layer 2 networks only periodically use the Ethereum Network, reducing the demand for ETH as gas fees.
As corresponding increases in throughput lag behind growth in the use of digital asset networks, average transaction fees and settlement times may increase considerably. Increased transaction fees and decreased settlement speeds could preclude certain uses for Ether (e.g., micropayments), and could reduce demand for, and the price of, ETH and ETH-related digital assets, which could adversely impact the value of our Common Stock. However, reduced gas fees could signal lower demand for ETH and ETH-related digital assets.
There is no guarantee that any of the mechanisms in place or being explored for increasing the scale of settlement or throughput of Ethereum Network transactions will be effective, or how long these mechanisms will take to become effective, which could adversely impact the value of our Common Stock.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: CORZIf a malicious actor or botnet obtains control of more than 33% of the validating power on the Ethereum Network, or otherwise obtains control over the Ethereum Network through its influence over core developers or otherwise, such actor or botnet could manipulate the Ethereum Network to adversely affect the value of our Common Stock.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: CLSKAll networked systems are vulnerable to various types of attacks. As with any computer network, the Ethereum Network could be attacked. For example, following the “Merge” to transition the Ethereum Network from a proof-of-work consensus mechanism to a proof-of-stake consensus mechanism and the switch to proof-of-stake validation, the Ethereum Network is currently vulnerable to several types of attacks, including:
● “>33% attack” where, if a malicious actor, validator, botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) or group of validators acting in concert were to gain control of more than 33% of the total staked ETH on the Ethereum Network, a malicious actor could temporarily impede or delay block confirmation or even cause a temporary fork in the blockchain. This is designed to be a temporary risk, as the Ethereum Network’s inactivity leak would be expected to eventually penalize the attacker enough for the chain to finalize again (i.e., the honest majority would be expected to reclaim 2/3rd stake as the attacker’s stake is penalized). Moreover, it is not believed that a 33% attack would allow a malicious actor to engage in double-spending or fraudulent block propagation. Even without 33% control, a malicious actor or botnet could create a flood of transactions in order to slow down the Ethereum Network.
● “>50% attack” where, if a malicious actor, validator, botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) or group of validators acting in concert were to gain control of more than 50% of the total staked ETH on the Ethereum Network, a malicious actor would be able to manipulate transactions on the blockchain, including censoring transactions, double-spending and fraudulent block propagation, potentially for an extended period or even permanently. In theory, the minority non-attackers might reach social consensus to reject blocks proposed by the malicious majority attacker, reducing the attacker’s ability to engage in malicious activity, but there can be no assurance this would happen or that non-attackers would be able to coordinate effectively. To the extent that such malicious actor or botnet did not yield its control of the validating power on the Ethereum Network or the Ethereum community did not reject the fraudulent blocks as malicious, reversing any changes made to the blockchain may not be possible.
● “>66% attack” where, if a malicious actor, validator, botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) or group of validators acting in concert were to gain control of more than 66% of the total staked ETH on the Ethereum Network, a malicious actor could permanently and irreversibly manipulate the blockchain, including censorship, double-spending and fraudulent block propagation. Although the malicious actor or botnet may not be able to generate new tokens or transactions using such control, it could “double-spend” its own tokens (i.e., spend the same tokens in more than one transaction) and prevent the confirmation of other users’ transactions for so long as it maintained control (over 50%). The attacker could finalize their preferred chain without any consideration for the votes of other stakers and could also revert finalized blocks.
In an example from another network, in August 2020, the Ethereum Classic Network, a proof-of-work network, was the target of two double-spend attacks by an unknown actor or actors that gained more than 50% of the processing power of the Ethereum Classic Network. The attacks resulted in reorganizations of the Ethereum Classic Blockchain that allowed the attacker or attackers to reverse previously recorded transactions in excess of over $5.0 million and $1.0 million.
In addition, in May 2019, the Bitcoin Cash network, a proof-of-work network, experienced a >50% attack when two large mining pools reversed a series of transactions in order to stop an unknown miner from taking advantage of a flaw in a then-recent Bitcoin Cash protocol upgrade. Although this particular attack was arguably benevolent, the fact that such coordinated activity was able to occur may have negatively impacted perceptions of the Bitcoin Cash network. Although the two attacks described above took place on proof-of-work-based networks, it is possible that a similar attack may occur on the Ethereum Network, which could negatively impact the value of ETH and the value of our Common Stock.
Similar paragraph at 1 of 31 other Crypto companies: XXIAlthough there are no known reports of malicious control of the Ethereum Network, if groups of coordinating or connected ETH holders that together have more than 33% of outstanding ETH were to stake that ETH and run validators, they could exert authority over the validation of ETH transactions. This risk is heightened if a substantial amount of the validating power on the network falls within the jurisdiction of a single governmental authority and is significantly heightened if over 66% falls within such a jurisdiction. If network participants, including the core developers and the administrators of validating pools, do not act to ensure greater decentralization of Ethereum Network validators, the feasibility of a malicious actor obtaining control of the validating power on the Ethereum Network will increase, which may adversely affect the value of our Common Stock.
A malicious actor may also obtain control over the Ethereum Network through its influence over core developers by gaining direct control over a core developer or an otherwise influential programmer. The less the Ethereum ecosystem grows, the greater the possibility that a malicious actor may be able to maliciously influence the Ethereum Network in this manner. Moreover, it is possible that a group of Ether holders that together control more than a substantial amount of outstanding Ether are in fact part of the initial or current core developer group, or are otherwise influential members of the Ethereum community. To the extent that the initial or current core developer groups also control higher than a threshold of outstanding Ether necessary for an attack, as some believe, the risk of this particular group of users causing the Ethereum Network to adopt updates to the core protocol that this particular group wants to be implemented will be even greater, and should this materialize, it may adversely affect the value of our Common Stock.
Digital asset networks are developed by a diverse set of contributors and the perception that certain high-profile contributors will no longer contribute to the network could have an adverse effect on the market price of the related digital asset.
Digital asset networks and related protocols are often developed by a diverse set of contributors, but are also often developed by identifiable and high-profile contributors. The perception that certain high-profile contributors may no longer contribute to the applicable digital asset network or protocol may have an adverse effect on the market price of any related digital assets. For example, in June 2017, an unfounded rumor circulated that Ethereum protocol developer Vitalik Buterin had died. Following the rumor, the price of Ether decreased approximately 20% before recovering after Buterin himself dispelled the rumor. Some have speculated that the rumor led to the decrease in the price of ETH. In the event a high-profile contributor to the Ethereum Network, such as Vitalik Buterin, is perceived as no longer contributing to the Ethereum Network due to death, retirement, withdrawal, incapacity or otherwise, whether or not such perception is valid, it could negatively affect the price of ETH, which could adversely impact the value of our Common Stock.
Due to the unregulated nature and lack of transparency surrounding the operations of many ETH trading venues, ETH trading venues may experience greater fraud, security failures or regulatory or operational problems than trading venues for more established asset classes, which may result in a loss of confidence in ETH trading venues and adversely affect the value of our ETH and ETH-related digital assets.
Similar paragraph at 10 of 31 other Crypto companies: BKKT, DJT, FWDI, GLXY, HSDT, HYPD, MARA, MSTR and 2 moreETH trading venues are relatively new and, in many cases, unregulated. Furthermore, there are many ETH trading venues which do not provide the public with significant information regarding their ownership structure, management teams, corporate practices and regulatory compliance. As a result, the marketplace may lose confidence in ETH trading venues, including prominent exchanges that handle a significant volume of ETH trading and/or are subject to regulatory oversight, in the event one or more ETH trading venues cease or pause for a prolonged period the trading of ETH or other digital assets, or experience fraud, significant volumes of withdrawal, security failures or operational problems.
Similar paragraph at 13 of 31 other Crypto companies: ABTC, BKKT, CLSK, DJT, FWDI, GLXY, HSDT, HUT and 5 moreRead in the 10-K ↗
New in the latest 10-Q
79 paragraphs in the 10-Q filed Nov 6, 2026 with nothing like them in the 10-Q filed Aug 7, 2026 (at least half the words must differ; new numbers alone do not count). Quoted exactly, grouped by the item heading above them. This is text that changed, not a judgement of how serious it is.
10-Q
200 S. Biscayne Boulevard, Floor 20 Miami, Florida 33131 (Address of principal executive (Zip Code) offices)
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Financial statements and notes
LsETH is a token received when ETH is staked through Liquid Collective, a third-party liquid staking protocol. weETH is a token received when ETH is staked through ether.fi, a third-party liquid staking protocol. wstETH is a wrapped, non-rebasing form of stETH, the token received when ETH is staked through Lido, a third-party liquid staking protocol. Our staking activities on ether.fi and Lido began in January 2026 and August 2026, respectively ( see Note 11 - Commitments and Contingencies ). Therefore, our liquid staking results for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2025 consist of Liquid Collective staking activities only.
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Beginning in the third quarter of 2026, we characterize weETH as a liquid staking token rather than a liquid restaking token, reflecting ether.fi’s August 2026 removal of restaking from weETH, after which the ETH-backed weETH is staked through Ethereum validators only, accrues Ethereum staking rewards only and is no longer pledged as security for third-party services through EigenCloud (formerly EigenLayer). This change in characterization did not change the unit of account, measurement or presentation of weETH in our condensed consolidated financial statements.
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We also participate in liquid staking arrangements, whereby ETH is deployed into third-party protocols in exchange for LST, such as LsETH, wstETH and weETH, our crypto assets at cost.
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During the three and nine months ended September 30, 2026, we redeemed LsETH from our liquid staking activities; no wstETH or weETH was redeemed. In August 2026, we transferred 8,054 wstETH units as a capital contribution for a limited partnership interest (see Note 6 - Investment in Galaxy Sharplink Onchain Yield Fund, LP). See Note 3 - Crypto Asset Holdings and Realized Gains (Losses) for a summary of our liquid staking activities and the realized gains (losses) resulting from these transactions during the three and nine months ended September 30, 2026.
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On August 12, 2026, the Company entered into a Liquid Staking Agreement with Lido Ecosystem Foundation (“Lido”) (the “Lido Agreement”). The Company committed to stake $200.0 million of ETH through the Lido protocol and to hold the resulting wstETH for one year from completion of the staking. The Lido Agreement does not provide for protocol token incentives. See Note 11 - Commitments and Contingencies.
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See Note 3 - Crypto Asset Holdings and Realized Gains (Losses) for further disclosures of our realized gains (losses) on our staking and redemption activities. See Note 4 - Revenue Recognition for further disclosures.
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As of September 30, 2026, we hold ETH, a crypto asset within the scope of ASC 350-60 which is recorded at fair value and various LSTs not within the scope of ASC 350-60 that are subject to nonrecurring impairment losses. See subsection (f) Crypto Assets above for further disclosure of our accounting policies over these digital assets.
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As disclosed in subsection (f) Crypto Assets above, our ETH is fair valued using quoted (unadjusted) prices on the Company’s principal market. Because ETH is valued using unadjusted quoted prices in an active market for an identical asset, the Company’s ETH holdings are classified within Level 1 of the fair value hierarchy.
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The Company’s Fund interest is measured at fair value on a recurring basis under the fair value option and is classified within Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy. The Company’s Fund interest is not traded in an active market, and there are no observable prices for the interest or for similar interests. Fair value is determined based on the Company’s proportionate share of the fair value of the Fund’s net assets, which include investment positions measured using significant unobservable inputs, including discounts for lack of marketability and lack of control for which there is little or no market activity. Because these unobservable inputs are significant to the overall fair value measurement, the investment is classified within Level 3.
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Impairment losses are recognized on crypto assets carried at lower-of-cost or impaired value. These impairment losses occur from decreases in prices which indicate that it is more likely than not that any of the assets are impaired. Our LSTs are valued using a market approach based on the quoted price of ETH in the Company’s principal market multiplied by each token’s conversion rate to ETH, as published by the respective protocol as of the measurement date. Therefore, the Company has determined that LSTs do not trade in active markets accessible to the Company; accordingly, their fair values are not based on quoted prices for the identical assets. Because the significant inputs, the ETH quoted price and the protocol conversion rates, are observable, these measurements are classified within Level 2 of the fair value hierarchy.
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In August 2026, the Company acquired an interest in a limited partnership, the Galaxy Sharplink Onchain Yield Fund, LP (the “Fund”). In accordance with ASC 323-30 Equity Method and Joint Ventures: Partnerships, Joint Ventures and Limited Liability Entities, when a noncontrolling investor in a limited partnership can exert significant influence over the entity’s operating and financial policies, the investment is required to be accounted for as an equity method investment. Because the Company’s interest in the Fund is more than minor (the Company’s commitment represents approximately 80% of total limited partner commitments), the Company has concluded that it has the ability to exert significant influence. The Company evaluated the Fund under ASC 810, Consolidation, and concluded that the Fund is not a variable interest entity because the limited partners hold substantive kick-out rights. The Company cannot unilaterally remove the General Partner; removal requires the affirmative vote of at least one other limited partner. The General Partner, an affiliate of Galaxy Digital, directs the Fund’s investment selection, leverage management, collateral management, valuation and disposition decisions. Therefore, the Company does not have the power to direct the activities that most significantly affect the Fund’s economic performance. As a result, the Company does not have a controlling financial interest in the Fund under the voting interest model.
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ASC 825 Financial Instruments permits the fair value option (FVO) for an investment that otherwise would be accounted for under the equity method. The Company has elected to account for its limited partnership interest using the fair value option. See Note 6 - Investment in Galaxy Sharplink Onchain Yield Fund, LP, for further disclosures of this investment. The election is irrevocable and is made on an instrument-by-instrument basis at initial recognition. The Company elected the fair value option because the value of its interest is driven primarily by the market price of wstETH and the fair value of the Fund’s investment positions, and fair value measurement is consistent with the Company’s measurement of its crypto assets at fair value. Gains (losses) from changes in the fair value of the Company’s investment in the Fund are recognized within gains (losses) from operations in the Company’s condensed consolidated statements of operations. Changes in the fair value of the investment are largely driven by market fluctuations in wstETH.
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The following table presents the components of “Realized gain on crypto assets, net,” which result primarily from the Company’s liquid staking activities described above (in thousands, except units):
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September September 30, 2026 30, 2026 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Revenue from contracts with customers Native staking rewards $ 8,540 $ 27,231 Native staking fees (365) (1,045) Protocol incentives earned 750 2,378 in ETH and weETH Rewards from native staking $ 8,925 $ 28,564 and protocol incentives, net Revenue from contracts with non-customers Liquid staking rewards $ 3,942 $ 6,576 Rebates earned in LsETH 189 578 Rewards 4,131 7,154 and rebates from liquid staking Total $ 13,056 $ 35,718 revenue from staking, net
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On August 31, 2026, the Company recognized its initial investment in the Fund when it contributed ETH-related collateral to the Fund. The Company’s initial contribution was in the form of 8,054 units of wstETH with a fair value of $ 24.8 million based on the quoted price in the Company’s principal market on the contribution date. The Fund is financed through partner commitments and Fund-level borrowings based on an approximate loan-to-value ratio of 50%. The Company’s total capital commitment is $ 100.0 million, of which $ 11.2 million had been called and satisfied with proceeds of Fund borrowings secured by the $ 24.8 million of wstETH collateral contributed. The collateral contributed exceeds the amount called because the Fund borrows against the collateral rather than receiving it as the capital contribution.
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Upon contribution, control of the wstETH transferred to the Fund. The Company derecognized the contributed wstETH and recognized its initial Fund interest at fair value of $ 24.8 million. The difference between the carrying amount of the wstETH and the fair value on the date of contribution was recognized as a realized gain of $ 1.7 million. The contribution is a non-cash investing transaction as reflected on the condensed consolidated statement of cash flows.
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As of September 30, 2026, we remeasured our interest in the Fund at its fair value and determined it was not significantly different from the initial $ 24.8 million. Therefore, the investment was not adjusted for any fair value changes as of September 30, 2026. We have reflected the fair value of our interest in the Fund of $ 24.8 million on our condensed consolidated balance sheet within “Investments at fair value.”
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The Fund may leverage its assets, including ETH-related assets contributed by the Company. The Fund is the sole borrower, and the Company is not a borrower, co-borrower, or guarantor. Accordingly, Fund borrowings are not recognized in the Company’s condensed consolidated balance sheets.
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The Company’s capital commitment of $ 100.0 million will be funded by ETH-related collateral contributed by the Company; the Company is not required to fund capital calls in cash. On August 28, 2026, the Fund called $ 11.2 million of the Company’s commitment, which was satisfied with proceeds of Fund borrowings secured by the 8,054 wstETH the Company contributed on August 31, 2026.
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The Fund’s general partner (the “General Partner”), an affiliate of Galaxy Digital, may require the Company to contribute additional ETH-related collateral to prevent liquidation of, or maintain borrowing capacity under, the Fund’s borrowing arrangements. Absent the Company’s consent, the aggregate value of ETH-related collateral contributed may not exceed $ 300 million, measured using prices as of the initial contribution date, of which $ 275.2 million remained available as of September 30, 2026. The Company is not required to contribute additional collateral for borrowings incurred at a loan-to-value ratio below 50% without its consent. The General Partner will cause the Fund to borrow USD against the ETH-related collateral contributed to the Fund through one or more borrowing arrangements, and the USD proceeds of such borrowing arrangements are deemed capital contributions of the Company. The General Partner may not cause the Fund to enter into any borrowing arrangement that would result in ETH-related collateral being rehypothecated without the prior consent of the Company.
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Expected volatility 96.91% Expected dividends 0.00% Expected term (years) 4.00 Risk-free rate 4.27% Strike price $8.15 Fair value per share of underlying Common Stock $4.97 on grant date
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On August 12, 2026, the Company entered into a Liquid Staking Agreement with Lido Ecosystem Foundation (the “Lido Agreement”). Under the Lido Agreement, the Company committed to stake $ 200.0 million of ETH through the Lido protocol and to hold the resulting wstETH for one year from completion of the staking (the “Term”). The Company completed the staking on September 28, 2026, and as of September 30, 2026 remained in compliance with the holding requirement. The Company’s aggregate liability under the Lido Agreement is limited to the amount of the fee. The Company assesses the likelihood of any loss from a breach of the Lido Agreement as remote and, therefore, has not recorded a liability.
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See Note 6 - Investment in Galaxy Sharplink Onchain Yield Fund, LP for our capital commitments in connection with our limited partnership interest acquired in August 2026.
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Also on September 21, 2026, the Company entered into a 2002 ISDA Master Agreement, including the related Schedule and Credit Support Annex (together, the “ISDA Master Agreement”), with Galaxy Trading Mercury LLC (“Galaxy Trading”), an affiliate of Galaxy Digital, which governs over-the-counter derivative transactions the Company may enter into with Galaxy Trading. Under the Credit Support Annex, the Company is required to post collateral in the form of U.S. dollars, ETH or other agreed digital assets, including LsETH, equal to Galaxy Trading’s exposure under outstanding transactions plus any independent amount specified in a transaction confirmation. Collateral is valued daily and is subject to a $ 0.5 million minimum transfer amount. Galaxy Trading is not required to post collateral to the Company and may sell, pledge or rehypothecate collateral posted by the Company. The ISDA Master Agreement contains customary events of default, including a cross-default to other borrowed money obligations of the Company in excess of $ 35.0 million. It also contains termination events, including those tied to specified stockholders’ equity thresholds and key persons. Upon an event of default or termination event, Galaxy Trading may terminate all outstanding transactions. There were no transactions outstanding under the ISDA Master Agreement as of September 30, 2026.
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Diluted net income per share is computed using the treasury stock method for outstanding warrants, stock options and unvested restricted stock units. Under this method, the proceeds from the assumed exercise of warrants and options (in-the-money), and the average unrecognized compensation cost for unvested restricted stock units, are assumed to be used to repurchase Common Stock at the average market price during the period. For the three months ended September 30, 2026, the average market price of the Company’s Common Stock was $ 7.30 per share.
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Warrants with exercise prices ranging from $ 7.38 to $ 214.80 per share and all outstanding stock options had exercise prices above the average market price for the period. These securities were excluded from the computation of diluted net income per share because their inclusion would have been anti-dilutive. Unvested restricted stock units were also excluded as anti-dilutive, as the shares assumed to be repurchased with the related unrecognized compensation cost exceeded the number of unvested units. Warrants with exercise prices of $ 6.15 and $ 6.77 per share were dilutive and the incremental shares are included in the computation under the treasury stock method.
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On October 14, 2026, the Company entered into an Account Control Agreement with Galaxy Digital LLC and Anchorage Digital Bank N.A., as custodian, establishing a segregated account to hold collateral pledged under the Galaxy Loan Agreement. As of the date these condensed consolidated financial statements were issued, the Company had not borrowed under the Galaxy Loan Agreement. See Note 11 - Commitments and Contingencies.
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On August 12, 2026, the Company entered into a Liquid Staking Agreement with Lido Ecosystem Foundation (the “Lido Agreement”). Under the Lido Agreement, the Company committed to stake $200.0 million of ETH through the Lido protocol and to hold the resulting wstETH for one year from completion of the staking (the “Term”). The Company completed the $200.0 million staking on September 28, 2026, and as of September 30, 2026 remained in compliance with the holding requirement.
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We track four related areas that may support long-term use of Ethereum: stablecoins, tokenization of real-world assets (“RWAs”), onchain financial applications and agentic finance. Stablecoins provide programmable money, tokenization can make financial assets available onchain, and onchain financial applications can provide markets for payments, lending and settlement. Further, software agents may make those services more accessible or automate their use within defined permissions. Management believes the interaction of assets, applications and liquidity supports adoption of Ethereum and its Layer 2 networks, however, this adoption does not necessarily produce a proportional increase in demand for ETH or its market price.
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Agentic finance refers to software carrying out financial tasks on behalf of users within defined permissions, such as monitoring cash balances, initiating payments or allocating assets subject to spending and risk limits. We believe Ethereum and its Layer 2 networks are positioned to provide infrastructure for these activities. Adoption remains at an early stage and depends on useful applications, reliable custody, authorization controls, privacy, auditable records and regulatory acceptance. ETH supports Ethereum network security through staking and is used to pay base-layer transaction fees, while stablecoins may be the asset transferred in a payment. The effect of increased activity on ETH demand and value will depend on where activity occurs, fee economics, competition and other factors. Accordingly, management views agentic finance as an emerging, not yet mature, contributor to onchain activity. Currently, the Company is not actively participating in agentic finance either within its operations or as part of our ETH Treasury Management Strategy.
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ETH per Share is an operating metric and is not a U.S. GAAP measure of earnings, liquidity or net asset value. It does not reflect corporate liabilities, expenses, taxes or potential dilution, and shareholders do not have a right to redeem the underlying ETH. An increase in this measure does not assure an increase in the value of our common stock. We evaluate the metric together with our financial results, liquidity requirements and treasury deployment.
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Basic Equivalent Shares Outstanding consist of common shares outstanding plus shares issuable upon exercise of pre-funded warrants, which carry a nominal exercise price. Basic Equivalent Shares Outstanding is a point-in-time measure and differs from the weighted-average shares used in calculating U.S. GAAP earnings per share. It excludes other potentially dilutive securities; their issuance or exercise may affect future per-share exposure.
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Our support for several independent organizations focused on protocol research, institutional adoption and privacy infrastructure is described under “Ecosystem Stewardship.” These activities are evaluated separately from treasury returns and may not produce a direct financial return to the Company.
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Source Original Impairment Carrying Number Approx. Weighted Conversion of cost avg
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losses value of average rate capital basis units held purchase at end of used to price
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Beginning in the third quarter of 2026, we characterize weETH as a liquid staking token rather than a liquid restaking token, reflecting ether.fi’s August 2026 removal of restaking from weETH, after which the ETH backing weETH is staked through Ethereum validators only, accrues Ethereum staking rewards only and is no longer pledged as security for third-party services through EigenCloud (formerly EigenLayer). This change in characterization did not change the unit of account, measurement or presentation of weETH in our condensed consolidated financial statements as of September 30, 2026.
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Source Original Impairment Carrying Number Approx. Weighted Conversion of of avg
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cost losses value average rate capital basis units purchase at end of used to held price
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On August 12, 2026, we entered into a Liquid Staking Agreement with the Lido Ecosystem Foundation and, during the third quarter of 2026, staked ETH through the Lido protocol, a decentralized liquid staking protocol. Staking ETH through the Lido protocol produces stETH, a rebasing token whose balance adjusts to reflect staking rewards. We hold our position as wstETH, the wrapped, non-rebasing form of stETH. The number of wstETH units we hold does not change as rewards accrue; instead, the amount of stETH, and therefore ETH, into which each wstETH unit is convertible increases over time, net of protocol fees and any penalties. Our wstETH is held in our name by Anchorage Digital Bank N.A., our qualified custodian.
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Under the Liquid Staking Agreement, we committed to stake $200.0 million of ETH through the Lido protocol and to hold the resulting wstETH for one year from completion of the staking. During the third quarter of 2026, we contributed 8,054 wstETH to the Galaxy Sharplink Onchain Yield Fund, LP as a capital contribution. See Note 6 - Investment in Galaxy Sharplink Onchain Yield Fund, LP and Note 11 - Commitments and Contingencies.
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Source Original Impairment Carrying Number Approx. Weighted Conversion of cost value of avg
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(b) Contributed to the Galaxy Sharplink Onchain Yield Fund, LP. See Note 6 – Investment in Galaxy Sharplink Onchain Yield Fund, LP.
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September Number Lowest Market Highest Market Market Market 30, 2026 Held at Market Value Market Value Price at Value at
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End Price using Price held End End of Quarter During the Lowest During the using of Quarter of Quarter
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As Carrying Market Excess of September 30, 2026 (in thousands) Value Value of Market Value over
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During 2026, the Company provided or committed capital to independent organizations addressing protocol research through Ethlabs, institutional adoption through Ethereum Institutional and privacy and compliance infrastructure through EthSystems. Management believes this support will strengthen the long-term thesis underlying our ETH treasury. The organizations operate independently, and their milestones and operations are separate and distinct from the Company’s operating results.
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Comprehensive federal digital asset market-structure legislation remained unfinished at September 30, 2026. On September 15, 2026, the Senate failed to invoke cloture on the motion to proceed to consideration of the Digital Asset Market Clarity Act (“CLARITY Act”), preventing the legislation from advancing at that stage. The proposed legislation seeks to establish a more comprehensive statutory framework for digital asset markets, including clearer allocation of regulatory responsibilities between the SEC and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). Although the procedural vote did not foreclose further legislative action, it left the timing, scope and ultimate enactment of a comprehensive framework uncertain.
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During the third quarter of 2026, U.S. agencies continued developing regulatory pathways for digital asset activity. On August 18, 2026, the SEC proposed Regulation Crypto Assets, which would establish offering exemptions and a disclosure framework for certain investment contracts involving crypto assets that are not themselves securities; the comment period closed on October 20, 2026. Regulation Crypto Assets is a proposal and may not be adopted, or may be adopted in a materially different form. The SEC exemptive order is limited by its terms and conditions, does not provide relief from the registration requirements of the Securities Act or from the Investment Company Act, and may be modified or withdrawn. On September 17, 2026, the CFTC submitted a pre-rule action titled ‘Regulation Crypto Asset Transactions and Regulation Crypto Asset Markets’ to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs for review and, on October 5, 2026, issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking, with comments due December 14, 2026. The CFTC has not yet proposed rule text, and any rules the CFTC ultimately proposes or adopts may differ materially from the framework described in its advance notice. We cannot predict the timing or outcome of any of these regulatory actions or their effect on our business, the market for our common stock, or the digital assets we hold.
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On September 17, 2026, the SEC issued a temporary, conditional exemptive order, which the SEC refers to as the ‘Innovation Exemption,’ that (i) exempts qualifying tokenized securities venues from the definition of ‘exchange’ under the Exchange Act to permit permissioned secondary trading of tokenized national market system (‘NMS’) stock through automated market makers and liquidity pools, and (ii) exempts certain liquidity providers in those pools from the definition of ‘dealer.’ The exemptions are effective through September 17, 2031, are subject to symbol and trading volume limits and other conditions, and may be modified by the SEC at any time.
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Management believes that greater regulatory clarity could facilitate institutional participation in Ethereum-based financial activity. However, the potential benefits to Ethereum and the Company remain uncertain and will depend on the substance, timing and implementation of legislative and regulatory developments. Continued uncertainty could affect the availability and terms of custody, trading, staking and other onchain services used by the Company and its counterparties. We continue to assess the implications of regulatory developments for custody, staking, protocol participation, liquidity and potential strategic transactions. Changes in law, interpretation or implementation may affect the availability, cost or terms of our activities and those of our counterparties. There can be no assurance that greater regulatory clarity will be achieved, or that any such clarity, if achieved, will facilitate institutional participation or otherwise benefit Ethereum or the Company.
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The following discussion compares the three and nine months ended September 30, 2026 with the corresponding periods in 2025. Our ETH Treasury Management activities began in June 2025. Changes in the size and composition of the treasury and in crypto asset prices affect comparability. The following table provides selected financial information for the periods presented:
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For For Change % For For Change % the Three the Three Change the Nine the Nine Change
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For the three months ended September 30, 2026, realized gains on crypto assets, net, were $75,215, compared with $6,308 in the corresponding 2025 period. Unrealized gains on crypto assets at fair value, net, were $676,695, compared with $107,326 in the prior-year quarter. Total gains from these items increased $638,276 to $751,910 from $113,634, driven by ETH price recovery during the quarter, coupled with a realized gain on the redemption of LsETH and realized gain on the conversion of ETH to wstETH. The price of ETH was approximately $2,681 at September 30, 2026, compared with approximately $1,563 at June 30, 2026. Realized gains for the quarter included $55,638 from LsETH redemptions, $17,968 from staking ETH for wstETH and $1,690 from the contribution of wstETH to the Fund. Unrealized gains reflect changes in the fair value of crypto assets during the period and are not a reflection of an increase in cash. Realized gains reflect transactions involving crypto assets and may include non-cash exchanges or redemptions; they should not be equated with cash proceeds.
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Total operating expenses decreased $(7,203) or -36.9%, to $12,333 for the three months ended September 30, 2026 from $19,536 in the corresponding 2025 period. Cost of affiliate marketing revenues decreased $(151) or -35.0%, to $280 from $431, consistent with lower affiliate marketing revenue. Selling, general and administrative expenses decreased $(1,011), or -8.4%, to $11,013 from $12,024. The decrease was primarily due to the elimination of $3,146 of asset manager fees following the termination of the Asset Management Agreements, partially offset by increases of $968 in salaries and benefits and $1,227 in stock-based compensation. Impairment losses on crypto assets carried at cost were the primary driver in the decrease in operating expenses, with a decrease of $(5,910), or -85.0%, to $1,040 from $6,950. These assets are measured at historical cost less cumulative impairment under ASC 350-30 rather than at fair value. Related-party stock-based compensation was zero, compared with $131 in the prior-year quarter.
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Operating income was $753,033 for the three months ended September 30, 2026, compared with $104,943 in the corresponding 2025 period. The improvement primarily reflected the increase in net crypto asset gains, together with higher revenue and lower operating expenses. The principal driver was the $569,369 increase in unrealized gains on crypto assets at fair value, net.
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Total other income was $514 for the three months ended September 30, 2026, compared with $119 in the corresponding 2025 period, and consisted of $516 of interest income and $(2) of other expense. Income tax expense increased to $2,104 from $792. Net income was $751,443, compared with $104,270, an increase of $647,174 primarily reflecting the increase in net crypto asset realized and unrealized gains.
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For the nine months ended September 30, 2026, realized gains on crypto assets, net, were $88,653 compared with $11,681 in the corresponding 2025 period, an increase of $76,972, resulting from realized gains on the redemptions of LsETH and realized gains on the conversion of ETH to wstETH and weETH. Unrealized losses on crypto assets at fair value, net, were $(150,971), compared with unrealized gains of $104,889 in the prior-year period, an adverse change of $(255,860). This change reflects ETH prices that were volatile during 2026 and ended the period lower, despite a third-quarter recovery, compared with rising ETH prices from the start of our ETH treasury strategy in June 2025 through September 30, 2025. Together, these items resulted in net losses of $(62,318), compared with net gains of $116,570, a decrease of $(178,888). The unrealized losses reflect changes in the fair value of crypto assets over the nine-month period; the third-quarter unrealized gains did not fully offset losses recorded earlier in 2026. These non-cash valuation changes do not themselves provide or use cash.
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Operating loss was $(325,003) for the nine months ended September 30, 2026, compared with operating income of $527 in the corresponding 2025 period. The adverse change of $(325,530) primarily reflected the $(178,888) decrease in net realized and unrealized crypto asset results and the $171,402 increase in operating expenses, partially offset by the $24,760 increase in total revenue.
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Total other income was $895 for the nine months ended September 30, 2026, compared with $168 in the corresponding 2025 period, and consisted of $897 of interest income and $(2) of other expense. Income tax expense increased $3,462 to $4,284 from $822. Net loss was $(328,392), compared with $(127), an increase in net loss of $(328,265), primarily reflecting unrealized crypto asset losses and higher impairment charges, partially offset by higher revenue and realized crypto asset gains.
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Our principal sources of liquidity are our cash and cash equivalents balances and proceeds from equity financing transactions, including our at-the-market offering facility under the Amended and Restated ATM Sales Agreement with A.G.P. We may also borrow U.S. dollars or specified digital assets under our Master Lender Agreement with FalconX Charlie Inc. and our Master Digital Currency Loan Agreement with Galaxy Digital LLC, although neither lender has an obligation to approve any request, borrowings must be secured by collateral and are subject to margin maintenance requirements, and no amounts had been borrowed under either agreement as of September 30, 2026 (see Note 11 - Commitments and Contingencies). Access to equity financing depends on market conditions and acceptable terms and is not assured. Sales of digital assets and conversion of rewards into cash may provide additional liquidity, subject to the restrictions described below.
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Long-Term Liquidity - Beyond the next 12 months, our cash requirements may include ongoing operations, contractual commitments, treasury deployments and strategic investments or mergers and acquisitions. Our ability to fund these requirements depends on operating cash flows, available liquid assets and access to financing on acceptable terms.
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Our cash requirements include operating expenses, working capital, taxes, capital expenditures and contractual commitments, including commitments relating to the Fund and ecosystem initiatives. Assets committed to protocols or investment vehicles may not be available to meet near-term cash requirements. See Note 11 - Commitments and Contingencies.
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On August 7, 2026, the Company and Galaxy Digital executed definitive agreements establishing a $125.0 million institutional investment vehicle designed to deploy ETH into professionally managed onchain yield strategies by investing in blockchain-based liquidity protocols and related digital-asset opportunities. The Company’s capital commitments consist of $100.0 million of capital, in the form of crypto assets. The Company’s capital commitment of $100.0 million funds borrowings of the Fund secured by ETH-related collateral contributed by the Company; the Company is not required to fund capital calls in cash. On August 28, 2026, the Fund called $11.2 million of the Company’s commitment, which was satisfied with proceeds of Fund borrowings secured by the 8,054 wstETH the Company contributed on August 31, 2026.
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Risk Factors
We have pursued, and may in the future pursue, mergers, acquisitions, investments, joint ventures and dispositions, which could adversely affect our results of operations.
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Our growth strategy includes acquiring or investing in businesses that offer complementary products, services and technologies, or enhancing our market coverage, business strategy or technological capabilities. Any acquisitions we may undertake involve risks and uncertainties, which could hamper the execution of our business strategy, such as:
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Our due diligence process may fail to identify significant issues with the acquired business’s products, financial disclosures, accounting practices, legal, tax and other contingencies, compliance with local laws and regulations (and interpretations thereof) in the U.S. and multiple international jurisdictions; ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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Difficulties integrating the acquired business or company and managing and retaining acquired employees, vendors and customers;
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Inaccuracies in our original estimates and assumptions used to assess a transaction, which may result in us not realizing the expected financial or strategic benefits of any such transaction; ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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Diversion of management’s attention from daily operations and the pursuit of other opportunities;
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Incurring significant restructuring charges and amortization expense, assuming liabilities and ongoing or new lawsuits, potential impairment of acquired goodwill (if any) and other intangible assets (if any), and increasing our expenses and working capital requirements;
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The potential for deficiencies in internal controls of the acquired business, as well as implementing our own management information systems, operating systems and internal controls for the acquired business;
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Unexpected delays, challenges and related expenses, and disruption of our business;
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From time to time, we may also seek to divest or wind down portions of our business or exit minority investments, any of which could materially affect our cash flows and results of operations. Such dispositions involve risks and uncertainties, including disruption to other parts of our business, potential loss of employees or customers, or exposure to unanticipated liabilities or ongoing obligations following any such dispositions. Such events could have a material adverse impact on our business and operations.
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Our use of AI could give rise to legal or regulatory action or damage our reputation.
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We currently use AI in certain of our business operations, subject to internal policies and oversight governing its use, including human review of AI-generated outputs. We continue to evaluate additional uses of AI in our ETH treasury and affiliate marketing businesses; however, our use of AI may not be successful and may present compliance and reputational risks. AI technologies are rapidly evolving and may generate outputs that appear correct but are inaccurate or incomplete. Although we maintain controls designed to address these risks, those controls may not identify or prevent every such issue. In addition, laws and regulations governing AI, including with respect to data privacy and intellectual property, continue to develop, and we may need to adapt our use of AI to comply with them. If we do not manage these risks effectively, we could be subject to legal or regulatory action or reputational harm.
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We face risks relating to the potential compromise of the Ethereum network’s security by emerging technologies, such as quantum computing, which may materially and adversely impact our operations and financial condition.
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The security and integrity of the Ethereum network are fundamentally dependent on the robustness of its cryptographic algorithms. The Ethereum protocol relies heavily on public key cryptography and hashing algorithms to secure transactions, safeguard private keys, secure validator participation in its proof-of-stake consensus mechanism and prevent double-spending. Advances in emerging technologies, particularly quantum computing, may pose significant risks to the Ethereum network’s security and operational stability and, as a result, to the value of the ETH and ETH-based receipt tokens. Quantum computing, in particular, presents a long-term threat to the cryptographic assumptions underpinning the Ethereum network. Should quantum computing achieve sufficient maturity, it could undermine the effectiveness of the cryptographic algorithms used to secure Ethereum. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer could potentially derive private keys from exposed public keys or compromise the network’s proof-of-stake consensus mechanism, leading to the theft of digital assets, double-spending, and other forms of fraud. Although current quantum computing capabilities are not yet at this level, advancements in quantum technologies could materialize more rapidly than anticipated, creating significant systemic risks for the Ethereum network and for the ETH we hold, stake or deploy through liquid staking and decentralized finance protocols. There can be no assurance that Ethereum’s current cryptographic safeguards will be sufficient to protect against future technological advances. While research and development efforts are ongoing to develop quantum-resistant cryptographic protocols, the Ethereum network may face challenges in adopting such technologies at scale or on a timely basis, particularly given its decentralized governance structure. Any successful attack or perceived vulnerability arising from quantum computing could materially and adversely affect the price, liquidity, and adoption of ETH and could negatively impact our business, financial condition, results of operations and the market price of our Common Stock.
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Other information
The website addresses and social media links included in this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q are inactive textual references only, and the information contained on, or that can be accessed through, any such website or social media channel is not incorporated by reference into, and does not form a part of, this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q or any other report we file with or furnish to the SEC.
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The 10-Q's risk factors against the 10-K
Item 1A of the 10-Q filed Nov 6, 2026 against Item 1A of the 10-K filed Mar 9, 2026.
A 10-Q repeats only the risks that changed, so a 10-K paragraph that is missing from it is not counted as removed.
Added is a paragraph with nothing like it in the 10-K, Reworded a sentence that is in both with several words changed,
Quiet changes a sentence in both where one to four words changed and one is a hedge or a modal
(cut words struck through, new words highlighted and underlined).
Text on the page, not a score; each links to the filing at sec.gov.
Added10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
On March 17, 2026, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), joined by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), issued a joint interpretation (the “Joint Interpretation”) clarifying the application of the federal securities laws to crypto assets and establishing a taxonomy of five categories: “digital commodities,” “digital collectibles,” “digital tools,” “stablecoins,” and “digital securities.” The Joint Interpretation expressly identifies ETH as an example of a digital commodity, and the SEC and CFTC have each stated that they will administer their respective statutes consistent with the Joint Interpretation. The Joint Interpretation is consistent with our long-held view, described below, that ETH is not a “security” within the meaning of the U.S. federal securities laws and that registration of the Company under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the “Investment Company Act”), is therefore not required under the applicable securities laws.
Added10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
The Joint Interpretation is interpretive guidance rather than a rulemaking and does not itself have the force of law. It could be modified, withdrawn, or superseded by future SEC or CFTC leadership, narrowed or invalidated through judicial challenge, or rendered obsolete by subsequent legislation or rulemaking. Federal and state courts are not bound by the Joint Interpretation, and the ultimate legal question of whether any particular digital asset, or any particular transaction involving a digital asset, is a “security” remains subject to judicial determination under tests articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, including in the Howey and Reves cases. In addition, the Joint Interpretation acknowledges that a crypto asset that is not itself a security may nonetheless become subject to an “investment contract” depending on the manner in which it is offered or sold, so classification of ETH as a digital commodity does not foreclose the possibility that particular transactions involving ETH could be characterized as securities transactions.
Added10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
The Joint Interpretation is interpretive guidance rather than a rulemaking, and it does not itself have the force of law. It could be modified, withdrawn, or superseded by future SEC or CFTC leadership, narrowed or invalidated through judicial challenge, or rendered obsolete by subsequent legislation or rulemaking. No assurance can be given that ETH will continue to be treated as a digital commodity under this or any future guidance, or that the current allocation of jurisdiction between the SEC and CFTC with respect to ETH and other digital assets will remain unchanged. A change in ETH’s regulatory classification, or in the coordinated posture between the SEC and the CFTC, could materially increase our compliance burden, restrict our ability to hold or transact in ETH, and adversely affect the market price of ETH and the market price of our listed securities.
Added10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
Consistent with the Executive Order and the July 2025 working group report, on March 17, 2026, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), joined by the CFTC, issued a joint interpretation (the “Joint Interpretation”) clarifying the application of the federal securities laws to crypto assets. The Joint Interpretation establishes a taxonomy of five categories - “digital commodities,” “digital collectibles,” “digital tools,” “stablecoins,” and “digital securities” - and expressly identifies ETH as an example of a digital commodity. The SEC and CFTC have each stated that they will administer their respective statutes consistent with the Joint Interpretation. While we believe the Joint Interpretation provides meaningful additional clarity regarding the regulatory status of ETH, it is interpretive guidance rather than a rulemaking, does not itself have the force of law, and is not binding on federal or state courts, state securities regulators, or private litigants. The Joint Interpretation could be modified, withdrawn, or superseded by future SEC or CFTC leadership, narrowed or invalidated through judicial challenge, or rendered obsolete by subsequent legislation or rulemaking, and it also acknowledges that a crypto asset that is not itself a security may nonetheless become subject to an “investment contract” depending on the manner in which it is offered or sold.
Added10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
Prior to August 2026, weETH was a liquid restaking token. In August 2026, ether.fi removed restaking from weETH, and the ETH backing weETH is now staked through Ethereum validators only. As a result, we do not currently participate in liquid restaking arrangements, however, we may participate in restaking arrangements in the future. Liquid restaking activities involve risks beyond those associated with native staking or liquid staking. In a liquid restaking arrangement, the underlying ETH (or its receipt token) is used to provide cryptoeconomic security not only to the Ethereum proof-of-stake protocol but also to additional services, such as the EigenCloud Autonomous Verifiable Services (“AVSs”) that we secured through ether.fi, prior to August 2026. This exposed our underlying ETH to potential slashing, forfeiture or other penalties arising from issues outside of the Ethereum staking protocol itself, including operational failures, validator or operator misconduct, or technical problems with the AVSs being secured, and any future restaking would expose us to similar risks. The AVSs and other services secured through restaking are themselves new, with limited operating history, and there can be no assurance that they will function as designed. We have deployed a portion of our ETH treasury into weETH issued by ether.fi, and any losses sustained in connection with that deployment - whether from slashing, smart contract exploits, protocol failure or otherwise - could have a material adverse effect on our financial condition, results of operations and the market price of our Common Stock. In addition, we have bridged weETH from the Ethereum mainnet to Linea, a zkEVM Layer 2 network, using ether.fi’s weETH OFT bridge powered by LayerZero v2. Cross-chain bridges have historically been a frequent target of exploits in decentralized finance, and any failure, vulnerability or exploit affecting the bridge, the messaging layer or the destination network - or any disruption to or change in the Linea sequencer, prover, governance or future upgrades - could result in delays in accessing, or partial or total loss of, the weETH we have bridged.
Added10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
We have pursued, and may in the future pursue, mergers, acquisitions, investments, joint ventures and dispositions, which could adversely affect our results of operations.
Added10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
Our growth strategy includes acquiring or investing in businesses that offer complementary products, services and technologies, or enhancing our market coverage, business strategy or technological capabilities. Any acquisitions we may undertake involve risks and uncertainties, which could hamper the execution of our business strategy, such as:
Added10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
Our due diligence process may fail to identify significant issues with the acquired business’s products, financial disclosures, accounting practices, legal, tax and other contingencies, compliance with local laws and regulations (and interpretations thereof) in the U.S. and multiple international jurisdictions; ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Added10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
Difficulties integrating the acquired business or company and managing and retaining acquired employees, vendors and customers;
Added10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
Inaccuracies in our original estimates and assumptions used to assess a transaction, which may result in us not realizing the expected financial or strategic benefits of any such transaction; ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Added10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
Diversion of management’s attention from daily operations and the pursuit of other opportunities;
Reworded10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
Reworded10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
See “Our “ Our shift towards an ETH-focused treasury strategy requires substantial changes in our day-to-day operations and exposes us to significant operational risks” and “We face risks relating to the custody of our ETH, including the loss or destruction of private keys required to access our ETH and cyberattacks or other data loss relating to our ETH. ” in Item 1A.
Reworded10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
Reworded10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
Reworded10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
The regulation of digital assets in the U.S. is also remains subject to change because of through the enactment and adoption of new laws and regulations. regulations, and the Joint Interpretation is expressly intended to complement, rather than substitute for, Congressional market structure legislation.
Reworded10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
The consequences of increased federal regulation these potential developments, including any narrowing, modification, or withdrawal of digital assets and digital asset activities the Joint Interpretation, could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, financial condition, and prospects, as well as the market price of ETH, which in turn could adversely affect the market price of our listed securities.
Reworded10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
It is difficult to predict whether, or when, as a result of these developments, Congress will grant additional authorities to the SEC SEC, the CFTC, or other regulators, what the nature of such additional authorities might be, how additional legislation and/or regulatory oversight might impact the ability of digital asset markets to function, the willingness of financial and other institutions to continue to provide services to the digital assets industry, or how any new regulations regulations, changes to existing regulations, or changes to or withdrawal of existing regulations interpretive guidance might impact the value of digital assets generally and ETH held by the Company specifically.
Reworded10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
As a result, and in particular due to our adoption of ASU 2023-08 and use of the fair value method for accounting for digital ETH assets, 2023-08, volatility in our earnings may be significantly more than what we experienced in prior periods.
Reworded10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
We have also adapted adapted, and expect to continue to adapt, our process for analyzing the U.S. federal securities law status of ETH and other cryptocurrencies over time, as guidance guidance, interpretive releases, and case law have evolved.
Reworded10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
If any of the smart contracts with which we interact, interact - whether decentralized finance, liquid staking, liquid restaking, cross-chain bridging or otherwise, otherwise - suffer from such manipulation or exploit, or otherwise do not function as intended or as we anticipate, our ETH and any LsETH LsETH, weETH or similar tokens we hold may be exposed.
Reworded10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
Supreme Court’s decisions in the Howey and Reves cases, as well as court rulings, reports, orders, press releases, public statements, and speeches by the SEC Commissioners and SEC Staff - including, most recently, the Joint Interpretation - providing guidance on when a digital asset asset, or a transaction to which a digital asset may relate relate, may be a security for purposes of U.S. federal securities laws.
Reworded10-Q 2026-11-06 vs 10-K 2026-03-09
If it is determined that the liquid staking or liquid restaking protocols we use, or the receipt tokens we receive, receive (including LsETH and weETH), are securities offerings, the providers of liquid staking those protocols may be required to pay fines or be subject to other third-party claims, and the ETH we have deposited with them may be available to their creditors to fulfill those claims.
The first 24 of 48 are shown (at most 12 of each type).
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