China
81 of 521 companies dropped a paragraph in Risk Factors that uses one of these words:
China, Chinese, PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan.
The paragraph was in the earlier 10-K and nothing like it is in the latest.
It counts text; it does not say how serious a risk is. Words in capitals only (such as AI) must be in capitals.
By sector
Sector is the SEC's industry description of the company. Each count opens that sector's quotes below.
| Sector | Companies | Compared |
|---|---|---|
| Apparel & Other Finishd Prods of Fabrics & Similar Matl | 1 | 1 |
| Canned, Frozen & Preservd Fruit, Veg & Food Specialties | 1 | 1 |
| Canned, Fruits, Veg, Preserves, Jams & Jellies | 1 | 1 |
| Communications Equipment, NEC | 1 | 1 |
| Electrical Industrial Apparatus | 1 | 1 |
| Electronic Connectors | 1 | 1 |
| Farm Machinery & Equipment | 1 | 1 |
| Games, Toys & Children's Vehicles (No Dolls & Bicycles) | 1 | 1 |
| Meat Packing Plants | 1 | 1 |
| Miscellaneous Food Preparations & Kindred Products | 1 | 1 |
| Motor Vehicle Parts & Accessories | 1 | 1 |
| Ordnance & Accessories, (No Vehicles/Guided Missiles) | 1 | 1 |
| Paper Mills | 1 | 1 |
| Retail-Eating & Drinking Places | 1 | 1 |
| Retail-Radio, Tv & Consumer Electronics Stores | 1 | 1 |
| Special Industry Machinery, NEC | 1 | 1 |
| Telephone & Telegraph Apparatus | 1 | 1 |
| Wholesale-Motor Vehicle Supplies & New Parts | 1 | 1 |
| X-Ray Apparatus & Tubes & Related Irradiation Apparatus | 1 | 1 |
| Computer Communications Equipment | 2 | 3 |
| Plastic Materials, Synth Resins & Nonvulcan Elastomers | 2 | 3 |
| Motor Vehicles & Passenger Car Bodies | 2 | 4 |
| Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical Sys | 2 | 4 |
| Aircraft Engines & Engine Parts | 1 | 2 |
| Fats & Oils | 1 | 2 |
| Industrial Organic Chemicals | 1 | 2 |
| Instruments For Meas & Testing of Electricity & Elec Signals | 1 | 2 |
| Printed Circuit Boards | 1 | 2 |
| Pumps & Pumping Equipment | 1 | 2 |
| Radio & Tv Broadcasting & Communications Equipment | 1 | 2 |
| Retail-Auto & Home Supply Stores | 1 | 2 |
| Retail-Lumber & Other Building Materials Dealers | 1 | 2 |
| Rubber & Plastics Footwear | 1 | 2 |
| Services-Medical Laboratories | 1 | 2 |
| Semiconductors & Related Devices | 6 | 15 |
| Orthopedic, Prosthetic & Surgical Appliances & Supplies | 2 | 5 |
| Electronic Computers | 1 | 3 |
| Perfumes, Cosmetics & Other Toilet Preparations | 1 | 3 |
| Finance Services | 9 | 28 |
| Pharmaceutical Preparations | 3 | 11 |
| Investment Advice | 2 | 8 |
| Electronic & Other Electrical Equipment (No Computer Equip) | 1 | 4 |
| Retail-Eating Places | 1 | 4 |
| Surgical & Medical Instruments & Apparatus | 2 | 10 |
| Laboratory Analytical Instruments | 1 | 5 |
| Retail-Variety Stores | 1 | 5 |
| Services-Computer Programming, Data Processing, Etc. | 1 | 5 |
| National Commercial Banks | 2 | 11 |
| Petroleum Refining | 1 | 6 |
| Security Brokers, Dealers & Flotation Companies | 1 | 7 |
| Services-Business Services, NEC | 2 | 16 |
| Real Estate Investment Trusts | 3 | 27 |
| Services-Prepackaged Software | 2 | 19 |
| Electric Services | 1 | 15 |
193 paragraphs · Finance Services show all sectors
Further, we have faced complications related to the import of mining equipment in the past and may face such complications in the future. The global supply of miners is unpredictable and presently heavily dependent on manufacturers based in China. Geopolitical matters, including the relationship between the United States and other countries and trade restrictions and tariffs (or the threat of trade restrictions or tariffs), may impact our ability to import miners or other equipment necessary for our operations. Restrictions or bans on mining equipment from China, whether due to trade restrictions, national security concerns or geopolitical tensions, could disrupt our supply chain, increase equipment costs and delay our growth plans.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 31, 2025 ↗
In May 2021, China’s State Council issued a statement signaling its intent to restrict cryptocurrency mining and trading activities, resulting in provincial governments taking proactive measurements to prohibit cryptocurrency mining. On September 24, 2021, China’s central bank and its National Development and Reform Commission issued a nation-wide ban on cryptocurrency mining and declaring all financial transactions involving cryptocurrencies illegal. As a result, mining data centers previously operating in China have been forced to shut down and owners of cryptocurrency mining equipment located in China have been attempting to relocate the equipment to mining data centers in other jurisdictions, with a particular focus on locations within the United States. Combined with the increase in the price of bitcoin in 2021, the influx of cryptocurrency miners from China has created conditions of great demand for mining data centers and limited supply. Due to these conditions, there is no assurance that Gryphon will be able to procure alternative hosting agreements on acceptable terms in a timely manner or at all.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 31, 2025 ↗
A number of companies that engage in Bitcoin and/or other cryptocurrency-related activities have been unable to find banks or financial institutions that are willing to provide them with bank accounts and other services. Similarly, a number of companies and individuals or businesses associated with Bitcoin may have had and may continue to have their existing bank accounts closed or services discontinued with financial institutions in response to government action, particularly in China, where regulatory response to cryptocurrencies has been to exclude their use for ordinary consumer transactions within China. In January 2023, the Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued a joint statement effectively discouraging banks from doing business with clients in crypto-asset industries. The Federal Reserve also issued a policy statement broadening its authority to cover state-chartered institutions. Moreover, in January 2023, the White House issued a statement cautioning deepening ties between crypto-assets and the broader financial system. Gryphon also may be unable to obtain or maintain these financial services for Gryphon’s business. The difficulty that many businesses that provide Bitcoin and/or derivatives on other cryptocurrency-related activities have and may continue to have in finding banks and financial institutions willing to provide them services could decrease their usefulness and harm their public perception in the future and may be decreasing the usefulness of Bitcoin as a payment system and harming public perception of Bitcoin.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 31, 2025 ↗
As laws and regulations and public opinion rapidly evolve to govern the use of social media platforms, our ability to use certain platforms, including TikTok in particular, as marketing tools may become limited, restricted or more expensive or complicated, which could adversely impact our business and operating results. On April 24, 2024, President Biden signed into law the PAFACA Act requiring TikTok’s parent company to sell TikTok by January 19, 2025 or face a total ban in the United States. On January 20, 2025, President Trump instructed the Attorney General of the United States not to take any action to enforce the PAFACA Act for a period of 75 days. There can be no assurance that TikTok’s parent company will sell TikTok to a non-Chinese owner or that the PAFACA Act will not be enforced.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 31, 2025 ↗
Relocating our miners, as we did to migrate from China and from Compute North and Core Scientific facilities and Blockfusion and Blockbreakers facilities, required us to incur costs to transition to new facilities including, but not limited to, transportation expenses and insurance, downtime while we are unable to mine, legal fees to negotiate the new lease, de-installation at our current facility and, ultimately, installation at any new facility we identify. These costs may be substantial, and we cannot guarantee that we will be successful in transitioning our miners to a new facility. Since we are required to move our miners, our business may suffer, and our results of operations would be expected to be materially adversely affected.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
A number of companies that engage in bitcoin and/or other bitcoin-related activities have been unable to find banks or financial institutions that are willing to provide them with bank accounts and other services. This is particularly true as a result of recent bank failures, which were connected to cryptocurrency activities. Similarly, a number of companies and individuals or businesses associated with digital assets may have had and may continue to have their existing bank accounts closed or services discontinued with financial institutions in response to government action, particularly in China, where regulatory response to digital assets has been to exclude their use for ordinary consumer transactions within its jurisdiction.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
Our mining operations can only be successful and ultimately profitable if the costs, including hardware and electricity costs, associated with mining digital assets are lower than the price of a bitcoin. As our mining facility operates, our miners experience ordinary wear and tear, and may also face more significant malfunctions caused by a number of extraneous factors beyond our control. We have purchased second-hand miners from third parties. The degradation of our miners requires us to, over time, replace those miners which are no longer functional. Additionally, as the technology evolves, we are required to acquire newer models of miners to remain competitive in the market. Reports have been released which indicate that miner manufacturers or sellers adjust the prices of their miners according to bitcoin prices, so the cost of new machines is unpredictable but could be extremely high. As a result, at times, we may obtain miners and other hardware from third parties at premium prices, to the extent they are available. This upgrading process requires substantial capital investment, and we may face challenges. Further, the global supply chain for bitcoin miners is presently heavily dependent on China-based manufacturers. In addition, there have been shortages of the semiconductors which are key components in miner production. The global reliance on China as a main supplier of bitcoin miners has been called into question, particularly in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Should similar outbreaks or other disruptions to the China-based global supply chain for bitcoin hardware on the spot market or otherwise occur, we may not be able to obtain adequate replacement parts for our existing miners or to obtain additional miners from the manufacturer or third parties on a timely basis. Such events could have a material adverse effect on our ability to pursue our business strategy, which could have a material adverse effect on our business and the value of our Ordinary Shares.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
The Chinese government implements the management systems of pre-establishment national treatment and negative list for foreign investment. Pre-establishment national treatment refers to the treatment given to foreign investors and their investments during the investment access stage, which is not lower than that given to their domestic counterparts; negative list for foreign investment refers to special administrative measures for the restricted or prohibited access of foreign investment in specific fields as stipulated by the Chinese government.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
Pursuant to the Special Administrative Measures for Access of Foreign Investment Access (2021 Edition), or the 2021 Edition Negative List for Foreign, issued by The Ministry of Commerce of the PRC (the “MOFCOM”) and the National Development and Reform Commission (the “NDRC”) on December 27, 2021, which came into effect on January 1, 2022, our bitcoin mining business does not fall into the Negative List for Foreign. However, the 2021 Edition Negative List for Foreign indicates that “Fields not mentioned in the Negative List for Foreign Investment Access shall be subject to administration under the principle of consistency for domestic and foreign investments. The relevant provisions of the Negative List for Market Access shall apply to domestic and foreign investors on a unified basis.”
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
Also, based on the Negative List for Market Access (2022 Edition), “the Catalogue for Guidance on Industrial Restructuring shall be included in the Negative List for Market Access”; plus, according to the Decision of the State Council on Promulgating and Implementing the “Temporary Provisions on Promoting Industrial Structure Adjustment,” valid from December. 2, 2005, “In principle, the ‘Guidance Catalogue for the Industrial Structure Adjustment’ shall apply to various types of enterprises inside China.” “The industries of the eliminated category under the ‘Guidance Catalogue for the Industrial Structure Adjustment’ shall apply to the foreign investment enterprises.” and “Investments are prohibited from being contributed to projects under the eliminated category.” Additionally, the NDRC released on December 30, 2021 its No. 49 Decree, announcing that the Decision of the National Development and Reform Commission on Amending the Guiding Catalog for Industrial Restructuring (2019 Version) (the “Amended Catalog”). The Amended Catalog added “virtual currency mining activities” to the eliminated category of “1. outdated production processing and equipment under the original Catalog.” Therefore, foreign investment enterprises are prohibited from virtual currency activities and our bitcoin mining business are banned in China as well. There can be no assurance that our prior mining activities in China will not be subject to fines and penalties on a retroactive basis.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
We may be subject measures from the Cyberspace Administration of China concerning the collection of data and required to obtain clearance from the CAC.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
We believe we currently are not required to obtain clearance from the CAC regarding our listing in the United States under the recently-enacted or proposed regulations or rules because we have never set an online platform for any user and we have not acted as an online platform operator. However, since these cybersecurity rules were recently enacted and uncertainties exist as to the interpretation or implementation of the Measures, if the Measures require us to obtain clearance or permissions from the CAC, we would file an application with CAC and seek to obtain the clearance or permissions from the CAC as required, however there can be no assurance we will obtain clearance or permission which could adversely affect our business. Compliance with the Measures, as well as additional laws, regulations and guidelines that the Chinese government promulgates in the future, may entail significant expenses and could materially affect our business.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
United States regulators may be limited in their ability to conduct investigations or inspections of our operations in Hong Kong.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
The increased regulatory scrutiny of U.S.-listed companies with operations in China could add uncertainties to our business operations, share price and reputation. Although the audit reports of Audit Alliance LLP incorporated by reference into this report are prepared by our auditors in Singapore who are subject to inspection by the Public Company Accounting Overnight Board (the “PCAOB”), there is no guarantee that future audit reports will be prepared by auditors that are completely inspected by the PCAOB and, as such, future investors may be deprived of the benefit of such complete inspections, which could result in limitations or restrictions on our ability to access the U.S. capital markets. Furthermore, trading in our securities may be prohibited under the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (the “HFCA Act”) or the Accelerating Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act if the SEC subsequently determines our audit work is performed by auditors that the PCAOB is unable to inspect or investigate completely, and as a result, U.S. national securities exchanges, such as Nasdaq or the over-the-counter market, may determine to delist our securities.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
U.S. public companies that have or had a substantial portion of their operations in China have been the subject of heightened scrutiny, criticism and negative publicity by investors, financial commentators and regulatory agencies, such as the SEC. Much of the scrutiny, criticism and negative publicity has centered on financial and accounting irregularities and mistakes, a lack of effective internal controls over financial accounting, inadequate corporate government policies or a lack of adherence thereto and, in many cases, allegations of fraud.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
On June 22, 2021, the U.S. Senate passed the Accelerating Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act, which if enacted into law, would amend the HFCA Act and require the SEC to prohibit an issuer’s securities from trading on U.S. stock exchanges if its auditors are not subject to PCAOB inspections for two consecutive “non-inspection” years instead of three. On September 22, 2021, the PCAOB adopted a final rule implementing the HFCA Act, which provides a framework for the PCAOB to use when determining, as contemplated under the HFCA Act, whether the Board is unable to inspect or investigate completely registered public accounting firms located in a foreign jurisdiction because of a position taken by one or more authorities in that jurisdiction. On December 16, 2021, the PCAOB issued PCAOB Rule 6100 Board Determinations Under the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act. The PCAOB notified the SEC that it was unable to inspect or investigate completely registered public accounting firms headquartered in mainland China and in Hong Kong because of the positions taken by authorities in mainland China and Hong Kong. The PCAOB issued a Determination Report on December 15, 2022, determining that the PCAOB secured complete access to inspect and investigate registered public accounting firms headquartered in mainland China and Hong Kong, and vacating the 2021 Determinations to the contrary. However, the PCAOB further noted that it will act immediately to consider the need to issue a new determination if the PRC authorities obstruct or otherwise fail to facilitate the PCAOB’s access. While the audit report of Audit Alliance LLP included in this report was prepared by auditors based in Singapore who are subject to inspection and investigation by the PCAOB, there can be no assurance that our auditor or we will be able to comply with these and other requirements imposed by U.S. regulators in the future. The market prices of our Ordinary Shares and/or other securities could be adversely affected as a result of possible negative impacts of the HFCA Act and other similar rules and regulations.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
Our Hong Kong subsidiaries could become subject to certain PRC laws if such laws are applied to Hong Kong.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
The national laws of the PRC, including, but not limited to the Cybersecurity Review Measures that became effective on February 15, 2022, do not currently apply to our Hong Kong subsidiaries, except for those listed in the Basic Law of Hong Kong. However, due to changes in laws, regulations or policies, including how those laws, regulations or policies would be interpreted or implemented, and the national laws applicable in Hong Kong, the Basic Law might be revised in the future and our Hong Kong subsidiaries may be subject to certain PRC laws.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
Pursuant to Article 18 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC (the “Basic Law”), the laws in force in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the Basic Law, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong as provided for in Article 8 of this Law, and the laws enacted by the legislature of the Region. National laws shall not be applied in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region except for those listed in Annex III to the Basic Law. The laws listed therein shall be applied locally by way of promulgation or legislation by the Region. Also, regarding the Annex III and several Instruments of the Basic Law, National Laws, which have applied in Hong Kong until now are as following:
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
“Resolution on the Capital, Calendar, National Anthem and National Flag of the PRC; Resolution on the National Day of the PRC; Declaration of the Government of the PRC on the Territorial Sea; Nationality Law of the PRC; Regulations of the PRC Concerning Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities; Law of the PRC on the National Flag; Regulations of the PRC Concerning Consular Privileges and Immunities; Law of the PRC on the National Emblem; Law of the PRC on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; Law of the PRC on Garrisoning the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; Law of the PRC on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf; Law of the PRC on Judicial Immunity from Compulsory Measures Concerning the Property of Foreign Central Banks; and Law of the PRC on the National Anthem; Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
As of the date of this report, the Hong Kong subsidiaries have not established any subsidiary or branch in mainland PRC and are not conducting any business operations in mainland PRC.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
However, due to changes in laws, regulations or policies, including how these laws, regulations or policies would be interpreted or implemented, the national laws applicable in Hong Kong in the Basic Law might be revised in the future.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
Enhanced scrutiny over acquisition transactions by the PRC tax authorities may have a negative impact on the indirect transfer of equity in the past and potential acquisitions we may pursue in the future.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
The PRC tax authorities have enhanced their scrutiny over the direct or indirect transfer of certain taxable assets, including, in particular, equity interests in a PRC resident enterprise, by a non-resident enterprise by promulgating and implementing SAT Circular 59 and Circular 698, which became effective in January 2008, and a Circular 7 to replace some of the existing rules in Circular 698, which became effective in February 2015.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
Under Circular 7, where a non-resident enterprise conducts an “indirect transfer” by transferring the equity interests of a PRC “resident enterprise” indirectly by disposing of the equity interests of an overseas holding company, the non-resident enterprise, being the transferor, may be subject to PRC enterprise income tax if the indirect transfer is considered to be an abusive use of company structure without reasonable commercial purposes. As a result, gains derived from such indirect transfer may be subject to PRC tax at a rate of up to 10%.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
Where a non-resident enterprise transfers taxable assets in China indirectly by disposing of the equity interests of an overseas holding company, which is an Indirect Transfer, the non-resident enterprise as either transferor or transferee, or the PRC entity whose equity is transferred, may report such Indirect Transfer to the relevant tax authority. Using a “substance over form” principle, the PRC tax authority may disregard the existence of the overseas holding company if it lacks a reasonable commercial purpose and was established for the purpose of reducing, avoiding or deferring PRC tax. As a result, gains derived from such Indirect Transfer may be subject to PRC enterprise income tax, and the transferee or other person who is obligated to pay for the transfer is obligated to withhold the applicable taxes, currently at a rate of 10% for the transfer of equity interests in a PRC resident enterprise. Both the transferor and the transferee may be subject to penalties under PRC tax laws if the transferee fails to withhold the taxes and the transferor fails to pay the taxes. We face uncertainties as to the reporting and other implications of certain past and future transactions where PRC taxable assets are involved, such as offshore restructuring, sale of the shares in our offshore subsidiaries and investments. Our Company may be subject to filing obligations or taxed if our company is transferor in such transactions and may be subject to withholding obligations if our company is transferee in such transactions, under Circular 7 and/or SAT Circular 37. For transfer of shares in our Company by investors who are non-PRC resident enterprises, our former PRC subsidiaries may be requested to assist in the filing under SAT Circular 7 and/or Circular 37. As a result, we may be required to expend valuable resources to comply with SAT Circular 7 and/or Circular 37 or to request the relevant transferors from whom we purchase taxable assets to comply with these circulars, or to establish that our Company should not be taxed under these circulars, which may have a material adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
For example, the U.S. government has announced increased tariffs on China, and increased scrutiny over imports into the United States. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency’s (“CBP”) also has broad discretion regarding products imported into the United States and has detained and/or seized imported miners, which has caused bitcoin miners to experience delays in receiving miners. We have also faced immaterial delays due to the CBP’s detention and/or seizure of imported miners in the past and may again in the future. As the majority of miners are manufactured outside of the United States, such tariffs, trade restrictions, the threat of tariffs and trade restrictions, and increased focus over imports into the country could increase our costs and delay shipments needed for us to obtain new miners. These tariffs and any retaliatory action that may be taken have introduced significant uncertainty into the market, leading to volatility in material prices and potential delays in project timelines, which could negatively affect our operations, strategic planning and financial forecasting.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2025 ↗
significantly impact our ability to receive the mining equipment and timely roll-out of our operations. For example, an increase in geopolitical tensions in Asia, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, could significantly disrupt existing semiconductor chip manufacturing and increase the prospect of an interruption to the semiconductor chip supply across the world. The world’s largest semiconductor chip manufacturer is located in Taiwan and a large part of equipment and materials for our bitcoin miners, including ASIC chips, is manufactured in Taiwan. There is also a potential increase in risk for cyberattacks due to cyberwarfare in connection with ongoing military conflicts and geopolitical unrest.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2025 ↗
Many entities, including consortiums and financial institutions are also researching and investing resources into private or permissioned blockchain platforms or digital currencies that do not use proof-of-work mining like the Bitcoin network. Additionally, central banks in some countries have started to introduce digital forms of legal tender. For example, China’s central bank digital currency (“CBDC”) project was made available to consumers in January 2022, and governments from Russia to the European Union have been discussing potential creation of new digital currencies. Whether or not they incorporate blockchain or similar technology, CBDCs, as legal tender in the issuing jurisdiction, could have an advantage in competing with, or replacing, bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies as a medium of exchange or store of value. As a result, the value of bitcoin could decrease, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, prospects, financial condition, and operating results.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2025 ↗
As digital assets have grown in both popularity and market size, governments around the world have reacted differently. Certain governments have deemed digital assets illegal or have severely curtailed the use of digital assets by prohibiting the acceptance of payment in bitcoin and other digital assets for consumer transactions and barring banking institutions from accepting deposits of digital assets. Other nations, however, allow digital assets to be used and traded without restriction. In some jurisdictions, such as in the U.S., digital assets are subject to extensive, and in some cases overlapping, unclear and evolving regulatory requirements. There is a risk that relevant authorities in any jurisdiction may impose more onerous regulation on bitcoin, for example banning its use, regulating its operation, or otherwise changing its regulatory treatment. Such changes may introduce a cost of compliance, or have a material impact on our business model, and therefore our financial performance and shareholder returns. If the use of bitcoin is made illegal in jurisdictions where bitcoin is currently traded in heavy volumes, the available market for bitcoin may contract. For example, on September 24, 2021, the People’s Bank of China announced that all activities involving digital assets in mainland China are illegal, which corresponded with a significant decrease in the price of bitcoin. If another government with considerable economic power were to ban digital assets or related activities, this could have further impact on the price of bitcoin. As a result, the markets and opportunities discussed herein may not reflect the markets and opportunities available to us in the future.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2025 ↗
Much of the equipment necessary for HPC hosting and almost entirely all of the equipment necessary for digital asset mining is manufactured outside of the United States. There is currently significant uncertainty about the future relationship between the United States and various other countries, including China, the European Union, Canada, and Mexico, with respect to trade policies, treaties, tariffs and customs duties, and taxes. For example, since 2019, the U.S. government has implemented significant changes to U.S. trade policy with respect to China. These tariffs have subjected certain digital asset mining equipment manufactured overseas to additional import duties of up to 25%. The amount of the additional tariffs and the number of products subject to them has changed numerous times based on action by the U.S. government. These tariffs have increased costs of digital asset mining equipment, and new or additional tariffs or other restrictions on the import of equipment necessary for digital asset mining could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2025 ↗
In addition, various foreign jurisdictions either have adopted or may adopt laws, regulations or directives that affect digital assets, digital asset networks and their users and hosting service providers that fall within such jurisdictions’ regulatory scope. Such laws, regulations or directives may conflict with those of the United States, and may negatively impact the acceptance of digital assets by users, merchants and service providers outside of the United States and therefore impede the growth of digital asset use. A number of countries, including India, China, South Korea and Russia, among others, currently have a more restrictive or unclear stance toward digital assets and, thereby, have reduced the rate of expansion of digital asset use, as well as digital asset mining, in each of those countries.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2025 ↗
The evolving design of our platform may create challenges for various organizations, including governments, that seek to block certain content based on IP address “blacklists” or other mechanisms. If these challenges become too difficult for those organizations to overcome, they could make the decision to block content in an over broad manner or block completely websites of providers that integrate with our platform. For example, the Chinese government restricts access to certain Google Cloud services from within the People’s Republic of China, and users of our mobile platform have experienced degraded functionality in China due to these restrictions on our platform’s ability to connect with those services. Some of these blocking efforts would be out of our control once they have been put in place and may limit our ability to provide our platform or third-party apps on a fully global basis, which could reduce demand for our platform among current or potential users and adversely impact our business, results of operations and financial condition.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 6, 2025 ↗
We incurred net losses of approximately $1,951,000 and $3,737,000 in Fiscal 2024 and 2023, respectively. We expect to generate losses for the foreseeable future. We will need to generate increased revenues to achieve profitability in the future. Despite our efforts, we may not achieve profitability in the future or sustain profitability for a prolonged period of time. In December 2024, our largest design customer notified us of its plan to discontinue their insulin patch program on which we were providing design services. In Fiscal 2024, this design customer was responsible for 25.2% of our revenues. While we plan to mitigate the impact of this lost revenue with cost reduction efforts, seeking continued flexibility on payments to Forward China and exploring additional sources of financing, these efforts may not be sufficient to meet our liquidity needs through December 31, 2025.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 27, 2024 ↗
Rising threats of international tariffs, including tariffs applied to goods between the U.S. and China, may materially and adversely affect our business.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 27, 2024 ↗
Rising threats of international tariffs, including tariffs applied to goods traded between the U.S. and China, could materially and adversely affect our business and results of operations. Since the beginning of 2018, there has been increasing rhetoric, in some cases coupled with legislative or executive action, from several U.S. and foreign leaders regarding the possibility of instituting tariffs on the foreign imports of certain materials and products. More specifically, throughout 2019 and 2020, the U.S. and China imposed tariffs or announced proposed tariffs to be applied in the future to certain of each other’s exports. As of the date of this report, the Company has not been directly affected by any tariffs previously implemented by former President Trump on the medical technology industry which currently remain in place. In May 2022 the U.S. Trade Representative (the “USTR”) announced a statutory four-year review of the tariffs against China. The USTR also announced in May 2022 that it reinstated or extended various eligible tariff exclusions on certain products from China through December 2023. In September 2024, the USTR completed its statutory four-year review and announced tariff increases on imports from China on various products. Further, we do not know if the administration that takes office in 2025 will implement any new tariffs or alter current tariffs. If any tariffs or restrictions are imposed on products that we import for our customers, we would be required to raise our prices, which may result in the loss of customers and harm our business. Additionally, some of our non-diabetic distribution customers and customers in the design and development business have been affected by these tariffs, specifically those who manufacture non-medical electronic products. This may cause these customers to reduce the amount of discretionary spending they use on outsource product design and engineering services supplied by our design segment.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 27, 2024 ↗
Changes in political conditions in China and changes in the state of China-U.S. relations, including any tensions relating to potential military conflict between China and Taiwan, are difficult to predict and could adversely affect the operations or financial condition of the Company. In addition, because of our involvement in the Chinese market, any deterioration in political or trade relations might cause a public perception in the U.S. or elsewhere that might cause our business to become less attractive. Such an impact could adversely affect our revenues and cash flows.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 27, 2024 ↗
In addition to margin compression from customers in general, we are encountering increased costs from our Chinese suppliers who are reacting to inflationary increases in materials and labor costs incurred by them. In addition, prices that our Chinese vendors charge to us may reflect any appreciation of the Chinese currency against the U.S. dollar, which can be passed through to us in the form of higher U.S. dollar prices. This in turn will tend to reduce gross profit if we are unable to raise our prices. Any decrease in demand for our products or services, coupled with pressure from the market and our customers to decrease our prices, would have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 27, 2024 ↗
Our Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and largest shareholder is the owner of Forward China, our exclusive sourcing agent in the Asia Pacific region. We have a Buying Agency and Supply Agreement with Forward China under which Forward China acts as the Company’s exclusive agent to arrange for sourcing, manufacturing and exporting the Company’s distribution products. Historically, Forward China has relied on a limited number of suppliers to supply the component parts and pieces necessary for the production of our carry and protective solutions products. As a result, our ability to effectively push back against rising material costs may diminish. In addition, any inability to obtain supplies from a single or limited number of suppliers may result in difficulty obtaining the supplies necessary for our business and may restrict our ability to produce our carry and protective solutions products. Where practical, we intend to establish alternative sources through Forward China to mitigate the risk that the failure of any single supplier will adversely affect our business. Nevertheless, either a prolonged inability to obtain certain components or the failure of one of our suppliers to do so could impair our ability to ship products and generate revenues, which could adversely affect our operating results and damage our customer relationships.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 27, 2024 ↗
In addition, we depend significantly on Forward China as our exclusive buying agent for substantially all of our component parts. As a result, we have limited visibility as to our supplier base, making it difficult to forecast future events and to plan our operations. In addition, if Forward China fails to satisfactorily perform its obligations, including payment obligations, to our suppliers or its duties to us as our exclusive buying agent as a result of financial or other difficulties or for any other reason, or if our relationship with Forward China was to suffer or we are unable to maintain our agreement with Forward China, which is currently in effect until April 30, 2025, but may be terminated prior to that with 30 days’ notice, we could suffer irreparable harm resulting in substantial damage to the distribution business.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 27, 2024 ↗
As a result of the reverse stock split effected in June 2024 and the entrance into the Accounts Payable Conversion Agreements with Forward China (described in Note 14 to the consolidated financial statements), the Company regained compliance with the Minimum Bid Price Rule and Stockholders’ Equity Rule in July 2024 and was formally notified by Nasdaq that such requirements were met. Until July 24, 2025, the Company is subject to a Nasdaq “Panel Monitor” which provides for in the event the Company fails to satisfy the Stockholders’ Equity Rule during the monitoring period, the Company will be required to request a hearing before the Panel in order to maintain its listing rather than taking the interim step of submitting a compliance plan for the Nasdaq Listing Qualifications Staff’s review or receiving any otherwise applicable grace period. We can provide no assurance that if the Company fails to satisfy the Stockholders’ Equity Rule during this period that the Company will be able to maintain its Nasdaq listing.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 27, 2024 ↗
We are currently focusing efforts on commercializing our Mydcombi and clobetasol propionate products, and we have licensed commercialization rights to Mydcombi in Greater China (mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan) and South Korea to Arctic Vision (with Senju retaining such licensed rights in the rest of Asia). Our understanding of both the number of people who have needs for our products, as well as the subset of people who have the potential to benefit from our product in varying countries, are based on estimates in published literature. While we believe these estimates are reasonable, they may prove to be incorrect and new studies may reduce the estimated incidence or prevalence of mydriasis. The number of patients in the United States and elsewhere may turn out to be lower than expected or these patients might not be otherwise amenable to our products or may become increasingly difficult to identify and access, all of which would adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects.
Read in the 10-K filed Apr 15, 2025 ↗
Our operations are subject to anti-corruption laws, including the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), and the United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010 (“Bribery Act”), which apply wherever we do business around the world. We may also become subject to local anti-corruption laws in countries where we may do business in the future, such as Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, the Criminal Law and Anti-unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Hong Kong Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, and the Act on Preventing Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, or OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, enacted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and adopted by South Korea along with more than 40 other countries, and which is designed to criminalize bribery of public officials in connection with international business transactions. The Bribery Act, FCPA, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and similar international treaties and various countries’ local anti-corruption laws, referred to as Anti-Corruption Laws, generally prohibit us, our officers, and our employees and intermediaries from bribing, being bribed or making other prohibited payments to government officials or other persons to obtain or retain business or gain some other business advantage. Compliance with the FCPA, for example, is expensive and difficult, particularly in countries in which corruption is a recognized problem. In addition, the FCPA presents particular challenges in the pharmaceutical industry, because, in many countries, hospitals are operated by the government, and doctors and other hospital employees are considered foreign officials. Certain payments to hospitals in connection with clinical trials and other work have been deemed to be improper payments to government officials and have led to FCPA enforcement actions.
Read in the 10-K filed Apr 15, 2025 ↗
Moreover, our ability to protect and enforce our intellectual property rights may be adversely affected by unforeseen changes in foreign intellectual property laws. Many companies have encountered significant problems in protecting and defending intellectual property rights in certain foreign jurisdictions. The legal systems of some countries, including India, China and other developing countries, do not favor the enforcement of patents and other intellectual property rights. This could make it difficult for us to stop the infringement of our patents or the misappropriation of our other intellectual property rights. For example, many foreign countries have compulsory licensing laws under which a patent owner must grant licenses to third parties. Consequently, we might not be able to prevent third parties from practicing our inventions in certain foreign countries. Competitors may use our technologies in jurisdictions where we have not obtained patent protection to develop and market their own products and, further, may export otherwise infringing products to territories where we have patent protection, if our ability to enforce our patents to stop infringing activities is inadequate. These products may compete with our products, and our patents or other intellectual property rights might not be effective or sufficient to prevent them from competing.
Read in the 10-K filed Apr 15, 2025 ↗
overall political and economic conditions, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Israel and Palestine conflict and growing geopolitical tension with China.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗