China
83 of 521 companies dropped a paragraph in Risk Factors that uses one of these words:
China, Chinese, PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan.
The paragraph was in the earlier 10-K and nothing like it is in the latest.
It counts text; it does not say how serious a risk is. Words in capitals only (such as AI) must be in capitals.
By sector
Sector is the SEC's industry description of the company. Each count opens that sector's quotes below.
| Sector | Companies | Compared |
|---|---|---|
| Apparel & Other Finishd Prods of Fabrics & Similar Matl | 1 | 1 |
| Canned, Frozen & Preservd Fruit, Veg & Food Specialties | 1 | 1 |
| Canned, Fruits, Veg, Preserves, Jams & Jellies | 1 | 1 |
| Communications Equipment, NEC | 1 | 1 |
| Electrical Industrial Apparatus | 1 | 1 |
| Electronic Connectors | 1 | 1 |
| Farm Machinery & Equipment | 1 | 1 |
| Games, Toys & Children's Vehicles (No Dolls & Bicycles) | 1 | 1 |
| Meat Packing Plants | 1 | 1 |
| Miscellaneous Food Preparations & Kindred Products | 1 | 1 |
| Motor Vehicle Parts & Accessories | 1 | 1 |
| Ordnance & Accessories, (No Vehicles/Guided Missiles) | 1 | 1 |
| Paper Mills | 1 | 1 |
| Retail-Eating & Drinking Places | 1 | 1 |
| Retail-Radio, Tv & Consumer Electronics Stores | 1 | 1 |
| Special Industry Machinery, NEC | 1 | 1 |
| Telephone & Telegraph Apparatus | 1 | 1 |
| Wholesale-Motor Vehicle Supplies & New Parts | 1 | 1 |
| X-Ray Apparatus & Tubes & Related Irradiation Apparatus | 1 | 1 |
| Computer Communications Equipment | 2 | 3 |
| Plastic Materials, Synth Resins & Nonvulcan Elastomers | 2 | 3 |
| Motor Vehicles & Passenger Car Bodies | 2 | 4 |
| Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical Sys | 2 | 4 |
| Aircraft Engines & Engine Parts | 1 | 2 |
| Fats & Oils | 1 | 2 |
| Industrial Organic Chemicals | 1 | 2 |
| Instruments For Meas & Testing of Electricity & Elec Signals | 1 | 2 |
| Printed Circuit Boards | 1 | 2 |
| Pumps & Pumping Equipment | 1 | 2 |
| Radio & Tv Broadcasting & Communications Equipment | 1 | 2 |
| Retail-Auto & Home Supply Stores | 1 | 2 |
| Retail-Lumber & Other Building Materials Dealers | 1 | 2 |
| Rubber & Plastics Footwear | 1 | 2 |
| Services-Medical Laboratories | 1 | 2 |
| Semiconductors & Related Devices | 7 | 15 |
| Orthopedic, Prosthetic & Surgical Appliances & Supplies | 2 | 5 |
| Finance Services | 10 | 28 |
| Electronic Computers | 1 | 3 |
| Perfumes, Cosmetics & Other Toilet Preparations | 1 | 3 |
| Pharmaceutical Preparations | 3 | 11 |
| Investment Advice | 2 | 8 |
| Electronic & Other Electrical Equipment (No Computer Equip) | 1 | 4 |
| Retail-Eating Places | 1 | 4 |
| Surgical & Medical Instruments & Apparatus | 2 | 10 |
| Laboratory Analytical Instruments | 1 | 5 |
| Retail-Variety Stores | 1 | 5 |
| Services-Computer Programming, Data Processing, Etc. | 1 | 5 |
| National Commercial Banks | 2 | 11 |
| Petroleum Refining | 1 | 6 |
| Security Brokers, Dealers & Flotation Companies | 1 | 7 |
| Services-Business Services, NEC | 2 | 16 |
| Real Estate Investment Trusts | 3 | 27 |
| Services-Prepackaged Software | 2 | 19 |
| Electric Services | 1 | 15 |
197 paragraphs
Further, we have faced complications related to the import of mining equipment in the past and may face such complications in the future. The global supply of miners is unpredictable and presently heavily dependent on manufacturers based in China. Geopolitical matters, including the relationship between the United States and other countries and trade restrictions and tariffs (or the threat of trade restrictions or tariffs), may impact our ability to import miners or other equipment necessary for our operations. Restrictions or bans on mining equipment from China, whether due to trade restrictions, national security concerns or geopolitical tensions, could disrupt our supply chain, increase equipment costs and delay our growth plans.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 31, 2025 ↗
In May 2021, China’s State Council issued a statement signaling its intent to restrict cryptocurrency mining and trading activities, resulting in provincial governments taking proactive measurements to prohibit cryptocurrency mining. On September 24, 2021, China’s central bank and its National Development and Reform Commission issued a nation-wide ban on cryptocurrency mining and declaring all financial transactions involving cryptocurrencies illegal. As a result, mining data centers previously operating in China have been forced to shut down and owners of cryptocurrency mining equipment located in China have been attempting to relocate the equipment to mining data centers in other jurisdictions, with a particular focus on locations within the United States. Combined with the increase in the price of bitcoin in 2021, the influx of cryptocurrency miners from China has created conditions of great demand for mining data centers and limited supply. Due to these conditions, there is no assurance that Gryphon will be able to procure alternative hosting agreements on acceptable terms in a timely manner or at all.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 31, 2025 ↗
A number of companies that engage in Bitcoin and/or other cryptocurrency-related activities have been unable to find banks or financial institutions that are willing to provide them with bank accounts and other services. Similarly, a number of companies and individuals or businesses associated with Bitcoin may have had and may continue to have their existing bank accounts closed or services discontinued with financial institutions in response to government action, particularly in China, where regulatory response to cryptocurrencies has been to exclude their use for ordinary consumer transactions within China. In January 2023, the Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued a joint statement effectively discouraging banks from doing business with clients in crypto-asset industries. The Federal Reserve also issued a policy statement broadening its authority to cover state-chartered institutions. Moreover, in January 2023, the White House issued a statement cautioning deepening ties between crypto-assets and the broader financial system. Gryphon also may be unable to obtain or maintain these financial services for Gryphon’s business. The difficulty that many businesses that provide Bitcoin and/or derivatives on other cryptocurrency-related activities have and may continue to have in finding banks and financial institutions willing to provide them services could decrease their usefulness and harm their public perception in the future and may be decreasing the usefulness of Bitcoin as a payment system and harming public perception of Bitcoin.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 31, 2025 ↗
The production of the Company’s products uses materials that can create emissions of certain regulated substances, including GHG emissions. Such regulated emissions also include indirect emissions that occur in the value chain as the result of activities from assets now owned or controlled by the Company. Several jurisdictions where the Company has operations have implemented or are in the process of implementing carbon pricing programs or regulations to reduce GHG emissions impacting climate change and rising sea levels including, but not limited to, the United States, Canada, Mexico, the European Union and its member states, the United Kingdom, and China. In particular, the State of Illinois enacted legislation intended to eliminate carbon emissions by 2050 which includes the mandate for zero emissions of carbon dioxide equivalent and co-pollutants from electric generation using coal by 2030. It is difficult at this time to estimate the likelihood of passage, or predict the potential impact, of any additional legislation, regulations or agreements. Potential consequences of new obligations could include increased energy, transportation, raw material, and administrative costs, and may require the Company to make additional investments in its facilities and equipment.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 20, 2025 ↗
Several other countries, including China, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, and Japan, have also established specific legal requirements for cross-border data transfers. There is also an increasing trend towards data localization policies. For example, China and India have introduced localization requirements for certain data. Other countries also are considering data localization requirements. If this trend continues, and countries implement more restrictive regulations for cross-border personal data transfers (or do not permit personal data to leave the country of origin), it could affect the manner in which we provide our services, the geographical location or segregation of our relevant systems and operations, and our business, financial condition, and results of operations in those jurisdictions could be impacted.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 6, 2025 ↗
In December 2021, the United States adopted the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (“UFLPA”) which creates a rebuttable presumption that any goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured in whole or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Administrative Region of China or that are produced by certain entities are prohibited from importation into the United States and are not entitled to entry. These import restrictions came into effect on June 21, 2022. While we are not presently aware of any direct impacts these restrictions will have on its supply chain, the UFLPA may materially and negatively impact our ability to import the goods and products we rely on to manufacture our products and operate our business.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 12, 2025 ↗
We are also subject to data export restrictions and international transfer laws and regulations that prohibit or impose conditions upon certain data transfers. The mechanisms upon which we and many other companies rely upon for European data transfers have been the subject of legal challenge, regulatory interpretation and judicial decisions by the EU courts and regulators, and may be subject to significant changes. Several countries, including the United States, China, Australia, and Japan, have established legal requirements for cross-border transfers of all or certain personal information and certain countries have also established legal requirements for data localization. These laws and regulations are constantly evolving and may be created, interpreted, applied or amended in ways that could restrict our activities in certain jurisdictions, limit our ability to provide our products and services in those jurisdictions, require us to modify our policies and practices and to engage in additional contractual negotiations, or increase our costs and obligations and impose limitations upon our ability to efficiently transfer personal data across borders. We have and likely will again in the future be required to implement new or expand existing data storage protocols, build new storage facilities, devote additional resources, and modify relevant policies or procedures to comply with the foregoing laws, any of which could be costly and which may adversely affect our business and our customers' businesses, our financial condition and our results of operations in those jurisdictions.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 28, 2025 ↗
•political and social attitudes, laws, rules, regulations and policies within countries, including in China, the United States, and countries in Europe and Asia, that favor domestic companies over non-domestic companies, including efforts to promote the development and growth of local competitors and reduce dependence on foreign semiconductor equipment and manufacturing capabilities through policies and financial incentives;
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 13, 2024 ↗
•fluctuations in interest rates and currency exchange rates, including the relative strength or weakness of the U.S. dollar against the Japanese yen, Israeli shekel, euro, Taiwanese dollar, Singapore dollar, Chinese yuan or Korean won;
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 13, 2024 ↗
•the concentration of new wafer starts in Korea and Taiwan, where our service penetration and service-revenue-per-wafer-start have been lower than in other regions;
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 13, 2024 ↗
•the timing and extent of an expansion of manufacturing facilities in China, which may be affected by changes in economic conditions and governmental regulations, including trade policies and export regulations;
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 13, 2024 ↗
We have equity interests in two joint ventures (collectively, the THATIC JV) with Higon Information Technology Co., Ltd. (THATIC), a third-party Chinese entity. In June 2019, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce added certain Chinese entities to the Entity List, including THATIC and the THATIC JV. Since that time, the United States administration has called for changes to domestic and foreign policy, including policies with respect to China and Russia. Specifically, United States-China trade relations remain uncertain as the United States continues to add more Chinese companies to the Entity List and more regulations targeted to advanced computing, semiconductor manufacturing, and emerging technologies such as AI. Further, the United States and other countries and coalitions have issued sanctions and revisions to export control and other regulations against Russia, Belarus and the DNR and LNR regions of Ukraine, due to the conflict in Ukraine.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 5, 2025 ↗
In October 2023, BIS issued new requirements for certain advanced computing items that apply to the export of products classified ECCN 3A090 or 4A090 to a party headquartered in, or with an ultimate parent headquartered in, any of Country Groups D1, D4 or D5, including China. These controls prevent us from shipping certain AMD Instinct™ integrated circuits and certain AMD Versal™ FPGAs to China, or to customers outside of the United States whose ultimate parent is headquartered in a D5 country (including China), without a license. These controls also require us to file a Notified Advanced Computing (NAC) notification with BIS 25 days before shipping certain Versal FPGAs to China, or to customers outside of the United States whose ultimate parent is headquartered in a D5 country (including China). The NAC notification process could result in BIS prohibiting a shipment or requiring a license application before shipping a product that is the subject of a NAC notification. BIS may issue new licensing requirements and regulatory controls in the future. Even new products that fall below the licensing thresholds may not be successful because we have no assurances BIS will agree that the alternative products are not subject to the new licensing requirements or that future regulations will not control the alternative products. A significant trade disruption or the establishment or increase of any tariffs, trade protection measures or restrictions, or retaliatory actions from foreign governments could result in lost sales adversely impacting our reputation and business. There is also a possibility of future tariffs, trade protection measures, import or export regulations or other restrictions imposed on our current and future products, customers, or suppliers by the United States, China or other countries that could have a material adverse effect on our business. New export control restrictions may adversely impact the ability of our research and development teams located outside of the United States from executing our product roadmaps in a timely manner or at all. In addition, deemed export restrictions could further affect our ability to provide services or develop products in the United States.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 5, 2025 ↗
•enhanced U.S. tax, tariff, import/export restrictions, Chinese regulations or other trade barriers may negatively affect our business;
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2025 ↗
•deterioration of political relations between the U.S. and China, Canada, Mexico, Russia and EU including international trade wars and increased tariffs between the U.S. and such countries or regions, which could have a material adverse effect on our sales as well as our manufacturing operations and supply chain in these countries;
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2025 ↗
We increasingly depend upon our IT systems to conduct virtually all of our business operations, ranging from our internal operations and product development activities to our marketing and sales efforts and communications with our customers and business partners. Computer programmers or other persons or organizations may attempt to penetrate our network security, or that of our website or systems, and access, use, or obtain confidential, personal, or otherwise sensitive or proprietary information about us or our customers, or via these or other methods, including denial of service attacks and other cyberattacks, disrupt or cause interruptions of our systems, products, services and networks. In addition, geopolitical tensions and conflicts, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Israel-Hamas hostilities and deteriorating relations with China, may create a greater risk of cyberattacks against our company and our manufacturers, suppliers, logistics providers, banks and other business partners. Because the techniques used to access, disrupt, or sabotage networks and systems change frequently and may not be recognized until launched against a target, we may be unable to anticipate these techniques. In addition, our software and sophisticated hardware and operating system software and applications that we develop or procure from third parties may contain vulnerabilities or defects in design or manufacture, including “bugs,” viruses, ransomware and other malware, and other problems that could cause the software or applications to fail or otherwise to unexpectedly interfere with the operation of the system or that could result in a breach of or disruption to our systems, products, services or networks or the systems, networks, products, or services of third parties that support us and our services. We also face risks of others gaining unauthorized access to our products and services and introducing malicious software, and such malicious software, defects, bugs or vulnerabilities, or other defects, bugs, or vulnerabilities in our products or services may result in failures or interruptions of our products or services or expose our end-customers' networks, leaving their networks unprotected against the latest security threats.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2025 ↗
Because our products are primarily manufactured internationally, the import of our products may be affected by changes in applicable tariffs. Our products are primarily manufactured in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Mexico, and we also procure some of our products directly from China. In February 2025, the U.S. government scheduled 25% tariffs to be imposed on products of Mexican origin. Although subsequent discussions between the President of the United States and the President of Mexico have resulted in an agreement to temporarily defer the effective date for these tariffs, this policy may be reversed at any time. In addition, imports of products manufactured in Malaysia and/or Vietnam may be targeted for U.S. tariff increases in light of the increased trade imbalances between the United States and these countries, which has increased significantly in the past decade as manufacturing operations have increasingly moved to these countries due to strained U.S.-China trade relations. An increase in trade-related costs associated with these imports may impair the profitability of such international production, may strain our suppliers’ ability to provide inputs necessary for the production of these items, and may otherwise affect our manufacturing partners’ ability to provide our products at previously contracted prices. We also may not be able to pass on the full burden of the increase in trade-related costs to our partners and/or customers which could impact our profitability and/or our competitiveness.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2025 ↗
Our products may also be subject to further increased U.S. or international tariffs as a result of the outbreak of and escalation in international trade wars between the U.S., China, Mexico and other countries. In response to the February 2025 U.S. government tariffs scheduled on goods of Canadian, Mexican, and Chinese origin, all three affected countries announced plans to implement retaliatory measures including new tariffs on certain U.S. goods, and, in the case of China, new export controls on certain critical metal items. The U.S. tariffs on Canadian and Mexican origin products and the Canadian and Mexican tariffs on U.S. origin products has been suspended for a period of 30 days pursuant to agreements between the U.S. government and the Canadian and Mexican governments, pending further negotiations between these countries. Such
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2025 ↗
agreements and negotiations may fail and result in the imposition of new trade measures between any or all of these countries and the United States. The February 2025 U.S. government executive orders scheduling the tariff increases on goods of Canadian, Mexican, and Chinese origin also included provisions allowing for further escalation of tariffs in the event affected countries implement retaliatory measures. Such increases could result in the imposition of extreme tariff or non-tariff measures, which may lead to a breakdown in international supply chains due to increased tariff costs and disruptions in the availability of goods.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2025 ↗
There is currently significant uncertainty about the future relationship between the United States, and various other countries, most significantly China, Canada and Mexico, with respect to trade policies, treaties, tariffs and taxes. The U.S. government has and continues to make significant additional changes in U.S. trade policy and has taken certain actions that could negatively impact U.S. trade. In addition, there may be further changes in U.S. trade policy given the change in the presidential administration.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2025 ↗
For example, in 2018, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") enacted various tariffs of 7.5%, 10%, 15% and 25% on imports into the U.S. from China, including communications equipment products and components manufactured and imported from China. USTR has continued to expand these tariffs recently announcing new tariffs of up to 100% on certain products. Since then, China has retaliated through various trade related measures including imposing tariffs on imports into China from the United States. Most recently, in February 2025, the U.S. government imposed an additional 10% tariff on imports from China, on top of existing tariff burdens, and the U.S. President has indicated that additional tariffs may be forthcoming. In response, China announced additional tariffs on certain U.S.-origin goods and implemented new export controls on various critical metals.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2025 ↗
Given the relatively fluid regulatory environment in China and the United States and uncertainty how the U.S. government or foreign governments will act with respect to tariffs, international trade agreements and policies, a trade war, further governmental action related to tariffs or international trade policies, or additional tax or other regulatory changes in the future could directly and adversely impact our financial results and results of operations.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2025 ↗
The regulatory environment surrounding information security and privacy is increasingly demanding, with frequent imposition of new and changing requirements. Privacy laws and regulations around the world including, for example, in the European Union (“EU”), People’s Republic of China, the state of California, and several other U.S. states, impose significant obligations for companies on how they collect, store, protect, process and transfer personal information and can impose significant fines for non-compliance. The potential for fines, penalties and other related costs in the event of a breach of or non-compliance with any existing and forthcoming information security or privacy laws and requirements may have an adverse effect on our financial results. For further discussion of the Company’s risk management, strategy, and governance around cybersecurity, refer to Part I, Item 1C. Cybersecurity herein.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 7, 2025 ↗
General macroeconomic conditions, such as inflation, high interest rates, or a recession or economic slowdown in the United States or internationally, including those resulting from uncertainty in the global banking and financial services markets, political uncertainty and international conflicts around the world, such as between Russia and Ukraine and in the Middle East, as well as, friction between the United States and China, could create uncertainty and adversely affect discretionary consumer spending habits and preferences as well as advertising spending. Our revenue is driven in part by discretionary consumer spending habits and preferences, and by advertising spending patterns. Historically, consumer purchasing and advertising spending have each declined during economic downturns and periods of uncertainty regarding future economic prospects or when disposable income or consumer lending is lower. In certain periods in 2022, we experienced the impacts of the macroeconomic deterioration as advertisers more closely managed budgets and reduced overall spend, which resulted in slowed growth for our Advertising solutions. Uncertain economic conditions may impact advertiser spending in future periods and may also adversely affect our clients, which in turn may harm our business, financial condition, and results of operations. In addition, the economic conditions affecting the financial markets, and uncertainty in global economic conditions may result in a number of adverse effects including a low level of liquidity in domestic and global markets, volatility in credit, equity, and currencies and instability in the stock market. There could be a number of other follow-on effects from these economic developments on our business, including customer insolvencies, decreased demand for our marketing solutions; decreased customer ability to pay their accounts, and increased collections risk and defaults. We are particularly susceptible to market conditions and risks associated with the advertising ecosystem, including changes in user demographics, the availability and popularity of other forms
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2025 ↗
the subject of additional legislative activity and regulatory guidance. We and many other companies may need to implement different or additional measures to establish or maintain legitimate means for the transfer and receipt of personal data from the EEA, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, or other jurisdictions to the United States, and we may, in addition to other impacts, experience additional costs associated with increased compliance burdens, and we and our clients face the potential for regulators to apply different standards to the transfer of personal data from various jurisdictions to the United States and to block, or require ad hoc verification of measures taken with respect to, certain data flows. We also may find it necessary to engage in contract negotiations with third parties that aid in processing data on our behalf to address cross-border data transfer matters. We may not be able to find alternative service providers, which could limit our ability to process personal data from impacted jurisdictions and increase our costs and/or impact our Advertising solutions Apps, or other offerings. We and our clients may face a risk of enforcement actions by data protection authorities relating to personal data transfers. Any such enforcement actions could result in substantial costs and diversion of resources, distract management and technical personnel, and adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations. Similar to the GDPR, in September 2020, Brazil enacted the Brazilian General Data Protection Law. China has enacted a new data privacy law known as PIPL, effective November 1, 2021, which adopts a stringent data transfer regime requiring, among other things, data subject consent for certain data transfers. Any of these developments may have an adverse effect on our business.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2025 ↗
In 2022, certain of our operations in China were impacted by lockdowns imposed by governmental authorities to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, resulting in total indirect and direct adverse impacts to revenue of approximately $270 million during the year ended December 31, 2022. The extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic or similar significant health crises will impact our business in the future is uncertain. In addition, to the extent such significant health crises may adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations and cash flows, they may also have the effect of heightening many of the other risk factors in this section.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 7, 2025 ↗
additional 25% tariff on certain exports from Canada and Mexico, and up to an additional 60% tariff on certain exports from China.
Read in the 10-K filed Jan 27, 2025 ↗
trade, economic and other policies, including with respect to treaties and tariffs. The United States has recently enacted and proposed to enact significant new tariffs, including on Mexican, Canadian and Chinese goods. Additionally, the new Presidential Administration has directed various federal agencies to further evaluate key aspects of U.S. trade policy and there has been ongoing discussion and commentary regarding potential significant changes to U.S. trade policies, treaties and tariffs.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2025 ↗
As laws and regulations and public opinion rapidly evolve to govern the use of social media platforms, our ability to use certain platforms, including TikTok in particular, as marketing tools may become limited, restricted or more expensive or complicated, which could adversely impact our business and operating results. On April 24, 2024, President Biden signed into law the PAFACA Act requiring TikTok’s parent company to sell TikTok by January 19, 2025 or face a total ban in the United States. On January 20, 2025, President Trump instructed the Attorney General of the United States not to take any action to enforce the PAFACA Act for a period of 75 days. There can be no assurance that TikTok’s parent company will sell TikTok to a non-Chinese owner or that the PAFACA Act will not be enforced.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 31, 2025 ↗
If significant tariffs or other restrictions continue to be placed on foreign imports by the United States, our sales and results of operations may be harmed. For example, ongoing trade tensions between the United States and China have led to a series of significant tariffs on the importation of certain product categories into the United States over recent years. In retaliation for these tarrifs, China has recently placed restrictions on the export of certain raw materials, including gallium and germanium. Further, President Trump has proposed significantly increased tariffs on foreign imports into the United States, particularly from China, Mexico and Canada. Such tariffs could have a significant impact on our business, particularly the importation of products used in our business that are manufactured outside the United States, or could result in our products exported from the United States being subject to retaliatory tariffs imposed by other countries. We
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 28, 2025 ↗
During fiscal 2025, new global trade tariffs were announced on imports to the United States, including additional tariffs on various countries from which the Company directly or indirectly imports and/or sources merchandise, including Canada, China and Mexico, among others. In response, several countries have imposed or threatened reciprocal tariffs on imports from the U.S. and other measures. Various modifications to the U.S. tariffs have been
Read in the 10-K filed Oct 27, 2025 ↗
While we directly import approximately 2% to 3% of our overall assortment, our complex supply chain is heavily reliant on vendor imports from China and Mexico, which we currently estimate make up approximately 55% and 20%, respectively, of the products we purchase. Moreover, the consumer electronics we sell and our underlying technological infrastructure are dependent on rare earth elements, predominantly processed in China. Recently passed or proposed tariffs involving these countries could have an adverse impact on our operations. Any further changes in, or uncertainty surrounding, trade policies with these countries, including tariffs on products and parts imported by us or our vendors, as well as any international retaliatory actions, could increase costs, disrupt our supply chain and/or impact the availability of underlying technology critical to our operations. Additionally, changes in, or uncertainty surrounding, policies or efforts that may affect the flow of trade, especially those impacting critical international trade routes, such as the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal, could potentially cause disruption to the global supply chain and may adversely affect our operations and financial results.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 19, 2025 ↗
We utilize governmental rebates, tax credits, and other financial incentives to lower the effective price of our products to customers in the U.S. and Japan, India, Republic of Korea, and Taiwan (collectively, our “Asia Pacific region”).
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2025 ↗
Digital assets currently face an uncertain regulatory landscape in not only the United States but also in many foreign jurisdictions, such as the European Union, China, India and Russia. While certain governments have issued guidance as to how to treat bitcoin, most regulatory bodies have not yet issued official statements regarding intention to regulate or determinations on regulation of bitcoin, the bitcoin network and bitcoin users. The effect of any future regulatory change on us, bitcoins, or other digital assets is impossible to predict, but such change could be substantial and adverse to us and could adversely affect an investment in our securities.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 9, 2024 ↗
Furthermore, one or more countries, such as China, India and Russia, may take regulatory actions in the future that severely restricts the right to acquire, own, hold, sell or use digital assets or to exchange digital assets for fiat currency. Such an action may also result in the restriction of ownership, holding or trading in the Company’s securities.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 9, 2024 ↗
Although currently cryptocurrencies generally are not regulated or are lightly regulated in most countries, several countries, such as China, India and Russia, may continue taking regulatory actions in the future that could severely restrict the right to mine, acquire, own, hold, sell or use cryptocurrency assets or to exchange any such cryptocurrency assets for local currency. For example, in China and Russia (India is currently proposing new legislation), it is illegal to accept payment in bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies for consumer transactions and banking institutions are barred from accepting deposits of cryptocurrencies. In addition, in March 2021, the governmental authorities for the Chinese province of Inner Mongolia banned bitcoin mining in the province due to the industry’s intense electrical power demands and its negative environmental impacts. Later, China extended the ban on bitcoin mining to all of China. If other countries, including the U.S., implement similar restrictions, such restrictions may adversely affect us. For example, in New York State, a moratorium on certain bitcoin mining operations that run on carbon-based power sources was signed into law on November 22, 2022. Such circumstances could have a material adverse effect on us, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, prospects or operations and potentially the value of any bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies we mine or otherwise acquire or hold for our own account, and thus harm investors.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 9, 2024 ↗
President Trump has indicated his willingness to increase the use of tariffs by the U.S. to accomplish certain U.S. policy goals. On February 1, 2025, President Trump signed three executive orders announcing his intent to impose 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico and a 10% additional tariff on imports from China. While the implementation of tariffs on imports from Mexico and Canada were paused, the Chinese tariffs took effect as scheduled and China responded by implementing 15% tariffs on certain U.S. imports. The implementation of new tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, China or other countries for an extended period and without specific exemptions for our products, and any reciprocal tariffs or other reactions by other countries thereto, could have a material adverse impact on our financial condition, results of operations and cash flows.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 18, 2025 ↗
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Relocating our miners, as we did to migrate from China and from Compute North and Core Scientific facilities and Blockfusion and Blockbreakers facilities, required us to incur costs to transition to new facilities including, but not limited to, transportation expenses and insurance, downtime while we are unable to mine, legal fees to negotiate the new lease, de-installation at our current facility and, ultimately, installation at any new facility we identify. These costs may be substantial, and we cannot guarantee that we will be successful in transitioning our miners to a new facility. Since we are required to move our miners, our business may suffer, and our results of operations would be expected to be materially adversely affected.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
A number of companies that engage in bitcoin and/or other bitcoin-related activities have been unable to find banks or financial institutions that are willing to provide them with bank accounts and other services. This is particularly true as a result of recent bank failures, which were connected to cryptocurrency activities. Similarly, a number of companies and individuals or businesses associated with digital assets may have had and may continue to have their existing bank accounts closed or services discontinued with financial institutions in response to government action, particularly in China, where regulatory response to digital assets has been to exclude their use for ordinary consumer transactions within its jurisdiction.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
Our mining operations can only be successful and ultimately profitable if the costs, including hardware and electricity costs, associated with mining digital assets are lower than the price of a bitcoin. As our mining facility operates, our miners experience ordinary wear and tear, and may also face more significant malfunctions caused by a number of extraneous factors beyond our control. We have purchased second-hand miners from third parties. The degradation of our miners requires us to, over time, replace those miners which are no longer functional. Additionally, as the technology evolves, we are required to acquire newer models of miners to remain competitive in the market. Reports have been released which indicate that miner manufacturers or sellers adjust the prices of their miners according to bitcoin prices, so the cost of new machines is unpredictable but could be extremely high. As a result, at times, we may obtain miners and other hardware from third parties at premium prices, to the extent they are available. This upgrading process requires substantial capital investment, and we may face challenges. Further, the global supply chain for bitcoin miners is presently heavily dependent on China-based manufacturers. In addition, there have been shortages of the semiconductors which are key components in miner production. The global reliance on China as a main supplier of bitcoin miners has been called into question, particularly in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Should similar outbreaks or other disruptions to the China-based global supply chain for bitcoin hardware on the spot market or otherwise occur, we may not be able to obtain adequate replacement parts for our existing miners or to obtain additional miners from the manufacturer or third parties on a timely basis. Such events could have a material adverse effect on our ability to pursue our business strategy, which could have a material adverse effect on our business and the value of our Ordinary Shares.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
The Chinese government implements the management systems of pre-establishment national treatment and negative list for foreign investment. Pre-establishment national treatment refers to the treatment given to foreign investors and their investments during the investment access stage, which is not lower than that given to their domestic counterparts; negative list for foreign investment refers to special administrative measures for the restricted or prohibited access of foreign investment in specific fields as stipulated by the Chinese government.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
Pursuant to the Special Administrative Measures for Access of Foreign Investment Access (2021 Edition), or the 2021 Edition Negative List for Foreign, issued by The Ministry of Commerce of the PRC (the “MOFCOM”) and the National Development and Reform Commission (the “NDRC”) on December 27, 2021, which came into effect on January 1, 2022, our bitcoin mining business does not fall into the Negative List for Foreign. However, the 2021 Edition Negative List for Foreign indicates that “Fields not mentioned in the Negative List for Foreign Investment Access shall be subject to administration under the principle of consistency for domestic and foreign investments. The relevant provisions of the Negative List for Market Access shall apply to domestic and foreign investors on a unified basis.”
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
Also, based on the Negative List for Market Access (2022 Edition), “the Catalogue for Guidance on Industrial Restructuring shall be included in the Negative List for Market Access”; plus, according to the Decision of the State Council on Promulgating and Implementing the “Temporary Provisions on Promoting Industrial Structure Adjustment,” valid from December. 2, 2005, “In principle, the ‘Guidance Catalogue for the Industrial Structure Adjustment’ shall apply to various types of enterprises inside China.” “The industries of the eliminated category under the ‘Guidance Catalogue for the Industrial Structure Adjustment’ shall apply to the foreign investment enterprises.” and “Investments are prohibited from being contributed to projects under the eliminated category.” Additionally, the NDRC released on December 30, 2021 its No. 49 Decree, announcing that the Decision of the National Development and Reform Commission on Amending the Guiding Catalog for Industrial Restructuring (2019 Version) (the “Amended Catalog”). The Amended Catalog added “virtual currency mining activities” to the eliminated category of “1. outdated production processing and equipment under the original Catalog.” Therefore, foreign investment enterprises are prohibited from virtual currency activities and our bitcoin mining business are banned in China as well. There can be no assurance that our prior mining activities in China will not be subject to fines and penalties on a retroactive basis.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
We may be subject measures from the Cyberspace Administration of China concerning the collection of data and required to obtain clearance from the CAC.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
We believe we currently are not required to obtain clearance from the CAC regarding our listing in the United States under the recently-enacted or proposed regulations or rules because we have never set an online platform for any user and we have not acted as an online platform operator. However, since these cybersecurity rules were recently enacted and uncertainties exist as to the interpretation or implementation of the Measures, if the Measures require us to obtain clearance or permissions from the CAC, we would file an application with CAC and seek to obtain the clearance or permissions from the CAC as required, however there can be no assurance we will obtain clearance or permission which could adversely affect our business. Compliance with the Measures, as well as additional laws, regulations and guidelines that the Chinese government promulgates in the future, may entail significant expenses and could materially affect our business.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
United States regulators may be limited in their ability to conduct investigations or inspections of our operations in Hong Kong.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
The increased regulatory scrutiny of U.S.-listed companies with operations in China could add uncertainties to our business operations, share price and reputation. Although the audit reports of Audit Alliance LLP incorporated by reference into this report are prepared by our auditors in Singapore who are subject to inspection by the Public Company Accounting Overnight Board (the “PCAOB”), there is no guarantee that future audit reports will be prepared by auditors that are completely inspected by the PCAOB and, as such, future investors may be deprived of the benefit of such complete inspections, which could result in limitations or restrictions on our ability to access the U.S. capital markets. Furthermore, trading in our securities may be prohibited under the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (the “HFCA Act”) or the Accelerating Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act if the SEC subsequently determines our audit work is performed by auditors that the PCAOB is unable to inspect or investigate completely, and as a result, U.S. national securities exchanges, such as Nasdaq or the over-the-counter market, may determine to delist our securities.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
U.S. public companies that have or had a substantial portion of their operations in China have been the subject of heightened scrutiny, criticism and negative publicity by investors, financial commentators and regulatory agencies, such as the SEC. Much of the scrutiny, criticism and negative publicity has centered on financial and accounting irregularities and mistakes, a lack of effective internal controls over financial accounting, inadequate corporate government policies or a lack of adherence thereto and, in many cases, allegations of fraud.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
On June 22, 2021, the U.S. Senate passed the Accelerating Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act, which if enacted into law, would amend the HFCA Act and require the SEC to prohibit an issuer’s securities from trading on U.S. stock exchanges if its auditors are not subject to PCAOB inspections for two consecutive “non-inspection” years instead of three. On September 22, 2021, the PCAOB adopted a final rule implementing the HFCA Act, which provides a framework for the PCAOB to use when determining, as contemplated under the HFCA Act, whether the Board is unable to inspect or investigate completely registered public accounting firms located in a foreign jurisdiction because of a position taken by one or more authorities in that jurisdiction. On December 16, 2021, the PCAOB issued PCAOB Rule 6100 Board Determinations Under the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act. The PCAOB notified the SEC that it was unable to inspect or investigate completely registered public accounting firms headquartered in mainland China and in Hong Kong because of the positions taken by authorities in mainland China and Hong Kong. The PCAOB issued a Determination Report on December 15, 2022, determining that the PCAOB secured complete access to inspect and investigate registered public accounting firms headquartered in mainland China and Hong Kong, and vacating the 2021 Determinations to the contrary. However, the PCAOB further noted that it will act immediately to consider the need to issue a new determination if the PRC authorities obstruct or otherwise fail to facilitate the PCAOB’s access. While the audit report of Audit Alliance LLP included in this report was prepared by auditors based in Singapore who are subject to inspection and investigation by the PCAOB, there can be no assurance that our auditor or we will be able to comply with these and other requirements imposed by U.S. regulators in the future. The market prices of our Ordinary Shares and/or other securities could be adversely affected as a result of possible negative impacts of the HFCA Act and other similar rules and regulations.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
Our Hong Kong subsidiaries could become subject to certain PRC laws if such laws are applied to Hong Kong.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
The national laws of the PRC, including, but not limited to the Cybersecurity Review Measures that became effective on February 15, 2022, do not currently apply to our Hong Kong subsidiaries, except for those listed in the Basic Law of Hong Kong. However, due to changes in laws, regulations or policies, including how those laws, regulations or policies would be interpreted or implemented, and the national laws applicable in Hong Kong, the Basic Law might be revised in the future and our Hong Kong subsidiaries may be subject to certain PRC laws.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
Pursuant to Article 18 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC (the “Basic Law”), the laws in force in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the Basic Law, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong as provided for in Article 8 of this Law, and the laws enacted by the legislature of the Region. National laws shall not be applied in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region except for those listed in Annex III to the Basic Law. The laws listed therein shall be applied locally by way of promulgation or legislation by the Region. Also, regarding the Annex III and several Instruments of the Basic Law, National Laws, which have applied in Hong Kong until now are as following:
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
“Resolution on the Capital, Calendar, National Anthem and National Flag of the PRC; Resolution on the National Day of the PRC; Declaration of the Government of the PRC on the Territorial Sea; Nationality Law of the PRC; Regulations of the PRC Concerning Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities; Law of the PRC on the National Flag; Regulations of the PRC Concerning Consular Privileges and Immunities; Law of the PRC on the National Emblem; Law of the PRC on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; Law of the PRC on Garrisoning the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; Law of the PRC on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf; Law of the PRC on Judicial Immunity from Compulsory Measures Concerning the Property of Foreign Central Banks; and Law of the PRC on the National Anthem; Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
As of the date of this report, the Hong Kong subsidiaries have not established any subsidiary or branch in mainland PRC and are not conducting any business operations in mainland PRC.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
However, due to changes in laws, regulations or policies, including how these laws, regulations or policies would be interpreted or implemented, the national laws applicable in Hong Kong in the Basic Law might be revised in the future.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
Enhanced scrutiny over acquisition transactions by the PRC tax authorities may have a negative impact on the indirect transfer of equity in the past and potential acquisitions we may pursue in the future.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
The PRC tax authorities have enhanced their scrutiny over the direct or indirect transfer of certain taxable assets, including, in particular, equity interests in a PRC resident enterprise, by a non-resident enterprise by promulgating and implementing SAT Circular 59 and Circular 698, which became effective in January 2008, and a Circular 7 to replace some of the existing rules in Circular 698, which became effective in February 2015.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
Under Circular 7, where a non-resident enterprise conducts an “indirect transfer” by transferring the equity interests of a PRC “resident enterprise” indirectly by disposing of the equity interests of an overseas holding company, the non-resident enterprise, being the transferor, may be subject to PRC enterprise income tax if the indirect transfer is considered to be an abusive use of company structure without reasonable commercial purposes. As a result, gains derived from such indirect transfer may be subject to PRC tax at a rate of up to 10%.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
Where a non-resident enterprise transfers taxable assets in China indirectly by disposing of the equity interests of an overseas holding company, which is an Indirect Transfer, the non-resident enterprise as either transferor or transferee, or the PRC entity whose equity is transferred, may report such Indirect Transfer to the relevant tax authority. Using a “substance over form” principle, the PRC tax authority may disregard the existence of the overseas holding company if it lacks a reasonable commercial purpose and was established for the purpose of reducing, avoiding or deferring PRC tax. As a result, gains derived from such Indirect Transfer may be subject to PRC enterprise income tax, and the transferee or other person who is obligated to pay for the transfer is obligated to withhold the applicable taxes, currently at a rate of 10% for the transfer of equity interests in a PRC resident enterprise. Both the transferor and the transferee may be subject to penalties under PRC tax laws if the transferee fails to withhold the taxes and the transferor fails to pay the taxes. We face uncertainties as to the reporting and other implications of certain past and future transactions where PRC taxable assets are involved, such as offshore restructuring, sale of the shares in our offshore subsidiaries and investments. Our Company may be subject to filing obligations or taxed if our company is transferor in such transactions and may be subject to withholding obligations if our company is transferee in such transactions, under Circular 7 and/or SAT Circular 37. For transfer of shares in our Company by investors who are non-PRC resident enterprises, our former PRC subsidiaries may be requested to assist in the filing under SAT Circular 7 and/or Circular 37. As a result, we may be required to expend valuable resources to comply with SAT Circular 7 and/or Circular 37 or to request the relevant transferors from whom we purchase taxable assets to comply with these circulars, or to establish that our Company should not be taxed under these circulars, which may have a material adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
In addition, political turmoil and instability; geopolitical challenges, tensions and conflicts (including those related to China, the Russia - Ukraine war and the conflicts in the Middle East); terrorism; and other instabilities have occurred in various regions and emerging market countries across the globe, which impact Citi’s businesses, results of operations and financial conditions in those countries where Citi operates and have required, and may continue to require, management time and attention and other resources, such as managing the impact of sanctions and their effect on Citi’s operations in certain emerging market countries. For additional information, see the macroeconomic challenges and uncertainties risk factor above.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 21, 2025 ↗
•uncertain economic, legal and geopolitical conditions in Europe, Asia and other regions where we do business, including, for example, as a result of continued impacts of Brexit on the relationship between the United Kingdom and Europe, the ongoing military conflicts between both Russia and Ukraine and Israel and groups based in surrounding regions, including related maritime impacts in the Red Sea, and changes in China-Taiwan and U.S.-China relations.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 20, 2024 ↗
A number of our key technology vendors rely upon sales to customers, including our competitors, in China for a material portion of their revenue. There have been a number of significant geopolitical events, including trade tensions and regulatory actions, involving the governments of the United States and China. In May 2019, the U.S. Department of Commerce amended the EAR by adding Huawei and certain affiliates to the “Entity List” for actions contrary to the national security and foreign
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 20, 2024 ↗
policy interests of the United States, imposing significant new restrictions on export, reexport and transfer of U.S. regulated technologies and products to Huawei. In August 2020, the U.S. Department of Commerce added additional Huawei affiliates to the Entity List, confirmed the expiration of a temporary general license applicable to Huawei and amended the foreign direct product rule in a manner that represents a significant expansion of its application to Huawei. More recently, the U.S. Department of Commerce has expanded the scope of the EAR by amending the foreign direct product rule, resulting in more products made outside the United States becoming subject to the EAR for purposes of exports or transfers to certain countries and/or parties, which increases compliance risks and licensing obligations for companies dealing with such products. Several of our third-party component suppliers, including certain sole and limited source suppliers, sell products to Huawei and, in some cases, Huawei is a significant customer for such suppliers. At this time, there can be no assurance regarding the scope or duration of these restrictions, including the foreign direct product rule, or further actions imposed on Huawei and other companies located and operating in China, and any future impact on our suppliers. Any continued restriction on our suppliers’ ability to make sales to Huawei and other companies may adversely impact their businesses and financial position. In addition, China is in the midst of executing a five-year plan to improve China’s capabilities in the optoelectronics industry. There can be no assurance that this initiative, or similar efforts in China such as the Made in China 2025 initiatives (and actions taken by the U.S. government in response to such efforts), will not have an adverse impact on the business of our suppliers or our access to necessary components. These and similar industry, market and regulatory disruptions affecting our suppliers could, in turn, expose our business to loss or lack of supply or discontinuation of components that could result in lost revenue, additional product costs, increased lead times and deployment delays that could harm our business and customer relationships. Our business and results of operations would be negatively affected if we were to experience any significant disruption or difficulties with key suppliers affecting the price, quality, availability or timely delivery of required components.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 20, 2024 ↗
For example, our supply chain includes certain direct and indirect suppliers based in China who supply goods to us, our manufacturers, or our third-party suppliers. Recently, there have been a number of significant geopolitical events, including trade tensions and regulatory actions, involving the governments of the United States and China. The U.S. government has raised tariffs, and imposed new tariffs, on a wide range of imports of Chinese products, including component elements of our solutions and certain finished goods products that we sell. For example, U.S. tariff policy involving imports from China was subject to a lengthy, now-completed review by the U.S. government in 2023 and the first three quarters of 2024, and the incoming U.S. administration has announced an intent to impose an additional 10% tariff on all imports from China. The U.S. government has also introduced broad new restrictions on imports from China allegedly manufactured with forced labor, and the EU and the UK have recently adopted similar restrictions. China has retaliated by raising tariffs, and imposing new tariffs, on certain exports of U.S. goods to China, introducing blocking measures to restrict the ability of domestic companies to comply with U.S. trade restrictions, and recently prohibiting the export of certain rare minerals from China to the United States, and could take further steps to retaliate against U.S. industries or companies. In May 2020, the U.S. introduced significant further restrictions limiting access to controlled U.S. technology to additional Chinese government and commercial entities, including certain of our
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 20, 2024 ↗
competitors based in China. More recently, in October 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce imposed additional export control restrictions targeting the provision of certain semiconductors and related technology to China that could further disrupt supply chains that could adversely impact our business. In addition, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) in November 2022 prohibited communications equipment deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to national security from obtaining the equipment authorization that allows the products to be imported, marketed, or sold in the U.S. This prohibition currently includes telecommunications equipment produced by Huawei, its affiliates and subsidiaries, and four other Chinese companies, and additional entities may be subsequently added to this list. In addition, U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control has increasingly designated as Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDNs”) companies in China for their alleged activities involving Russia, Iran, North Korea or forced labor practices in the Xinjiang province of China, and such SDN designation includes not only an asset freeze but also broad prohibitions on any direct or indirect dealings with designated SDNs, or non-designated entities owned by one or more SDNs at 50% or greater level. The situation involving U.S.-China trade relations remains volatile and uncertain, and there can be no assurance that further actions by either country will not have an adverse impact on our business, operations and access to technology, or components thereof, sourced from China. See also the risk factor with the caption beginning “Our reliance on third-party component suppliers…” above.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 20, 2024 ↗
At this time, it remains unclear what additional actions, if any, will be taken by the U.S. or other governments with respect to international trade agreements, the imposition of tariffs on goods imported into the U.S., tax policy related to international commerce, increased export control, sanctions and investment restrictions, import or use of foreign communications equipment, or other trade matters. However, the incoming U.S. administration announced an intent to impose tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and China. We estimate that products or components that make up a significant portion of our revenue are either manufactured in or distributed from Mexico. Although the ultimate scope and timing of any such tariffs is indeterminable, if implemented, they could have a significant impact on our financial condition and results of operations. Based on our manufacturing practices and locations, there can be no assurance that any future executive or legislative action in the United States or other countries relating to tax policy and trade regulation would not adversely affect our business, operations and financial results.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 20, 2024 ↗
For example, the U.S. government has announced increased tariffs on China, and increased scrutiny over imports into the United States. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency’s (“CBP”) also has broad discretion regarding products imported into the United States and has detained and/or seized imported miners, which has caused bitcoin miners to experience delays in receiving miners. We have also faced immaterial delays due to the CBP’s detention and/or seizure of imported miners in the past and may again in the future. As the majority of miners are manufactured outside of the United States, such tariffs, trade restrictions, the threat of tariffs and trade restrictions, and increased focus over imports into the country could increase our costs and delay shipments needed for us to obtain new miners. These tariffs and any retaliatory action that may be taken have introduced significant uncertainty into the market, leading to volatility in material prices and potential delays in project timelines, which could negatively affect our operations, strategic planning and financial forecasting.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2025 ↗
significantly impact our ability to receive the mining equipment and timely roll-out of our operations. For example, an increase in geopolitical tensions in Asia, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, could significantly disrupt existing semiconductor chip manufacturing and increase the prospect of an interruption to the semiconductor chip supply across the world. The world’s largest semiconductor chip manufacturer is located in Taiwan and a large part of equipment and materials for our bitcoin miners, including ASIC chips, is manufactured in Taiwan. There is also a potential increase in risk for cyberattacks due to cyberwarfare in connection with ongoing military conflicts and geopolitical unrest.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2025 ↗
Many entities, including consortiums and financial institutions are also researching and investing resources into private or permissioned blockchain platforms or digital currencies that do not use proof-of-work mining like the Bitcoin network. Additionally, central banks in some countries have started to introduce digital forms of legal tender. For example, China’s central bank digital currency (“CBDC”) project was made available to consumers in January 2022, and governments from Russia to the European Union have been discussing potential creation of new digital currencies. Whether or not they incorporate blockchain or similar technology, CBDCs, as legal tender in the issuing jurisdiction, could have an advantage in competing with, or replacing, bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies as a medium of exchange or store of value. As a result, the value of bitcoin could decrease, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, prospects, financial condition, and operating results.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2025 ↗
As digital assets have grown in both popularity and market size, governments around the world have reacted differently. Certain governments have deemed digital assets illegal or have severely curtailed the use of digital assets by prohibiting the acceptance of payment in bitcoin and other digital assets for consumer transactions and barring banking institutions from accepting deposits of digital assets. Other nations, however, allow digital assets to be used and traded without restriction. In some jurisdictions, such as in the U.S., digital assets are subject to extensive, and in some cases overlapping, unclear and evolving regulatory requirements. There is a risk that relevant authorities in any jurisdiction may impose more onerous regulation on bitcoin, for example banning its use, regulating its operation, or otherwise changing its regulatory treatment. Such changes may introduce a cost of compliance, or have a material impact on our business model, and therefore our financial performance and shareholder returns. If the use of bitcoin is made illegal in jurisdictions where bitcoin is currently traded in heavy volumes, the available market for bitcoin may contract. For example, on September 24, 2021, the People’s Bank of China announced that all activities involving digital assets in mainland China are illegal, which corresponded with a significant decrease in the price of bitcoin. If another government with considerable economic power were to ban digital assets or related activities, this could have further impact on the price of bitcoin. As a result, the markets and opportunities discussed herein may not reflect the markets and opportunities available to us in the future.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2025 ↗
We face risks resulting from political and macroeconomic instability and geopolitical events and tensions, such as the war in Ukraine, the conflict in the Middle East and tensions between China and Taiwan. These geopolitical conflicts
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 13, 2025 ↗
China is a major producer of solar panels and other solar products. Certain solar cells, modules, laminates and panels from China are subject to various antidumping and countervailing duty rates, depending on the exporter supplying the product, imposed by the U.S. government as a result of determinations the United States was materially injured as a result of such imports being sold at less than fair value and subsidized by the Chinese government. Additionally, in March 2022, the DOC announced it would initiate an investigation into whether imports of solar cells and panels produced in Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam are circumventing U.S. rules and laws, such as antidumping and countervailing duty rates, which impose a tariff on imports of solar cells and panels manufactured in China. On August 18, 2023, the DOC announced its final determination that five of the eight companies investigated were attempting to bypass U.S. duties by doing minor processing in Southeast Asian countries before shipment to the United States. On May 15, 2024, based on a petition filed by the American Alliance for Solar Manufacturing Trade Committee, the DOC announced the initiation of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations of silicon photovoltaic cells from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. On October 1, 2024, the DOC’s preliminary countervailing duty determination affirmed the petition and established preliminary duty rates. A final
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 20, 2025 ↗
determination is expected in the first quarter of 2025. On November 29, 2024, the DOC announced its preliminary affirmative determination in the antidumping investigation and established preliminary dumping rates. A final determination is expected in the second quarter of 2025. In addition, in December 2021, the United States enacted the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which bans goods from China’s Xinjiang region due to the use of forced labor. Continuing tensions between the United States and China may lead to restrictions in trade between the two countries or new legislation, tariffs or bans. Furthermore, President Trump has expressed a desire to impose substantial new or increased tariffs on foreign imports into the United States, and in February 2025, President Trump imposed tariffs on several countries (the effectiveness of tariffs imposed on certain countries was subsequently delayed until March 2025) and certain imports into the United States. These tariffs, as well as new legislation, tariffs, bans, potential retaliatory trade measures taken against the United States or related governmental action, could further negatively impact the supply of solar panels. In addition to supply reductions, these or similar duties, legislation and other measures have and may in the future also put upward pressure on prices of these solar energy products, which may reduce our ability to acquire these items in a timely and cost-efficient manner. If we or the developers we are working with are unable to secure such solar energy products in a timely and cost-efficient manner, we may be required to seek additional regulatory review and approvals and/or be forced to delay, downsize and/or cancel solar projects, in which case we may not be able to fully execute on our ten-year capital plan or achieve our net zero and GHG emissions reduction goals. We have experienced project delays due to developers of our projects being unable to acquire solar panels due to supply chain constraints. Additionally, delays or cancellations by developers of third-party solar power facilities expected to interconnect with CenterPoint Energy’s and Houston Electric’s system may have adverse impacts, such as delayed or reduced potential future revenues. We cannot predict what additional actions the U.S. government may adopt with respect to tariffs, trade agreements or other trade regulations in the future or what actions may be taken by other countries in retaliation for such measures. If the DOC imposes tariffs on solar panels as a result of its findings or other additional measures are imposed, our business, financial condition and results of operations may be adversely affected.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 20, 2025 ↗
Much of the equipment necessary for HPC hosting and almost entirely all of the equipment necessary for digital asset mining is manufactured outside of the United States. There is currently significant uncertainty about the future relationship between the United States and various other countries, including China, the European Union, Canada, and Mexico, with respect to trade policies, treaties, tariffs and customs duties, and taxes. For example, since 2019, the U.S. government has implemented significant changes to U.S. trade policy with respect to China. These tariffs have subjected certain digital asset mining equipment manufactured overseas to additional import duties of up to 25%. The amount of the additional tariffs and the number of products subject to them has changed numerous times based on action by the U.S. government. These tariffs have increased costs of digital asset mining equipment, and new or additional tariffs or other restrictions on the import of equipment necessary for digital asset mining could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2025 ↗
In addition, various foreign jurisdictions either have adopted or may adopt laws, regulations or directives that affect digital assets, digital asset networks and their users and hosting service providers that fall within such jurisdictions’ regulatory scope. Such laws, regulations or directives may conflict with those of the United States, and may negatively impact the acceptance of digital assets by users, merchants and service providers outside of the United States and therefore impede the growth of digital asset use. A number of countries, including India, China, South Korea and Russia, among others, currently have a more restrictive or unclear stance toward digital assets and, thereby, have reduced the rate of expansion of digital asset use, as well as digital asset mining, in each of those countries.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2025 ↗
component suppliers and distribution partners. Our business in emerging countries in the aggregate experienced a decline in orders in certain prior periods. We continue to assess the sustainability of any improvements in our business in these countries and there can be no assurance that our investments in these countries will be successful. Our future results could be negatively impacted by a variety of political, economic or other factors relating to our operations inside and outside the United States, any or all of which could materially harm our operating results and financial condition, including the following: impacts from global central bank monetary policy; issues related to the political relationship between the United States and other countries that can affect regulatory matters, affect the willingness of customers in those countries to purchase products from companies headquartered in the United States or affect our ability to procure components if a government body were to deny us access to those components; government-related disruptions or shutdowns; the challenging and inconsistent global macroeconomic environment; foreign currency exchange rates; geopolitical tensions (including China-Taiwan relations); political or social unrest; economic instability or weakness or natural disasters in a specific country or region, including economic challenges in China and global economic ramifications of Chinese economic difficulties; environmental protection regulations (including new laws and regulations related to climate change); trade protection measures, such as tariffs; other legal and regulatory requirements, some of which may affect our ability to import our products to, export our products from, or sell our products in various countries or affect our ability to procure components; political considerations that affect service provider and government spending patterns; health or similar issues, including pandemics or epidemics; difficulties in staffing and managing international operations; and adverse tax consequences, including imposition of withholding or other taxes on our global operations.
Read in the 10-K filed Sep 3, 2025 ↗
Hess Guyana Exploration Limited (HGEL), a wholly owned subsidiary of Hess, is currently in arbitration with respect to the right of first refusal (Stabroek ROFR) contained in an operating agreement among HGEL, affiliates of Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) regarding the Stabroek Block offshore Guyana. The arbitration merits hearing about the applicability of the Stabroek ROFR to the merger has been scheduled for May 2025, with a decision expected in approximately the following three months. If the arbitration does not result in a confirmation that the Stabroek ROFR is inapplicable to the merger, and if Chevron, Hess, Exxon and/or CNOOC do not otherwise agree upon an acceptable resolution, then there would be a failure of a closing condition under the merger agreement, in which case the merger would not close.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 21, 2025 ↗
research and development activities. Continuing or expanding trade restrictions or disputes or changes in international trade policy, including new or increased tariffs or export controls, could adversely impact demand for and manufacture, distribution or sale of the Company’s products, and restrict access to certain markets, any of which could have a material adverse effect on the Company’s results of operations and growth prospects. China’s policy to enhance domestic supply in sectors where the Company competes, could impact future demand for the Company’s products.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 14, 2025 ↗
Trade restrictions, negotiation of new trade agreements, non-tariff trade barriers, local content requirements, and imposition of new or retaliatory tariffs against certain countries or covering certain products, including developments in U.S.-China trade relations, have limited, and could continue to limit, our ability to capitalize on current and future growth opportunities in international markets. These trade restrictions, and changes in, or uncertainty surrounding global trade policies, may affect our competitive position.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 12, 2024 ↗
We purchase certain raw materials that are affected by commodity prices, the most significant of which is sheepskin. The supply of sheepskin, which is used to manufacture a significant portion of our UGG brand products, is in high demand and there are limited suppliers that are able to provide the quantity and quality of sheepskin that we require. In addition, our unique product design and animal welfare standards require sheepskin that may be found only in certain geographies. Sheepskin used in our UGG brand products is sourced primarily from designated suppliers in Australia and processed by two tanneries in China. If this sheepskin and the resulting products we produce do not conform to our quality or sustainability specifications or fail to meet consumer expectations, we could experience reduced demand for our products, a higher rate of customer returns, and negative effects on the image of our brands, any of which could have a material adverse effect on our business. Similarly, if these tanneries are not able to deliver sheepskin in the quantities required, or were to cease operations, we may not be able to timely obtain suitable substitute materials, which would limit our ability to meet demand for our products, lead to inventory shortages, result in a loss of sales, strain our customer relationships, and harm our reputation. In addition, any factors that negatively affect the business of these tanneries, or the businesses of the suppliers that warehouse their inventories, such as loss of customers, financial instability, loss or destruction of property, work stoppages, political instability, or acts of terrorism or catastrophic events, could result in shortages in our supply of sheepskin.
Read in the 10-K filed May 23, 2025 ↗
There are a number of laws protecting the privacy and security of personal information and increased scrutiny by regulators, such as the Federal Trade Commission, and state attorneys general focused on our industry. Such laws include the California Consumer Privacy Act and California Privacy Rights Act, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation and member state directives, Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Acts, and China’s Personal Information Protection Law, and limit how we may collect, use, share and store personal information, and they impose obligations to protect that information. Further, we may be subject to new data privacy and security laws and regulations. If we, or any of our service providers who have access to the personal data for which we are responsible, are found to be in violation of the privacy or security requirements of applicable data protection laws, we could be subject to civil or criminal penalties, which could increase our liabilities, harm our reputation, and have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, and results of operations. Although we utilize a variety of measures to secure the data that we control, even compliant entities can experience security breaches or have inadvertent failures despite employing reasonable practices and safeguards.
Read in the 10-K filed May 23, 2025 ↗
Our business could be significantly harmed if we are not able to protect our intellectual property rights. We believe our competitive position is attributable to the value of our trademarks, patents, trade dress, trade names, trade secrets, copyrights, and other intellectual property rights. An unfortunate reaction to the success of our brands is that we have become a target of counterfeiting and product imitation strategies. Although we are aggressive in legal and other actions in pursuing those who infringe on our intellectual property rights, we cannot guarantee that the actions we have taken will be adequate to protect our brands in the future, especially because some countries’ laws do not protect these rights to the same extent as US laws. If we fail to adequately protect our intellectual property rights, it will allow our competitors to sell products that are similar to and directly competitive with our products, or we could otherwise lose opportunities to sell our products to consumers who may instead purchase a counterfeit or imitation product, which could reduce sales of our products and adversely affect the value of our brands. In addition, any intellectual property lawsuits in which we are involved could cost a significant amount of time and money and distract management’s attention from operating our business, which may negatively affect our business and results of operations. In addition to fighting intellectual property infringement, we may need to defend claims against us related to our intellectual property rights. For example, we have faced claims that the word “ugg” is a generic term. Such a claim was successful in Australia, but similar claims have been rejected by courts in the US, China, Republic of Türkiye, and the Netherlands. Any court decision or settlement that invalidates or limits trademark protection of our brands, which allows a third-party to continue to sell products similar to our products, or that allows a manufacturer or distributor to continue to sell counterfeit products, could lead to intensified competition and a material reduction in our sales, and could have a material adverse effect on the value of our brands.
Read in the 10-K filed May 23, 2025 ↗
Among our foreign suppliers, China is the source of the majority of our direct imports. In early 2025, the United States imposed or threatened to impose significant additional tariffs, including reciprocal tariffs, on China, Mexico, Canada and other countries from which we import goods. In addition, the Trump administration has announced plans to impose significant fees on Chinese shipping companies and any Chinese-built vessels that enter U.S. ports. The imposition of these or other additional tariffs on imported merchandise or other actions against China or other countries from which we import goods, and any retaliatory actions or other responses by such countries, could impair our ability to meet customer demand and could result in lost sales, an increase in our cost of merchandise or other adverse impacts on our operations, unless we are able to successfully offset or mitigate these impacts. Our mitigation efforts could include negotiating lower product costs, rebates or invoice deductions; shifting supply sources to alternate countries; changing our product assortment or discontinuing certain items; or increasing our prices. Even if we are able to mitigate the impact of tariffs in the short-term through one or more of the foregoing actions, a change in product assortment, reduced product offering or increase in pricing could reduce the competitiveness of our products, particularly if our competitors do not keep pace with any such changes or are able to offset the impact of tariffs through other actions.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 26, 2025 ↗
Furthermore, in response to the recent tariffs announced by the United States, China and other countries have imposed or proposed additional tariffs on certain exports from the United States. These and any other retaliatory countermeasures imposed by countries subject to such tariffs, such as China, could increase our, or our vendors’, import expenses. Additionally, even if the products we import are not directly impacted by additional tariffs, the imposition of such additional tariffs on goods imported into the United States could cause increased prices for consumer goods in general, which could have a negative impact on consumer spending for discretionary items reducing demand for our products. These direct and indirect impacts of increased tariffs or trade restrictions implemented by the United States, both individually and cumulatively, could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of future operations.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 26, 2025 ↗
Cross-border trade is an important source of both revenue and profits for us. Cross-border trade also represents our primary (or in some cases, only) presence in certain important markets, such as China, and various other countries. The interpretation and/or application of laws, such as those related to intellectual property rights of authentic products, selective distribution networks, and sellers in other countries listing items on the Internet, could impose restrictions on, or increase the costs of, purchasing, selling, shipping, or returning goods across national borders. The shipping of goods across national borders is often more expensive and complicated than domestic shipping. Changes to customs authorities’ “de minimis” thresholds, as well as increased costs or fees for third party sellers, logistics providers, or online marketplaces associated with changes in customs policy, tariffs, and any other
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2025 ↗
Several countries are considering or have implemented tariffs or other trade barriers or restrictions, as well as other measures impacting cross-border commerce, which could negatively affect our business and our users. The United States has implemented tariffs on certain foreign goods and may implement additional tariffs in the future. For example, in February 2025, the U.S. administration issued three Executive Orders imposing tariffs of 25% on goods imported from Canada and Mexico and an additional 10% on goods imported from China (including Hong Kong). The tariffs on imports from China took effect on February 4, 2025, while the tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico were suspended until March 4, 2025. Such tariffs would eliminate the “de minimis” exemption from customs duties and taxes for imported goods falling below a threshold value. The elimination of the “de minimis” rule is paused pending the implementation of a system to collect tariffs on such imports. Such actions could give rise to an escalation of trade measures by the United States and impacted countries. For example, after the tariffs on goods imported from China went into effect, China announced retaliatory tariffs on certain goods imported from the United States. In addition, in February 2025, the U.S. administration announced plans to levy reciprocal tariffs against countries taxing U.S. imports. Developments with regard to the timing and manner in which tariffs will be implemented, the amount, scope and nature of tariffs, the countries subject to new or additional tariffs imposed by the United States, and tariffs imposed by other countries on goods imported from the United States are rapidly evolving and may change unexpectedly at any time.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2025 ↗
Additionally, geopolitical events, such as the trade war between the U.S. and China, the war between Russia and Ukraine, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, could have a negative effect on our business domestically and/or internationally. While some time has passed since some of these events first occurred, it remains unpredictable how these events will continue to develop and impact the environment in which we do business.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 12, 2025 ↗
With respect to the ongoing trade war between the U.S. and China, we have several Chinese customers who are named in restrictive executive orders ("EOs"), and while a majority of these EOs are typically only applicable to transactions and/or services provided to these Chinese customers in the U.S. today, it is uncertain if the new U.S. administration would further expand the applicability of such EOs to transactions and businesses outside of the U.S. If Equinix is required to cease business with these companies, or additional companies in the future, our revenues could be adversely affected. Similarly, current relations between the U.S. and China have created increased supply chain risk due to successive U.S. legislation promoting decoupling from China on semiconductors and specific telecommunications equipment makers, and having to source for alternative suppliers for key components outside of China.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 12, 2025 ↗
The evolving design of our platform may create challenges for various organizations, including governments, that seek to block certain content based on IP address “blacklists” or other mechanisms. If these challenges become too difficult for those organizations to overcome, they could make the decision to block content in an over broad manner or block completely websites of providers that integrate with our platform. For example, the Chinese government restricts access to certain Google Cloud services from within the People’s Republic of China, and users of our mobile platform have experienced degraded functionality in China due to these restrictions on our platform’s ability to connect with those services. Some of these blocking efforts would be out of our control once they have been put in place and may limit our ability to provide our platform or third-party apps on a fully global basis, which could reduce demand for our platform among current or potential users and adversely impact our business, results of operations and financial condition.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 6, 2025 ↗
Changes in international trade policy can also have a substantial adverse effect on our financial condition, results of operations, or our business in general. Steps taken by governments to implement local content requirements or apply or consider applying additional or new tariffs on automobiles, parts, and other products and materials have the potential to disrupt existing supply chains, impose additional costs on our business, and could lead to other countries attempting to retaliate by imposing tariffs, which would make our products more expensive for customers, and, in turn, could make our products less competitive. The new, substantial tariff increases on imports to the United States from Canada and Mexico (in addition to China) announced on February 1, 2025, should they be implemented and sustained for an extended period of time, would have a significant adverse effect, including financial, on the overall automotive industry, Ford, and our supply chain. Further, any additional tariffs in the United States or retaliatory tariffs imposed by other governments would exacerbate the impact.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 6, 2025 ↗
We are subject to laws and regulations in the U.S. and in other countries relating to privacy and the collection, use, transfer, storage and security of personal data, including the European Union General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR"), the UK GDPR, the EU ePrivacy Directive, Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Act, China’s Personal Information Protection Law ("PIPL"), India's Digital Personal Data Protection Act, and other privacy and data security laws throughout the Asia Pacific region and across the globe. In the U.S., many states including California, Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and Virginia have enacted data privacy laws. The California Consumer Privacy Act ("CCPA") became effective January 1, 2020 and was further amended by the California Privacy Rights Act ("CPRA"), which became effective on January 1, 2023. The CCPA and CPRA, among other requirements, require covered companies to provide new rights and disclosures to California consumers, and allow such consumers abilities to opt-out of certain sales of personal information and other activities, and creates a new regulatory enforcement body. These and potential additional regulations and avenues for enforcement could result in, among other things, government inquiries, which could result in significant penalties. Additionally, new privacy and data protection laws and regulations are being considered, under development or are pending at the U.S. Federal and state level and many international jurisdictions.
Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2025 ↗
Political changes and trends such as populism, protectionism, economic nationalism and sentiment toward multinational companies and resulting tariffs, export controls or other trade barriers, or changes to tax or other laws and policies, have been and are expected to continue to be disruptive and potentially costly to our business, and these can interfere with our global operating model, supply chain, production costs, customer relationships, customer demand and competitive position. Such measures can be imposed suddenly and unpredictably. For example, the current U.S. administration has recently imposed new tariffs on goods from China and other countries. Further escalation of specific trade tensions, including as a result of the imposition of new tariffs (including retaliatory tariffs), tariff increases or other trade restrictions between the U.S. and its major trading partners, intensified decoupling between the U.S. (as well as other major economies) and China, or in global trade conflict more broadly could materially increase our product input costs, negatively affect global economic conditions contracting customer demand, or could be harmful to our business or that of our customers, and related decreases in confidence or investment activity in the global markets would adversely affect our business performance. As a contract manufacturer, we expect to recover the costs of tariffs by passing tariff costs to our customers which would increase net sales, decrease operating income margins, and negatively affect operating cash flow timing as we recover paid tariffs from our customers. To the extent we are unsuccessful in passing tariff costs to some customers, our results of operations and cash flows would be negatively impacted. The actual impact of new tariffs on our business is subject to a number of factors including the restrictions on trade,
Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2025 ↗
The attractiveness of our services to customers and our ability to conduct business with certain customers can be affected by changes in U.S. and other countries' policies, including regarding trade. We have significant operations located in China, which have been in the past, and could in the future be, adversely affected by evolving laws, regulations and policies, including with regard to import and export tariffs and restrictions, and information security and privacy, as well as changes in the political and geopolitical environment involving China. U.S.-China bilateral trade relations remain uncertain. The U.S.’s various trade actions, including imposing tariffs on certain goods imported from China or deemed to be of Chinese origin, as well as the potential for new tariffs, trade embargoes or sanctions by the U.S., and countermeasures imposed by China in response, have, in the past adversely affected, and could in the future, depending on their duration and implementation as well as our ability to mitigate their impact, adversely affect our business, including in the form of increased cost of goods sold, decreased margins, increased pricing for customers, and reduced sales. Moreover, we could be subject to reputational harm if any of our customers, former customers or vendors were subject to U.S. sanctions or if our customers, former customers or vendors did business with sanctioned countries. Furthermore, geopolitical changes in China-Taiwan relations could disrupt the operations of several companies in Taiwan that are critical to the global supply of semiconductors and other electronic components on which many of our customers depend.
Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2025 ↗
We are also exposed to risks related to the valuation of the Mexican and Chinese currencies relative to the U.S. dollar. The Mexican currency is the peso ("MXN") and the Chinese currency is the renminbi ("RMB"). A significant increase in the value of the MXN or RMB could adversely affect our financial results and cash flows by increasing both our manufacturing costs and the costs of our local supply base. Volatility in the functional and non-functional currencies of our entities and the United States dollar could seriously harm our business, operating results and financial condition.
Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2025 ↗
Given the diverse and varied nature of our business and the location of our business around the world, certain activities we perform, such as providing assembly services in China and India, may fall outside the scope of those licenses or may not be subject to the applicable intellectual property rights. Our licensors may disagree and claim royalties are owed for such activities. In addition, the basis (e.g., base price) for any royalty amounts owed are audited by licensors and may be challenged. Our customers often require us to indemnify them against the risk of intellectual property-related claims and licensors may claim that activities we perform are covered by licenses to which we are a party.
Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2025 ↗
•United States — Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Imported Crystalline Silicon PV Cells and Modules. The United States currently imposes antidumping and countervailing duties (“AD/CVDs”) on certain imported crystalline silicon PV cells and modules from China and Taiwan. Such AD/CVDs can
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2025 ↗
We incurred net losses of approximately $1,951,000 and $3,737,000 in Fiscal 2024 and 2023, respectively. We expect to generate losses for the foreseeable future. We will need to generate increased revenues to achieve profitability in the future. Despite our efforts, we may not achieve profitability in the future or sustain profitability for a prolonged period of time. In December 2024, our largest design customer notified us of its plan to discontinue their insulin patch program on which we were providing design services. In Fiscal 2024, this design customer was responsible for 25.2% of our revenues. While we plan to mitigate the impact of this lost revenue with cost reduction efforts, seeking continued flexibility on payments to Forward China and exploring additional sources of financing, these efforts may not be sufficient to meet our liquidity needs through December 31, 2025.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 27, 2024 ↗
Rising threats of international tariffs, including tariffs applied to goods between the U.S. and China, may materially and adversely affect our business.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 27, 2024 ↗
Rising threats of international tariffs, including tariffs applied to goods traded between the U.S. and China, could materially and adversely affect our business and results of operations. Since the beginning of 2018, there has been increasing rhetoric, in some cases coupled with legislative or executive action, from several U.S. and foreign leaders regarding the possibility of instituting tariffs on the foreign imports of certain materials and products. More specifically, throughout 2019 and 2020, the U.S. and China imposed tariffs or announced proposed tariffs to be applied in the future to certain of each other’s exports. As of the date of this report, the Company has not been directly affected by any tariffs previously implemented by former President Trump on the medical technology industry which currently remain in place. In May 2022 the U.S. Trade Representative (the “USTR”) announced a statutory four-year review of the tariffs against China. The USTR also announced in May 2022 that it reinstated or extended various eligible tariff exclusions on certain products from China through December 2023. In September 2024, the USTR completed its statutory four-year review and announced tariff increases on imports from China on various products. Further, we do not know if the administration that takes office in 2025 will implement any new tariffs or alter current tariffs. If any tariffs or restrictions are imposed on products that we import for our customers, we would be required to raise our prices, which may result in the loss of customers and harm our business. Additionally, some of our non-diabetic distribution customers and customers in the design and development business have been affected by these tariffs, specifically those who manufacture non-medical electronic products. This may cause these customers to reduce the amount of discretionary spending they use on outsource product design and engineering services supplied by our design segment.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 27, 2024 ↗
Changes in political conditions in China and changes in the state of China-U.S. relations, including any tensions relating to potential military conflict between China and Taiwan, are difficult to predict and could adversely affect the operations or financial condition of the Company. In addition, because of our involvement in the Chinese market, any deterioration in political or trade relations might cause a public perception in the U.S. or elsewhere that might cause our business to become less attractive. Such an impact could adversely affect our revenues and cash flows.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 27, 2024 ↗
In addition to margin compression from customers in general, we are encountering increased costs from our Chinese suppliers who are reacting to inflationary increases in materials and labor costs incurred by them. In addition, prices that our Chinese vendors charge to us may reflect any appreciation of the Chinese currency against the U.S. dollar, which can be passed through to us in the form of higher U.S. dollar prices. This in turn will tend to reduce gross profit if we are unable to raise our prices. Any decrease in demand for our products or services, coupled with pressure from the market and our customers to decrease our prices, would have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 27, 2024 ↗
Our Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and largest shareholder is the owner of Forward China, our exclusive sourcing agent in the Asia Pacific region. We have a Buying Agency and Supply Agreement with Forward China under which Forward China acts as the Company’s exclusive agent to arrange for sourcing, manufacturing and exporting the Company’s distribution products. Historically, Forward China has relied on a limited number of suppliers to supply the component parts and pieces necessary for the production of our carry and protective solutions products. As a result, our ability to effectively push back against rising material costs may diminish. In addition, any inability to obtain supplies from a single or limited number of suppliers may result in difficulty obtaining the supplies necessary for our business and may restrict our ability to produce our carry and protective solutions products. Where practical, we intend to establish alternative sources through Forward China to mitigate the risk that the failure of any single supplier will adversely affect our business. Nevertheless, either a prolonged inability to obtain certain components or the failure of one of our suppliers to do so could impair our ability to ship products and generate revenues, which could adversely affect our operating results and damage our customer relationships.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 27, 2024 ↗
In addition, we depend significantly on Forward China as our exclusive buying agent for substantially all of our component parts. As a result, we have limited visibility as to our supplier base, making it difficult to forecast future events and to plan our operations. In addition, if Forward China fails to satisfactorily perform its obligations, including payment obligations, to our suppliers or its duties to us as our exclusive buying agent as a result of financial or other difficulties or for any other reason, or if our relationship with Forward China was to suffer or we are unable to maintain our agreement with Forward China, which is currently in effect until April 30, 2025, but may be terminated prior to that with 30 days’ notice, we could suffer irreparable harm resulting in substantial damage to the distribution business.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 27, 2024 ↗
As a result of the reverse stock split effected in June 2024 and the entrance into the Accounts Payable Conversion Agreements with Forward China (described in Note 14 to the consolidated financial statements), the Company regained compliance with the Minimum Bid Price Rule and Stockholders’ Equity Rule in July 2024 and was formally notified by Nasdaq that such requirements were met. Until July 24, 2025, the Company is subject to a Nasdaq “Panel Monitor” which provides for in the event the Company fails to satisfy the Stockholders’ Equity Rule during the monitoring period, the Company will be required to request a hearing before the Panel in order to maintain its listing rather than taking the interim step of submitting a compliance plan for the Nasdaq Listing Qualifications Staff’s review or receiving any otherwise applicable grace period. We can provide no assurance that if the Company fails to satisfy the Stockholders’ Equity Rule during this period that the Company will be able to maintain its Nasdaq listing.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 27, 2024 ↗
Our business is affected by global geopolitical conditions. Future geopolitical factors that have the effect of reducing capital expenditures generally, and for healthcare products, services, or solutions specifically, may negatively impact sales of our offerings and, as a result, make it more difficult for us to attract new customers, retain existing customers, or maintain sales at existing levels. For example, in March 2024, the government in China announced a new stimulus program (“2024 stimulus”) that includes the healthcare sector and is being implemented through China’s provinces. In addition, an anti-corruption campaign directed at the healthcare sector remains ongoing. Both of these factors contributed to delayed orders and sales in our China business throughout 2024. While we expect the 2024 stimulus program to result in opportunities for our business in China in the longer term, it has had a short-term impact as provinces develop and announce their plans and customers begin to make purchasing decisions. We expect the effects of the delay in the 2024 stimulus and the anti-corruption campaign to continue to impact our orders and sales in the near term, although we are unable to predict the exact duration or magnitude of the impact.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 13, 2025 ↗
Middle East, and possible conflicts that could emerge in other geopolitically sensitive areas, such as the Taiwan Strait and broader Asia
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 6, 2025 ↗
and economic conditions, among other factors. In addition, various geopolitical factors, including the level of economic activity in China, the
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 6, 2025 ↗
markets. For example, China is a large manufacturer and developer of wind equipment and technology and Chinese wind turbine
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 6, 2025 ↗
manufacturers may increasingly pursue selling their wind turbine products in markets outside of China. The entry of new market
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 6, 2025 ↗
Act, China’s Unfair Competition Law, India’s Prevention of Corruption Act, and similar anti-corruption and anti-bribery laws in other
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 6, 2025 ↗
Our business is global, so changes to existing international trade agreements, blocking of foreign trade, increased protectionism, or imposition of tariffs on foreign goods could result in decreased revenues and/or increases in pricing, either of which could have an adverse impact on our business, results of operations, financial condition and cash flows in future periods. For instance, the United States imposed Section 232 tariffs on many imported products of steel and aluminum in March 2018 and expanded the tariffs to additional derivative products of steel and aluminum effective February 8, 2020. The United States imposed Section 301 tariffs on most imported products from China starting in July 2018. Although the United States and China reached a Phase One trade deal in January 2020, there was no Phase Two trade deal implemented and most of the tariffs imposed remain in place. Uncertainty persists in the trade relationship between the two countries that impacts the global trade landscape, and as of February 2025, new tariffs were enacted that significantly increase tariffs on foreign imports into the United States. The effects of these changes, including responsive actions from foreign governments, could also have significant impacts on our financial results.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 21, 2025 ↗
In 2024, numerous elections were held globally, including the recent U.S. presidential election. The outcomes of the elections are expected to result in changes in policy, which could also have adverse effects on us or the business environment in which we operate more generally. For example, the new U.S. presidential administration has imposed or increased tariffs, including on imports from China, and proposed imposing or increasing tariffs on U.S. trading partners, which could adversely affect markets, the business environment and some of our businesses.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2025 ↗
Our reliance on third-party manufacturers to produce our products, particularly in China, the U.S., Vietnam and India, presents risks to our business.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2025 ↗
Further, as described elsewhere, the imposition or threat of tariffs, border adjustment taxes, trade sanctions or other regulations or economic penalties by the U.S. or the European Union against products imported by us from China or other foreign countries, or the loss of “normal trade relations” status with China or other foreign countries in which we operate, could significantly increase our cost of products imported into the U.S. or Europe, shift more orders from direct import to domestic sales, put additional shipping and warehousing burdens on us, delay the time of our sales to retailers, result in lost sales, and otherwise harm our business. Additionally, the suspension of the operations of a third-party manufacturer by government inspectors in China or another market in which we source products could result in delays to us in obtaining product and may harm sales.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2025 ↗
The U.S. continues to implement certain trade actions, including imposing tariffs on certain goods imported from China and other countries, which has resulted in retaliatory tariffs by China and other countries. More significant tariffs have been proposed by the new administration in the U.S., although it is not possible to predict the extent or focus of any such tariffs at this time. Additional tariffs, export controls, and sanctions laws imposed by the U.S. on a broader range of imports, or further retaliatory trade measures taken by China or other countries in response, could increase the cost of our products.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 14, 2025 ↗
In recent years, outbreaks of ASF have impacted hog herds in China, Asia, Europe, and the Caribbean. If an outbreak of ASF were to occur in the U.S., the Company’s supply of hogs and pork could be materially impacted.
Read in the 10-K filed Dec 5, 2024 ↗
We are currently focusing efforts on commercializing our Mydcombi and clobetasol propionate products, and we have licensed commercialization rights to Mydcombi in Greater China (mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan) and South Korea to Arctic Vision (with Senju retaining such licensed rights in the rest of Asia). Our understanding of both the number of people who have needs for our products, as well as the subset of people who have the potential to benefit from our product in varying countries, are based on estimates in published literature. While we believe these estimates are reasonable, they may prove to be incorrect and new studies may reduce the estimated incidence or prevalence of mydriasis. The number of patients in the United States and elsewhere may turn out to be lower than expected or these patients might not be otherwise amenable to our products or may become increasingly difficult to identify and access, all of which would adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects.
Read in the 10-K filed Apr 15, 2025 ↗
Our operations are subject to anti-corruption laws, including the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), and the United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010 (“Bribery Act”), which apply wherever we do business around the world. We may also become subject to local anti-corruption laws in countries where we may do business in the future, such as Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, the Criminal Law and Anti-unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Hong Kong Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, and the Act on Preventing Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, or OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, enacted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and adopted by South Korea along with more than 40 other countries, and which is designed to criminalize bribery of public officials in connection with international business transactions. The Bribery Act, FCPA, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and similar international treaties and various countries’ local anti-corruption laws, referred to as Anti-Corruption Laws, generally prohibit us, our officers, and our employees and intermediaries from bribing, being bribed or making other prohibited payments to government officials or other persons to obtain or retain business or gain some other business advantage. Compliance with the FCPA, for example, is expensive and difficult, particularly in countries in which corruption is a recognized problem. In addition, the FCPA presents particular challenges in the pharmaceutical industry, because, in many countries, hospitals are operated by the government, and doctors and other hospital employees are considered foreign officials. Certain payments to hospitals in connection with clinical trials and other work have been deemed to be improper payments to government officials and have led to FCPA enforcement actions.
Read in the 10-K filed Apr 15, 2025 ↗
Moreover, our ability to protect and enforce our intellectual property rights may be adversely affected by unforeseen changes in foreign intellectual property laws. Many companies have encountered significant problems in protecting and defending intellectual property rights in certain foreign jurisdictions. The legal systems of some countries, including India, China and other developing countries, do not favor the enforcement of patents and other intellectual property rights. This could make it difficult for us to stop the infringement of our patents or the misappropriation of our other intellectual property rights. For example, many foreign countries have compulsory licensing laws under which a patent owner must grant licenses to third parties. Consequently, we might not be able to prevent third parties from practicing our inventions in certain foreign countries. Competitors may use our technologies in jurisdictions where we have not obtained patent protection to develop and market their own products and, further, may export otherwise infringing products to territories where we have patent protection, if our ability to enforce our patents to stop infringing activities is inadequate. These products may compete with our products, and our patents or other intellectual property rights might not be effective or sufficient to prevent them from competing.
Read in the 10-K filed Apr 15, 2025 ↗
Similarly, geopolitical developments, such as the US-China relations, escalating tensions between China and Taiwan, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel-Hamas war and wider Middle East developments (including disruptions to the Red Sea passage or such conflicts spreading further in the relevant regions), could also impact, among other things, certain raw material, energy and transportation costs, certain of our suppliers, distributors, customers and local markets, global and local macroeconomic conditions, and cause further supply chain disruptions (including by delaying the delivery times of raw materials needed for our business or our products to customers). We maintain operations in both Russia and Ukraine and export products to customers in Russia and Ukraine from operations outside the region. As the Russia-Ukraine war has prolonged, it continues to impact our sourcing of certain raw materials for future years, and we continue to look for alternative suppliers or adjust the types of raw materials used in our products. In response to the events in Ukraine, the Company has limited the production and supply of ingredients in and to Russia and Belarus to only those that meet the essential needs of people, including food, hygiene and medicine, and as a result, our operating performance in Russia remains lower compared to previous years and may not reverse in the near future. The Israel-Hamas war and wider Middle East developments have impacted and may continue to impact our operations in Israel and certain of our customers, local markets and suppliers.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 28, 2025 ↗
We operate or may pursue opportunities in some jurisdictions, such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and Africa, that pose potentially elevated risks of fraud or corruption or increased risk of internal control issues. In certain jurisdictions, compliance with anti-bribery laws may conflict with local customs and practices. From time to time, we have conducted and will conduct internal investigations of the relevant facts and circumstances, control testing and compliance reviews, and take remedial actions, when appropriate, to help ensure that we are in compliance with applicable corruption and similar laws and regulations.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 28, 2025 ↗
protocols, nationalization, changes in social, political or labor conditions, and adverse developments regarding sustainability, environmental regulations and trade policies and agreements, any of which risks could negatively affect our financial results. For example, a significant portion of sales from our Global Cellulose Fibers business are concentrated in China and could be adversely affected by changes in economic conditions and demographics. Trade protection measures in favor of local producers of competing products, including governmental subsidies, tax benefits and other measures giving local producers a competitive advantage may also adversely impact our operating results and our business prospects in these countries. Likewise, disruption in existing trade agreements or increased trade friction between countries (such as in relation to the trade tensions between the U.S. and China), could have a negative effect on our business and results of operations by restricting the free flow of goods and services across borders. Additionally, the current U.S. presidential administration has indicated a desire to significantly increase the rates and broaden the scope of tariffs imposed on goods imported into the U.S., such as from China, which may strain international trade relations and increase the risk that foreign governments implement retaliatory tariffs on goods imported from the United States. Specifically, the U.S. federal government has implemented tariffs on certain foreign goods and may implement additional tariffs on foreign goods. Such tariffs and any further legislation or actions taken by the U.S. federal government that restrict trade, such as additional tariffs, trade barriers, and other protectionist or retaliatory measures taken by governments in Europe, Asia, and other countries, could adversely impact our ability to sell products and services in our international markets. Tariffs could increase the cost of our products and the components and raw materials that go into making them. These increased costs could adversely impact the profit margin that we earn on our products, which could make our products less competitive and reduce consumer demand. Countries may also adopt other protectionist measures that could limit our ability to offer our products and services. The ultimate impact of any tariffs will depend on various factors, including if any tariffs are ultimately implemented, the timing of implementation, and the amount, scope, and nature of the tariffs.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 21, 2025 ↗
Our global operations are subject to complex and evolving domestic and international data privacy laws and regulations, such as the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, the UK's General Data Protection Regulation, any supplemental applicable European Union member state or UK national data protection laws, China’s Personal Information Protection Law and comprehensive privacy laws in many U.S. states, including California, Connecticut, Colorado, Utah, and Virginia. These laws impose a range of compliance obligations regarding the handling of personal data. There are significant penalties for non-compliance, including monetary fines, disruption of operations and reputational harm. Moreover, other states and governmental authorities around the world have introduced or passed, or are considering, similar legislation which may impose varying standards and
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 21, 2025 ↗
We attempt to mitigate a portion of these risks through foreign currency hedging, based on our judgment of the appropriate trade-offs among risk, opportunity, and expense. Although we have established a hedging program to partially hedge our exposure to foreign currency exchange rate fluctuations, primarily related to transactions denominated in the Euro, the British Pound, the Japanese Yen, the Korean Won, the New Taiwan Dollar, and the Swiss Franc, and we regularly review our hedging program and make adjustments as necessary, our hedging activities may not offset all of the adverse financial impact caused by unfavorable movement in foreign currency exchange rates, which could materially adversely affect our financial condition or results of operations. See “Item 7A. Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About Market Risk” for additional discussion on the impact of foreign exchange risk.
Read in the 10-K filed Jan 31, 2025 ↗
Additionally, forced labor concerns have rapidly become a global area of interest, and have resulted in, and are expected to continue to result in, new regulations in the markets in which we operate. For example, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (“UFLPA”) prohibits the import of articles, merchandise, apparel, and goods mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (“Xinjiang”) of the People's Republic of China, or by entities identified by the U.S. government on the UFLPA Entity List. As a result of the UFLPA, materials and products we import into the United States could be held by U.S. Customs and Border Protection based on a suspicion that inputs used in such materials or products originated from Xinjiang or that they may have been produced by Chinese suppliers alleged to participate in forced labor, pending our provision of satisfactory evidence to the contrary. Among other consequences, such an outcome could result in negative publicity that harms our brands and reputation and could result in a delay or our complete inability to import such materials or products, which could result in inventory shortages and greater supply chain compliance costs.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 13, 2025 ↗
Geopolitical developments and other local and global events outside of our control can materially and adversely impact various aspects of KKR and its businesses. We are a global financial institution with operations, investors and investments located in many countries around the world, which are not immune to geopolitical developments. Geopolitical developments and other local and global events outside of our control, including trade conflict, sanctions (reciprocal or unilateral), restrictions on foreign direct investment, trade barriers, civil unrest, national and international security events (including the outbreak of war, terrorist acts or other hostilities), can, and occasionally do, materially and adversely impact our ability to conduct our investment management and insurance businesses, as well as our portfolio companies and other investments. These risks have increased in both scale and complexity due to intensifying geopolitical competition and conflicts, including the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine and unrest in the Middle East, heightened geopolitical competition between China and other major world economies, heightened levels of political populism leading to regulatory volatility, and increased attention to global threats, including climate change. We have a number of offices located in multiple countries and regions around the world, including China, South Korea, Japan, India, Australia, the United Kingdom, the European Union, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere, and we seek investors from various countries throughout the world for our investment products and, to a lesser extent, our insurance business’ products. In particular, our investment strategies target opportunities globally, including across the Americas, Europe, Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East. Political instability and extremism, conflict, and civil unrest in any region where we have material business operations or investments may have a material adverse effect on us. Any escalation in an actual or perceived trade war or barriers to investment between the U.S. and other countries or regions could chill or limit business opportunities, and otherwise negatively affect our investment management and insurance businesses. In addition, intensifying rivalries and conflicts in in the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, Europe and globally have created new complexities in the international business environment, including through the imposition of sanctions, national security-motivated regulatory changes, and protectionist policies by certain countries. Occurrence of war or hostilities involving a country in which we have investments, investors, insurance counterparties or employees could adversely affect our business.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 28, 2025 ↗
We may have direct investments in a region or a country that is experiencing one of the aforementioned events, and we may also be materially and adversely affected by the occurrence of such events as a result of indirect exposure that our portfolio companies or other investments may have through other interconnectivities such as supply chains, commodity prices and general macroeconomic exposure. The value of our investments can be materially impacted by tariffs, export controls, sanctions, or other governmental actions related to international trade agreements and policies that materially constrain cross-border flows of investment, goods, or data, which have the potential to increase costs, decrease margins, reduce the competitiveness of products and services offered by portfolio companies and adversely affect the revenues and profitability of portfolio companies, including as a result of the potential imposition of tariffs or tariff increases or other trade restrictions between the United States and its major trading partners, including Canada, Mexico, the European Union, and China. Similarly, escalation in tensions between the U.S. (as well as other major economies) and China, the inability of the U.S. and China to reach further trade agreements, the continued use of reciprocal sanctions by each country, or broadening implementation of investment restriction regimes in or related to China, may contribute to a slowing of global economic growth and adversely affect the revenues and profitability of our portfolio companies and other investments.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 28, 2025 ↗
In December 2024, the DOJ finalized a rule with phased-in compliance for U.S. persons, including us, beginning in April 2025 which will impose data security requirements, such as meeting certain standards for cybersecurity, adopting cybersecurity policies, conducting cybersecurity audits and performing due diligence and recordkeeping requirements, on, and prohibit the transfer of, and access to, bulk sensitive personal data to foreign persons connected with certain countries of concern which currently include China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia and Venezuela.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 28, 2025 ↗
In addition, we and our portfolio companies are required to comply with certain non-U.S. privacy laws, including, for example, the GDPR, the Personal Information Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (“PIPL”), which has parallels with the GDPR given that it has extra-territorial effect, applying to data processing activities in China and outside of China in certain circumstances, the India Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 and the UK Data Protection Act as well as laws in other jurisdictions globally. Global laws in this area are rapidly increasing in the scale and depth of their requirements and are also often extra-territorial in nature. In addition, a wide range of regulators and private actors are seeking to enforce these privacy laws with increased scrutiny and growing penalties, including across regions and borders. Furthermore, we frequently have privacy compliance requirements because of our contractual obligations with counterparties. As new privacy-related laws and regulations are implemented, the time, cost and resources needed for us and our portfolio companies to comply with such laws and regulations continues to increase. These legal, regulatory, and contractual obligations heighten our privacy obligations in the ordinary course of conducting our business in the U.S. and internationally. Furthermore, failure to comply with U.S. and foreign privacy, data protection, and data security laws and regulations could result in government investigations or enforcement actions (which could include civil or criminal penalties), private litigation, claims, or public statements against us or adverse publicity. Claims that we have violated individuals’ privacy rights, failed to comply with privacy, data protection, and data security laws, or breached our contractual obligations, even if we are not found liable, could be expensive and time consuming to defend, could result in adverse publicity and could have a material adverse effect on us. Many regulators have indicated an intention to take more aggressive enforcement actions regarding data privacy matters, and private litigation resulting from such matters is increasing and resulting in progressively larger judgments and settlements.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 28, 2025 ↗
The U.S. government has also implemented and expanded a number of economic and trade sanctions programs and export controls that target Chinese entities and nationals on national security grounds and has imposed restrictions on acquiring and retaining interests in the securities of certain Chinese entities. These initiatives target, for example, entities associated with the Chinese government's response to political demonstrations in Hong Kong, the Chinese government's treatment of Uighurs and other ethnic minorities, the Chinese government's capabilities to conduct surveillance on its own population and internationally, and the capabilities of the Chinese military, paramilitary, security and police forces. The U.S. has also enacted rules aimed at restricting China's ability to obtain advanced computing chips, develop and maintain supercomputers, and manufacture advanced semiconductors, as well as expanded export control laws to reach additional items produced outside of the United States, restricted the ability of U.S. persons to support the development or production of integrated circuits at certain semiconductor fabrication facilities in China, and added new license requirements for certain items destined for China. In return, China has issued rules and laws to counteract the impact of these measures, including by enabling Chinese citizens, legal persons, and other organizations to seek remedies as a result of prohibitions or restrictions on normal economic, trade, and related activities with persons of other countries, and by authorizing the imposition of countermeasures such that a company that complies with U.S. sanctions against a Chinese entity may face penalties in China. China has also instituted tariffs on certain U.S. goods and may impose additional tariffs on U.S. products in the future.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 28, 2025 ↗
subsidies that could distort the internal EU market. Additionally, outside the EU, certain transactions in Australia are subject to review by the FIRB; transactions in the UK must comply with the National Security and Investment Act 2021; and transactions in China must comply with the Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investment. In addition, during 2022, Japan enacted economic security legislation to protect Japanese national security from adverse economic activities, focusing in particular on protecting sensitive industry sectors, such as semiconductors, rare earths, infrastructure, as well as research and development of defense and dual-use technologies.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 28, 2025 ↗
More recently, the Department of the Treasury promulgated regulations pursuant to a U.S. Presidential Executive Order establishing an outbound investment screening regime restricting certain investments by U.S. persons in advanced technology sectors in jurisdictions designated as a “country of concern” (presently, as of the date of this report, China, Hong Kong, and Macau). The corresponding notification requirements and prohibitions took effect on January 2, 2025. Other jurisdictions, including the EU, may adopt similar outbound investment restrictions in the future. Additionally, certain U.S. states have enacted their own-state level restrictions on Chinese investments and a number of U.S. states are passing and implementing state laws prohibiting or otherwise restricting the acquisition of interests in real property located in the state by foreign persons. These laws may impact the ability of non-U.S. limited partners to participate in certain of our investment strategies.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 28, 2025 ↗
Conditions in commodity markets impact the valuations of our portfolio companies and other investments in a variety of ways, including through the direct or indirect impact on the cost of the inputs used in their operations, as well as the pricing and profitability of the products or services that they sell. The price of commodities has historically been subject to substantial volatility, which among other things, could be driven by economic, monetary, geopolitical or weather-related factors. For example, shifting geopolitics and conflicts in areas around the world, such as China, Russia, Ukraine, and the Middle East, including the imposition of sanctions and protectionist policies, have, and may continue to, exacerbate price volatility globally, including by continuing to increase commodity prices. See also “—Risks Related to Our Business—Geopolitical developments and other local and global events outside of our control can materially and adversely impact KKR." If the operating partners for certain of our investments or our portfolio companies are unable to raise prices to offset increases in the cost of raw materials or other inputs, or if customers defer purchases of or seek substitutes for these products, these investments or portfolio companies could experience lower operating income which may in turn reduce their valuation. With respect to our energy investments, when commodity prices decline or if a decline is not offset by other factors, the revenues, operating results, profitability and liquidity of the businesses related to such investments may be adversely affected. In general, we expect sustained downward price movements to have a negative impact on the fair value of our energy portfolio, all other things being equal, given that lower commodity prices may reduce the operating margins, cash flow and borrowing ability of such investments. The reverse is true for upward price movements. However, because we and our operating partners and portfolio companies may use near-term
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 28, 2025 ↗
•political and economic conditions and events in foreign oil, natural gas and NGL producing countries, including embargoes, continued hostilities in the Middle East and other sustained military campaigns, the armed conflict in Ukraine and associated economic sanctions on Russia, conditions in South America, Central America and China, and acts of terrorism or sabotage; and
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 28, 2025 ↗
The conduct of animal research at BLS’s facilities must be in compliance with applicable laws and regulations in the jurisdictions in which those activities are conducted. These laws and regulations include the U.S. Animal Welfare Act (AWA), which governs the care and use of warm-blooded animals for research in the U.S. other than laboratory rats, mice and chickens, and is enforced through periodic inspections by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The AWA establishes facility standards regarding several aspects of animal welfare, including housing, ventilation, lighting, feeding and watering, handling, veterinary care, and recordkeeping. Similar laws and regulations apply in other jurisdictions in which BLS conducts animal research, including the UK, EU, and China. BLS complies with licensing and registration requirement standards set by these laws and regulations in the jurisdictions in which it conducts animal research. If an enforcement agency determines that BLS’s equipment, facilities, laboratories or processes do not comply with applicable standards, it may issue an inspection report documenting the deficiencies and setting deadlines for any required corrective actions. For noncompliance, the agency may take action against BLS that may include fines, suspension and/or revocation of animal research licenses, or confiscation of research animals.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2025 ↗
from Russia and certain equipment from China, or are currently sourced from areas which are at risk of sanctions or
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 14, 2025 ↗
•changes in or limitations imposed by trade protection laws or other regulatory orders or requirements in the United States or in other countries, including changes in the trade policies of the U.S. and its trading partners, heightened, scheduled, or threatened tariffs, sanctions, or other costs or requirements which may affect our ability to import or export our products from various countries or increase the cost to do so, including government action to restrict our ability to sell to foreign customers where sales of products may require export licenses (See Risk Factor entitled “Our ability to sell our products to a significant customer has been restricted”); the restrictions in China on the export of gallium and germanium and other rare earth metals and critical minerals; and other retaliatory responses in the trade policies of the U.S. or foreign governments;
Read in the 10-K filed Aug 19, 2025 ↗
companies seek alternative solutions, which has reduced the demand for our products from some of our Chinese customers;
Read in the 10-K filed Aug 19, 2025 ↗
other processing of proprietary, confidential and other information. Moreover, new laws and regulations, such as the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”), and China’s Personal Information Protection Law, add to the complexity of our compliance obligations and increases our compliance costs. Although we have established internal controls and procedures intended to comply with such laws and regulations, any actual or alleged failure to fully comply could result in significant penalties and other liabilities, harm to our reputation and market position, business and financial condition.
Read in the 10-K filed Aug 19, 2025 ↗
In addition, significant portions of our business are conducted in Europe, Asia, and other international geographies. Trade and other global disputes and interruptions, including related to tariffs, trade protection measures, import or export licensing requirements, the imposition of trade sanctions or similar restrictions by the U.S. or other governments, international tension and conflicts, as well as economic stagnation, cost inflation, strains on global transportation, manufacturing, and labor markets, and public health outbreaks, epidemics, or pandemics affect our ability to do business. Among other risks, the use of tariffs and other trade restrictions increase costs and may impact clinical trials or sales of our products, or otherwise complicate aspects of our business. In particular, tensions between the U.S. and China, which have already led to a series of tariffs and sanctions, as well as other business restrictions, could further escalate based on additional trade restrictions or retaliation thereto. In February 2025, the U.S. presidential administration imposed new tariffs on Chinese goods and China responded with tariffs on select U.S. goods. Additionally, tariffs were proposed or threatened with respect to other jurisdictions, including Mexico, Canada and Europe. If geopolitical tensions were to increase and disrupt our operations in, or related to, China or other major international geographies, such disruption would significantly impact our business. See Item 1A, "Risk Factors—Risks Related to Our Operations—Reliance on third-party relationships and outsourcing arrangements could adversely affect our business," for additional information. As a further example, the financial impact of higher energy prices, defense spending, and geopolitical and economic disruptions, has further exacerbated financial pressures on governments with single-payer or government funded healthcare systems, leading to increased impetus for increases in rebates, clawbacks, and other reforms to reimbursement systems, particularly in Europe. These and similar events have adversely affected, and may continue to adversely affect, us, our business partners, and our customers. For more details, see Item 1, "Business—Regulations and Private Payer Actions Affecting Pharmaceutical Pricing, Reimbursement, and Access."
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2025 ↗
offices in India and China, and any extended disruption of our operations in our different locations, whether due to labor difficulties or otherwise, could adversely affect our business and results of operations.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 24, 2025 ↗
There is inherent risk, based on the complex relationships among the world’s major trading nations, that political, diplomatic and national security influences can lead to trade disputes, impacts and/or disruptions, in particular those affecting the semiconductor industry. This can adversely affect our business with China, Japan, Korea, and/or Taiwan and perhaps the entire Asia Pacific region or global economy. A significant trade dispute, impact, and/or disruption in any area where we do business could have a materially adverse impact on our future revenue and profits.
Read in the 10-K filed Aug 11, 2025 ↗
Many of our products may be considered discretionary items for consumers. Some of the factors that may influence consumer spending on discretionary items include general economic conditions, high levels of unemployment, pandemics, higher consumer debt levels, reductions in net worth based on market declines and uncertainty, home foreclosures and reductions in home values, fluctuating interest and foreign currency exchange rates and credit availability, government austerity measures, fluctuating fuel and other energy costs, fluctuating commodity prices, inflationary pressure, tax rates and general uncertainty regarding the overall future economic environment. Global economic conditions are uncertain and volatile, due in part to the potential impacts of increasing inflation, the potential impacts of geopolitical uncertainties, and any potential sanctions, restrictions or responses to those conditions. For example, the PRC market presents a number of risks, including changes in laws and regulations, currency fluctuations, increased competition, and changes in economic conditions, including the risk of an economic downturn or recession, trade embargoes, restrictions or other barriers, as well as other conditions that may adversely impact consumer spending, any of which could cause us to fail to achieve anticipated growth. As global economic conditions continue to be volatile or economic uncertainty remains, trends in consumer discretionary spending also remain unpredictable and subject to reductions due to credit constraints and uncertainties about the future. Unfavorable economic conditions may lead consumers to delay or reduce purchases of our products. Consumer demand for our products may not reach our targets, or may decline, when there is an economic downturn or economic uncertainty in our key markets. Our sensitivity to economic cycles and any related fluctuation in consumer demand may have a material adverse effect on our financial condition.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 27, 2025 ↗
Adverse changes in, or withdrawal from, trade agreements or political relationships between the United States and the PRC, Canada, or other countries where we sell or source our products, could negatively impact our results of operations or cash flows. General geopolitical instability and the responses to it, such as the possibility of sanctions, trade restrictions, and
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 27, 2025 ↗
changes in tariffs, including sanctions against the PRC, tariffs imposed by the United States and the PRC, and the possibility of additional tariffs or other trade restrictions, could adversely impact our business. It is possible that further tariffs may be introduced or increased. Such changes could adversely impact our business and could increase the costs of sourcing our products from the PRC as well as other countries, or could require us to source our products from different countries. The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and other similar legislation may lead to greater supply chain compliance costs and delays to us and to our vendors.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 27, 2025 ↗
Our manufacturing operations require raw and processed materials and equipment that must meet exacting standards. We generally have multiple sources for these supplies, but there may be a limited number of suppliers capable of meeting our standards. We have experienced supply shortages from time to time in the past, and on occasion our suppliers have told us they need more time to fill our orders, that they cannot fill certain orders, that they will no longer support certain equipment with updates or parts, or that they are increasing prices. In particular, in fiscal 2023 and in fiscal 2022, we experienced increased prices at certain suppliers for certain materials required for production purposes. However, in fiscal 2024 and fiscal 2025, the pricing environment stabilized compared to the two prior fiscal years. An interruption of any materials or equipment sources, or the lack of supplier support for a particular piece of equipment, could harm our business. The supplies necessary for our business could become more difficult to obtain as worldwide use of semiconductors increases, or due to supply chain disruptions, transit disruptions, trade restrictions or political instability. Additionally, consolidation in our supply chain due to mergers and acquisitions may reduce the number of suppliers or change our relationships with them. Also, the reduced availability of necessary labor, the application of sanctions, trade restrictions or tariffs by the U.S. or other countries or the impact of public health concerns, may adversely impact the industry supply chain. The U.S. has imposed additional tariffs on imports, and certain countries have imposed retaliatory tariffs on imports that have the U.S. as their country of origin. For example, in March and April 2025, the U.S imposed tariffs on imports from China and other countries and foreign governments imposed tariffs on imports from the U.S. It is unclear what tariffs will apply to semiconductors during this time of change.
Read in the 10-K filed May 23, 2025 ↗
Furthermore, our information technology systems, and the systems of our customers, vendors, suppliers, and other third-party service providers, are subject to cyber-attacks or other security incidents including computer viruses or other malicious codes, phishing attacks, unauthorized access attempts, cyber extortion, business email compromise, deepfake or social engineering schemes, denial of service attacks, hacking, ransomware, or other cyberattacks attempting to exploit vulnerabilities. Cybercriminals have increasingly demonstrated advanced capabilities, such as use of zero-day vulnerabilities, and rapid integration of new technology such as generative artificial intelligence. Continued geographical turmoil, including the ongoing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, the war in the Middle East, and rising tensions between China and Taiwan, has heightened the risk of cyberattack. Such incidents could result in unauthorized access to information including customer, consumer or other company
Read in the 10-K filed Jan 23, 2025 ↗
Privacy, cyber security, and data protection are becoming increasingly significant issues. To address these issues, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress promulgated the Cyber Security Law of the People’s Republic of China (the “Cyber Security Law”), which took effect on June 1, 2017. The Cyber Security Law sets forth various requirements relating to the collection, use, storage, disclosure and security of data, among other things. On June 10, 2021, the National People’s Congress passed the Data Security Law of the People’s Republic of China (the “Data Security Law”), which became effective on September 1, 2021. The Data Security Law is the first comprehensive data security legislation in China, which becomes a key supplement to the Cyber Security Law and aims to regulate a wide range of issues in relation to the collection, storage, processing, use, provision, transaction and publication of any kind of data. Various Chinese agencies are expected to issue additional regulations in the future to define these requirements more precisely. For example, the Personal Information Protection Law (“PIPL”), took effect on November 1, 2021. PIPL is aimed at protecting and controlling the use and transfer of personal data in China. There is significant uncertainty in how regulators will interpret and enforce the law, and it contains provisions that allow substantial government oversight and include fines for failure to obtain required approval from China’s cyber and data protection regulators for cross-border transfers of personal data.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 3, 2025 ↗
The U.S. government has announced plans to significantly increase tariffs on foreign imports into the U.S., particularly from Canada and Mexico and has already increased tariffs on imports from China. It is too early for the
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2025 ↗
Our operations are vulnerable to global events, including pandemics like COVID-19. Despite precautions, such outbreaks can lead to business shutdowns, illness, quarantines, and workforce disruptions. Events in key regions such as North America, Europe, or China could significantly impact commercial activity, adversely affecting our financial condition, operations, and prospects.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 7, 2025 ↗
In June 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Chevron doctrine, ending judicial deference to regulatory agencies. This shift could significantly impact environmental regulation, consumer protection, advertising, privacy, artificial intelligence, and other regulatory frameworks we must comply with. This may impact our ability to operate our business in the manner in which we are accustomed and could negatively impact how we market our offerings, and could increase our regulatory compliance expense, which could in turn have a material adverse effect on our business, financial conditions, and results of operations. Political policies in the U.S., China, the U.K., Canada, and Europe may affect global trade, domestic purchasing, or create uncertainty. In recent years, the U.S. government has taken a new approach to trade policy, renegotiating or potentially terminating agreements and imposing tariffs, particularly on
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 7, 2025 ↗
Chinese goods. These tariffs could raise the cost of our products, components, and raw materials, impacting our gross margin. Higher prices may also reduce competitiveness and consumer demand.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 7, 2025 ↗
U.S. trade policy under the new administration, including potential new or increased tariffs, along with trade policies in China, Mexico, the U.K., Canada, and parts of Europe, may impact global trade and create uncertainty, potentially harming our business. Additionally, before taking office, President Trump pledged to impose 60% tariffs on all Chinese imports in his first year. In response, foreign governments, including China, have enacted retaliatory tariffs and domestic purchasing requirements favoring local competition, which could reduce our sales.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 7, 2025 ↗
On October 23, 2023, the USG informed us that the licensing requirements were effective immediately for shipments of our A100, A800, H100, H800, and L40S products (removing the grace period granted by the official rule). Blackwell systems, such as GB200 NVL 72 and NVL 36 as well as B200 are also subject to these requirements and therefore require a license for any shipment to certain entities and to China and Country Groups D1, D4, and D5, excluding Israel. To date, we have not received licenses to ship these restricted products to China.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 26, 2025 ↗
Following these 2022 export controls, we transitioned some operations, including certain testing, validation, and supply and distribution operations out of China and Hong Kong. Any future transitions could be costly and time consuming, and adversely affect our research and development and supply and distribution operations, as well as our revenue, during any such transition period. We expanded our Data Center product portfolio to offer new solutions, including those for which the USG does not require a license or advance notice before each shipment. To the extent that a customer requires products covered by the licensing requirements, we may seek a license for the customer. However, the licensing process is time-consuming. We have no assurance that the USG will grant such a license or that the USG will act on the license application in a timely manner or at all. Even if a license is approved, it may impose burdensome conditions that we or our customer or end users cannot or decide not to accept. The USG evaluates license requests in a closed process that does not have clear standards or an opportunity for review. For example, the Notified Advanced Computing, or “NAC,” process has not resulted in approvals for exports of products to customers in China. The license process for exports to D1 and D4 countries has been time-consuming and resulted in license conditions that are onerous, even for small-sized systems that are not able to train frontier AI models. The requirements have a disproportionate impact on NVIDIA and already have disadvantaged and may in the future disadvantage NVIDIA against certain of our competitors who sell products that are not subject to the new restrictions or may be able to acquire licenses for their products.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 26, 2025 ↗
Given the increasing strategic importance of AI and rising geopolitical tensions, the USG has changed and may again change the export control rules at any time and further subject a wider range of our products to export restrictions and licensing requirements, negatively impacting our business and financial results. In the event of such change, we may be unable to sell our inventory of such products and may be unable to develop replacement products not subject to the licensing requirements, effectively excluding us from all or part of the China market, as well as other impacted markets, including the Middle East and countries designated “Tier 2” by the AI Diffusion IFR. For example, the USG has already imposed conditions to limit the ability of foreign firms to create and offer as a service large-scale GPU clusters, for example by imposing license conditions on the use of products to be exported to certain countries, and may impose additional conditions such as requiring chip tracking and throttling mechanisms that could disable or impair GPUs if certain events, including unauthorized system configuration, use, or location, are detected. The USG has already imposed export controls restricting certain gaming GPUs, and if the USG expands such controls to restrict additional gaming products, it may disrupt a significant portion of our supply and distribution chain and negatively impact sales of such products to markets outside China, including the U.S. and Europe. In addition, as the performance of the gaming GPUs increases over time, export controls may have a greater impact on our ability to compete in markets subject to those controls. Export controls may disrupt our supply and distribution chain for a substantial portion of our products, which are warehoused in and distributed from Hong Kong. Export controls restricting our ability to sell data center GPUs may also negatively impact demand for our networking products used in servers containing our GPUs. The USG may also impose export controls on our networking products, such as high-speed network interconnects, to limit the ability of downstream parties to create large clusters for frontier model training. Any new control that impacts a wider range of our products would likely have a disproportionate impact on NVIDIA and may disadvantage us against certain of our competitors that sell chips that are outside the scope of such control. Excessive or shifting export controls have already and may in the future encourage customers outside China and other impacted regions to “design-out” certain U.S. semiconductors from their products to reduce the compliance burden and risk, and to ensure that they are able to serve markets worldwide. Excessive or shifting export controls have already encouraged and may in the future encourage overseas governments to request that our customers purchase from our competitors rather than NVIDIA or other U.S. firms, harming our business, market position, and financial results. As a result, excessive or shifting export controls may negatively impact demand for our products and services not only in China, but also in other markets, such as Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Excessive or shifting export controls increase the risk of investing in U.S. advanced semiconductor products, because by the time a new product is ready for market, it may be subject to new unilateral export controls restricting its sale. At the same time, such controls may increase investment in foreign competitors, which would be less likely to be restricted by U.S. controls. If additional products are subject to worldwide licensing requirements, we may incur significant inventory provisions and excess purchase obligation charges.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 26, 2025 ↗
In the ordinary course of business, we transfer personal data from Europe, China, and other jurisdictions to the United States or other countries. Certain jurisdictions have enacted data localization laws and cross-border personal data
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 26, 2025 ↗
We derive a significant portion of our revenues from a small number of customers and licensees, and particularly from their sale of premium-tier handset devices, and we expect this trend to continue in the foreseeable future. The mobile industry is experiencing and may continue to experience concentration of device share among a few companies, particularly at the premium tier, contributing to this trend. Certain Chinese original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have increased and may continue to increase their device share in China and in certain regions outside of China, and we derive a significant portion of our revenues from a small number of these OEMs as well. See also “Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements, Note 2. Composition of Certain Financial Statement Items - Concentrations.”
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 5, 2025 ↗
We derive a significant portion of our revenues from Chinese OEMs, and from non-Chinese OEMs that utilize our products in devices they sell into China, which has the largest number of smartphone users in the world. We also source certain critical integrated circuit products from Chinese suppliers.
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 5, 2025 ↗
and OEMs in certain geographic regions (such as China); longer operating histories in industries and applications beyond mobile handsets (such as automotive, IoT and data center), including more established and/or stronger customer, vendor, distributor or other channel relationships in such industries; and a more established presence in certain regions.
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 5, 2025 ↗
•labor challenges and supply delays and shortages due to a variety of macroeconomic factors, including disruptions to global supply chains as a result of wars and geopolitical events, including those involving Russia and Ukraine and Middle East conflicts, as well as the slowing of China's economy, tariffs, pandemics, and/or inflationary pressures;
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 14, 2025 ↗
Instability in geopolitical matters could have a material adverse effect on our results of operations and financial condition. The macroeconomic environment in the United States is susceptible to global events and volatility in financial markets. For example, trade negotiations between the United States and other nations remain uncertain and could adversely impact economic and market conditions for our and our clients and counterparties. Global political and military conflicts, including the ongoing conflicts in the Ukraine and the Middle East, present destabilizing forces, including higher and more volatile commodity and food prices, which may cause international and domestic economic deterioration. Financial markets may be adversely affected by the current or anticipated impact of military conflicts, including the conflicts in the Ukraine and the Middle East, terrorism or other geopolitical events (including China-Taiwan and U.S.-China relations), which could cause higher inflation. Any of the above consequences could have significant negative effects on the U.S. economy, and, as a result, our operations and earnings. We could also experience more numerous and aggressive cyber-attacks launched by or under the sponsorship of one or more of the adversaries in such a conflict.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 21, 2025 ↗
overall political and economic conditions, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Israel and Palestine conflict and growing geopolitical tension with China.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 14, 2025 ↗
The International segment is an important profit center driving our global returns, along with our North America segment. In particular, our China MBU, as our second-largest market overall and 100% company-operated, contributes meaningfully to both consolidated and International net revenues and operating income. Due to the significance of our China MBU for our profit and growth, we are exposed to risks in China, including the risks mentioned elsewhere and the following:
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 20, 2024 ↗
•a highly competitive retail environment and the entry of new competitors to the specialty coffee market in China;
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 20, 2024 ↗
•changes in economic conditions in China and potential negative effects to the growth of its middle class, wages, labor, inflation, discretionary spending, and real estate and supply chain costs;
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 20, 2024 ↗
•the effects of U.S.-China relations, including escalating U.S.-China tension and increased anti-Americanism, potential tariff increases, retaliations, restrictive regulations, or boycotts, and increasing political sensitivities in China;
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 20, 2024 ↗
•data privacy and cybersecurity risks unique to the conduct of business in China; and
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 20, 2024 ↗
•especially in our largest markets, including the U.S. and China, labor discord or disruption, geopolitical events, war, terrorism (including incidents targeting us), political instability, acts of public violence, boycotts, increasing anti-
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 20, 2024 ↗
As a retailer that is dependent upon consumer discretionary spending, our results of operations are sensitive to changes in or uncertainty about macroeconomic conditions. A continued economic downturn or recession, or slowing or stalled recovery therefrom, may have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, or results of operations. Our customers may have less money for discretionary purchases and may stop or reduce their purchases of our products or switch to our or our competitors’ lower-priced products as a result of various factors, including job loss, inflation, changes in prevailing interest rates, higher taxes, reduced access to credit, changes in federal economic policy, a global health pandemic, international trade disputes, or geopolitical instability. For example, reductions and continuing volatility in China may be caused by, among other things: changes in consumer spending behaviors, including those caused by a decrease in consumer confidence in general macroeconomic conditions, a decrease in consumer discretionary spending, increasing competition in the market, lower-priced competitor product offerings, negative economic impacts related to the rising geopolitical tensions between China and Taiwan, economic policies or sanctions, heightened data and cybersecurity risks associated with conduct of business in China, and food-safety related matters. We may also experience a reduction or increased volatility in demand for our products in connection with a global health pandemic. Decreases in customer traffic and/or average value per transaction without a corresponding decrease in costs would put downward pressure on margins and could have a material negative impact on our financial results. There is also a risk that if negative economic conditions or uncertainty persist for a long period of time or worsen, consumers may make long-lasting changes to their discretionary purchasing behavior, including less frequent discretionary purchases on a more permanent basis or enduring changes in behavior that precipitate a more general downturn in the restaurant industry. These and other macroeconomic factors could have an adverse effect on our sales, profitability, or development plans, which could harm our results of operations and financial condition.
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 20, 2024 ↗
For example, Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) and the U.K. General Data Protection Regulation (which implements the GDPR into U.K. law), impose stringent data protection requirements and provide for significant penalties for noncompliance. In China, the Personal Information Protection Law (“PIPL”) has established personal information processing rules, data subject rights, and obligations for personal information processors, among other things. In addition to the PIPL, China’s Data Security Law regulates data processing activities associated with personal and non-personal data. Noncompliance with these laws may result in significant civil and criminal penalties. Other newly enacted and proposed privacy and data protection laws in other jurisdictions served by Starbucks and its licensees may impose similar requirements, including restrictions on cross-border data transfers and stringent safeguards on personal and non-personal data. Such laws may impact our business operations and increase the cost and expense of compliance.
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 20, 2024 ↗
The global economy has been negatively impacted by the ongoing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and Israel and Hamas, as well as rising tensions between China and Taiwan. Governments in the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union have imposed sanctions on certain products, industry sectors, and parties in Russia. Although we do not have any operations in Russia, Ukraine, Israel, Palestine, China, or Taiwan, we have experienced and may continue to experience shortages in materials and increased costs for transportation, energy, and raw materials due in part to the negative impact of the conflicts on the global economy. If the conflicts continue for an extended period of time, they could result in cyberattacks, supply chain disruptions, lower consumer demand, changes in foreign currency exchange rates, increased trade barriers and restrictions on global trade, and other impacts, which may adversely affect our business, financial condition, or results of operations. These and other impacts of the ongoing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, Israel and Hamas, and rising tensions between China and Taiwan could also heighten many of the other risk factors discussed in this section.
Read in the 10-K filed Jun 18, 2025 ↗
Our business is subject to risks generally associated with doing business abroad, such as U.S. and foreign governmental regulation in the countries in which we operate and the countries in which our contract manufacturers, component suppliers, and other business partners are located. Our operations and performance depend significantly on global, regional, and U.S. economic and geopolitical conditions. For example, tensions between the United States and China have led to the United States’ imposition of a series of tariffs, sanctions, and other restrictions on imports from China and sourcing from certain Chinese persons or entities, as well as other business restrictions. The U.S. government has recently imposed tariffs on certain foreign goods, and some foreign governments have threatened or instituted retaliatory tariffs on certain U.S. goods and have indicated a willingness to impose additional tariffs on U.S. products, which could increase tensions and create greater uncertainty in our business dealings. Further, such actions by the U.S. could result in other retaliatory actions by those countries which could impact our ability to profitably commercialize our products in those jurisdictions. Several countries are considering or have implemented tariffs or other trade barriers or restrictions, as well as other measures affecting cross-border commerce and the flow of information, which could have broad economic consequences, impact global supply chains and negatively affect our business, customers and partners.
Read in the 10-K filed Aug 28, 2025 ↗
Global events may present challenges and risks to us. For example, the crises in Eastern Europe and the Middle East continue to pose challenges to global companies, including us, which have customers in the impacted regions. The U.S. and other global governments have placed restrictions on how companies may transact with businesses in these regions, particularly Russia, Belarus and restricted areas in Ukraine. Because of these restrictions and the growing logistical and other challenges, we have paused sales to Russia, Belarus and the restricted areas in Ukraine. This decision, which is in line with the approach of other global technology companies, helps us comply with our obligations under the various requirements in the U.S. and around the world. While it is difficult to estimate the impact on our business and financial position of both (i) our pause in sales to Russia, Belarus and the restricted areas in Ukraine and the current or future sanctions and (ii) tensions in the Taiwan strait, our pause in sales and these sanctions and continuing rising tensions could have adverse impacts on us in future periods, although they have not been material to date. For example, with respect to Russia, Belarus and the restricted areas in Ukraine, we did not, prior to the imposition of restrictions, make a material portion of our sales or acquire a material portion of our parts or components directly from impacted regions; however, our suppliers and their suppliers may acquire raw materials for parts or components from the impacted regions. Supply disruptions may make it harder for them to find favorable pricing and reliable sources for materials they need, which may put further upward pressure on their costs and increasing the risks that our costs may increase and that it may be more difficult, or we may be unable, to acquire materials needed. In addition, the crises may further exacerbate inflationary pressures that have indirect impacts on our business, such as further increasing our logistics costs from rising fuel prices and/or continuing to increase our compensation expenses. In addition, no assurances can be given that additional developments in the impacted regions, and responses thereto from the U.S. and other global governments, would not have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition.
Read in the 10-K filed Aug 28, 2025 ↗
Demand from Chinese customers may be adversely affected by China’s evolving laws and regulations, including those relating to taxation, import and export tariffs and restrictions, currency controls, environmental regulations, privacy and information
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 15, 2024 ↗
We are subject to pricing pressures as a result of cost containment measures in the United States and other countries and other factors, including changes in reimbursement practices and coverage policies and third-party payor cost containment measures: Initiatives to limit the growth of general healthcare expenses and hospital costs are ongoing in the markets in which we do business. These initiatives are sponsored by government agencies, legislative bodies and the private sector and include price regulation and competitive pricing. For example, China has implemented a volume-based procurement process designed to decrease prices for medical devices and other products. Pricing pressure has also increased due to continued consolidation among healthcare providers, trends toward managed care, the shift toward governments becoming the primary payers of healthcare expenses, reduction in coverage or reimbursement levels and medical procedure volumes and government laws and regulations relating to sales and promotion, reimbursement and pricing generally. Coverage policies and reimbursement levels can vary across the payer community globally, regionally, and locally, and may affect which products customers purchase, the market acceptance rate for new technologies and the prices customers are willing to pay for those products in a particular jurisdiction. Furthermore, any changes to the coverage or reimbursement landscape, or adverse decisions relating to our products by administrators of these systems could significantly reduce reimbursement for procedures using our products or result in denial of reimbursement for those products, which could adversely affect customer demand, or the price customers are willing to pay for such products. Public and private payers have challenged, and are expected to continue to challenge, prices charged for medical products and services. Such downward pricing pressures from any or all of these payers may result in an adverse effect on our business, results of operations, financial condition and cash flows. We have also reduced prices for certain products due to increased competition and if we further reduce prices, we could become less profitable. In addition, due to healthcare industry consolidation in recent years, competition to provide goods and services to industry participants has become, and may continue to become, more intense, and this consolidation has produced, and may continue to produce, larger enterprises with more bargaining power. Pricing pressures related to any of the foregoing or other factors have impacted and could in the future impact our results of operations and profitability.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 12, 2025 ↗
the European Union Medical Device Regulation (MDR) through December 2028); differing local product preferences and product requirements; diminished protection of intellectual property in some countries; tariffs and other trade protection measures, as well as increasing localization and protectionism policies in certain jurisdictions; international trade disputes and import or export requirements; difficulty in staffing and managing foreign operations; introduction of new internal business structures and programs; political and economic instability and uncertainty; current or potential geopolitical conflicts, such as the tensions between China and Taiwan and the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and related sanctions and other developments; disruptions of transportation, including port closures, increased border controls or border closures or reduced transportation availability, due to military conflicts, a global pandemic of contagious diseases like COVID-19 or otherwise; increased energy or transportation costs; fluctuations in currency exchange rates and financial markets; and increased security threats to our supply chain. Many of these risks are rapidly evolving and subject to an accelerating pace of change. Our business could be adversely impacted if we are unable to successfully manage these and other risks of global operations in an increasingly volatile environment. In addition, in many countries, the laws and regulations applicable to us or our industry are evolving, and we have in certain cases become subject to divergent and conflicting laws and regulations across our operations, which has increased the risks we are subject to.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 12, 2025 ↗
Interruption of manufacturing operations could adversely affect our business: We and our suppliers have manufacturing and supply sites all over the world. However, the manufacturing of certain of our product lines is concentrated in one or more plants or geographic regions. We have principal manufacturing and distribution facilities in the United States in Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Washington, and outside the United States in China, France, Germany, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland and Turkey. Damage to our facilities, to our suppliers’ or service providers’ facilities, or to our central distribution centers as a result of natural disasters, fires, explosions or otherwise, as well as issues in our manufacturing arising from a failure to follow specific internal protocols and procedures, compliance concerns relating to the quality systems regulation, equipment breakdown or malfunction, IT system failures or cybersecurity incidents, environmental hazard incidents or changes to environmental regulations or other factors, could adversely affect the availability of our products. In the event of an interruption in manufacturing, we may be unable to move quickly to alternate means of producing and distributing affected products to meet customer demand. In the event of a significant interruption, we may experience lengthy delays in resuming production or distribution of affected products due to the need for regulatory approvals, and we may experience loss of market share, additional expense and harm to our reputation.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 12, 2025 ↗
Low-cost competition from China and other developing countries could also result in decreased demand for our products. Increasing competition could reduce the volume of our sales or the prices we may charge, which would negatively impact our revenues. We are experiencing increasing competition in many of our businesses, especially our digital imaging and instrumentation businesses, from Chinese manufacturers that offer lower cost products with increasingly advanced technical capabilities.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 21, 2025 ↗
•political and economic instability, including the war between Ukraine and Russia, the conflict in Israel and neighboring region and potential hostilities between China and Taiwan;
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 21, 2025 ↗
•compliance with non-U.S. data protection laws, including the EU General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) in the European Union and the Personal Information Protection Law in China;
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 21, 2025 ↗
In 2018, the United States Trade Representative imposed a 25% tariff on many lists of products, including certain Teradyne products that are made in China and imported into the United States. On February 1, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order directing the United States to impose an additional 10% tariff on all imports from China effective February 4, 2025.We plan to implement operational changes that mitigate some of the impact of these tariffs on the import of our impacted products into the United States. As a result, the existing tariffs have not had a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition or results of operations. The implementation of additional tariffs by the United States could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition or results of operations.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 20, 2025 ↗
In February, 2025, President Trump issued executive orders directing the United States to impose new or additional tariffs on certain imports from Canada, Mexico and China and subsequently announced his intention to pause such tariffs on Canada and Mexico. While we do not believe any tariffs announced to date will have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition or results of operations, we are still evaluating the potential impact of these tariffs and any additional tariffs implemented by the
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 20, 2025 ↗
Our business operations are and will continue to be subject to complex environmental, occupational, health and safety laws and regulations at numerous jurisdictional levels in the U.S., China, Germany and other locations abroad, including laws relating to the use, handling, storage, recycling, disposal and/or human exposure to hazardous materials,
Read in the 10-K filed Jan 30, 2025 ↗
In China, UnionPay remains the predominant processor of domestic payment card transactions and operates the predominant domestic acceptance market. Although we filed an application with the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) in May 2020 to operate a Bank Card Clearing Institution (BCCI) in China, the timing and the procedural steps for approval remain uncertain. There is no guarantee that the license to operate a BCCI will be approved or, if we obtain such license, that we will be able to successfully compete with domestic payments networks. Co-badging and co-residency regulations also pose additional challenges in markets where Visa competes with national networks for issuance and routing. Certain banks have issued dual-branded cards for which domestic transactions in China are processed by UnionPay and transactions outside of China are processed by Visa, UnionPay or other international payments networks. Although the PBOC has permitted Visa and UnionPay’s cooperation on upgrading magstripe dual-branded cards to chip cards, these modernization efforts are limited to existing cards and not new issuances. Looking forward, the PBOC is considering phasing out dual-branded cards over time as new licenses are issued to international companies to participate in China’s domestic payments market. In response, we have been working with Chinese issuers to issue Visa-only branded cards for international travel, and later for domestic transactions should we obtain a BCCI license. However, notwithstanding such efforts, these restrictions on dual-branded cards have decreased our payments volume and impacted the net revenue we generate in China.
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 6, 2025 ↗
UnionPay has grown rapidly in China and is actively pursuing international expansion plans, which could potentially lead to regulatory pressures on our international routing rule (which requires that international transactions on Visa cards be routed over VisaNet). Furthermore, although regulatory barriers shield UnionPay from competition in China, alternative payments providers such as Alipay and WeChat Pay have rapidly expanded into ecommerce, offline and cross-border payments, which could make it difficult for us to compete even if our license is approved in China. NetsUnion Clearing Corp, a Chinese digital transaction routing system, and other such systems could have a competitive advantage in comparison with international payments networks.
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 6, 2025 ↗
Ongoing regulatory initiatives in India, including data localization requirements which continue to evolve, have cost implications for us and could affect our ability to effectively compete with domestic payments providers. Furthermore, any inability to meet the requirements of the data localization mandate could impact our ability to do business in India. In Europe, the European Central Bank has announced initiatives to reduce reliance on international payment networks. For example, with the support of the European Central Bank, the European Payments Initiative (EPI), led by a group of European banks, launched a pan-European A2A payment system, Wero. More recently, the European Central Bank has embarked on a multi-year effort to explore a digital euro, an alternative to foreign digital currency and payment service providers. In addition, regional groups of countries, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and a number of countries in Southeast Asia (e.g., Malaysia), have adopted or may consider, efforts to restrict our participation in the processing of regional transactions. The African Development Bank has also indicated an interest in supporting national payment systems in its efforts to expand financial inclusion and strengthen regional financial stability. Finally, some countries such as Nigeria and South Africa are mandating on-shore processing of domestic transactions. Geopolitical events, including sanctions and trade tensions have intensified these activities, which could adversely affect our business. For example, some countries have expressed concerns about their reliance on U.S. financial services companies, including payments networks, and have taken steps to bolster the development of domestic solutions, in light of U.S., European and UK sanctions against Russia and the decision by U.S. payments networks, including Visa, to suspend operations in the country. Separately, Russia has called for the BRICS countries (led by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and which has recently expanded to include countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 6, 2025 ↗
Our business relies on the processing of data across national borders. Legislators and regulators around the world are increasingly adopting or revising privacy, data protection, data management, data transfer, AI and cybersecurity laws and regulations. For example, our ongoing efforts to comply with complex U.S. and international privacy and data protection laws may increase the complexity of our compliance operations, entail substantial expenses, divert resources from other initiatives and projects, require us to modify our data processing practices, policies or services, and adversely impact our business. In addition, privacy laws in numerous jurisdictions, including but not limited to the U.S., China, India, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong and Japan, have established specific legal requirements for cross-border transfers of personal information and substantial compliance and audit obligations. Certain countries have also established specific legal requirements for data localization, such as where personal data must remain stored in the country. The global proliferation of new privacy and data protection laws may lead to inconsistent and conflicting requirements or legal interpretations, which create an uncertain regulatory environment. Noncompliance could also result in regulatory penalties and significant legal liability. Enforcement actions and investigations by regulatory authorities into companies related to data security incidents and privacy violations are generally increasing. In Europe, data protection authorities continue to apply and enforce the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), imposing record setting fines. As we develop integrated and personalized products and services and acquire new companies to meet the needs of a changing marketplace, we may expand our data profile through additional data types and sources, across multiple channels, and involving new partners. This potential expansion could amplify the impact of these various laws and regulations on our business. As a result, we are required to constantly monitor our privacy, data and cybersecurity practices and potentially change them when necessary or appropriate. We also may need to provide increased care in our data management, governance and quality practices, particularly as it relates to the use of data in products leveraging AI.
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 6, 2025 ↗
•In July 2025, the U.S. enacted the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (GENIUS Act), establishing a comprehensive framework for regulating stablecoins. Similarly, the European Union has adopted its own legal framework for crypto assets. Many other countries, including the U.K., Japan, United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong and Singapore, are at varying stages of adopting stablecoin and digital assets-related regulatory frameworks. With more regulatory certainty and permissive or favorable regulations, stablecoins could potentially disrupt existing payment networks, including in cross-border and B2B transactions. In countries facing currency instability and controls, stablecoins could increasingly be used as an alternative to preserve and transfer asset value. In more mature markets, stablecoins could achieve broad adoption through regulated issuance by traditional banks, fintechs and other new entrants, as well as by being integrated in closed loop systems operated by large digital ecosystems and platforms.
Read in the 10-K filed Nov 6, 2025 ↗
Other countries have imposed or may in the future impose data localization obligations, cross-border data transfer restrictions, and other country specific privacy and security requirements which could be problematic to cloud software and data providers. For example, in 2021, China adopted the Personal Information Protection Law, which, together with the Cybersecurity Law and the Data Security Law, require companies that process personal data of China residents above certain thresholds to seek approval from the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) to transfer such data outside of China. In 2023, certain of our Veeva CRM customers in China were required to request such approval from the CAC and had their requests denied. Customers required to request approval may need to implement a CRM solution that does not require data to be transferred outside of China and customers not subject to the requirement may nonetheless choose to do so. While we offer the China CRM Suite, a CRM solution that does not require data to be transferred outside of China, some customers have chosen, and other customers may choose, other CRM providers, which may negatively impact our CRM business in China. Currently, approximately 2% of our total revenue is attributable to China. Additionally, as we expand our data product offerings into new jurisdictions, we are required to assess, monitor, and comply with additional laws and regulations related to our collection and processing of data, which may include new registration, consent, and notification obligations.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 24, 2025 ↗
U.S. federal and state data privacy laws are rapidly evolving. These laws impose new and modify existing obligations on businesses that collect personal information, create new privacy rights for individuals, and contain enhanced requirements for and restrictions on data brokers. For example, under the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), as amended, we are generally considered a “service provider” for our software solutions and a “business” for our data products. Some of these laws and regulations also target certain types of marketing and advertising based on the use of personal information. The State of Washington, for example, passed the My Health My Data Act, which became effective on March 21, 2024, establishing significant new restrictions on how businesses can collect, use, and disclose consumer health data. Veeva Crossix’s data platform combines large-scale data sets, inclusive of de-identified health and consumer data, to provide insights, analytics, and audience segmentation for our life sciences customers in the U.S. In response to the Washington law, we made modifications to our audience segments that may reduce demand for our Crossix products, which, in turn, could adversely impact the business. Other states have considered, and in certain cases enacted, similar laws. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Justice recently issued a final rule that takes effect on April 8, 2025, and places limitations, and in some cases prohibitions, on certain transfers of sensitive personal data to data to business partners located in China or with other specified links to China and other designated countries. These various laws, regulations, and legislative developments have potentially far-reaching consequences and have and may continue to require us to modify our solutions and data management practices and incur substantial expense in order to comply.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 24, 2025 ↗
We could be subject to significant supply interruptions as a result of disruptions to third party or our internal manufacturing capabilities. Our supply chain for sourcing raw materials and manufacturing drug product ready for distribution, including obtaining necessary supplies, is a multi-step international endeavor. Third-party contract manufacturers, including some in China, perform different parts of our manufacturing process. Contract manufacturers may supply us with raw materials, convert these raw materials into drug substance and/or convert the drug substance into final dosage form. We also use third parties are used for packaging, warehousing, and distribution of products. We maintain property insurance to cover potential losses that may result from supply interruptions or destruction at these third parties, however, this insurance may not be sufficient to cover all potential losses that may result.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 13, 2025 ↗
We have expanded our international operations over the past several years to market our medicines and expand our research and development capabilities. New laws and industry codes in the E.U. and elsewhere have expanded transparency requirements regarding payments and transfers of value to healthcare professionals, requirements surrounding patient-level clinical trial data, the protection of personal data and increased sanctions for violations. Collectively, our expansion and these new requirements are adding to our compliance costs and potentially exposes us to sanctions in the event of an infringement or failure to report in these jurisdictions. In addition, a significant portion of our commercial supply chain, including sourcing of raw materials and manufacturing, is located in China and the E.U. Consequently, we are, and will continue to be, subject to risks related to operating in foreign countries, including risks relating to intellectual property protections and business interruptions. Risks associated with operating a global biotechnology company include:
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 13, 2025 ↗
These risks are increased with respect to countries such as China that have substantially different local laws and business practices and weaker protections for intellectual property. In particular, there is currently significant uncertainty about the future relationship between the U.S. and various other countries, including China, with respect to trade policies, treaties, tariffs, taxes, and other limitations on cross-border operations. The U.S. government has made and continues to make significant additional changes in U.S. trade policy and may continue to take future actions that could negatively impact U.S.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 13, 2025 ↗
trade. For example, legislation has been introduced in Congress to limit certain U.S. biotechnology companies from using equipment or services produced or provided by select Chinese biotechnology companies, and others in Congress have advocated for the use of existing executive branch authorities to limit those Chinese service providers’ ability to engage in business in the U.S. We cannot predict what actions may ultimately be taken with respect to trade relations between the United States and China or other countries, what products and services may be subject to such actions or what actions may be taken by the other countries in retaliation. If we are unable to obtain or use services from existing service providers or become unable to export or sell our products to any of our customers or service providers, our business could be materially and adversely affected.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 13, 2025 ↗
We have significant operations and direct and indirect suppliers located in China, which have been in the past, or could in the future be, adversely affected by: i) China’s evolving laws, regulations and policies, including as respects public health crises, import and export tariffs and restrictions, and information security and privacy, and ii) changes in the political and geopolitical environment, including China's relations with the U.S., European Union and Taiwan. The U.S.’s imposition of tariffs on goods imported from China or deemed to be of Chinese origin, as well as the potential for new or increased tariffs, other governmental actions, trade embargoes or sanctions by the U.S., or similar measures or countermeasures imposed by China in response, has in the past and could in the future have an adverse direct or indirect impact our global supply chain, manufacturing costs, business and operating results. Geopolitical changes in China-Taiwan relations could disrupt the operations of several companies in Taiwan that are critical to the global supply chain for semiconductors (“chips”) and other electronic components. Such changes could have significant negative effects on the global semiconductor industry and could adversely affect our ability to manufacture our digitally-enabled products, such as pumps, controllers and smart meters.
Read in the 10-K filed Mar 3, 2025 ↗
from time to time. If Yum China’s business is harmed or development of our Concepts’ restaurants is slowed in mainland China due to any of these factors, it could negatively impact the license fee paid by Yum China to us, which would negatively impact our financial results.
Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2025 ↗