China

There is continued uncertainty about the future relationship between the U.S. and various other countries with respect to tariffs, trade policies, government regulations, treaties and trade agreements. Recent changes in U.S. administrative policy have led to significant increases in tariffs on goods imported into the U.S., particularly tariffs on products manufactured in Europe, Mexico and China. These tariffs, and additional proposed tariffs or other restrictive changes, have resulted, and may further result, in retaliatory trade measures in response to such actions and ongoing uncertainty regarding existing trade agreements and greater restrictions on free trade generally, among other possible changes. Further governmental action related to tariffs or international trade agreements, a trade war, changes in U.S. social, political, regulatory and economic conditions or in laws and policies governing foreign trade, manufacturing, development and investment in the territories and countries where we currently manufacture and sell products, and any resulting negative sentiments towards the U.S. as a result of such changes, would likely have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition or results of operations. To the extent that we incur incremental tariffs, we may need to recover such tariffs from our customers, and there is no guarantee such recoveries will occur.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 5, 2026 ↗

There is inherent risk, based on the complex relationships between certain countries and within regions, that political, diplomatic or military events could result in trade disruptions and other disruptions in the markets and industries we serve and our supply chain. For example, the ongoing geopolitical and economic uncertainty between the U.S. and China, the unknown impact of current and future U.S. and Chinese trade regulations, and geopolitical risks between the U.S, Canada, where WhiteFiber’s data centers are located, between the U.S. and Mexico, where certain components are supplied, or between China and Taiwan where chips are manufactured, could, directly or indirectly, materially harm our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 27, 2026 ↗

We cannot be certain that our operations or any aspects of our business do not or will not infringe upon or otherwise violate trademarks, patents, copyrights, know-how or other intellectual property rights held by third parties. We may be, from time to time in the future, subject to legal proceedings and claims relating to the intellectual property rights of others. In addition, there may be third-party trademarks, patents, copyrights, know-how or other intellectual property rights that are infringed by our products, services or other aspects of our business without our awareness. Holders of such intellectual property rights may seek to enforce such intellectual property rights against us in China, the United States or other jurisdictions. If any third-party infringement claims are brought against us, we may be forced to divert management’s time and other resources from our business and operations to defend against these claims, regardless of their merits. If we were found to have violated the intellectual property rights of others, we may be subject to liability for our infringement activities or may be prohibited from using such intellectual property, and we may incur licensing fees or be forced to develop alternatives of our own. Moreover, the intellectual property ownership and license rights, including copyright, surrounding AI technologies has not been fully addressed by courts or laws or regulations, and the use or adoption of AI technologies into our offerings may result in exposure to claims of copyright infringement or other intellectual property misappropriation. As a result, our business and results of operations may be materially and adversely affected.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 27, 2026 ↗

Although the statute of limitations for non-compliance by our former business in the PRC is generally two years and the Company has not had any operations in PRC since September 2021, the authority may still find its prior bitcoin mining operations involved a threat to financial security. In such event, the two-year period would be extended to five years.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 27, 2026 ↗

between China and Taiwan and/or China and the U.S.; high and rising government debt levels in the U.S. and other countries; sanctions; natural disasters; and pandemics.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 20, 2026 ↗

In addition, as previously disclosed, on May 23, 2025, BIS informed us that a license was required for the export, re-export or in-country transfer of EDA Software and Technology when a party to the transaction is located in China or is a Chinese "military end user" on the "Military End-User List," wherever located. On July 2, 2025, BIS informed us that the license requirements set forth in the May 23, 2025 letter from BIS were rescinded effective immediately. While we have since restored access to EDA Software and Technology for affected customers in accordance with these updated U.S. export regulations, the temporary license requirements negatively impacted our revenue in China during this period. However, in light of continued negotiations between the United States and China, the United States may consider reimposing these or additional restrictions on the export, re-export or in-country transfer of EDA Software and Technology or our other products and services in China in the future.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2026 ↗

Specifically, as previously disclosed, on July 27, 2025, we reached a settlement with each of BIS and the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") that resolved matters relating to export control violations that occurred between 2015 and 2021 primarily involving sales initiated by a Cadence subsidiary of products and services valued at $45.3 million in total over that period to a customer in China, as well as the subsequent transfer of technology involved in those sales to a third party in China, without the requisite authorization from BIS. As part of the settlements, we entered into a plea agreement with the DOJ pursuant to which we agreed to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit export controls violations. The plea agreement has a three-year probationary term and includes obligations to implement additional export compliance programs and policies, including ongoing reporting and certification requirements and risk assessments, as well as obligations to cooperate in any ongoing or future investigations. In addition, we have entered into an administrative settlement agreement with BIS. Obligations under the administrative settlement agreement include two internal annual audits of our export compliance programs. Compliance with the administrative settlement agreement is a condition to our continued ability to export products. Under the agreements, we paid BIS and the DOJ aggregate net penalties and forfeitures of $140.6 million during the three months ended September 30, 2025.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2026 ↗

Failure to comply with the terms of the plea agreement, the administrative settlement agreement or our probation could result in further criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings or denial of export privileges. Such failure or any resulting further government action could materially and adversely affect our reputation, business, financial condition and results of operations. Further, our ongoing obligations under these agreements will generally apply to any new business entities we acquire, which could limit our ability to acquire new businesses that may be strategically important to us, and our continued acquisition and integration of other businesses could increase our risk of a violation. Our ongoing obligations under these agreements will also generally apply to any purchaser of our company or our material business operations, which could deter a potential acquisition of our company. In addition, political, media or other scrutiny surrounding these matters or their outcome could cause significant expense and reputational harm and distract senior executives from managing normal day-to-day operations. Entry into the settlements, including the plea agreement and the administrative settlement agreement, exposes us and our directors, officers and employees to further inquiries or other actions by other governmental authorities, including in China, which could materially and adversely affect our ability to operate and do business in China. We could also face challenges in our future business dealings with government agencies, including the potential for debarment from U.S. government contracts. Any of the foregoing could further materially and adversely affect our reputation, business, financial condition and results of operations.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2026 ↗

Our global operations and supply chain expose us to risks associated with geopolitical developments, including instability or disruption in particular region, war, terrorism, riot, civil insurrection, and social or political unrest. We are also exposed to a wide range of shifting economic, regulatory or national security priorities in the countries we operate. Increasing tensions between the United States and China—including tariffs, export controls, investment restrictions, and evolving data security or technology transfer requirements—could disrupt our supply chain. Any escalation of these tensions, or similar geopolitical volatility in other regions, could result in reduced demand, increased costs, supply shortages, product delays or other adverse consequences to our business and operations. Our success depends on our ability to anticipate and manage these risks effectively. Failure to mitigate these risks could reduce our sales, or give rise to incremental costs that could adversely affect our results of operations.

Read in the 10-K filed Dec 12, 2025 ↗

In addition, foreign governments have taken and may take retaliatory actions in response to U.S. trade and export-control measures. These restrictive governmental actions and any similar measures that may be imposed on U.S. companies by other governments, especially in light of ongoing trade tensions with China, will likely limit or prevent us from doing business with certain of our customers or suppliers and harm our ability to compete effectively or otherwise negatively affect our ability to sell our products. Any such retaliatory actions, including imposing conditions for the supply of products or requiring the license or other transfer of IP, which could have a material adverse effect on our business.

Read in the 10-K filed Aug 14, 2026 ↗

the United States and various other countries, including China, the European Union, Canada, and Mexico, with respect to trade

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 2, 2026 ↗

changes to U.S. trade policy with respect to China. These tariffs have subjected certain digital asset mining equipment manufactured

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 2, 2026 ↗

Significant developments or changes in national laws or policies to protect or promote domestic interests and/or address foreign competition, including laws and policies in areas such as trade, manufacturing, government purchasing, healthcare, intellectual property, regulatory enforcement and investment/development, can adversely affect our business and financial statements. The U.S. has experienced a rapid increase in new government regulations, including tariffs and proposed tariffs on imports from a wide range of markets and geographies, including some in which we operate. These tariffs/proposed tariffs have prompted retaliatory tariffs by a number of countries and a cycle of retaliatory tariffs by both the U.S. and other countries. We continue to monitor the global tariff environment and potential trade conflicts, sanctions and impediments that could impact our business. As of the date of this report a number of tariffs remain in effect, including significant tariffs between the U.S. and countries from which we obtain significant supply, such as Vietnam, Mauritius, Cambodia, and China. Collectively, this may adversely impact our operating margin and results of operations, for example, our costs and expenses related to our business activities and those of our customers and suppliers; demand for our products and our competitive positioning; the availability to us of certain products in certain countries; and our supply chain operations. Though the risks identified above in certain cases have already adversely impacted part of our business, the full impact of these tariffs and other actions on the Company and on our business partners remains highly uncertain and subject to rapid change.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 18, 2026 ↗

•Challenging and uncertain global macroeconomic environments, central bank policies, currency exchange rates, and regional economic instability (including economic challenges in China and their resulting global ramifications)

Read in the 10-K filed Sep 2, 2026 ↗

•International tensions (including China-Taiwan relations), U.S. foreign relations impacting customer willingness to buy U.S. products or our ability to procure components, trade protection measures such as tariffs, and government disruptions or shutdowns

Read in the 10-K filed Sep 2, 2026 ↗

Unexpected changes in business conditions, materials pricing, labor issues, wars, trade policies, natural disasters, health epidemics, trade and shipping disruptions, port congestions, and other factors beyond our or our suppliers’ control could also affect these suppliers’ ability to deliver components to us or to remain solvent and operational. Such disruptions could adversely affect our business if we are not able to meet customer demands. In addition, some of our suppliers are located in China. Our access to suppliers in China may be limited or impaired as a result of tariffs, including those that have been recently introduced by the current U.S. administration, or other government restrictions in response to geopolitical factors. There is no guarantee we may be able to continually use alternative suppliers and alternative parts as we scale production to meet our growth targets. Additionally, if our suppliers do not accurately forecast and effectively allocate production or if they are not willing to allocate sufficient production to us, it may reduce our access to components and require us to search for new suppliers. The unavailability of any component or supplier could result in production delays, idle manufacturing facilities, product design changes, and loss of access to important technology and tools for producing and supporting our products, as well as impact our capacity expansion and our ability to fulfill our obligations under customer contracts. Moreover, new product launches or product design changes by us have required, and may in the future require, us to procure additional components in a short amount of time. Our suppliers may not be willing or able to sustainably meet our timelines or our cost, quality, and volume needs, or to do so may cost us more, which may require us to replace them with other sources.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 26, 2026 ↗

Trade regulations, policies and disputes as well as geopolitical changes and trends such as populism, protectionism and economic nationalism can and have resulted in increased tariffs and trade barriers, which can and have limited DuPont’s ability to sell certain products to certain customers, and have otherwise impacted its global supply and distribution chains and research and development activities. The extent, duration or escalation in specific trade tensions, such as between the U.S. and China, or in the global trade conflict more broadly, could be harmful to global economic growth, increase market uncertainty and volatility and adversely impact the Company’s business in or with China or other countries. The resulting impact on general economic conditions and on DuPont’s business are uncertain and depend on various factors, such as negotiations between the U.S. and affected countries, the responses of other countries or regions, exemptions or exclusions that may be granted, availability and cost of alternative sources of supply, and DuPont’s ability to change its supply chains or otherwise execute its sourcing model to offset the effects of the tariffs and other trade barriers.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 17, 2026 ↗

Ultimately, changes in, and responses to, U.S. trade controls have the potential to reduce the competitiveness of DuPont products and cause sales to decline, which could have a material adverse effect on the Company’s business, financial condition and results of operations. Such risks may be especially exacerbated as they relate to China and Hong Kong, a market that represented approximately 10 percent of the Company’s consolidated net sales for the year ended December 31, 2025.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 17, 2026 ↗

On April 4, 2025, the Company announced that it was aware of a report that the State Administration for Market Regulation of the People’s Republic of China (“SAMR”) initiated an investigation in connection with the Company’s Tyvek® business. SAMR has suspended the antitrust investigation process. DuPont Tyvek® sales to China in full year 2025 were approximately 1 percent of DuPont’s 2025 consolidated net sales.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 17, 2026 ↗

We anticipate fluctuations in our supply chain due to ongoing geopolitical and economic uncertainty, and regulatory and policy instability, including import tariffs and trade agreements. For example, certain of our products, including motors, batteries, and other components, rely on rare earth minerals for their manufacturing, of which a significant majority are sourced from China. The inability to obtain export permits for rare earth minerals could have a detrimental effect on our business. These complications have the potential to significantly increase production and logistics costs, including additional research and development costs for designing alternative solutions, and therefore would have a detrimental effect on the profitability of the business. Rapid changes and growing complexity in trade policies may also affect the ability of customs brokers and logistics providers to timely process imported products, which could result in delays, higher logistics costs, and production disruptions.

Read in the 10-K filed Dec 18, 2025 ↗

demand and sourced primarily from Australia and processed largely by two tanneries in China capable of meeting

Read in the 10-K filed May 22, 2026 ↗

Indonesia, while less than 5% was from China or any other individual country. As a result, we are exposed to

Read in the 10-K filed May 22, 2026 ↗

Documents Act, and China’s Personal Information Protection Law, and limit how we may collect, use, share and

Read in the 10-K filed May 22, 2026 ↗

rejected by courts in the US, China, the Republic of Türkiye, and the Netherlands. Any court decision or settlement

Read in the 10-K filed May 22, 2026 ↗

disrupting our operations in and outside the U.S., including our international theme parks and resorts operations in France, mainland China and Hong Kong.

Read in the 10-K filed Nov 13, 2025 ↗

in China, the People’s Bank of China and the National Development and Reform Commission have outlawed cryptocurrency mining and declared all cryptocurrency transactions illegal within the country.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2026 ↗

Additionally, central banks in some countries have started to introduce digital forms of legal tender. For example, China’s central bank digital currency (“CBDC”) project was made available to consumers in January 2022, and governments including Japan, the United Kingdom and the European Union have been discussing the potential creation of new CBDCs. Further, some countries, such as Sweden, Norway and Israel, are exploring cross-border interoperability of retail CBDCs. Whether or not they incorporate blockchain or similar technology, CBDCs, as legal tender in the issuing jurisdiction, could also compete with, or replace, bitcoin and other digital assets as a medium of exchange or store of value. As a result, the emergence or growth of these or other digital assets could cause the market price of bitcoin and Cronos to decrease, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, prospects, financial condition, and operating results.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2026 ↗

Among our foreign suppliers, China is the source of the majority of our direct imports. In early 2025, the United States imposed a new tariff and trade policy, announcing significant additional tariffs on a wide variety of products originating from countries worldwide, including China, and other countries from which we import goods. Subsequently, there have been various updates and revisions to these tariffs and the United States’ tariff policy, with some tariffs delayed or temporarily paused as country-specific agreements have been negotiated with certain countries. On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled that certain of the tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) were unlawful. Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the United States imposed new, temporary tariffs on imports from all countries under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 and could take action to invoke other laws to collect tariffs. While the company has taken action to preserve its rights, there remains substantial uncertainty regarding the impacts of this decision on the availability, timing, and amount of potential refunds, if any, for the invalidated tariffs, the scope and duration of newly announced tariffs, and the possibility of further additional or modified tariffs or retaliatory actions.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 16, 2026 ↗

The imposition of tariffs on imported merchandise or other actions against China or other countries from which we import goods, and any retaliatory actions or other responses by such countries, could negatively impact product availability or impair our ability to meet customer demand and could result in lost sales, an increase in our cost of merchandise or other adverse impacts on our operations, unless we are able to successfully offset or mitigate these impacts. We have actively implemented mitigation strategies to offset the impact of tariffs and other cost pressures by re-negotiating supplier terms, re-engineering products for efficiency, shifting country of origin where it adds advantage, discontinuing lower-margin or underperforming items and executing targeted retail price changes. We experienced increased costs during fiscal 2025 related to the implementation of these mitigation strategies, including significant labor and other discrete costs related to price changes, and our results could continue to be negatively impacted by tariffs

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 16, 2026 ↗

Recent and ongoing changes in U.S. federal government policy have introduced uncertainty to the capital markets, as well as within our industry and the industries of our tenants and operators. These policy changes include, but are not limited to, workforce reductions at federal agencies; executive actions impacting National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) grant funding; changes to visa policies affecting the scientific workforce; efforts to cap NIH indirect cost reimbursements; tariffs and potential tariff actions; and changes to drug pricing policies. For example, recent policy shifts and administration priorities affecting research funding, drug pricing, drug review and approval processes, and tariffs, among other policies, have created uncertainty in the life science ecosystem in which our lab tenants operate. This uncertainty has adversely impacted, and in the future may adversely impact, the ability of life science companies obtain investor funding, which could lead to setbacks in research and development timelines, advancement of drug pipelines, or achievement of commercial viability. In addition, competitive international biotech sectors, including in China, supported by favorable regulatory conditions and costs there, may also divert research and development activity and investment away from the U.S., reducing long-term demand for domestic life science real estate. These policy shifts and other dynamics may affect our lab tenants’ ability to make rent payments to us or expand within our properties, which, as a result, could negatively impact our operating and financial results.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 3, 2026 ↗

Cross-border trade is an important source of both revenue and profits for us. Cross-border trade also represents our primary (or in some cases, only) presence in certain important markets, such as Greater China, and various other countries. Therefore, changes in global trade policies can have a significant impact on buyers and sellers, which can materially harm our business. For example, trade policies that increase tariffs, shipping fees, delivery times or that otherwise restrict or make cross-border trade more difficult or impractical can reduce buying and selling activity on our platforms, which could materially adversely affect our business and results of operations.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2026 ↗

We depend on suppliers, including suppliers with manufacturing in China and other countries, for various materials in our Hybrid MNO, satellite and related infrastructure, Pay-TV and Wireless businesses. Changes in U.S. or foreign trade policies, including, but not limited to, new or increased tariffs, export controls, trade restrictions or sanctions, have resulted, and may continue to result, in higher costs for the wireless devices and other equipment we procure.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 2, 2026 ↗

Current relations between the U.S. and China have created increased supply chain risk due to successive U.S. legislation promoting decoupling from China on semiconductors and specific telecommunications equipment makers as well as the threat of increased tariffs and having to source from alternative suppliers for key components outside of China. We are currently using our global supply chain to manage the evolving tariff environment and reduce impacts on our business and customers. At this time, we believe the largest potential tariff impact for us is related to steel and steel derivatives. Tariffs on steel and steel derivatives could lead to significant building cost increases for us if we are unable to source alternative options. Any additional tariffs to be imposed by the U.S. on imports from certain countries and potential counter-tariffs in response, could lead to increased costs and supply chain disruptions.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 11, 2026 ↗

Laws and regulations related to economic sanctions, export controls, anti-bribery and anti-corruption, and other international activities may restrict or limit our ability to engage in transactions or dealings with certain counterparties, in or with certain countries or territories, or in certain activities. We screen third parties against applicable sanctions lists per our standard process, and use of software solutions when possible. However, sanctions lists continue to evolve and vary by country. We continue to address necessary changes in global sanctions laws including by running manual sanctions checks in certain instances and we modify our processes as necessary in light of evolving laws. A material failure to comply with global sanctions laws could have a negative effect on our reputation, business and financial condition. In addition, we have several Chinese customers who are named in restrictive executive orders ("EOs") in the United States, and while a majority of these EOs do not apply to the type of services that we currently provide to these Chinese customers, the landscape continues to evolve, and new rules have been broader than what we have historically experienced. If we are required to cease business with these companies, or additional companies in the future, our revenues could be adversely affected. The U.S. has

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 11, 2026 ↗

also been adopting a restrictive posture toward Chinese technology, data flows, and cross-border digital infrastructure, which could materially impact our business.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 11, 2026 ↗

completely websites of providers that integrate with our platform. For example, the Chinese government restricts access to

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 11, 2026 ↗

certain Google Cloud services from within the People’s Republic of China, and users of our mobile platform have

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 11, 2026 ↗

experienced degraded functionality in China due to these restrictions on our platform’s ability to connect with those

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 11, 2026 ↗

The United States has undertaken a substantial global tariff rebalancing effort, resulting in higher tariffs on imports, including significantly higher tariffs on goods made in China and sectoral tariffs on a range of materials and products. These measures led to threatened or actual retaliatory tariffs on goods made in the United States from several countries, including China and Canada. This created an unpredictable trade environment for shippers to determine if and how to adapt their sourcing patterns given these new and fast-changing regulations. If these conditions result in a significant, short-term or longer-term, decrease or redistribution of international trade volumes, it could negatively affect our business volumes and revenues. Expeditors' activity is particularly exposed to trade volume impacts from trade actions and tariff disputes between China and the United States, as we generated 19% and 22% of our revenues and 15% and 17% of our operating income in 2025 and 2024, respectively, on exports from China and Hong Kong. Uncertainty and changes to trade volumes could also affect air and ocean freight carriers because they may adjust capacity and transportation schedules, which could result in volatility in available capacity, and average sell and buy rates, all of which could adversely impact our operations and financial results. While some of those volumes are shifting to other routes, as customers look to mitigate their exposure to China-specific tariffs, it is too early to know what the overall decline in volumes might be. Many of our customers are subject to the increased tariffs and may experience increased costs of conducting business. This could result in a loss of business, bad debt or increased expenses in the future if our customers were to abandon cargo, enter into bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings, or their ability to pay deteriorates. Additionally, the increased complexity of trade regulations and customs declaration processes challenges our ability to be in compliance with such ever-changing regulations and may require us to dedicate additional resources to our customs brokerage operations.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗

In addition, instability in the supply chain exacerbated by tariffs and other industry concerns, such as China’s restriction on the export of rare earth minerals and various components, has resulted in production disruptions and increased costs and heightens the risk of future production disruptions and further cost increases. Although there is uncertainty regarding the application, scope, and duration of tariffs, those that have been implemented have had a significant adverse effect, both operationally and financially, on the overall automotive industry, Ford, and our supply chain. Any additional tariffs or other measures that are implemented in the United States and any retaliatory tariffs or other measures or restrictions that are implemented by other governments, and the potential related market impacts, should they be sustained for an extended period of time, may have a significant adverse effect.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 11, 2026 ↗

Additionally, as noted above, U.S. federal tax incentives for purchasers of plug-in vehicles have changed in recent years. In 2022, Congress established these incentives and many retail and commercial vehicle purchasers were eligible for a tax credit of up to $7,500 per vehicle, increasing market demand for plug-in vehicles. Further, to make vehicles eligible for the tax incentive for retail purchasers, Ford and other manufacturers structured battery supply chains to comply with the “foreign entity of concern” criteria, which were aimed at reducing dependence on China and companies based in or operating in China. In 2025, Congress eliminated these credits, ending the incentives for purchasers and likewise changing the business rationale to use and create battery supply chains with less control by China.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 11, 2026 ↗

The 2025 legislation preserved the advanced manufacturing production tax credit for the domestic manufacture of batteries and battery components (first established in the 2022 legislation), but restricted the eligibility criteria going forward, most notably by imposing criteria for “prohibited foreign entities,” which concern China and other countries. As a manufacturer that intends to engage in large-scale production of batteries in the United States for vehicles and energy storage, this tax credit influences our decisions concerning the location, scale, supply chain, and operations of our domestic battery manufacturing business. Such decisions involve substantial lead time, and it may take years before Ford can satisfy any new or changed eligibility criteria. Accordingly, the termination of or a change to such incentives could have a significant impact on our financial condition, results of operations, or the operation of our business.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 11, 2026 ↗

BRICS countries are working to reduce their reliance on the U.S. dollar and Western financial infrastructure due to sanctions, wars, and tariffs. BRICS is an international organization currently comprised of 11 countries, including Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Iran. Intelligence sources, along with peer assessments and other observers, suggest that cyber actors from some of the BRICS countries may conduct attacks on payment infrastructure, including third-party fintech services, to undermine trust in the Western financial infrastructure.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 24, 2026 ↗

in China, Europe, or other regions, may reduce demand for, or profitability of, our products and services outside the U.S., and the impact on our business could be significant given the extent of our global operations. We also do business in emerging market jurisdictions where economic, political, and legal risks are heightened. These factors have in the past adversely affected, and could in the future adversely affect, our business.

Read in the 10-K filed May 20, 2026 ↗

Throughout 2025 and into 2026, the U.S. administration imposed varying levels of tariffs on goods imported from China and other countries where we or our customers source materials and manufacture products. Further escalation of trade tensions, including through the imposition of new or increased tariffs (including retaliatory tariffs), expanded trade restrictions, or intensified decoupling between the U.S. (as well as other major economies) and China or other key trading partners could materially increase our product input costs, negatively affect global economic conditions, contract customer demand, or otherwise adversely affect our business. Related declines in confidence or investment activity in global markets could further adversely affect our business performance.

Read in the 10-K filed May 20, 2026 ↗

Recent legal and policy developments have also increased uncertainty regarding the enforceability, duration, and potential re‑imposition of certain tariffs. For example, on February 20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down certain tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"). Following that decision, the U.S. administration announced a new 10% global tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, subject to certain exceptions; however, on May 7, 2026, the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled that the Section 122 tariffs were not authorized by law, a decision the administration has appealed. These and similar developments have created uncertainty regarding the future rate, scope, and enforceability of tariffs; the availability and timing of refunds for tariffs that may be invalidated; the potential adoption of alternative legislative or executive actions; and the continued effectiveness of trade arrangements or mitigation actions adopted in response to prior tariffs. Ongoing uncertainty regarding U.S. and global trade policies, sanctions, and tariffs, including actions involving China, North America, and other key manufacturing and sourcing jurisdictions, could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.

Read in the 10-K filed May 20, 2026 ↗

Changes in U.S. and foreign government policies, including those relating to trade, sanctions, information security, data privacy, national security, and foreign investment, may affect the attractiveness of our services to customers and our ability to conduct business with certain customers or suppliers. We have significant operations in China, which have been, and could continue to be, affected by evolving laws, regulations, and geopolitical developments involving China. We could be subject to reputational harm if any of our customers, former customers or vendors were subject to U.S. sanctions or did business with sanctioned entities or countries or otherwise violated applicable sanctions or export control laws. Furthermore, regional conflicts, including the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, including the conflict in Israel and recent U.S. military operations in Iran, and tension between China and Taiwan, could result in sanctions, regional market instability, increased energy and transportation costs, supply chain disruptions, and other adverse regional and global financial and economic conditions, any of which can impact the demand for, or our ability to sell, our products and services in the impacted regions. Escalation of hostilities involving Iran, Israel, and the United States or regional proxy groups could adversely affect regional stability, threaten critical infrastructure such as data centers, impair access to ports and transportation routes including the Strait of Hormuz, and increase fuel, energy, freight, insurance, and security costs. In addition, expanded sanctions, export controls, or other governmental measures affecting the region could impair our ability to conduct business, collect receivables, or repatriate funds. In particular, geopolitical changes in China-Taiwan relations could disrupt the operations of several companies in Taiwan that are critical to the global supply of semiconductors and other electronic components on which many of our customers depend, and any escalation of tensions could materially affect our supply chain and operations.

Read in the 10-K filed May 20, 2026 ↗

We regularly move data across borders to operate our global business, and are consequently subject to a broad and continuously evolving set of privacy and data protection laws and regulations both domestically and internationally, including the European Union General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR"), the UK GDPR, China's Personal Information Protection Law ("PIPL"), India's Digital Personal Data Protection Act, and comprehensive privacy statutes in numerous U.S. states, including the California Consumer Privacy Act ("CCPA"), as amended by the California Privacy Rights Act ("CPRA"). These laws impose numerous, and oftentimes differing, obligations on data controllers and processors, and new requirements continue to be proposed and enacted across U.S. federal, state, and international jurisdictions. Compliance can be costly, and the complexity and inconsistency of these frameworks across jurisdictions poses significant compliance challenges that have resulted, and will continue to result, in increased costs and required modifications to our data processing practices and policies.

Read in the 10-K filed May 20, 2026 ↗

•any reciprocal or other tariffs may place burdens on our customers’ supply chains exclusive of module import costs, including through increased costs of trackers, inverters, transformers, and other imported equipment, which are often heavily dependent on Chinese supply chains. These and other costs could result in an inability for certain projects to generate profitable returns, and may lead to the delay or abandonment of such projects, thereby reducing or removing demand for currently contracted PV module sales; and

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 24, 2026 ↗

•United States — Port Fees on Certain Chinese Vessel Operators and Chinese Vessel Owners. On April 17, 2025, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative published a notice of final action based on an investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 into China’s targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance. The action imposes new port fees on Chinese vessel operators and/or Chinese vessel owners as well as on non-Chinese operators of Chinese-origin vessels beginning on October 14, 2025. The level of fees is on a sliding scale per net ton or, in the case of non-Chinese operators, the higher of a net ton or container-based fee. Effective November 10, 2025, however, the United States suspended implementation of such action for one year. Once implemented, such fees may impact our logistics services and consequently impact our profitability and results of operations.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 24, 2026 ↗

regions such as China, improve quality and reliability and pursue markets outside their home countries. Some competitors are government-

Read in the 10-K filed Jan 29, 2026 ↗

pound sterling, Canadian dollar, Chinese renminbi, euro, Japanese yen, Mexican peso, and Swiss franc. From time to time, we enter

Read in the 10-K filed Jul 1, 2026 ↗

Additionally, in the first half of 2025, the United States imposed increased tariffs on foreign imports into the United States, including an additional 20% tariff on all product imports from China, an additional 25% tariff on all product imports from Mexico and Canada, as well as additional proposed tariffs on other countries. The tariff policy environment has been and is expected to continue to be dynamic, and we cannot predict what additional actions may ultimately be taken by the United States or other governments with respect to tariffs or trade relations, including retaliatory trade measures taken by other countries in response to existing or future United States tariffs or other measures. While we have taken steps to mitigate the impact of tariffs on our businesses, including through price increases and supply chain enhancements, tariffs and related inflationary pressures have impacted our SG&A expenses and gross margins. If these pressures continue or worsen, we may be required to take additional steps to mitigate the impact on our business, which could adversely affect our business and financial results.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 20, 2026 ↗

Certain of the goods we import are subject to tariffs and duties imposed by customs authorities of the jurisdictions into which they are imported. We manufacture our products in, and source goods from, multiple jurisdictions, such as Taiwan and China among others. New or increased tariffs, duties, or other trade restrictions imposed on products, goods, or components we import into the United States or other countries could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 18, 2026 ↗

The U.S. continues to implement certain trade actions, including imposing tariffs on certain goods imported from China and other countries, which has resulted in retaliatory tariffs by China and other countries. The recent changes in U.S. trade policy involving the application or increase of tariffs and the subsequent retaliatory measures against the U.S. have created a dynamic environment that may have a material adverse impact on our business. While we have deployed strategies to mitigate the impact of these dynamic trade policies, there is no assurance that we will be able to mitigate the full impact of all such tariffs, retaliatory tariffs or other trade policies that have or may develop in this rapidly changing environment. Increasing trade tensions and changes in trade policies have the potential to adversely impact our costs, the demand for our products, our supply chain and the global economy, and could result in fines and penalties or reputational harm if we are found not to be in compliance, which may have an adverse impact on our business, including operating and financial results and conditions.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 17, 2026 ↗

Additionally, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a rule entitled the Preventing Access to U.S. Sensitive Personal Data and Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern or Covered Persons, which places additional restriction on certain data transactions involving countries of concern (e.g., China, Russia, Iran) and covered persons (i.e., individuals and entities who are designated as such by the U.S. Attorney General or considered “foreign persons” and are majority owned by, organized under the laws of, a primary resident in, or a contractor of, a covered person or country of concern, as

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 31, 2026 ↗

Central banks in various countries have introduced digital forms of legal tender. China’s CBDC project, known as Digital Currency Electronic Payment, has reportedly been tested in a live pilot program conducted in multiple cities in China. Central banks representing at least 130 countries have published retail or wholesale CBDC work ranging from research to pilot projects. Whether or not they incorporate blockchain or similar technology, CBDCs, as legal tender in the issuing jurisdiction, could have an advantage in competing with, or replace, HYPE and other cryptocurrencies as a medium of exchange or store of value. Central banks and other governmental entities have also announced cooperative initiatives and consortia with private sector entities, with the goal of leveraging blockchain and other technology to reduce friction in cross-border and interbank payments and settlement, and commercial banks and other financial institutions have also recently announced a number of initiatives of their own to incorporate new technologies, including blockchain and similar technologies, into their payments and settlement activities, which could compete with, or reduce the demand for, HYPE. As a result of any of the foregoing factors, the price of HYPE could decrease, which could adversely affect the value of our HYPE holdings.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 30, 2026 ↗

in China, the People’s Bank of China and the National Development and Reform Commission have outlawed cryptocurrency mining and declared all cryptocurrency transactions illegal within the country, and

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 30, 2026 ↗

Our products depend on a wide range of raw materials sourced globally, such as essential or vegetable oils, botanical extracts, animal products, organic and petroleum-based chemicals. For certain materials, we rely on a limited number of suppliers or regions, making us vulnerable to shortages, delays, and price volatility. Tariffs and trade restrictions, sanctions, and geopolitical tensions (e.g., U.S.-China relations, Russia-Ukraine war, Middle East conflicts), as well as supply chain disruptions, along with energy price fluctuations, may further strain operations and margins. Environmental and climate-related events, including severe weather, droughts, floods, and water scarcity, can also impact crop yields, transportation, and energy costs, increasing sourcing challenges or prices of input costs.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2026 ↗

We operate and may pursue opportunities in jurisdictions such as China, India, Brazil, Russia, and certain African countries, which present elevated risks of fraud, corruption, and internal control challenges. In certain regions, compliance with anti-bribery laws may conflict with local customs and practices. We periodically conduct internal investigations, compliance reviews, and control testing, and implement remedial actions as appropriate to help ensure compliance. Detecting, investigating, and resolving actual or alleged violations of anti-bribery laws is costly, time-consuming, and may divert senior management attention. Allegations of non-compliance could disrupt operations, damage relationships with third parties, and negatively impact our financial condition and results of operations. A determination that we violated such laws could result in severe civil or criminal penalties, significant fines, loss of licenses or permits, and reputational harm.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2026 ↗

We operate a diversified, global supply chain. Recent tariff measures and related policy actions have already resulted in higher input costs and longer lead times, and we expect continued volatility in tariff rates, sector-specific duties, and licensing or other trade requirements in the U.S. and key international markets (including China) that may further raise costs, constrain pricing, reduce demand, or cause inventory imbalances. While we pursue mitigation efforts, these actions may not be successful, timely, or economically feasible, and our ability to pass cost increases to customers may be limited, any of which could adversely affect our business, cash flows, financial condition, and results of operations.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 12, 2026 ↗

well as heightened geopolitical tensions in regions such as the Middle East, China, and recent events in Venezuela,

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2026 ↗

increased trade friction between countries (such as in relation to the trade tensions between the U.S. and China),

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2026 ↗

scope of certain tariffs imposed on goods imported into the U.S., such as from China, which may strain international

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2026 ↗

in the Middle East, and increasing tensions between China and Taiwan. These risks may be further heightened in

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2026 ↗

China’s Personal Information Protection Law and comprehensive privacy laws in many U.S. states. These laws

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2026 ↗

The United States has announced tariffs and reciprocal tariffs on a wide range of products manufactured or produced worldwide, including Canada, China, the European Union, Japan and Mexico, among others. Several countries have similarly announced reciprocal or other tariffs impacting products manufactured or produced in the United States. The United States has and may in the future pause, reimpose or increase tariffs, and countries subject to such tariffs have and, in the future, may impose reciprocal tariffs or other restrictive trade measures in response to the imposition of tariffs by the United States. We maintain operations worldwide, including the jurisdictions impacted by announced and contemplated tariffs. If the actual and potential tariffs and reciprocal tariffs are implemented, we expect that such actions could negatively impact our revenue growth and margins in future periods through increased costs, decreased demand and other adverse economic impacts. We could also experience increased material cost inflation and component shortages, as well as disruptions and delays in our supply chain. The net effect of these actions will depend on our ability to successfully mitigate and offset their impact, which may not be effective.

Read in the 10-K filed Nov 14, 2025 ↗

performance of the APAC segment. The continuation of economic weakness in China or in other regions could adversely impact our financial performance in such regions, as well as our consolidated financial performance.

Read in the 10-K filed Nov 14, 2025 ↗

There have been recent and ongoing changes to U.S. tariff policy, resulting in broad-based increases in tariff rates. Commencing in the second quarter of fiscal 2025, new U.S. tariffs applying to imports from all countries were announced, including significantly higher rates on imports from China. In response, several countries, including China, have imposed or threatened to impose retaliatory measures on imports from the U.S. The U.S. government has announced various modifications and delays to its tariff policy and further changes may be made in the future. There has also been continuing litigation in the federal courts regarding the validity of the imposition of certain tariffs.

Read in the 10-K filed Dec 17, 2025 ↗

heightened geopolitical competition between China and other major world economies, heightened levels of political populism

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2026 ↗

Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong, and we conduct fund management activities under license from the

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2026 ↗

Regulation, the Personal Information Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China, the India Digital Personal Data

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2026 ↗

countries outside of the United States and, in particular, in emerging markets such as China and India, Eastern Europe, South

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2026 ↗

In April 2025, the Chinese government imposed export controls on seven of the seventeen elements classified as rare earth elements. In October 2025, the Chinese government imposed additional restrictions and licensing requirements on certain rare earth elements, some of which became effective immediately on the announcement date and other portions of the regulations became effective in November 2025. The Chinese government imposed export controls on an additional five rare earth elements and certain license requirements for items made outside of China that incorporate controlled rare earth elements. It is estimated that China controls about 70% of the worldwide mining of rare earth elements, 90% of the separation and processing of those elements and 93% of the magnets manufactured from those elements. Rare earth elements are critical to certain components contained in our products. If our suppliers are unable to provide the components necessary to make our products because of restrictions placed on their access to rare earth elements or products derived from rare earth elements, our business, financial condition and results of operations could be materially harmed. Our operating results and business may be adversely impacted if we are unable to obtain parts to meet our production requirements and product specifications, or if we are able to do so only on unfavorable terms.

Read in the 10-K filed Aug 6, 2026 ↗

BLS’s preclinical research activities must comply with animal welfare laws in the jurisdictions where it operates, including the AWA and similar regulations in the U.K., the EU, and China. These laws govern standards for housing, care, and oversight of research animals. Failure to meet regulatory requirements may result in fines, suspension or revocation of licenses, confiscation of animals, and reputational harm, any of which could have a material adverse effect on the Company’s operations and financial results.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 24, 2026 ↗

In recent years, global supply chains, including ours, have experienced significant disruption from material availability and supplier performance, as well as extended lead times, pricing volatility, inflationary pressures and labor issues. We and our subcontractors and suppliers have also experienced difficulties in the timely procurement of necessary materials and components, including microelectronics. Current geopolitical conditions, including sanctions and other trade restrictive activities and strained inter-country relations, have contributed to issues procuring necessary materials and components. For example, some materials and components in our supply chain have previously been sourced from areas now under sanctions or other trade restrictions, such as specialty metals from Russia and certain equipment from China, or are currently sourced from areas which are at risk of sanctions or other trade restrictive actions, not just by the United States but by other nations or groups, such as the European Union.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 12, 2026 ↗

•the restrictions in China on the export of indium, gallium, germanium and other rare earth metals and critical minerals; and other retaliatory responses in the trade policies of the U.S. or foreign governments;

Read in the 10-K filed Aug 17, 2026 ↗

Moreover, tensions between the U.S. and China, which have already led to a series of tariffs and sanctions, as well as other business restrictions, could further escalate based on additional trade restrictions, retaliation thereto, or otherwise, which could significantly impact our business, including by increasing scrutiny of, or restrictions on, market access, operations, and business development transactions. See Item 1A, "Risk Factors—Risks Related to Our Operations—Reliance on third-party relationships and outsourcing arrangements could adversely affect our business," for additional information. The precise impact of tariffs, trade protection measures, and other restrictions may depend on their ultimate scope, timing, and other factors. If enacted, additional restrictions could result in supply disruptions or delays, further increase costs, or otherwise have a negative impact on our business. Given the nature of pharmaceutical regulation and commercialization, we may not be able to offset the burden of increased costs from tariffs and related impacts to any meaningful degree.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 12, 2026 ↗

In most international markets, we operate in an environment of government-mandated cost-containment programs. In some markets, including the EU, Japan, and China, governments have significant power as large single payors to regulate prices and access criteria or impose other means of cost control. Geopolitical and economic factors have in various cases exacerbated financial pressures on governments with single-payer or government funded healthcare systems, leading to increases in rebates, clawbacks, and other reforms to reimbursement systems, policies and programs. These and similar events have adversely affected, and may continue to adversely affect, us, our business partners, and our customers. For more details, see Item 1, "Business—Regulations and Private Payer Actions Affecting Pharmaceutical Pricing, Reimbursement, and Access." Our arrangements with the U.S. government and broader U.S. policy efforts to align domestic pharmaceutical pricing with international benchmarks may further pressure international payers, and the outcome of competing U.S. and international pricing objectives is uncertain. See Item 1A, "Risk Factors—Risks Related to Our Business and Industry—Our business is subject to government price controls and other public and private restrictions on pricing, reimbursement, and access for our drugs, which could have a material adverse effect on our results of operations, reputation, or business."

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 12, 2026 ↗

Government actions relating to rare earth minerals that are used in certain of our products, including U.S. Government sourcing prohibitions on the import of such minerals and the imposition of export controls on such minerals by China, have

Read in the 10-K filed Jan 29, 2026 ↗

There is inherent risk that political, diplomatic and national security influences can lead to trade disputes, impacts and/or disruptions, in particular those affecting the semiconductor industry. This can adversely affect our business in China, Japan, Korea, and/or Taiwan and perhaps the entire Asia Pacific region or worldwide. A significant trade dispute, impact, and/or disruption in any area where we do business could have a materially adverse impact on our future results of operations and cash flows. For example, the conflict that began in February 2026 between the United States, Israel, a number of states in the Persian Gulf, and Iran has led to significant regional instability and disruption in the Middle East, including the closure of or restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz, threatened or actual attacks on vessels in the Red Sea, and threatened or actual attacks on transportation and energy infrastructure, which has significantly and adversely affected the supply and prices of oil, refined oil products and byproducts, liquid natural gas, as well as certain other industrial commodities, such as aluminum, helium, bromine, and sulfur. Some of these commodities are important to the semiconductor industry. As a result, this instability and disruption has adversely affected, and may in the future materially and adversely affect, our business, results of operations, and financial condition. The extent to which we may be affected by this conflict will depend on various factors, including the scope, severity, and duration of the conflict and the extent to which the conflict, or additional laws, sanctions, or trade restrictions arising from or related to the conflict, further disrupt the availability or cost of critical inputs used in the semiconductor industry. Continuation or escalation of this conflict may also magnify the impact of other risks identified in this 2026 Form 10-K.

Read in the 10-K filed Aug 7, 2026 ↗

•difficulties or delays in obtaining required import or export approvals (including those that may be required under the Chinese export controls on rare earth elements described above);

Read in the 10-K filed Aug 7, 2026 ↗

be materially affected, resulting in increased costs and operational disruptions. In addition, heightened geopolitical tensions, including potential conflicts involving Taiwan or other regions where our suppliers are concentrated, could disrupt our supply of raw materials and finished goods. A significant portion of our technical fabrics originates from Taiwan, and any military conflict, trade embargo, or disruption affecting that region could materially impact our ability to source materials and fulfill customer orders. Political polarization in the United States has also led to increased consumer activism, brand boycotts, and public pressure campaigns targeting companies based on their perceived political or social positions. Whether or not we take public positions on social or political issues, we could face reputational harm, reduced consumer demand, or employee relations challenges if we are perceived as aligned or misaligned with particular viewpoints. These dynamics could adversely affect our brand, guest relationships, and results of operations.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 17, 2026 ↗

We are subject to an evolving cybersecurity, privacy, and AI regulatory environment, and failure to comply with new or existing requirements, including federal cybersecurity incident disclosure obligations, could result in regulatory enforcement and further financial or reputational harm. Emerging laws and regulations governing AI, including the European Union AI Act, China's generative AI regulations, and potential U.S. federal and state AI legislation, may impose new compliance obligations, restrict certain uses of AI technology, or require transparency regarding AI-driven decision-making. Data localization and sovereignty requirements in certain jurisdictions may require us to store and process data locally, increasing operational complexity and costs. Sovereign AI initiatives, under which governments require AI systems to be developed, trained, or operated within national borders using local data, could limit our ability to deploy centralized AI tools globally and may require significant investment in region-specific infrastructure. Our cybersecurity insurance may not cover all losses or liabilities related to cyberattacks. Furthermore, a sophisticated attack could persist undetected within our systems for an extended period before being discovered, potentially amplifying its impact.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 17, 2026 ↗

China is a predominant producer of many rare earth materials essential to the global electronics industry. In 2025, China imposed and later expanded export restrictions and licensing requirements on certain rare earth elements and related magnets. Although some restrictions were subsequently suspended for certain U.S. end‑users, future restrictions or renewed implementation could constrain global supply. If China further restricts exports or pressures other countries to do so, our suppliers may face shortages, longer lead times, or increased costs. Limited access to these materials could impair our ability to manufacture certain products, increase our production costs, or reduce our competitiveness relative to manufacturers with alternative supply sources. These constraints may also affect downstream customers; for example, export controls on rare earth magnets have previously led certain automotive manufacturers to temporarily suspend operations.

Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2026 ↗

Having a strong position in the Chinese market is a key component of our global growth strategy. Although our sales in

Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2026 ↗

AI‑related laws, regulations and national and regional governmental policies are rapidly evolving and inconsistent across jurisdictions. New and existing frameworks in the United States, the European Union and China - including the EU AI Act’s risk‑based approach - may impose additional compliance, transparency, conformity assessment, monitoring or usage‑restriction obligations on AI‑enabled products. Conflicting regulatory requirements across jurisdictions increase compliance complexity and costs, and failure or perceived failure to comply could result in fines, penalties, investigations, restrictions on product offerings, reputational harm, or lost sales or talent.

Read in the 10-K filed May 21, 2026 ↗

are being considered by various U.S. states. These laws and regulations impose operational requirements, including disclosures to consumers about personal data practices, opt-out and consent choices and required contractual terms with certain third parties, as well as obligations to provide notice to individuals, third parties, and/or regulators in the event of certain cybersecurity incidents involving personal data. In China, for instance, the Personal Information Protection Law also imposes requirements on the collection, use, and cross-border transfer of personal information, and noncompliance may result in penalties and operational restrictions.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2026 ↗

changes in U.S. laws, or the interpretation and enforcement of these laws, regarding investment in China or other countries;

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2026 ↗

The Company’s business in China experienced significantly lower sales of Gardasil/Gardasil 9 in 2025. Due to above normal inventory levels at the Company’s commercialization partner in China, the Company made a decision to pause shipments to China beginning in February 2025 and has not resumed shipments to date. The Company will not resume shipments until inventory levels return to normal levels and it cannot predict when shipments to China will resume nor the levels of sales that the Company will achieve and as a result, the Company expects that sales of Gardasil/Gardasil 9 in China will not materially increase in 2026. In June 2025, a nine-valent HPV vaccine produced by a local manufacturer received regulatory approval in China for use in females 9-45 years of age.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 24, 2026 ↗

Regulators and legislators are also increasingly scrutinizing and restricting certain personal data transfers and transactions involving foreign countries. For example, the Department of Justice’s January 8, 2025, rule on “Preventing Access to U.S. Sensitive Personal Data and Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern or Covered Persons,” prohibits data brokerage transactions involving certain sensitive personal data categories, including health data, genetic data, and biospecimens, to countries of concern, including China. The regulations also restrict certain investment agreements, employment agreements and vendor agreements involving such data and countries of concern, absent specified cybersecurity controls. Actual or alleged violations of these rules may be punishable by criminal and/or civil sanctions, result in exclusion from participation in federal and state programs or restrict our ability to use certain vendors, sites, investigators, or service providers in global clinical trials.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 20, 2026 ↗

In addition to the above risks related to economic conditions, the U.S. has implemented a series of tariffs targeting various nations and industries. These announcements have triggered global reactions, affecting markets, slowing global economic growth, and heightening concerns about broader financial instability. Tariffs and escalations of trade tensions between the U.S. and its trading partners, especially China, and the decoupling of global economies could result in a global economic slowdown and long-term changes to global trade. See also, “Adverse changes in the political, regulatory and economic policies of governments in connection with trade with China and Chinese customers have reduced the demand for our products and damaged our business” and “Changes to U.S. or foreign tax, trade policy, government incentives, tariff and import/export regulations may have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.”

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 11, 2026 ↗

In 2025, U.S. government interactions with U.S. semiconductor companies implied that as a condition to obtaining and maintaining export licenses for certain products and technologies destined for China, they remit to the U.S. government a fee equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the gross revenue derived from such China-related sales. In January 2026, BIS issued a new licensing policy related to chips from certain semiconductor companies, including a twenty-five percent (25%) tariff and other requirements. Historically, restrictions on sales to China were implemented by the U.S. government as national security measures that did not include revenue-sharing arrangements and export licensing was not tied to revenue sharing with the U.S. government. While these U.S. government actions did not impact Marvell, if such revenue sharing were to be imposed on our China-derived revenue, it could erode our gross margins, reduce our pricing flexibility, and potentially prompt us to curtail or discontinue sales in China.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 11, 2026 ↗

In addition to the provisions in certain international laws restricting the transfer of personal information to the United States, a new U.S. law also restricts the transfer of certain kinds of personal data in certain situations outside of the United States to “countries of concern,” including but not limited to China. On April 8, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice’s National Security Division implemented the Data Security Program Rule under Executive Order 14117 and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. This rule establishes restrictions on certain data-related transactions involving U.S. persons and entities, particularly those that may result in access to U.S. government-related data or bulk sensitive personal data of U.S. persons by foreign adversaries or entities under their control. The rule effectively imposes export control-like restrictions on the transfer, sale, or sharing of sensitive data-including genomic, geolocation, biometric, health, financial, and other personal data-to or with entities in countries of concern, as well as entities and persons associated with those countries. It also imposes additional due diligence obligations on U.S. companies concerning personal data they collect, store, or transmit. Failure to comply with the Data Security Program Rule could result in civil or criminal penalties, reputational harm, and restrictions on our ability to engage in certain business activities. Compliance may require us to modify our data handling practices, implement new controls, or terminate existing relationships with certain foreign vendors, customers, or partners. These changes could increase our operational costs, limit our market opportunities, and adversely affect our financial performance. Additionally, the scope and interpretation of the rule may evolve, and future guidance or enforcement actions could impose further obligations or restrictions.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2026 ↗

Political policies in the U.S., China, Europe, Mexico, and Canada may affect global trade, reduce domestic purchasing power, and create uncertainty. In 2025, the U.S. government enacted incremental tariff rates on imports from several foreign countries, which remain subject to negotiation and change, and the Chinese government implemented retaliatory tariffs resulting in incremental tariff costs of approximately $50 million in 2025. Accordingly, tariffs have raised the cost of our products, components, and raw materials, negatively impacting our gross margin. In addition, foreign governments, including

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 6, 2026 ↗

China, have enacted domestic purchasing requirements favoring local competition, which could reduce our sales.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 6, 2026 ↗

President Trump signed an executive order instructing a working group comprised of representatives from key federal agencies to evaluate measures that can be taken to provide regulatory clarity and certainty built on technology-neutral regulations for individuals and firms involved in digital assets, including through well-defined jurisdictional regulatory boundaries; the SEC’s Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 122, which rescinded Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 121, directs certain entities to evaluate and account for potential losses from safeguarding crypto assets using existing generally accepted accounting principles in the United States (“GAAP”) or IFRS guidance. It also emphasizes the importance of continued disclosures related to these obligations; the SEC has proposed changes to the SEC Custody Rule, which may require, if adopted, that public companies store their Bitcoin with a “qualified custodian,” which are typically banks, trust companies, or regulated broker-dealers that meet strict asset segregation and safeguarding standards; the European Union adopted Markets in Crypto Assets Regulation, a comprehensive digital asset regulatory framework for the issuance and use of digital assets, like Bitcoin; in June 2023, the United Kingdom adopted and implemented the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, which regulates market activities in “cryptoassets”; in China, the People’s Bank of China and the National Development and Reform Commission have outlawed cryptocurrency mining and declared all cryptocurrency transactions illegal within the country. Other jurisdictions, including Egypt, Morocco and the Dominican Republic, have also made the use of Bitcoin illegal. If the use of Bitcoin is made illegal in other jurisdictions, particularly where Bitcoin is currently traded in heavy volumes, the available market for Bitcoin may contract. Additionally, if another government with considerable economic power were to ban digital assets or related activities, this could have further impact on the price of Bitcoin. As a result, the markets and opportunities discussed herein may not reflect the markets and opportunities available to us in the future.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 30, 2026 ↗

Various digital assets compete with Bitcoin, including alternative cryptocurrencies using different validation mechanisms (such as Ethereum’s proof-of-stake), stablecoins backed by fiat currencies, and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) being developed by governments including China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. If these alternatives are perceived as superior to Bitcoin, they could gain market share and decrease Bitcoin’s price. Additionally, the cryptocurrency industry has experienced high-profile negative developments including fraud, theft, Security Incidents, and platform failures. Negative publicity and heightened scrutiny of the industry could adversely impact investor sentiment toward us, even if we are not directly involved, potentially resulting in reduced stock demand, increased volatility, and difficulty raising capital.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 30, 2026 ↗

We produce and distribute media content about Bitcoin and the digital asset industry to a global audience. However, certain jurisdictions have enacted laws or regulations that restrict, prohibit, or heavily regulate content related to cryptocurrencies, digital assets, or financial topics. For example, China has banned cryptocurrency-related activities, and other countries have imposed restrictions on cryptocurrency advertising or promotion. Our content may be blocked, restricted, or subject to legal action in jurisdictions with restrictive policies. Additionally, we may be required to comply with local content regulations, data protection laws, and other requirements in jurisdictions where our content is accessible, which may be difficult or impractical given the global nature of internet distribution. We may face legal liability, fines, or other penalties if our content is deemed to violate local laws, even if such content is lawful in the United States. These restrictions could limit our ability to grow our global audience, reduce our international advertising revenues, and expose us to legal and compliance risks. Changes in laws or enforcement practices in key markets could have a material adverse effect on our international operations and growth prospects.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 30, 2026 ↗

In April 2025, the USG informed us that it requires a license for export to China (including Hong Kong and Macau) and D:5 countries, or to companies headquartered or with an ultimate parent therein, of our H20 integrated circuits and any other circuits achieving the H20’s memory bandwidth, interconnect bandwidth, or combination thereof. As a result of these requirements, we incurred a $4.5 billion charge in the first quarter of fiscal year 2026 associated with H20 for excess inventory and purchase obligations, as the demand for H20 products diminished.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗

In August 2025, the USG granted licenses that would allow us to ship certain H20 products to certain China-based customers. We generated approximately $60 million in H20 revenue under those licenses. USG officials expressed an expectation that the USG will receive 15% or more of the revenue generated from licensed sales of our products, but the USG did not publish a regulation codifying such requirement.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗

In February 2026, the USG granted a license that would allow us to ship small amounts of H200 products to specific China-based customers. To date, we have not generated any revenue under the H200 licensing program, and do not yet know whether any imports will be allowed into China. The license requires that the H200s go through an inspection process in the United States prior to any shipment to the customer. As a result, any H200 shipped under the new licensing program will be subject to a 25% tariff upon importation into the United States.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗

In the event that we are able to sell licensed products into the China market, we may not be able to pass along all or any of the tariff to our customers, and may be subject to litigation, increased costs, and a harmed competitive position.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗

The export controls applicable to China are complex and address a variety of parameters, including the total processing performance of a chip, the “performance density” of a chip, the interconnect bandwidth of a chip, and the memory bandwidth of a chip. Under the current rules and geopolitical landscape, we are unable to create and deliver a competitive product for China’s data center market that receives approval from both the USG and the Chinese government. As of the end of fiscal year 2026, we were effectively foreclosed from competing in China's data center computing/compute market, and our effective foreclosure from the China market helped our competitors build larger developer and customer ecosystems to challenge us worldwide. Unless we are able to return with a product that meets the approval of both the USG and the Chinese government, our lost opportunity and the benefit to our competitors will have a material and adverse impact on our business, operating results, and financial condition.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗

For example, the USG already imposed license conditions that limit the ability of foreign firms to create and offer as a service large-scale GPU clusters, such as imposing license conditions on the use of products to be exported to certain countries, and may impose additional conditions such as requiring chip tracking and throttling mechanisms that could disable or impair GPUs if certain events, including unauthorized system configuration, use, or location, are detected. Such government mandates in chip designs could introduce system vulnerabilities and expose us to significant risk and potential liability, negatively impact demand for our products, and could have a material impact on our business, operating results, and financial condition. Even if not enacted into binding legislation, draft bills have impacted and may in the future negatively impact our business. For example, following U.S. legislative proposals calling for mandatory features in our chips, China’s government publicly questioned whether our H20 products have built-in vulnerabilities, discouraging customers from purchasing our products. We provided a public response explaining that our GPUs, including H20, do not include such built-in vulnerabilities, and will respond to any follow-up questions we receive.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗

Open-source foundation models are rapidly growing in popularity with developers worldwide. Any regulatory control or other restriction that limits our ability to provide products and services that support third-party applications and models, including applications built on foundation models originating in China such as DeepSeek, Qwen, or KIMMI, could have a material impact on our business, operating results, and financial condition.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗

negatively impact sales of such products to markets outside China, including the U.S. and Europe. In addition, as the performance of the gaming GPUs increases over time, export controls may have a greater impact on our ability to compete in markets subject to those controls. Export controls may disrupt our supply and distribution chain for a substantial portion of our products, which are warehoused in and distributed from Hong Kong.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗

Export controls have and are likely in the future to have a disproportionate impact on NVIDIA and may disadvantage us against certain of our competitors that sell chips that are outside the scope of such control. Export controls have already and may in the future encourage customers outside China and other impacted regions to “design-out” certain U.S. semiconductors from their products to reduce the compliance burden and risk, and to ensure that they are able to serve markets worldwide. Export controls have already encouraged and may in the future encourage overseas governments to request that our customers purchase from our competitors rather than NVIDIA or other U.S. firms, harming our business, market position, and financial results.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗

As a result, export controls have in the past and may in the future negatively impact demand for our products and services not only in China, but also in other markets, such as Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Export controls increase the risk of investing in U.S. advanced semiconductor products, because by the time a new product is ready for market, it may be subject to new unilateral export controls restricting its sale, resulting in excess inventory and purchase obligations as we recently experienced with the H20. At the same time, such controls may increase investment in foreign competitors, which would be less likely to be restricted by U.S. controls.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗

In 2025, the U.S. government announced a series of tariffs, including tariffs targeting a broad range of imports and targeted tariffs on goods from specific countries and industries. In response, many countries imposed reciprocal tariffs and other trade restrictions on the United States. Although many of these tariffs, countermeasures and other trade restrictions have since been eased or paused, their initial announcements triggered considerable volatility in global markets and heightened economic uncertainty, and the global trade situation, particularly between the United States and China, continues to be highly dynamic. Further, throughout 2025 the U.S. government has initiated numerous investigations into products and industries under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. For example, in April 2025, the Department of Commerce launched an investigation into the national security impacts of imported semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. While the results of this investigation remain unknown, it is expected to result in additional tariffs and trade restrictions that may adversely impact our business. Similar investigations on other industries or products, including automotive, copper, steel, aluminum, critical minerals and aircraft, may also adversely impact the semiconductor industry and our business. These changes have, and similar changes in the future may continue to, increase the cost or reduce the availability of raw materials and supplies we need to operate, cause customers to advance, delay, reduce, or cancel orders, shift buying patterns, impact demand in our end markets, complicate demand forecasting for us and our customers, increase supply chain complexity and contribute to volatility, a broader economic slowdown or recession. Any of these impacts or changes could materially and adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2026 ↗

•the potential for worsening trade and economic relations between the U.S. and China, including the imposition of additional tariffs, export controls, sanctions, retaliatory measures or other trade restrictions;

Read in the 10-K filed Jun 22, 2026 ↗

Our products and subscriptions are subject to regulatory requirements in a number of foreign jurisdictions, and the scope and complexity of these requirements continue to expand. For example, in China, our products may be required to comply with cybersecurity and data security laws, including the Cybersecurity Law, the Data Security Law, and related regulations, and may be subject to network security review, critical information infrastructure protection requirements, and mandatory product certifications. Other jurisdictions impose similar requirements, including local testing and certification requirements, in-country data storage or processing mandates, source code review or escrow obligations, and restrictions on the use of foreign-developed encryption or security technologies. Compliance with these requirements is costly and time-consuming, and the regulatory landscape in many jurisdictions is evolving and subject to change with limited or no notice. If we are unable to obtain or maintain required certifications, approvals, or authorizations in a timely manner, or if new or revised requirements render our products or subscriptions non-compliant, we may be unable to sell, deploy, or support our products in affected markets, which could result in lost revenue opportunities, reputational harm, and a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, and operating results.

Read in the 10-K filed Sep 10, 2026 ↗

Our inventory is produced and maintained in a limited number of locations, including one operated by a third party in China, and any loss could have a material adverse effect on our ability to manufacture and sell our products.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 18, 2026 ↗

Although we expect to derive an increasing portion of our revenues from areas outside of mobile handsets, such as automotive, IoT and data center, we continue to derive a significant portion of our revenues from a small number of mobile handset customers and licensees, and particularly from their sale of premium-tier handset devices. Device share in the mobile industry, particularly at the premium tier, is concentrated among a few companies, including Apple, Samsung and certain Chinese original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), many of whom are or have in the past been our largest customers. This concentration means that the loss of any one of our key mobile handset customers, or a significant reduction in purchases from any such customer, whether due to such customer’s use of their own integrated circuit products (i.e., vertical integration) or our competitors’ integrated circuit products, government restrictions, a decline in global, regional or local economic conditions, a decline in consumer demand or any other reason, would have a significant negative impact on our business. For example, Apple has historically purchased our modem products for use in its devices and has historically been one of our largest customers, but we expect that Apple will primarily use its own internally developed modem products, rather than our products, in its devices going forward. This will have a significant negative impact on our QCT revenues, results of operations and cash flows, and our ability to offset that impact depends on the timing and magnitude of growth in our non-handset revenues, including in automotive, IoT and data center, which may not occur as anticipated. See also “Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements, Note 2. Composition of Certain Financial Statement Items - Concentrations.”

Read in the 10-K filed Nov 4, 2026 ↗

We face increasing competition from Chinese biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, including Chinese state-owned or state-backed enterprises, with respect to both our marketed products and product candidates. China has become one of the world's leading developers of new drugs, and Chinese companies benefit from a regulatory regime that enables rapid, low-cost clinical trials that facilitate innovation. Furthermore, we compete with other large pharmaceutical companies, many of which have invested significantly in China, in acquiring or licensing Chinese product candidates, and we may not be as successful as our competitors in identifying or accessing such assets.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 4, 2026 ↗

Instability in geopolitical matters could have a material adverse effect on our results of operations and financial condition. The macroeconomic environment in the United States is susceptible to global events and volatility in financial markets.. Current and emerging sources of geopolitical risk include, among others, ongoing armed conflicts and military tensions (such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and various conflicts in the Middle East), heightened strategic competition between the United States and China and evolving tensions related to relations between China and Taiwan. Political and military developments in Venezuela and broader instability in other parts of Latin America may contribute to economic uncertainty and pressures on regional markets and supply chains. Additionally, shifting geopolitical priorities among major powers have amplified concerns about economic fragmentation, trade disruptions and the weaponization of economic policy tools such as sanctions, tariffs and export controls.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 24, 2026 ↗

Changes in trade policies, including the imposition of new tariffs or increases in existing tariffs between the United States, Mexico, Canada, China or other countries, or reactionary measures including retaliatory tariffs, legal challenges, or currency manipulation, could adversely affect our cost structure and profitability. If tariffs on imported materials, components, or finished goods increase, our manufacturing and supply chain costs may rise. Furthermore, changes to trade policies, retaliatory measures, or prolonged uncertainty in trade relationships could result in supply chain disruptions, delayed shipments, or increased operational complexity, adversely affecting our business and financial results. While we take steps to mitigate or avoid these increased costs and disruptions, our ability to do so may be limited by operational and supply chain constraints, especially in the short term. In addition, our ability to recover cost increases and maintain profitability levels through price adjustments may be limited by competitive pressures, customer acceptance, and contractual limitations.

Read in the 10-K filed Nov 12, 2025 ↗

Additionally, central banks in some countries have started to introduce digital forms of legal tender. For example, China’s CBDC project was made available to consumers in January 2022, and governments including the United Kingdom, the European Union, and Israel have been discussing the potential creation of new CBDCs. Whether or not they incorporate blockchain or similar technology, CBDCs, as legal tender in the issuing jurisdiction, could also compete with, or replace, ETH and other digital assets as a medium of exchange or store of value. As a result, the emergence or growth of these or other digital assets could cause the market price of ETH to decrease, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, prospects, financial condition, and operating results.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 9, 2026 ↗

We are subject to a complex and rapidly evolving landscape of local, national, and international laws and regulations governing the collection, use, retention, protection, disclosure, transfer, and other processing of personal data. These laws and regulations are frequently amended, reinterpreted, and increasingly enforced, often resulting in heightened compliance obligations, litigation risk, and operational costs. Regulatory scrutiny is intensifying, with agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and state attorneys general applying consumer protection laws to online data practices. The legal landscape remains fluid, with privacy and data protection laws potentially limiting data use, requiring changes to processing practices, exposing us to fines, litigation, or other penalties, or impacting our ability to develop new services. Regulatory changes may include new legislation, invalidation of existing rules, or increased penalties, all of which can impact our ability to develop and offer new products and services. For example, the EU’s GDPR and the U.K. equivalent impose strict data protection requirements and significant penalties for noncompliance. China’s Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) and Data Security Law similarly regulate personal and non-personal data processing activities and establish data subject rights and obligations for personal information processors, with civil and criminal liabilities for violations. Other jurisdictions served by Starbucks and its licensees are enacting or proposing comparable laws, including restrictions on cross-border data transfers and enhanced data safeguards, which may increase compliance costs and affect business operations.

Read in the 10-K filed Nov 14, 2025 ↗

In 2018, the U.S. imposed tariffs on certain imported steel and aluminum products, as well as tariffs in various ranges on imports from China. Those tariffs remain in effect. Beginning in January 2025, the U.S. Administration has announced a number of new and increased tariffs, both threatened and imposed, including a higher total tariff rate on goods from China and numerous other tariffs on imports from all countries with only limited exclusions. The U.S. Administration has delayed the effectiveness of certain tariffs and tariff rate increases and threatened to accelerate the effectiveness of others. In particular, the U.S. Administration has imposed new tariffs on Mexico and Canada, and additional tariffs have been threatened and these and other changes, including in connection with the planned joint review of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement in 2026, may become effective in the near term. Additionally, the U.S. Administration has expanded the application of the 2018 steel and aluminum tariffs to countries and products that had previously been excluded, including a broad range of derivative products, increased steel and aluminum tariff rates, and imposed tariffs on certain imported copper products. The U.S. Administration also is considering new tariffs on additional imported products, including power grid equipment, large-scale batteries and plastic piping. These threatened and imposed tariffs have created uncertainty in our business development efforts and for projects currently under construction, and we expect them to impact our businesses’ costs related to construction, pipeline transportation, electricity procurement and financing, among other areas, and increase costs across the LNG value chain. These impacts may result in delays, cost overruns or reduced profitability for construction and development projects, denials or delays of recovery in rates of higher costs at our regulated utilities, or other adverse effects, any of which could be material.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 26, 2026 ↗

These recent tariffs, along with other U.S. trade actions, have triggered retaliatory actions by certain affected countries, including China’s announcement of a tariff on U.S. LNG. The Mexican government has announced it may implement retaliatory tariffs in response to the U.S. Administration’s tariffs, and other foreign governments may also impose trade measures, including retaliatory tariffs, on LNG or other U.S. goods in the future. These tariffs and other trade actions could negatively impact demand for our LNG exports, which would adversely impact our LNG projects and development pipeline.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 26, 2026 ↗

Any disruptions or failures of our systems or other services that we use, including as a result of a natural disaster, fire, cyberattack (including the potential increase in risk for such attacks due to cyberwarfare in connection with the ongoing Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas conflicts), act of terrorism, geopolitical conflict (including due to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Hamas and U.S.-Venezuela conflicts and any potential conflict involving China and Taiwan), pandemic, the effects of climate change, or other catastrophic event, as well as power outages, telecommunications infrastructure outages, a decision by one of our third-party service providers to materially change the pricing or terms of their services, or other unanticipated problems with our third-party services that we use, such as a failure to meet service standards, could severely impact our ability to conduct our business operations, or result in a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting, any of which could materially adversely affect our future operating results.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 27, 2026 ↗

There is a possibility of further escalation of trade tensions, tariffs or additional trade restrictions. For example, in April 2025, China imposed export restrictions on certain rare earth minerals that are used in certain components of the Company’s products, which resulted in delays and shortages of certain components. If China were to further restrict exporting, or implement burdensome and lengthy licensing processes for the export of, these materials or components, or pressure other countries to do so, the Company’s and its suppliers' ability to obtain such materials or components may be disrupted and the Company may not be able to obtain sufficient quantities, or obtain supply in a timely manner, or at a commercially reasonable cost.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 24, 2026 ↗

•the imposition of or changes to tariffs, including the tariffs announced by the United States in 2025 with respect to numerous global trading partners and sectors, and any retaliatory tariffs or measures by any such trading partners, including countermeasures by China, have impacted and could further negatively impact trade between, or increase the cost of operating in, or increase the cost of or negatively impact the demand for, our products or our customers’ products in the countries in which we or our customers do business,

Read in the 10-K filed Nov 7, 2025 ↗

Low-cost competition from China and other developing countries could also result in decreased demand for our products.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 20, 2026 ↗

•legal, tax, accounting or regulatory changes (including changes in import/export regulations and tariffs, such as regulations imposed by the U.S. government restricting exports to China) or changes in the interpretation or enforcement of existing requirements;

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 19, 2026 ↗

•Chinese regulations requiring the use of local suppliers, which compel companies that do business in China to partner with local companies to conduct business and provide incentives to government-backed local customers to buy from local suppliers;

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 26, 2026 ↗

Many of our products use satellite signals available globally from the Russian GLONASS, China’s BeiDou, and the European Galileo GNSS Systems. Other countries have developed regional GNSS systems, such as India’s NavIC and Japan's QZSS,

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗

On December 16, 2021, the PCAOB issued a determination report which found that the PCAOB is unable to inspect or investigate completely registered public accounting firms headquartered in: (1) mainland China of the PRC; and (2) Hong Kong, a Special Administrative Region of the PRC, because of positions taken by PRC authorities in those jurisdictions, which determinations were vacated on December 15, 2022. Our current auditor, M&K CPAS, PLLC, is headquartered in Texas, the United States, and was not identified by the PCAOB in its report on December 16, 2021 as a firm subject to the PCAOB’s determinations, which determinations were vacated on December 15, 2022.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

we engaged BiT Global, a licensed Trust or Company Service Provider and registered trust company in Hong Kong, to set up the Treasury Wallet. Our director, Zhihong Liu, is one of the directors of BiT Global. some of our directors have certain ties with the TRON blockchain ecosystem. For example, Weike Sun is the father of Justin Sun, the founder of TRON. Zhihong Liu has been the senior advisor to TRON DAO since 2021. Zi Yang holds senior position for Tronscan, the official blockchain explorer for Tron protocol.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

in November 2023, Binance Holdings Ltd. and its then chief executive officer reached a settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice, CFTC, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network to resolve a multi-year investigation by the agencies and a civil suit brought by the CFTC, pursuant to which Binance Holdings Ltd. agreed to, among other things, pay $4.3 billion in penalties across the four agencies and to discontinue its operations in the United States; and in China, the People’s Bank of China and the National Development and Reform Commission have outlawed cryptocurrency mining and declared all cryptocurrency transactions illegal within the country.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

In 2023, the PRC government initiated a series of regulatory actions and statements to regulate business operations in certain areas in Mainland China, including cracking down on illegal activities in the securities market, enhancing supervision over Mainland China-based companies listed overseas using the variable interest entity structure, adopting new measures to extend the scope of cybersecurity reviews, and expanding the efforts in anti-monopoly enforcement. We are subject to PRC laws and regulations related to the current or future business operations of our subsidiary in Hong Kong and any changes in such laws and regulations and interpretations may impair its ability to operate profitably, which could result in a material negative impact on its operations and/or the value of our Common Stock or other securities.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

Although we have direct ownership of our subsidiary in Hong Kong and currently do not have or intend to have any subsidiary or any contractual arrangement to establish a VIE structure with any entity in Mainland China, we are still subject to certain legal and operational risks associated with our connections to Hong Kong. The legal and operational risks associated in Mainland China also apply to our current or future operations in Hong Kong, and we face the risks and uncertainties associated with the complex and evolving PRC laws and regulations and as to whether and how the recent PRC government statements and regulatory developments, such as those relating to data and cyberspace security and anti-monopoly concerns, would be applicable to a company such as our subsidiary and our Company, given the Hong Kong aspects of our subsidiary in Hong Kong and the potential that the Chinese government may exercise significant oversight over the conduct of business in Hong Kong. In the event we were to become subject to PRC laws and regulations, we could incur material costs to ensure compliance, and might be subject to fines, experienced evaluation of securities or delisting, restrictions on securities offerings, and/or no longer be permitted to continue business operations as presently conducted. Our organizational structure involves risks to the investors, and Chinese regulatory authorities could disallow this structure, which would likely result in a material change in our subsidiary’s operations and/or a material change in the value of our Common Stock or other securities, including the risk that such event could cause the value of our Common Stock or other securities to decline. Moreover, there are substantial uncertainties regarding the interpretation and application of PRC laws and regulations including, but not limited to, the laws and regulations potentially related to our business and the enforcement and performance of our arrangements with customers in certain circumstances. The laws and regulations may be subject to future changes, and their official interpretation and enforcement may involve substantial uncertainty. The effectiveness and interpretation of newly enacted laws or regulations, including amendments to existing laws and regulations, may be delayed, and our business may be affected if we rely on laws and regulations which are subsequently adopted or interpreted in a manner different from our understanding of these laws and regulations. We cannot predict what effect the interpretation of existing or new PRC laws or regulations may have on our business.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

The Regulations on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Companies by Foreign Investors, or the M&A Rules, adopted by six PRC regulatory agencies on August 8, 2006, and amended on June 22, 2009, requires an overseas special purpose vehicle formed for listing purposes through acquisitions of domestic companies in Mainland China and controlled by companies or individuals of Mainland China to obtain the approval of the CSRC, prior to the listing and trading of such special purpose vehicle’s securities on an overseas stock exchange. In addition, on December 24, 2021, the CSRC released the Administrative Regulations of the State Council Concerning the Oversea Issuance of Security and Listing by Domestic Enterprise (Draft for Comments) (the “Draft Administrative Regulations”) and the Measures for the Overseas Issuance of Securities and Listing Record-Filings by Domestic Enterprises (Draft for Comments) (the “Draft Filing Measures”), collectively the “Draft Rules on Overseas Listing”, for public opinion.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

As of the date of this Annual Report, we have no subsidiary, VIE structure or any direct operations in Mainland China, nor do we intend to have any subsidiary or VIE structure or to acquire any equity interests in any domestic companies in Mainland China, and we have not generated any revenues or profits in Mainland China. Additionally, we do not intend to operate in Mainland China in the foreseeable future. As such, we do not believe we would be subject to the M&A Rules, or would be required to file with the CSRC under the Trial Measures. Moreover, pursuant to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, or the Basic Law, PRC laws and regulations shall not be applied in Hong Kong except for those listed in Annex III of the Basic Law (which is confined to laws relating to national defense, foreign affairs and other matters that are not within the scope of autonomy). Therefore, we believe, as of the date of this Form 10-K, the CSRC’s approval or review is not required for the listing and trading of our Common Stock in the U.S. exchange as provided under the M&A Rules and the Trial Measures. We believe it is not necessary to obtain, and we have not obtained, an opinion from PRC or Hong Kong counsel to consult on the above.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

SRM Ltd has two independent contractors in Hong Kong, which is a part of the PRC. In 2023, the PRC government initiated a series of regulatory actions and statements to regulate business operations in certain areas in China with little advance notice, including cracking down on illegal activities in the securities market, enhancing supervision over China-based companies listed overseas using a VIE structure, adopting new measures to extend the scope of cybersecurity reviews, and expanding its efforts in anti-monopoly enforcement. Since these statements and regulatory actions are new, it is highly uncertain how soon the legislative or administrative regulation making bodies will respond and what existing or new laws or regulations or detailed implementations and interpretations will be modified or promulgated, if any. It is also highly uncertain what the potential impact such modified or new laws and regulations will have on our Hong Kong subsidiary. These actions could result in a material change in the Hong Kong aspects of our operations and/or to the value of our Common Stock or other securities.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

Statements by the PRC government have indicated an intent to exert more oversight and control over offerings that are conducted overseas and/or foreign investments in China based issuers. On July 6, 2021, the General Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council jointly issued a document to crack down on illegal activities in the securities markets and promote the high-quality development of the capital markets, which, among other things, requires the relevant governmental authorities to strengthen cross-border oversight of law-enforcement and judicial cooperation, to enhance supervision over China-based companies listed overseas, and to establish and improve the system of extraterritorial application of the PRC securities laws.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

Under the Trial Measures and the Guidance Rules and Notice, Chinese domestic companies conducting overseas securities offering and listing activities, either in direct or indirect form, shall complete filing procedures with the CSRC pursuant to the requirements of the Trial Measures within three working days following their submission of initial public offerings or listing application. The companies that have already been listed on overseas stock exchanges or have obtained the approval from overseas supervision administrations or stock exchanges for its offering and listing and will complete their overseas offering and listing prior to September 30, 2023 are not required to make immediate filings for its listing, yet need to make filings for subsequent offerings in accordance with the Trial Measures. Companies that have already submitted an application for an initial public offering to overseas supervision administrations prior to the effective date of the Trial Measures but have not yet obtained the approval from overseas supervision administrations or stock exchanges for the offering and listing, shall arrange for the filing within a reasonable time period and shall complete the filing procedure before such companies’ overseas issuance and listing.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

Management understands that as of the date of this Form 10-K, the Company has no operations in Mainland China and is not required to complete filing procedures with the CSRC pursuant to the requirements of the Trial Measures. While the Company has no current operations in Mainland China, should we have any future operations in Mainland China and should we (i) fail to receive or maintain such permissions or approvals, (ii) inadvertently conclude that such permissions or approvals are not required, or (iii) applicable laws, regulations, or interpretations change and require us to obtain such permissions or approvals in the future, we may face sanctions by the CSRC, the CAC or other PRC regulatory agencies. These regulatory agencies may also impose fines and penalties on our potential operations in Mainland China, as well as limit our ability to pay dividends outside of Mainland China, limit our operations in Mainland China, delay or restrict the repatriation of the proceeds from our offerings into Mainland China or take other actions that could have a material adverse effect on our business as well as the trading price of our Common Stock or other securities. If we have PRC operations in the future, we may be required to restructure our operations to comply with such regulations or potentially cease operations in the PRC entirely. The CSRC, the CAC or other PRC regulatory agencies also may take actions requiring us, or making it advisable for us, to halt our offerings before settlement and delivery of our Common Stock or other securities. In addition, if the CSRC, the CAC or other regulatory PRC agencies later promulgate new rules requiring that we obtain their approvals for our offerings, we may be unable to obtain a waiver of such approval requirements, if and when procedures are established to obtain such a waiver. If we have PRC operations in the future, any action taken by the PRC government could significantly limit or completely hinder our operations in the PRC and our ability to offer or continue to offer securities to investors, and could cause the value of such securities to decline.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

Furthermore, on July 10, 2021, the CAC issued a revised draft of the Measures for Cybersecurity Review for public comment, which required that, among others, in addition to any “operator of critical information infrastructure”, any “data processor” controlling personal information of no less than one million users which seeks to list in a foreign stock exchange should also be subject to cybersecurity review, and further elaborated the factors to be considered when assessing the national security risks of the relevant activities. On December 28, 2021, the CAC, the National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”), and several other administrations jointly issued the revised Measures for Cybersecurity Review, which became effective and replaced the existing Measures for Cybersecurity Review on February 15, 2022. According to the Revised Review Measures, if an “online platform operator” that is in possession of personal data of more than one million users intends to list in a foreign country, it must apply for a cybersecurity review. Based on a set of Q&A published on the official website of the State Cipher Code Administration in connection with the issuance of the Revised Review Measures, an official of the said administration indicated that an online platform operator should apply for a cybersecurity review prior to the submission of its listing application with non-PRC securities regulators. Moreover, the CAC released the draft of the Regulations on Network Data Security Management in November 2021 for public consultation, which among other things, stipulates that a data processor listed overseas must conduct an annual data security review by itself or by engaging a data security service provider and submit the annual data security review report for a given year to the municipal cybersecurity department before January 31 of the following year. Given the recency of the issuance of the Revised Review Measures and their pending effectiveness, there is a general lack of guidance and substantial uncertainties exist with respect to their interpretation and implementation. It remains unclear whether a Hong Kong company which collects personal information from PRC individuals shall be subject to the Revised Review Measures. We do not currently expect the Revised Review Measures to have an impact on our business, our operations or our offerings as we do not believe that our subsidiary would be deemed to be an “operator of critical information infrastructure” or a “data processor” controlling personal information of no less than one million users, that would be required to file for cybersecurity review before listing in the U.S.. However, there remains uncertainty in the interpretation and enforcement of relevant PRC cybersecurity laws and regulations. If the Revised Review Measures are adopted into law in the future and if our subsidiary is deemed to be an “operator of critical information infrastructure” or a “data processor” controlling personal information of no less than one million users, our operation and the listing of our Common Stock or other securities in the U.S. could be subject to CAC’s cybersecurity review.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

As of the date of this Annual Report, Hong Kong does not have similar regulations as of the PRC to extend oversight and control over offerings that are conducted overseas. Hong Kong does not have similar regulation as of the Trial Measures and the Guidance Rules and Notice, and Measures for Cybersecurity Review of the PRC. However, the legal and operational risks associated in Mainland China apply to operations in Hong Kong, and we face the risks and uncertainties associated with the complex and evolving PRC laws and regulations and as to whether and how the recent PRC government statements and regulatory developments, such as those relating to data and cyberspace security and anti-monopoly concerns, would be applicable to a company such as our subsidiary and our Company, given the Hong Kong aspects of our subsidiary in Hong Kong and the possibility that the Chinese government may exercise significant oversight over the conduct of business in Hong Kong. In the event we or our subsidiary were to become subject to PRC laws and regulations, we could incur material costs to ensure compliance, and we or our subsidiary might be subject to fines, experienced evaluation of securities or delisting, restrictions on securities offerings, and/or no longer be permitted to continue business operations as presently conducted. In the event that (i) the PRC government expands the categories of industries and companies whose foreign securities offerings are subject to review by the CSRC or the CAC or if applicable laws, regulations or interpretations change and we are required to obtain such permissions or approvals, (ii) we inadvertently conclude that relevant permissions or approvals were not required or (iii) we did not receive or maintain relevant permissions or approvals required, any action taken by the PRC government could significantly limit or completely hinder our operations in Hong Kong and our ability to offer or continue to offer securities to investors and could cause the value of our Common Stock or other securities to decline.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

We believe that our current connections to Hong Kong are not substantial. Although SRM Ltd, our wholly-owned subsidiary is a Hong Kong company, it has only two independent contractors and its function is to provide administrative support for the procurement and delivery process which is controlled by the Company directly with its PRC suppliers. As to our TRX treasury business, our Treasury Wallet is located in Hong Kong; however, all operating decisions relating to the movement of TRX to and from the Treasury Wallet are made by our Board, a majority of whom are not based in Hong Kong or the PRC.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

Certain of our operations are conducted in Hong Kong. It is possible that the Chinese government may exercise significant oversight and discretion over the conduct of such business and may influence such operations, which could potentially significantly interfere with, alter, limit or hinder our current presence in Hong Kong, and certain scenarios, possibly affect the value of our Common Stock or other securities. Changes in the policies, regulations, rules, and the enforcement of laws of the Chinese government may also occur quickly and our assertions and beliefs of the risk imposed by the PRC legal and regulatory system cannot be certain. There are uncertainties regarding the enforcement of PRC laws, and rules and regulations in China can change quickly with little advance notice. The Chinese government may intervene or influence the Hong Kong aspects of our operations, which could interfere with our operations and/or affect the value of the Common Stock or other securities we are registering for sale.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

In 2023, the PRC government initiated a series of regulatory actions and statements to regulate business operations in certain areas in Mainland China, including a cracking down on illegal activities in the securities market, enhancing supervision over Mainland China-based companies listed overseas using the VIE structure, adopting new measures to extend the scope of cybersecurity reviews, and expanding the efforts in anti-monopoly enforcement. Given the recent statements by the Chinese government indicating an intent to exert more oversight and control over offerings that are conducted overseas and/or foreign investment in Mainland China-based issuers, any extension of these actions, statements or policies into Hong Kong could potentially significantly interfere with, alter, limit or hinder our current presence in Hong Kong.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

There are uncertainties regarding the enforcement of PRC laws, and rules and regulations in China can change with little advance notice. The Chinese government may intervene or influence our Hong Kong subsidiary or our TRX treasury business at any time, which could result in a material change in the Hong Kong aspects of our operations and/or the value of the securities we are registering for sale.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

It may be difficult to enforce a judgment of U.S. courts for civil liabilities under U.S. federal securities laws against us, our directors or officers in Mainland China and Hong Kong.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

As of the date of this Annual Report, our Chairman and Director Mr. Weike Sun and our Director Mr. Zhihong Liu are based in Hong Kong. We do not have any directors or officers located in Mainland China. In addition, the Company retains sole control of the Treasury Wallet and private keys in Hong Kong, and Mr. Weike Sun and Mr. Zi Yang are authorized by the Board to make the arrangements for safeguarding and operating the private keys of the Treasury Wallet. As a result, it may be difficult for investors to effect service of process within the U.S. upon such directors, or to enforce judgments obtained in U.S. courts against them in Mainland China or Hong Kong, including judgments predicated upon the civil liability provisions of the securities laws of the U.S. or any state in the U.S. and whether in connection with any claim relating to the Treasury Wallet, or otherwise.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are provided for under the PRC Civil Procedures Law. The PRC courts may recognize and enforce foreign judgments in accordance with the requirements of the PRC Civil Procedures Law based either on treaties between China and the country where the judgment is made or on principles of reciprocity between jurisdictions. China does not have any treaties or other forms of written arrangement with the United States that provide for the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. In addition, according to the PRC Civil Procedures Law, the PRC courts will not enforce a foreign judgment if they decide that the judgment violates the basic principles of PRC laws or national sovereignty, security or public interest. As a result, it is uncertain whether and on what basis a PRC court would enforce a judgment rendered by a court in the United States. In addition, it will be difficult for U.S. shareholders to originate actions against us in China in accordance with PRC laws because it will be difficult for U.S. shareholders, by virtue only of holding our Common Stock or other securities, to establish a connection to the PRC for a PRC court to have jurisdiction as required under the PRC Civil Procedures Law.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

There is also uncertainty as to whether the courts of Hong Kong would (i) recognize or enforce judgments of United States courts obtained against us or our directors or officers predicated upon the civil liability provisions of the securities laws of the United States or any state in the United States or (ii) entertain original actions brought in Hong Kong against us or our directors or officers predicated upon the securities laws of the United States or any state in the United States. Currently, there are no treaties or reciprocity protocols in place between the U.S. and the PRC relating to the enforceability of civil judgments.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

In Hong Kong, foreign judgments can be enforced under statute under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance or under common law. The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance is a registration scheme for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments based on reciprocity but the United States is not a designated country under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance. As a result, a judgment rendered by a court in the United States, including as a result of administrative actions brought by regulatory authorities, such as the SEC, and other actions, will not be enforced by the Hong Kong courts under the statutory regime. In addition, the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC and the Government of Hong Kong have entered into the “Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by the Courts of the Mainland and of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region pursuant to Choice of Court Agreements between Parties Concerned,” or the Arrangement. The Mainland Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance gave effect to the Arrangement and is a registration scheme for recognition and enforcement of PRC judgements based on reciprocity. Other than the Arrangement, Hong Kong has not entered into any multilateral convention or bilateral treaty regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Accordingly, any judgments rendered by a court in the United States will need to be enforced under common law. In order to enforce a foreign judgment under common law in Hong Kong, the judgment must meet certain criteria before it can be enforced, such as the judgment being final and conclusive.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

The foregoing risks make it uncertain that stockholders or others will be able to obtain a legally binding judgment against the Company or our directors or officers, and if such a judgment is ultimately obtained, the process could be time consuming and costly. We believe it is not necessary to obtain, and we have not obtained, an opinion from PRC or Hong Kong counsel to consult on the above.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 25, 2026 ↗

tariffs or trade barriers by the U.S., the European Union, Mexico, Canada, China or other countries, we can provide no assurance that any strategies we implement to mitigate the impact of such tariffs or other trade actions will be successful.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗

•In China, UnionPay remains the predominant domestic processor and acceptance network for bank cards. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) accepted our application to operate a Bank Card Clearing Institution (BCCI) in June 2020, and approved our Application to Prepare in October 2026, which permits us to begin formal preparations to establish a domestic BCCI. We must take additional steps, including obtaining further regulatory approval, before we can begin domestic bank card clearing operations. There can be no assurance that we will receive this approval, and its timing is uncertain. Co-badging and co-residency regulations limit our competitive position, and the PBOC is considering phasing out dual-branded cards as international licenses are issued. Even if we receive approval to begin operations, competition from UnionPay and alternative payment providers such as Alipay and WeChat Pay, which have rapidly expanded across ecommerce, offline and cross-border payments, poses significant challenges.

Read in the 10-K filed Nov 5, 2026 ↗

Many countries and governmental bodies have adopted or may adopt laws and regulations governing our processing of personal and other data, making compliance an increasingly complex task. For example, we are regulated under the European General Data Protection Regulation (“EU GDPR”) and the United Kingdom’s General Data Protection Regulation (“UK GDPR”), as amended by the Data (Use and Access) Act of 2025, where we act as a data controller for our data products and a data processor with respect to our software products. In China, we are regulated under China’s Personal Information Protection Law (“PIPL”), where we process data as an entrusted party on behalf of our customers who operate as data handlers. In certain cases, we are regulated under the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) that covers protected health information collected or maintained by covered entities and their business associates. Additionally, many states in the U.S. have passed comprehensive privacy legislation, such as the California Consumer Privacy Act (amended by the California Privacy Rights Act). Some states in the U.S. also have passed legislation governing the processing of particular types of data, such as biometric data and certain other health-related data.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 20, 2026 ↗

In 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a final rule that places limitations, and in some cases prohibitions, on certain transfers of and access to certain personal data of U.S. persons by persons and entities located in China (and other designated countries) or controlled by a person or entity located in China (and other designated

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 20, 2026 ↗

The U.S. government has imposed significant tariffs or other restrictions on certain foreign imports and has raised the possibility of imposing additional tariff increases or expanding the tariffs to capture other countries and types of foreign imports. For example, since January 2025, the U.S. government has threatened or imposed significant tariffs on imports from China and various new or additional tariffs on imports from other countries with limited, temporary

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 20, 2026 ↗

destination. For example, we depend on China-based suppliers for portions of our supply chain. Finding alternative suppliers

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 13, 2026 ↗

U.S. biotechnology companies from using equipment or services from select Chinese biotechnology companies, and others in

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 13, 2026 ↗

Congress have advocated for limitations on those Chinese service providers’ ability to engage in business in the U.S. We

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 13, 2026 ↗

cannot predict what actions may ultimately be taken with respect to trade relations between the United States and China or

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 13, 2026 ↗

A global trend towards limiting growth of healthcare costs may also put industry-wide pressure on the Company’s products that are subject to reimbursement. In the U.S., these include value-based purchasing, group purchasing organizations and managed care arrangements. Governments in China and other countries continue to use various mechanisms to control healthcare expenditures, including increased use of competitive bidding and tenders, price regulation (such as volume-based procurement programs), government imposed payback provisions, and changes in reimbursement practices and policies on average selling prices for the Company’s products, which unfavorably impact the Company’s revenues and may continue to impact the Company’s results of operations in certain countries. In addition, changes in regulatory enforcement priorities and efforts by governments in countries in which the Company does business, including China, may increase compliance and monitoring costs that could have an adverse impact on the Company’s business. Group purchasing organizations and integrated health delivery networks have also served to concentrate purchasing decisions for some customers, which has led to downward pricing pressures. Further consolidation in the industry could intensify competition and exert additional pressure on the demand for and prices of the Company’s products.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 23, 2026 ↗

Certain foreign employees of the Company are represented by works councils, unions or similar non-U.S. employee representative bodies in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Brazil, Spain, China, Israel, Japan, Mexico and other foreign jurisdictions. Strikes, work slowdowns, work stoppages or the possibility of such actions in such jurisdictions could result in delays in production or cause the Company to incur higher costs. The Company may also lack practical control over the negotiations and terms of the agreements governing the employees’ labor.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 23, 2026 ↗

Increasing global protectionism also impedes the Company’s ability to compete with local companies. The Company may not be able to participate in certain public tenders in China, India and Russia because of increasing measures to restrict access to such tenders for companies without local manufacturing capabilities. Such regulations could adversely affect the Company’s business, results of operations and financial condition.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 23, 2026 ↗

Additionally, a final rule issued by the U.S. Department of Justice establishing a “Data Security Program” came into effect on April 8, 2025. The rule prohibits or restricts certain transactions that could result in access to bulk U.S. sensitive personal data or U.S. government-related data by countries of concern, including China (which includes Hong Kong and Macau). The rule imposes certain diligence, security, audit and record-keeping requirements, and may adversely impact certain of our global business operations, including by restricting or conditioning certain data access or transfers involving subsidiaries, affiliates, and vendors.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 6, 2026 ↗

In addition, armed conflicts and heightened geopolitical tensions can result in sanctions, export controls, tariffs and other trade restrictions, limit or restrict our ability to access certain markets and disrupt critical logistics networks, including air and ocean freight routes. For example, the escalation of the conflict involving Iran and heightened tensions in the Middle East could cause disruption to critical logistics and supply routes, which could affect the availability and cost of materials used in our business. Additionally, China has imposed export restrictions on rare earth minerals and related materials critical to semiconductor and hard drive manufacturing. These developments have increased, and could further increase, costs for, or limit the availability of, energy, rare earth minerals, materials, components and transportation, constrain manufacturing capacity and may require us to redesign products or reconfigure aspects of our global supply chain. Geopolitical instability may also elevate cybersecurity risks, including state-sponsored attacks, which could disrupt our operations or those of our suppliers, customers or partners, and further adversely affect demand for our products.

Read in the 10-K filed Aug 14, 2026 ↗

Misuse of such tools can also result in violations of applicable laws and regulations, including data protection and intellectual property laws. Governments worldwide are adopting or proposing AI-specific regulations, including the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act, as well as various proposed frameworks in the U.S., China, and other jurisdictions. These regulations may impose requirements on the development, deployment, and use of AI systems in our products or operations, require jurisdiction-specific product configurations, increase compliance costs, or limit our ability to leverage AI technologies. The evolving and potentially divergent nature of these regulations creates uncertainty and could adversely affect our business. Public and governmental perceptions regarding the use and impact of AI may evolve over time and could give rise to new regulatory requirements, legal liability, or reputational harm. If we enable or offer products that support AI solutions that draw

Read in the 10-K filed Aug 14, 2026 ↗

Geopolitical changes in China-Taiwan relations could disrupt the operations of companies in Taiwan that are critical to the global supply chain for semiconductors (“chips”) and other electronic components, as well as the supply of lithium batteries, carbide seals, and rare earth elements. Such changes could have significant negative effects on the global supply chain for these components and materials and could adversely affect our ability to manufacture certain of our digitally-enabled products, such as pumps, controllers and smart meters.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2026 ↗