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China

183 of 1505 companies dropped a paragraph in Risk Factors that uses one of these words: China, Chinese, PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan. The paragraph was in the earlier 10-K and nothing like it is in the latest. It counts text; it does not say how serious a risk is. Words in capitals only (such as AI) must be in capitals.

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336 paragraphs · Semiconductors & Related Devices show all sectors

AMAT APPLIED MATERIALS INC /DE · Semiconductors & Related Devices

•political and social attitudes, laws, rules, regulations and policies within countries, including in China, the United States, and countries in Europe and Asia, that favor domestic companies over non-domestic companies, including efforts to promote the development and growth of local competitors and reduce dependence on foreign semiconductor equipment and manufacturing capabilities through policies and financial incentives;

Read in the 10-K filed Dec 13, 2024

•fluctuations in interest rates and currency exchange rates, including the relative strength or weakness of the U.S. dollar against the Japanese yen, Israeli shekel, euro, Taiwanese dollar, Singapore dollar, Chinese yuan or Korean won;

Read in the 10-K filed Dec 13, 2024

•the concentration of new wafer starts in Korea and Taiwan, where our service penetration and service-revenue-per-wafer-start have been lower than in other regions;

Read in the 10-K filed Dec 13, 2024

1 more from AMAT, with the rest of what changed in its 10-K

AMD ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES INC · Semiconductors & Related Devices

We have equity interests in two joint ventures (collectively, the THATIC JV) with Higon Information Technology Co., Ltd. (THATIC), a third-party Chinese entity. In June 2019, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce added certain Chinese entities to the Entity List, including THATIC and the THATIC JV. Since that time, the United States administration has called for changes to domestic and foreign policy, including policies with respect to China and Russia. Specifically, United States-China trade relations remain uncertain as the United States continues to add more Chinese companies to the Entity List and more regulations targeted to advanced computing, semiconductor manufacturing, and emerging technologies such as AI. Further, the United States and other countries and coalitions have issued sanctions and revisions to export control and other regulations against Russia, Belarus and the DNR and LNR regions of Ukraine, due to the conflict in Ukraine.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 5, 2025

In October 2023, BIS issued new requirements for certain advanced computing items that apply to the export of products classified ECCN 3A090 or 4A090 to a party headquartered in, or with an ultimate parent headquartered in, any of Country Groups D1, D4 or D5, including China. These controls prevent us from shipping certain AMD Instinct™ integrated circuits and certain AMD Versal™ FPGAs to China, or to customers outside of the United States whose ultimate parent is headquartered in a D5 country (including China), without a license. These controls also require us to file a Notified Advanced Computing (NAC) notification with BIS 25 days before shipping certain Versal FPGAs to China, or to customers outside of the United States whose ultimate parent is headquartered in a D5 country (including China). The NAC notification process could result in BIS prohibiting a shipment or requiring a license application before shipping a product that is the subject of a NAC notification. BIS may issue new licensing requirements and regulatory controls in the future. Even new products that fall below the licensing thresholds may not be successful because we have no assurances BIS will agree that the alternative products are not subject to the new licensing requirements or that future regulations will not control the alternative products. A significant trade disruption or the establishment or increase of any tariffs, trade protection measures or restrictions, or retaliatory actions from foreign governments could result in lost sales adversely impacting our reputation and business. There is also a possibility of future tariffs, trade protection measures, import or export regulations or other restrictions imposed on our current and future products, customers, or suppliers by the United States, China or other countries that could have a material adverse effect on our business. New export control restrictions may adversely impact the ability of our research and development teams located outside of the United States from executing our product roadmaps in a timely manner or at all. In addition, deemed export restrictions could further affect our ability to provide services or develop products in the United States.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 5, 2025
CRDO Credo Technology Group Holding Ltd · Semiconductors & Related Devices

Recently, the president of the United States has imposed new tariffs and substantially increased other tariffs on a variety of products and countries that could materially affect macroeconomic conditions. In particular, in April 2025 the United States announced an across-the-board 10% tariff on all countries and individualized higher tariffs on certain countries, including China. If an environment of significantly increased U.S. tariffs and trade restrictions, together with reciprocal or retaliatory tariffs from other countries, continues or further escalates in a “trade war,” the global economy could be adversely affected, including through higher costs, higher interest rates or lower demand for our products, any of which could materially affect our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects.

Read in the 10-K filed Jul 2, 2025

Recently, the President of the United States has increased tariffs on a variety of products and countries that could materially affect our business. In particular, in April 2025 the United States announced an across-the-board 10% tariff on all countries and individualized higher tariffs on certain countries, including China. A great deal of uncertainty surrounds the state of tariffs and other trade measures worldwide. While the current U.S. administration has been actively focused on trade, the exact implementation, amount, scope and nature of these tariffs remains unclear. It also remains unclear how other countries will respond to the United States’ trade proposals and actions.

Read in the 10-K filed Jul 2, 2025

As of now, high reciprocal tariffs are in effect between China and the United States and the United States has announced, but temporarily paused the effective date of, tariffs on goods imported from many other countries, including Mexico, Canada, Taiwan and the European Union. Significant trade partners such as Mexico, Canada and the European Union have announced retaliatory tariffs. Further, while the United States has exempted certain technology products such as semiconductors and electronics from the reciprocal tariffs announced on April 2, 2025 such that our products are not subject to the announced tariffs, it has also initiated Section 232 investigations on such products, possibly leading to the imposition of specific tariffs on these products or on products that incorporate them.

Read in the 10-K filed Jul 2, 2025

2 more from CRDO, with the rest of what changed in its 10-K

CRUS CIRRUS LOGIC, INC. · Semiconductors & Related Devices

parties to whom we outsource these functions could reduce our sales, damage our customer relationships, and damage our reputation in the marketplace, any of which could harm our business, results of operations, and financial condition. For example, we rely on several third-party suppliers located in Taiwan. Any deterioration in the social, political, or economic conditions in Taiwan, particularly as it relates to China-Taiwan relations, may disrupt our business operations and materially and adversely affect our results of operations. Similarly, our operations could be harmed, and our costs could increase, if the war in Ukraine results in a shortage of materials that our suppliers require to manufacture our products. In addition, we are currently working with a supplier that is headquartered in Israel on the development of additional manufacturing alternatives. The declaration of war by Israel against Hamas, the rising tensions in the Middle East, and the resulting actions that may be taken by governments in response to the war could potentially impact or delay the supplier's ability to provide timely engineering support that may be required to advance our efforts to develop future manufacturing alternatives.

Read in the 10-K filed May 23, 2025
ENPH Enphase Energy, Inc. · Semiconductors & Related Devices

Escalating trade tensions between the U.S. and China have led to increased tariffs and trade restrictions, including tariffs applicable to certain of our products. For example, in September 2018, the U.S. began assessing 10% tariffs on certain solar products manufactured in China, including our microinverter products and related accessories which are manufactured in China. These tariffs increased to 25% in May 2019, and on January 2020, the United States and China entered into an initial trade deal which preserves the bulk of the tariffs imposed in 2018 and maintains a threat of additional sanctions should China breach the terms of the deal.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 10, 2025

It is unknown whether and to what extent additional new tariffs or other new laws or regulations will be adopted that increase the cost of manufacturing in China and/or importing components from China to the United

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 10, 2025
FSLR FIRST SOLAR, INC. · Semiconductors & Related Devices

•United States — Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Imported Crystalline Silicon PV Cells and Modules. The United States currently imposes antidumping and countervailing duties (“AD/CVDs”) on certain imported crystalline silicon PV cells and modules from China and Taiwan. Such AD/CVDs can

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 25, 2025
IPGP IPG PHOTONICS CORP · Semiconductors & Related Devices

We are subject to risks of doing business in Belarus, which historically provided mechanical parts to our German subsidiary and former Russian subsidiary and which does not currently provide parts to our affiliates outside of Belarus. We are also subject to risks of doing business in China, as approximately 25% of our sales in 2024 were to Chinese customers. The results of our operations, business prospects and facilities in China and Belarus are subject to the economic and political

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 20, 2025
KLIC KULICKE & SOFFA INDUSTRIES INC · Semiconductors & Related Devices

In November 2023, the BIS issued additional rules to update export controls on advanced computing semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, as well as items that support supercomputing applications and end-uses, to arms embargoed countries, including China.

Read in the 10-K filed Nov 14, 2024
MCHP MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY INC · Semiconductors & Related Devices

Our manufacturing operations require raw and processed materials and equipment that must meet exacting standards. We generally have multiple sources for these supplies, but there may be a limited number of suppliers capable of meeting our standards. We have experienced supply shortages from time to time in the past, and on occasion our suppliers have told us they need more time to fill our orders, that they cannot fill certain orders, that they will no longer support certain equipment with updates or parts, or that they are increasing prices. In particular, in fiscal 2023 and in fiscal 2022, we experienced increased prices at certain suppliers for certain materials required for production purposes. However, in fiscal 2024 and fiscal 2025, the pricing environment stabilized compared to the two prior fiscal years. An interruption of any materials or equipment sources, or the lack of supplier support for a particular piece of equipment, could harm our business. The supplies necessary for our business could become more difficult to obtain as worldwide use of semiconductors increases, or due to supply chain disruptions, transit disruptions, trade restrictions or political instability. Additionally, consolidation in our supply chain due to mergers and acquisitions may reduce the number of suppliers or change our relationships with them. Also, the reduced availability of necessary labor, the application of sanctions, trade restrictions or tariffs by the U.S. or other countries or the impact of public health concerns, may adversely impact the industry supply chain. The U.S. has imposed additional tariffs on imports, and certain countries have imposed retaliatory tariffs on imports that have the U.S. as their country of origin. For example, in March and April 2025, the U.S imposed tariffs on imports from China and other countries and foreign governments imposed tariffs on imports from the U.S. It is unclear what tariffs will apply to semiconductors during this time of change.

Read in the 10-K filed May 23, 2025
MPWR MONOLITHIC POWER SYSTEMS, INC. · Semiconductors & Related Devices

Privacy, cyber security, and data protection are becoming increasingly significant issues. To address these issues, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress promulgated the Cyber Security Law of the People’s Republic of China (the “Cyber Security Law”), which took effect on June 1, 2017. The Cyber Security Law sets forth various requirements relating to the collection, use, storage, disclosure and security of data, among other things. On June 10, 2021, the National People’s Congress passed the Data Security Law of the People’s Republic of China (the “Data Security Law”), which became effective on September 1, 2021. The Data Security Law is the first comprehensive data security legislation in China, which becomes a key supplement to the Cyber Security Law and aims to regulate a wide range of issues in relation to the collection, storage, processing, use, provision, transaction and publication of any kind of data. Various Chinese agencies are expected to issue additional regulations in the future to define these requirements more precisely. For example, the Personal Information Protection Law (“PIPL”), took effect on November 1, 2021. PIPL is aimed at protecting and controlling the use and transfer of personal data in China. There is significant uncertainty in how regulators will interpret and enforce the law, and it contains provisions that allow substantial government oversight and include fines for failure to obtain required approval from China’s cyber and data protection regulators for cross-border transfers of personal data.

Read in the 10-K filed Mar 3, 2025
NVDA NVIDIA CORP · Semiconductors & Related Devices

On October 23, 2023, the USG informed us that the licensing requirements were effective immediately for shipments of our A100, A800, H100, H800, and L40S products (removing the grace period granted by the official rule). Blackwell systems, such as GB200 NVL 72 and NVL 36 as well as B200 are also subject to these requirements and therefore require a license for any shipment to certain entities and to China and Country Groups D1, D4, and D5, excluding Israel. To date, we have not received licenses to ship these restricted products to China.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 26, 2025

Following these 2022 export controls, we transitioned some operations, including certain testing, validation, and supply and distribution operations out of China and Hong Kong. Any future transitions could be costly and time consuming, and adversely affect our research and development and supply and distribution operations, as well as our revenue, during any such transition period. We expanded our Data Center product portfolio to offer new solutions, including those for which the USG does not require a license or advance notice before each shipment. To the extent that a customer requires products covered by the licensing requirements, we may seek a license for the customer. However, the licensing process is time-consuming. We have no assurance that the USG will grant such a license or that the USG will act on the license application in a timely manner or at all. Even if a license is approved, it may impose burdensome conditions that we or our customer or end users cannot or decide not to accept. The USG evaluates license requests in a closed process that does not have clear standards or an opportunity for review. For example, the Notified Advanced Computing, or “NAC,” process has not resulted in approvals for exports of products to customers in China. The license process for exports to D1 and D4 countries has been time-consuming and resulted in license conditions that are onerous, even for small-sized systems that are not able to train frontier AI models. The requirements have a disproportionate impact on NVIDIA and already have disadvantaged and may in the future disadvantage NVIDIA against certain of our competitors who sell products that are not subject to the new restrictions or may be able to acquire licenses for their products.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 26, 2025

Given the increasing strategic importance of AI and rising geopolitical tensions, the USG has changed and may again change the export control rules at any time and further subject a wider range of our products to export restrictions and licensing requirements, negatively impacting our business and financial results. In the event of such change, we may be unable to sell our inventory of such products and may be unable to develop replacement products not subject to the licensing requirements, effectively excluding us from all or part of the China market, as well as other impacted markets, including the Middle East and countries designated “Tier 2” by the AI Diffusion IFR. For example, the USG has already imposed conditions to limit the ability of foreign firms to create and offer as a service large-scale GPU clusters, for example by imposing license conditions on the use of products to be exported to certain countries, and may impose additional conditions such as requiring chip tracking and throttling mechanisms that could disable or impair GPUs if certain events, including unauthorized system configuration, use, or location, are detected. The USG has already imposed export controls restricting certain gaming GPUs, and if the USG expands such controls to restrict additional gaming products, it may disrupt a significant portion of our supply and distribution chain and negatively impact sales of such products to markets outside China, including the U.S. and Europe. In addition, as the performance of the gaming GPUs increases over time, export controls may have a greater impact on our ability to compete in markets subject to those controls. Export controls may disrupt our supply and distribution chain for a substantial portion of our products, which are warehoused in and distributed from Hong Kong. Export controls restricting our ability to sell data center GPUs may also negatively impact demand for our networking products used in servers containing our GPUs. The USG may also impose export controls on our networking products, such as high-speed network interconnects, to limit the ability of downstream parties to create large clusters for frontier model training. Any new control that impacts a wider range of our products would likely have a disproportionate impact on NVIDIA and may disadvantage us against certain of our competitors that sell chips that are outside the scope of such control. Excessive or shifting export controls have already and may in the future encourage customers outside China and other impacted regions to “design-out” certain U.S. semiconductors from their products to reduce the compliance burden and risk, and to ensure that they are able to serve markets worldwide. Excessive or shifting export controls have already encouraged and may in the future encourage overseas governments to request that our customers purchase from our competitors rather than NVIDIA or other U.S. firms, harming our business, market position, and financial results. As a result, excessive or shifting export controls may negatively impact demand for our products and services not only in China, but also in other markets, such as Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Excessive or shifting export controls increase the risk of investing in U.S. advanced semiconductor products, because by the time a new product is ready for market, it may be subject to new unilateral export controls restricting its sale. At the same time, such controls may increase investment in foreign competitors, which would be less likely to be restricted by U.S. controls. If additional products are subject to worldwide licensing requirements, we may incur significant inventory provisions and excess purchase obligation charges.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 26, 2025

1 more from NVDA, with the rest of what changed in its 10-K

NXT Nextpower Inc. · Semiconductors & Related Devices

On April 2, 2025, President Trump announced a new reciprocal tariff regime intended to reciprocate other countries’ tariffs and trade barriers. The new U.S. regime consists of a universal 10% tariff rate on almost all trading partners and higher country-specific reciprocal tariff rates on 57 countries. On April 9, 2025, President Trump suspended implementation of the country-specific reciprocal tariffs on all countries other than China for 90 days, such that as of April 9 imports from most countries are subject only to the baseline 10% tariff, with China alone subject to a much higher reciprocal tariff.

Read in the 10-K filed May 22, 2025

As of April 10, 2025, there is a 145% reciprocal tariff on imports of most China-origin products, with limited exceptions. These reciprocal tariffs generally are additive to other tariffs on various solar energy-related products.

Read in the 10-K filed May 22, 2025

As of March 12, 2025, there are 25% import tariffs on all imports of steel and aluminum products (including “derivative” products), with limited exceptions for products imported from Canada and Mexico, imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. These steel and aluminum tariffs are not additive to the reciprocal tariffs on China-origin products but are additive to tariffs of 25% on many Chinese steel products currently imposed under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Our products contain steel some of which is sourced from outside the United States. As a result, steel tariffs could impact our costs and our gross margins and result in interruptions in the steel supply chain.

Read in the 10-K filed May 22, 2025
SITM SITIME Corp · Semiconductors & Related Devices

Most of our revenue has been from sales of products to distributors with ship-to locations outside of the United States. Many of our third-party suppliers are located outside of the United States. If significant tariffs or other restrictions are placed on certain goods, existing tariffs are increased, or any related counter-measures are taken by other countries, our revenue and results of operations may be materially and adversely affected. For example, beginning in July 2018, the U.S. Trade Representative imposed tariffs on products from China and China then imposed certain retaliatory tariffs. It is uncertain what further alterations to trade terms between China and the United States may occur, including limiting trade with China and imposing additional tariffs on imports from China. In the event that future tariffs are imposed on imports of our products or on our third-party suppliers, or that China or other countries take retaliatory trade measures in response to existing or future tariffs or other trade restrictions, or that the United States imposes further restrictions on trade with China, our business may be impacted, and we may be required to raise prices or make changes to our operations, or we may not be able to sell our products to customers in China, any of which could materially harm our revenue or operating results.

Read in the 10-K filed Feb 14, 2025
SYNA SYNAPTICS Inc · Semiconductors & Related Devices

Geopolitical instability, including in the Middle East, Taiwan, or U.S.-China relations, could disrupt access to critical markets or destabilize key supply chain and logistics corridors. On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a strike on Iranian military and nuclear sites, followed by Iranian retaliation. On June 21, 2025, the U.S. conducted targeted air strikes, which Iran answered with attacks on U.S. interests. Although a ceasefire has been reached, there is no assurance that hostilities will not escalate or recur. This military escalation between Israel and Iran has increased geopolitical tensions and uncertainty across the broader region. Escalations of hostilities could also trigger new or expanded U.S. sanctions or export controls affecting parties or regions with which we do business. The developments could lead to delayed shipments, increased costs, or reduced revenue in impacted markets.

Read in the 10-K filed Aug 21, 2025
VIAV VIAVI SOLUTIONS INC. · Semiconductors & Related Devices

The U.S. and China have been engaged in protracted negotiations over the Chinese government’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation.

Read in the 10-K filed Aug 11, 2025
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